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This thesis uses the prism of Liberia’s post-conflict experience to explore the centrality 
of the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) of children to the success 
of peacebuilding efforts. Until recently, the concept and process of child DDR has either 
been completely ignored, subsumed as part of adult processes or has been treated by 
academics, policymakers and international organisations as a peripheral issue in attempts 
to consolidate peace and security. This thesis seeks to fill this crucial gap in the literature 
by analysing each step of the DDR programme in Liberia, carefully isolating child-
specific causalities, interventions and implications from the broader peacebuilding 
processes. Based on this disaggregation, it argues that addressing the needs of child 
soldiers through a comprehensive and dedicated child-specific DDR programme has not 
only been vital to the achievement of short, medium term, and long-term peacebuilding 
objectives in Liberia, but should also be considered an essential “peace” of the puzzle in 
other pertinent post-conflict situations. 
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This thesis uses the prism of Liberia’s post-conflict experience to explore the centrality 
of the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) of children to the success 
of peacebuilding efforts. Until recently, the concept and process of child DDR has either 
been completely ignored, subsumed as part of adult processes or has been treated by 
academics, policymakers and international organisations as a peripheral issue in attempts 
to consolidate peace and security. This thesis seeks to fill this crucial gap in the literature 
by analysing each step of the DDR programme in Liberia, carefully isolating child-
specific causalities, interventions and implications from the broader peacebuilding 
processes. Based on this disaggregation, it argues that addressing the needs of child 
soldiers through a comprehensive and dedicated child-specific DDR programme has not 
only been vital to the achievement of short, medium term, and long-term peacebuilding 
objectives in Liberia, but should also be considered an essential piece of the puzzle in 
other pertinent post-conflict situations. 
 
Liberia has been called ‘the classic example of the rationale behind using children as an 
alternate military labour source’ and is a prime case for examining post-conflict 
reconstruction and child interventions.1 The persistent and pervasive use of child soldiers 
by all factions made the war in Liberia (1989-2003) easier to start, but also made it harder 
to bring to a close.2 Children provided necessary manpower and were used as frontline 
soldiers, porters, sex slaves and auxiliary support. This phenomenon was extensively 
documented by the international media with constant images of machine-gun tooting 
children wreaking havoc in the streets of Monrovia and in the country’s hinterland. With 
an estimated 15,000 to 21,000 children recruited as soldiers in the later stages of the 
conflict (1999-2003) Liberia’s war quickly became synonymous with the use of child 
                                                
1 P.W Singer, Children at War (New York: Pantheon Books, 2005), 31. 
2 Ibid., 94. 
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soldiers.3 Throughout the war, until 2003, there were several unsuccessful attempts at 
disarming, demobilising and reintegrating both adult and child soldiers. These failed 
attempts at DDR directly contributed to the prolongation, continuation and resurgence 
of the conflict (in 1999). These failings further accentuated the need to effectively 
address children’s DDR as part of the peacebuilding processes to break the conflict 
chain.  
 
The Liberian war claimed the lives of 250,000 people, displaced approximately 1.25 
million people and touched virtually every Liberian citizen’s life either directly or 
indirectly. In 2003 the war came to an end through political negotiations amongst the 
warring factions under intense sub-regional and international political pressure.4 The 
signing of the Accra Comprehensive Peace Agreement (13 August 2003) formally ended 
the war, and provided a framework for transitioning the country out of war. Intended to 
address the root causes of the Liberian conflict the peace agreement outlined many 
short- and medium-term peacebuilding initiatives such as the establishment of several 
commissions to spearhead efforts on governance reform, anti-corruption, human rights 
and reconciliation. Apart from the call for immediate cessation of hostilities, the peace 
agreement outlined the establishment of a power-sharing transitional government to run 
the country for a period of approximately two years until multiparty elections could be 
held and a democratically elected government inaugurated. It called for the establishment 
of a United Nations peacekeeping mission, mandated with the responsibility of 
maintaining peace and security in Liberia. A comprehensive DDR programme was called 
for, as was the creation of the National Commission for Disarmament, Demobilisation 
and Rehabilitation and Reintegration intended to oversee and guide the DDR process 
from a national perspective. DDR was seen as an integral peacebuilding component 
necessary for the enabling of other intervention in support of the consolidation of 
sustainable peace and security. The peace agreement was only the second in history 
(Sierra Leone was the first) to explicitly acknowledge the significance of the involvement 
of child soldiers in the war and called for the implementation of child specific DDR.  
 
This thesis looks at two different categories of questions. The first directly relate to the 
context-specific DDR process in Liberia, including the extent to which the design of the 
DDR programme addressed the needs of adult and child combatants and the extent to 
                                                
3 Amnesty International, Liberia: The Promises of Peace for 21,000 Child Soldiers (New York: Amnesty 
International, 2004), AI Index: AFR 34/006/2004. 
4 Singer, 56. 
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which DDR and child DDR specifically impacted peacebuilding strategies. The second 
category of questions addresses the overall characteristics of child DDR, including what 
makes child DDR different from adult DDR, and why it is important; whether DDR is a 
necessary component in peacebuilding and whether child DDR solves the problem it 
seeks to fix. This thesis generates further debate and discussion on the role of child DDR 
in peacebuilding, its usefulness, documents the process and thus addresses the notable 
gap in the academic literature on peacebuilding that originally motivated this study. 
 
By addressing these questions, the thesis comes to two main conclusions with regard to 
the centrality of child DDR to peacebuilding. First, Liberia’s adult DDR programme 
achieved most of its objectives despite significant design flaws and implementation gaps; 
DDR was a critical contribution to peacebuilding and the consolidation of peace and 
security. It was clear that without a DDR programme, even a flawed one, the security 
and political situation would not have improved. After a turbulent start to the DDR 
process in December 2003, which saw rioting, looting and a deterioration of an already 
fragile state of security, the DDR programme was suspended until April 2004 to allow 
for further planning and necessary preparations. Once the programme resumed, from a 
security perspective, both the adult and child DDR processes ran more smoothly. 
Despite the disarmament process yielding a low weapons-to-combatant-ratio, the DDR 
programme still had the intended effect of providing a sense of security and was able to 
incentivise the combatants to renounce violence. This was of course supported by a large 
peacekeeping presence responsible for monitoring and enforcing the peace agreement. 
Although the credibility of the DDR programme was severely questioned as a result of 
the lax implementation of the entry criteria and the inflated number of participants (triple 
the original estimate), this did not necessarily render the DDR programme ineffective. 
And in spite of severe delays in providing reintegration benefits the situation remained 
manageable and as of December 2010, has not deteriorated or slid back into conflict. In 
that sense, the DDR programme served its purpose and enabled other peacebuilding 
initiatives to progress. 
 
Second, despite the DDR programme suffering from numerous structural and 
operational challenges that both slowed down the process and complicated its 
implementation, the child DDR programme was successful in delivering its various 
components and achieved many of its objectives. Although it is clear that many children 
were not able to access the DDR programme, a total of 10,963 took advantage of the 
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DDR programme and its benefits.5 Children spent up to twelve weeks in interim care 
centres where they received life-skills, basic education (for numeracy and literacy) and 
health services. Ninety-eight percent of all former child combatants were reunited with 
their families in Liberia or provided with alternative living arrangements; the other two 
percent were repatriated to their countries of origin and reunited with their families 
there. Formal education was the only reintegration option for children younger than 
fourteen years of age, while older children were given the option of pursuing skills 
training or formal education. All things considered, the child DDR process delivered 
most of its objectives: children were discharged from the ranks of the fighting factions, 
they went through the demobilisation programme, they received goods as well as 
benefited from services assisting in their social and economic reintegration, while the 
child protection capacities of both government and local communities’ were enhanced 
and improved. Had the children not been included in the DDR programme, they may 
have posed an immediate as well as a long-term threat to security.  
 
Despite a growing body of literature focussed on peacebuilding, children and war, and 
Liberia, little systematic attention has been given to the specific role of child DDR in 
peacebuilding. This thesis makes a contribution by closing a yawning gap in current 
literature by describing, assessing and analysing the centrality and consequences of the 
Liberian child DDR process. This thesis relies heavily on previously unavailable 
documentation, dozens of semi-structured and unstructured interviews and eight months 
of fieldwork in Liberia. In order to make peacebuilding interventions more effective in 
the future policymakers and scholars have called for further academic research to gain a 
better understanding of the centrality of children’s involvement in peacebuilding 
initiatives and in DDR especially.6 That is what this thesis aims to do. Improving 
policymakers and practitioners’ understanding of how best to address and remedy the 
child soldiers issue has practical implications for the future implementation of child 
DDR programmes both in Africa and beyond.7 This thesis is to be understood in the 
context of peacebuilding, DDR, children and war and Liberia – all of which are covered 
in subsequent chapters. 
 
                                                
5 NCDDRR, "DDRR Consolidated Report Phase 1, 2, & 3," (Monrovia: NCDDRR, 16 January 2005). 
6 Singer, X. 
7 Roland Paris, At War's End: Building Peace after Civil Conflict (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2004), 4. 
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Peacebuilding  
Over the past two decades the thinking, approach and policies regarding the resolution 
of armed conflict within the United Nations’ (UN) system and international finance 
institutions (IFIs) has changed considerably. The UN’s involvement in the maintenance 
of peace and security through peacekeeping as well as peacebuilding interventions is 
being relied upon in ways that were not politically possible during the Cold War. In the 
early 1990s, no longer hindered by Cold War mentalities such as the impenetrability of 
sovereignty, which previously prevented the deployment of peacekeeping missions and 
the interference in wars that were seen to be domestic or national issues, the UN Security 
Council’s understanding of what constituted threats to international peace was 
broadened. The notion of international peace and security was broadened to not only 
include armed conflicts, but also economic, social, humanitarian and ecological factors 
both external and internal to states.8 The concept of sovereignty has gradually shifted, 
albeit selectively, towards the notion that the UN has the responsibility to get involved 
when threats to international peace and security arise.9 These combined factors 
contributed to the increased use and deployment of UN peacekeeping missions as a 
response to the outbreak and, in some cases, the continuation of wars throughout the 
world.  
 
The concept of peacebuilding emerged in 1992, as the UN got more involved in 
peacekeeping and began exploring ways to strengthen its capacities and improve its 
preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peacekeeping capacities.10 Seen as an integral 
part of the UN's mandate under the Charter, peacebuilding was defined as a process of 
identifying and supporting structures, which tends to strengthen peace in order to avoid 
conflict or the recurrence of conflict and foster a sustainable environment so that 
economic and social development can prosper.11 Peacebuilding was seen to be relevant 
not only in a post-conflict environment, but as a preventative tool as well.12 Post-conflict 
peacebuilding focussed on addressing the root causes, severe deficits and contributing 
factors of the conflict. These can generally be categorised in three mutually reinforcing 
                                                
8 United Nations, "Note by the President of the Security Council: Broadening Security " (New York: 
United Nations, 31 January 1992), 3. 
9 Challenges and Change High-Level Panel on Threats, A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility (New 
York: United Nations, 2005). 
10 Boutros Boutros-Ghali, "An Agenda for Peace," (New York: United Nations, 17 June 1992). 
11 Ibid., para 21, 55-57. 
12 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Peacebuilding Overview (OECD, 2005), 1; 
United Nations, "Statement by the President of the Security Council," (New York: United Nations, 20 
February 2001); United Nations, "Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations," (August 
2000). 
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dimensions relating to 1) security; 2) governance and political; and 3) social, economic 
and environmental issues.13 However, policymakers recognised that post-conflict 
peacebuilding, in comparison to preventative peacebuilding, has different immediate 
needs and a unique set of challenges that have arisen as a consequence of conflict.14 
Given that in 2003 Liberia was ravished by war it is the application of post-conflict 
peacebuilding that is of most interest to this thesis.  
 
In post-conflict peacebuilding, the security is often exacerbated as a result of a conflict’s 
legacy. In this context, the concept of security is in a broad sense, to incorporate both 
the state and the individual. Successfully coping with and addressing the presence of 
weapons as well as armaments, and the needs of the combatants are of the utmost 
importance to the consolidation of peace and security. Peacebuilding interventions 
attempt to do this in part through implementation of security sector reform or 
transformation and DDR programmes.  
 
Although there are many grievances that contribute to or trigger war, the political 
situation is often a key factor.15 Whether these grievances are a result of weak, corrupt, 
illegitimate or discriminatory governments the impact and subsequent damage of such 
abuse can and is often devastating. This was the case in Liberia. Peacebuilding aims to 
address these deficits through supporting governance reform; improving state 
institutions, capacities and authority; addressing transitional justice issues; and 
strengthening civil society.16 
 
Inequality, social and economic marginalisation and poverty are common contributing 
factors of war.17 The social, economic and environmental dimensions of peacebuilding 
attempts address these potential root causes of conflict to empower the population by 
repatriating and reintegrating refugees and internally displaced persons; supporting short-
term economic or social projects; and supporting efforts for long-term sustainable 
development.18  
                                                
13 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 1-4. 
14 Heiner  Hänggi, "Conceptualising Security Sector Reform and Reconstruction " in Reform and 
Reconstruction of the Security Sector ed. Alan Bryden and Heiner Hänggi(Geneva: Lit Verlag Münster, 2004), 3-
16. 
15 Mats Berdal and David M. Malone, eds., Greed and Grievance (Boulder Lynne Rienner, 2000); Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development, 3. 
16 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 3. 
17 David Keen, "Incentives and Disincentives for Violence " in Greed and Grievance ed. Mats Berdal and 
David M. Malone(Boulder Lynne Rienner, 2000), 25-31. 
18 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 3. 
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Although the components of peacebuilding are by no means new, the field of 
peacebuilding is (as currently defined) and has received much attention by academics and 
policymakers alike. Over the years, many questions have been asked about the underlying 
assumptions around peacebuilding interventions and in doing so have helped clearly 
establish links between security and development. Being critical of the implementation of 
peacebuilding, its utility and effectiveness has not only contributed to a greater 
understanding of the concept itself, but also ways to improve it both theoretically and in 
practice.19 This body of literature has helped to develop and hone the UN’s approach to 
peacebuilding at a crucial time. Although many authors agree that addressing the issues 
of child soldiering is important, the issue seldom receives more than tangential attention. 
The DDR of soldiers is one of the integral means of trying to address some of these 
complex peacebuilding issues. 
 
DDR 
The nature of modern war in Africa has shifted away from inter-state wars fought by 
soldiers to intra-state or civil wars, fought mostly by mobilised civilians, including 
children, using small and light weapons.20 Although the question of what to do with 
soldiers after war is by no means a new concern, the prevalence of wars and use of non-
professional armies around the developing world and the evolving concept of 
peacebuilding re-focused attention on the issue. The relationship between peacebuilding 
and DDR is a symbiotic one and ‘although a sustainable recovery after war cannot be 
achieved without a successful DDR process, conversely, without a successful 
peacebuilding process the viability of a DDR process would, in general, be 
questionable.’21 
 
                                                
19 Richard Caplan, International Governance of War-Torn Territories : Rule and Reconstruction (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2005); Thomas F. Keating and W. Andy Knight, eds., Building Sustainable Peace 
(Edmonton: University of Alberta Press, 2004); Keith Krause and Oliver Jütersonke, "Peace, Security and 
Development in Post-Conflict Environments," Security Dialogue 36, no. 4 (2005); Anthony F. Lang, Just 
Intervention Carnegie Council on Ethics and International Affairs Series (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown 
University Press, 2003); Paris; Michael  Pugh, The UN, Peace, and Force Cass Series on Peacekeeping 
(London Frank Cass, 1997); Michael  Pugh, ed. Regeneration of War-Torn Societies (New York: St. Martin's 
Press, 2000); Rolf Schwarz, "Post-Conflict Peacebuilding: The Challenges of Security, Welfare and 
Representation," Security Dialogue 36, no. 4 (2005). 
20 Michael Wessells, Child Soldiers- from Violence to Protection (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University 
Press, 2006), 18-23. 
21 Mark Knight and Alpaslan Özerdem, "Guns, Camps and Cash: Disarmament, Demobilisation and 
Reinsertion of Former Combatants in Transitions from War to Peace," Journal of Peace Research 41, no. 4 
(2004): 501. 
   
  
- 15 - 
 
One of the first steps in the peacebuilding process is establishing a secure environment.22 
The thinking behind DDR programmes is that in the presence of weapons and idle 
soldiers, peace and security cannot improve. Thus the consolidation of peace is 
impossible without addressing these issues. DDR programmes aim to not only remove 
weapons from circulation, but also to also break down the command structure, equip the 
ex-combatants with either education or skills that would assist them in supporting 
themselves and their families. DDR benefits provide an incentive, for instance through 
training and allowances, to resist resorting to the use of violence and possibly de-
stabilising a fragile peace.23 DDR is seen as an essential component of the peacebuilding 
process crucially enabling and allowing for the implementation of other complementary 
peacebuilding activities and relief efforts.24  
 
The UN acknowledged that the DDR of combatants ‘has repeatedly proved to be vital to 
stabilizing a post-conflict situation; to reducing the likelihood of renewed violence, either 
because of relapse into war or outbreaks of banditry; and to facilitating a society’s 
transition from conflict to normalcy and development.’25 Since the mid-1990s it has been 
incorporated as standard procedure in peacekeeping and peacebuilding missions when 
and where appropriate.26 This is illustrated by the fact that between 1992-6 there were 
thirty-six DDR processes identified in 29 countries, two-thirds of which were in Africa. 27 
Moreover, between 2000 and 2006, DDR was part of the mandate of six UN 
peacekeeping operations in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC), Liberia 
(UNMIL), Cote d’Ivoire (UNOCI), Burundi (ONUB), Haiti (MINUSTAH) and Sudan 
(UNMIS).28 Pre-2003, Liberia alone had attempted to implement three DDR 
programmes during its fourteen-year conflict.  
 
Briefly put, the DDR process is a set of sequential phases and often overlapping events 
with short, medium and long term goals. For the purpose of this thesis, the UN 
                                                
22 Mats Berdal, Disarmament and Demobilisation after Civil Wars (London: Oxford University Press, 1996), 24. 
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Reconstruction of the Security Sector ed. Alan Bryden and Heiner Hänggi (Geneva: Lit Verlag Münster, 2004), 
13. 
24 Keating and Knight, eds., XLIV-XLV. 
25 United Nations, "The Role of UN Peacekeeping in Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration " 
(New York: United Nations, 11 February 2000), 1. 
26 Ibid., 2-3. 
27 Nicole Ball and Dylan Hendrickson, Review of International Financing Arrangements for Disarmament, 
Demobilisation and Reintegration (Stockholm Initiative on Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration, 
2005), para 6. 
28 United Nations, "Report of the Secretary-General on Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration," 
(New York: 2 March 2006), 2. 
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definition of DDR will be used, given that the UN was responsible for Liberia’s DDR 
programme:  
Disarmament is the ‘collection of small arms and light and heavy weapons within 
a conflict zone. It frequently entails the assembly and cantonment of combatants; 
it should also comprise the development of arms management programmes, 
including their safe storage and their final disposition, which may entail their 
destruction.’29 
 
Demobilisation ‘refers to the process by which parties to a conflict begin to 
disband their military structures and combatants begin the transformation into 
civilian life. It generally entails registration of former combatants; some kind of 
assistance to enable them to meet their immediate basic needs; discharge, and 
transportation to their home [or chosen] communities.’30 
 
Reintegration ‘refers to the process which allows ex-combatants and their 
families to adapt, economically and socially, to productive civilian life. It generally 
entails the provision of a package of cash or in-kind compensation, training, and 
job- and income- generating projects.’31  
 
The goals of DDR have been covered extensively in literature.32 Although DDR’s goals 
can be seen as relatively straightforward the implementation of DDR programmes are 
usually complex. In the short term, DDR is aimed at contributing to the restoration of 
security and stability through the de-militarization of the warring factions, benefiting 
society as a whole. It is meant not only to reduce or eliminate the number of arms 
floating around, but also to allow the deployment of international peacekeepers to 
provide a secure environment allowing relief, humanitarian, and ultimately development 
workers to operate. In the medium and long term, coupled with broader development 
and governance assistance, DDR is aimed at maintaining a secure environment and 
assisting the social and economic reintegration of ex-combatants in a peaceful society. 
DDR is therefore at the very nexus of security and development. Although the DD 
components are normally carried out by military or peacekeepers and are security-
focused processes, their success or failure have direct implications on the consolidation 
of peace and development more generally. And conversely, the developmental or socio-
economic process of reintegration has direct implications to security. If the ex-
combatants (who are potential peace spoilers) are left unsatisfied or if their socio-
economic needs are not sufficiently met, insecurity may persist. Although successful 
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DDR depends on a number of factors, their implementation does not guarantee overall 
success or consolidation of sustainable peace. Successful DDR depends on a number of 
factors such as good planning and implementation, sufficient funding, providing basic 
provisions ex-combatants, strong political will and a secure environment. However, these 
factors do not guarantee success or the successful consolidation of sustainable peace.33 
Moreover, if DDR is to succeed it needs to be situated within a more holistic and better-
coordinated peacebuilding approach from all actors including participants, donors and 
implementation agencies.34 
 
Security sector reform (SSR), of which DDR is a part of, is another means of addressing 
the security deficits in post-conflict situations. Like DDR, SSR which has also received 
much attention from policymakers and scholars, is an evolving concept and is an equally 
contested topic. Scholars have aptly addressed the concept, its rationale, objectives, its 
challenges and opportunities, how best it should be implemented and have provided 
useful theoretical frameworks, including identifying gaps between theory and practice.35 
SSR generally refers to the process of reforming the security agents (such as the armed 
forces, police, intelligence and security services, non-state actors, as well as oversight 
bodies such as the executive, legislature, judiciary and relevant ministries) ‘act in 
accordance to the priorities of the state, under democratic principles and a sound 
legislative framework, with adequate capacity and resources and an acceptable degree of 
civilian oversight.’36 Collectively, academics, policymakers and practitioners including 
institutions such as the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) have provided useful guidance and best practices while establishing the SSR 
agenda as a compelling, necessary and complex endeavour within the peacebuilding 
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paradigm.37 The UN’s approach to peacebuilding not only acknowledges the importance 
of SSR, but has also developed policies and programmes to support its implementation.38 
 
With regard to the presence and relevance of children, scholars such as Berdal, Knight 
and Özerdem simply acknowledge that children have special needs in post-conflict 
environments and emphasise the importance of incorporating children into DDR 
processes where appropriate. However even though children have the potential to derail 
or unravel fragile peace processes, they have only been tangential to the analysis of DDR 
processes. For instance, although Berdal states that ‘experience since 1989 also shows 
that the requirements of other war-affected groups during demobilisation and 
reintegration need special consideration’ no further analysis is offered.39 Although there 
has been some analysis on child DDR in other countries, there has been little focus 
specifically on Liberia.40 This dearth in the literature and lack of focus on children during 
peace processes strengthens the need for and relevance of this dissertation.  
 
Children and Armed Conflict 
As the notion of security broadened, international recognition and attention has 
increased regarding the use of child soldiers in wars across the developing world. 
Although not a new phenomenon by any means, as the number of internal conflicts 
increased after the end of the Cold War, so did the UN’s and many of its members’ 
interest in child soldiers. Children and war, as a distinct field, is relatively new within 
academia and policy-making. In fact, the articulation of children’s rights separate from 
human or adult rights only emerged in 1989 with the codification of the Convention on 
the Rights of a Child.41 Starting in 1994, spearheaded by international non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs) and later by the United Nations, the issue of child soldiering 
caught the attention, scrutiny and moral condemnation of the world. It was quickly 
acknowledged by policymakers, scholars and media that children were now a common 
feature in armed conflict as a result of the proliferation of small arms and light weapons, 
opportunism, changing social norms, and increased instability. Although Africa, as the 
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location of many wars, is at the epicentre of the phenomenon, the issue is of global 
concern. In 2001, the use of child soldiers had been documented in thirty-six conflict 
countries while over eighty-five nations have recruited under-age soldiers.42 Although the 
precise number is difficult to ascertain, the UN has estimated that approximately 300,000 
child soldiers are mobilised around the world at any time.43 For the purpose of this study 
and based on the Cape Town Principles, a child soldier is ‘any person under eighteen 
years of age who is part of any kind of regular or irregular armed force in any capacity, 
including but not limited to cooks, porters, messengers, and those accompanying such 
groups, other than purely family members. Girls recruited for sexual purposes and forced 
marriage are included in this definition. It does not, therefore, only refer to a child who is 
carrying or has carried arms.’44  
 
As recognition of the use of children as soldiers increased, the UN and many member 
states began mounting its response. In 1996, the UN took up the issue by dedicating an 
office to learn more about the impact of armed conflict on children, including the child 
soldiering issue. In 1999, the UN Security Council placed the issue of the protection and 
security of children affected by armed conflict on its annual agenda affirming that child 
soldiering was a concern to international peace and security. Since these early 
engagements, there has been a growing recognition that more must be done to 
ameliorate the impact war has on children, including their recruitment as soldiers. The 
Liberian civil war was fought as the world came to better understand the issue, and as it 
came to grips with the reality and began developing its response to the phenomenon of 
child soldiering.  
 
Early literature, notably two contributions from Cohn and Goodwin-Gill and Brett, 
McCallin and O’Shea, set a useful foundation for others to build upon.45 Prior to Cohn 
and Goodwin-Gill’s contribution, there was limited understanding on children and war 
and a significant gap in the literature. In 1994, they provided the first comprehensive 
examination of the child solider phenomenon including why children participate in war, 
the conditions in which they are recruited into armed forces, the consequences of their 
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involvement in armed conflict, the responses of their participation and what mechanisms 
exist to prevent the involvement of children in armed conflict.46 They claimed that 
children, like adults, are motivated to join wars by the root causes of conflicts and other 
‘social, economic and political issues defining their lives.’47 In this preliminary study the 
authors acknowledge that they are responding to the dearth of information in the field, 
and state that ‘researchers need to evaluate seriously the effectiveness of existing 
programme models, and whether they might be replicated in other contexts.’48  
 
Brett, McCallin and O’Shea assert that children are invisible soldiers and are often further 
marginalised during peace processes. Moreover, a compelling case was made that until 
the presence of child soldiers is explicitly acknowledged amongst armed factions children 
will continue to be marginalised from demobilisation and reintegration phases. This 
study had a significant impact within policy circles and provided the basis of the initial 
United Nations examination into the issue of child soldiers, which began in 1996. The 
UN’s first report regarding the impact of armed conflict on children, which has come to 
be referred to as the Machel Report, later spearheaded the UN’s focus on child soldiers.49 
The Machel Report was heavily based on the empirical data and information of Brett, 
McCallin and O’Shea’s work.50 
 
The literature on children and war and more specifically on child soldiers has grown. 
Many issues regarding child soldiers have been explored including recruitment;51 girl 
soldiers;52 small arms proliferation;53 political violence against children;54 the 
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psychological impact of war on children;55 the legal aspects of children and war;56 and 
their use in Africa.57 
 
One of the most up-to-date and comprehensive reference on the child soldier 
phenomenon is Peter Singer’s Children at War.58 Singer starts his book by reiterating that 
child soldiers are still largely invisible to both researchers and policymakers, and that ‘the 
treatment of the phenomenon is at best peripheral.’59 Singer establishes the justification 
for not only his work, but also this thesis by stating that the problem of child soldiers 
warrants more research and that the field will benefit from a deeper understanding of the 
issue, especially given that the norms and the UN’s response to child soldiering has 
proven to be insufficient.60 Moreover, dealing with the effects of child soldiers ‘has been 
a gradual learning process for all involved, such that none of the operations that dealt 
with this issue can be described as a full success.’61  
 
Singer argues that the phenomenon of child soldiers is much more than just a moral 
issue, and very much in line with this thesis, that the use of child soldiers has broader 
security implications. He explains that the child soldiering trend is encouraged by not 
addressing problems such as poverty, the lack of economic and educational opportunity, 
the spread of war and disease.62 That the complex underlying causes for the use of 
children as soldiers are compounded by ‘(1) social disruptions and failures of 
development caused by globalization, war and disease; (2) technological improvements in 
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small arms; and (3) [the] rise in a new type of conflict that is far more brutal and 
criminalised.’63 He notes that armed factions recruit and use children as a low-cost and 
efficient way to generate force. Of particular relevance to this thesis, Liberia is shown as 
setting a dangerous precedent for using child soldiers in the sub-region that had a 
contagion effect in Sierra Leone, Côte d’Ivoire, and in Guinea.64  
 
There have been two pieces written by Ilene Cohn that examine the protection of 
children in peacemaking and peacekeeping processes, one of which is of particular 
interest to this thesis as it looks at Liberia specifically.65 Cohn goes well beyond just 
looking at child DDR processes, and comprehensively analyses all components of peace 
processes relevant to children, including humanitarian law, normative standards as well as 
frameworks, and post-conflict justice or transitional justice.66 She provides an invaluable 
contribution to the literature by systematically analysing and highlighting peace processes 
in various countries. Her purpose is to identify opportunities and prescribe methods, 
mechanisms and solutions to enhance child protection in peace processes from the 
moment mediation efforts begin through the implementation of the peacebuilding 
agenda.67 In particular, Cohn argues that the use of child soldiers and the negative impact 
war has on children should be acknowledged from the onset of the peace negotiations so 
as not to be marginalised in peacebuilding efforts and ought to receive greater attention 
throughout the implementation of peacebuilding interventions. Cohn's article establishes 
a precedent for comprehensively examining peace processes and the post-conflict 
reconstruction phase through a children’s perspective.  
 
Cohn uses Liberia’s earlier peacebuilding interventions to draw wider lessons for anti-
child soldier policies that have emerged from the United Nations.68 By evaluating the 
Liberian peace process through a child-focussed lens, Cohn provides a useful assessment 
of the 1989-96 Liberian child DDR and peacebuilding interventions. She examines the 
child DDR planning process, the inclusion of children in the peace agreements as well as 
its implementation and impact. She concludes (in 1998) that the international 
community’s responses to the phenomenon of child soldiers had not gained much 
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traction or momentum and therefore remains mainly rhetorical. Cohn emphasises that 
the opportunity to address the needs of child soldiers is often missed in the peace 
negotiation process and therefore the needs of child soldiers are subsequently omitted 
from peacebuilding process. This was the case in the Liberian peace process (1989-96). 
She argues that child soldiers require demobilisation and reintegration packages that 
address their special needs, such as physical injury, psychosocial treatment, lost education 
time and reuniting them with their families.69 This work provided a sound foundation for 
the UN to build upon regarding addressing children’s needs in peace agreements in post-
conflict peacebuilding interventions.   
 
Although Cohn’s work is the closest in providing analysis of a child specific peace 
process in Liberia, her work shares a characteristic with many of the key texts highlighted 
above. Cohn’s work was published before the resurgence of fighting in Liberia in 1999 
and thus does not cover or provide analysis of the latest phase of Liberia’s peacebuilding 
or post-conflict reconstruction efforts beginning in 2003. This thesis will therefore not 
only build on Cohn’s analysis, but will directly respond to the dearth in child-focused 
analysis of post-conflict reconstruction that the she rightfully identified.  
 
Beyond academic literature, human rights and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) 
have produced a lot of work on and paid much attention to child soldiers. The material 
that organisations such as Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, Save the 
Children, Watchlist, and the Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers produce has 
helped raise global awareness by heavily advocating and pushing the issue of child 
soldiers onto the international policy agenda.70 As a result of the focus on advocacy 
much of the material is highly emotive, quite descriptive, often testimonial and in some 
ways quite limited. Notwithstanding its inherent limitations, this is nonetheless a useful 
body of literature that serves the purpose of raising awareness, documenting trends, 
fundraising for the organisations, and sending simple messages on the issue, but does not 
necessarily provide analysis or alternative perspectives.  
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There are gaps in our understanding about the threat children pose to peace and security, 
the role they play in consolidating peace and security, how well DDR processes reflect 
the needs of child soldiers, and the overall importance of successfully dealing with child 
soldiers in post-conflict situations. Given the importance of the role of children in 
peacebuilding, Liberia’s most recent attempt at disarming, demobilising, and reintegrating 
its child soldiers deserves deeper analysis than has been provided.  
 
Liberia 
Liberia is a ideal case-study for examining post-conflict reconstruction and more 
specifically, child interventions in peacebuilding as it is not only a classic example of the 
rationale for the use of child soldiers as a mean to wage war but also because of the 
explicit attention children received in the peace agreement in 2003. The peace agreement 
in 2003 was not the first peace accord, but it was the first time the DDR of child soldiers 
was explicitly recognised as a priority. It is important to remember that while the war was 
being fought in Liberia the international community’s interest (the UN, ECOWAS, AU, 
etc.) in peacekeeping and peacebuilding was evolving, as was its acknowledgement, 
understanding and response to child soldiers. Liberia in many ways embodied much of 
what was wrong with not only modern war, but also the international community’s 
inability to prevent it, and until 2003, control and manage it. 
 
Liberia’s civil war began on 25 December 1989, with a cross-border attach from a base in 
Cote d’Ivoire. Consisting of approximately 165 men, Charles Taylor’s forces attacked 
government troops with the aim of overthrowing President Samuel Doe. Within months, 
as the movement gained momentum as a direct result of the recruitment of civilians, 
including many children, Taylor was able to turn a small insurgency into an armed-group 
with thousands of fighters.71 Civilians were easily mobilised and took up arms because of 
deep-rooted historical social, economic and political grievances, the lack of good 
governance, pervasive corruption, and an unpopular regime.72 From the onset of war, a 
defining feature of the Liberian conflict was the unprecedented and continual use of 
child soldiers initiated by Charles Taylor. The initial and deliberate policy to recruit 
children set a dangerous precedent, and subsequently every faction followed suit. 
Initially, young entrepreneurial men and women took up arms to gain political power, 
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change the political status quo, and address their everyday existential problems.73 Over 
the years, ethnicity was manipulated for political purposes, helping fuel the conflict and 
contributing to the ready pool of civilian combatants.74  
 
As time went by, the conflict soon acquired a logic of its own. Alliances shifted, factions 
splintered and new factions emerged, and the war’s raison d’être became less about 
addressing grievances and more about the benefits of plunder and looting.75 The 
proliferation of small arms compounded the problem and quickly flooded into not only 
Liberia, but also the entire Mano River sub-region in West Africa. Small arms and light 
weapons were the weapons of choice. 
 
There is an extensive body of literature on Liberia and much of the material examines the 
country’s dramatic history, the root causes and conduct of the war, the systemic 
breakdown of governance, the political economy of the war, as well as its regional and 
international peacekeeping and peacebuilding interventions.76 That being said, apart from 
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Peter Singer, Ilene Cohn, and Mats Utas little has been written specifically on child 
soldiers in Liberia or on their involvement in the country’s peacebuilding interventions. 
 
Stephen Ellis’s The Mask of Anarchy provides one of the best overviews of the Liberian 
conflict until the elections in 1997. Although he highlights the role and participation of 
child soldiers, including his description of child soldiers being organised into special units 
known as Small Boy Units, his work does not go into much detail of their involvement in 
peacebuilding, nor does it focus on child DDR. Another authoritative author, Amos 
Sawyer, concentrates on governance issues, institutional capacity, the political economy 
and state collapse in Liberia.77 While he acknowledges the importance of addressing 
children’s needs in the Liberian peacebuilding process, the issue is not dealt with in much 
detail; it is touched upon in only two pages.78 Sawyer acknowledges that as the conflict 
adversely affected many children, the peacebuilding initiatives needed to address their 
plight.79 Although Sawyer claims that child-focussed peacebuilding initiatives are essential 
to addressing the wrongs of war, he merely gives a brief description of how all Liberian 
children were traumatised and provides some general prescriptive suggestions and 
explores the challenges of providing such assistance.80 For instance, he argues that the 
rehabilitation of child soldiers into families and communities poses a particularly delicate 
challenge, especially since many of these children have known nothing except war and 
have committed atrocious acts themselves.’81 In line with his focus on institutional 
arrangements, his main concern is that programmes being implemented by international 
and national organisations for children (including former child soldiers) and youth are 
too concerned with short-term results and not long-term sustainability. He rightfully 
observes that ‘very little preparation for transition from the phase of humanitarian 
emergency to development’ has taken place.82 Although one can infer Sawyer is referring 
to the child DDR programme amongst other things, it lacks detail or analysis. 
 
                                                                                                                                      
Enforcing Restraint- Collective Intervention in Internal Conflicts, ed. Lori Fisler Damrosch (New York: Council on 
Foreign Relations Press, 1993). 
77 Amos Sawyer, The Emergence of Autocracy in Liberia : Tragedy and Challenge (San Francisco ICS Press, 1992); 
Sawyer, Beyond Plunder; Sawyer, Social Capital. 
78 Sawyer, Beyond Plunder, 148-49. 
79 Ibid., 148. 
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81 Ibid.  
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There are notable contributions analysing regional and international interventions in 
Liberia’s peace processes however mostly focused on the years between 1989 and 1997.83 
Despite their recurrent failure up to 2003, Liberia’s multiple peace agreements have been 
well documented and their implications known. Many of the failed peace agreements, 
including the Cotonou (1995) and Abuja Accords (1996) stressed the importance of a 
certain level of security, they called for the need for disarmament and peacebuilding 
strategies.84 Throughout Peacekeepers, Politicians, and Warlords attention is specifically given 
and explicit references are made to child soldiers, albeit not in any great detail. The 
involvement of child soldiers is highlighted as a defining feature throughout the war and 
although ultimately unsuccessful because the climate for disarmament was undeveloped, 
the authors claim children were given special attention in the planning and 
implementation phases of the DDR process up until 1997.85  
 
Despite many authoritative contributions, two main limitations exist in this body of 
work. Firstly, with the exception of Sawyer’s Beyond Plunder, many contributions were 
published prior to the war ended in 2003. The most recent part of the Liberia’s 
peacebuilding process has received less attention than the country’s previous stages. 
Secondly, although there is wide acknowledgement for the need to address children and 
child soldiers in peacebuilding (more so in later contributions), it is dealt with 
superficially and as a tangential issue. This thesis will address Liberia’s most recent 
peacebuilding intervention as well as look at DDR from the perspective of child soldiers 
as an integral component of consolidating sustainable peace and security in Liberia.  
 
Methodology 
This thesis provides a systematic examination of Liberia’s child DDR process that began 
in December 2003. The aim of the study is to formulate an analysis of the centrality and 
contribution of child DDR in Liberia’s peacebuilding process. The methodological 
approach of this study is qualitative and relies on three main methods of data collection: 
document analysis; semi-structured interviews; and participant observation. A literature 
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Jeremy Armon and Andy Carl, eds., An International Review of Peace Initiatives Accord, The Liberian Peace 
Process 1990-1996 (London: Conciliation Resources, 1996).  
84 Abiodun Alao, John Mackinlay, and Funmi Olonisakin, 71.  
85 Ibid., 21, 45-6, 81-3, 120. 
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review was conducted within the relevant fields including peacebuilding, children and 
war and Liberia. Primary source information, such as published and unpublished official 
documents, policy guidelines, meeting minutes, high-level correspondence, DDR 
programme documents, policy papers and interviews have invaluably contributed to the 
data collection. Also important to the data collection were secondary source information, 
such as newspaper articles, media, and non-governmental organisation documents and 
reports.  
 
Semi-structured interviews with a diverse group of international and Liberian 
policymakers, practitioners and academics were conducted in multiple locations including 
Liberia, Accra, New York, London, Geneva over a span of six years (2004-2010).86 These 
interviews were intended to gain information and insights about Liberia’s peacebuilding 
intervention, its child DDR programme (policies, design and implementation), and 
ascertain its impact on the consolidation of peace and security. The respondents 
consisted of high-level representative (i.e., the former United Nations Secretary-
General’s Special Representative in Liberia, the head of UNICEF Liberia, Liberian 
government officials, etc.), working-level staff members (i.e., UNMIL staff, UNMIL 
military observers, UNICEF employees, members of civil society, etc.), but also a cross 
section of Liberian society, including village elders, former child soldiers, former adult 
combatants, internally displaced persons and regular citizens. This method was effective 
for gathering information on the child DDR process, identifying many of the challenges, 
gauging the frame of mind of the policymakers and the views of community members 
and former child soldiers. Although many of the views and positions were personal, 
many of the people interviewed were either making policy decisions, implementing or 
directly involved in the child DDR or the wider peacebuilding processes. Given the 
author’s role within UNMIL, he was able to have candid both on-the-record and off-the-
record with many of the people developing the policies and implementing the 
programmes in Liberia as they were being executed. There was an attempt to go beyond 
and deeper than the organisations’ point of view. Where possible, information secured 
from respondents was triangulated and verified in an attempt to improve its reliability as 
well as usefulness (in terms of mitigating bias). Due to the lack of academic research on 
                                                
86 See the Bibliography and Sources for a list of pertinent meetings attended, interviews and focus groups 
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the topic and the high turnover in Liberia post-2003 these interviews were integral in 
establishing a more complete and informed perspective of the reality on the ground.87  
 
Another invaluable method used to gather data was through participant observation. The 
author lived in Monrovia, Liberia from January through September 2005 while working 
for the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL). This time in Liberia enabled the 
observation of the planning and implementation of parts of the child DDR and the 
wider peacebuilding process, as well as provided the opportunity to speak to many 
people that were either involved in or impacted by the process. Hired as the 
Humanitarian Coordination Section’s Liaison and Reports Officer the author’s role was 
to interact with international and national entities including United Nations agencies, 
NGO, and government officials. It was the author's responsibilities to write daily, weekly 
and monthly reports on the overall security, relief, humanitarian, and development 
situation in Liberia; this included covering the DDR programme. Being in Liberia and 
working for UNMIL significantly facilitated access to individuals (policymakers, 
practitioners, child soldiers and community members) as well as to documentation within 
the UN system, NGOs and government, both of which benefited the data collection and 
research for this study. While in Liberia, the author participated in and was a member of 
various peacebuilding oversight mechanisms and working groups pertaining to security 
and development (i.e., the Child Protection Working Group, the DDR Forum, etc.). This 
participation provided a first-hand insight into the complexities of the planning, 
implementation and political processes of peacebuilding interventions in post-conflict 
Liberia. However, given the delays in the implementation of the DDR programme, the 
author left before the reintegration process had begun in earnest. Since departing Liberia 
in 2005, a follow up research trip was conducted on 29 March through 5 April 2006.88  
 
Structure 
This thesis is organised into eight chapters. Chapter two (Children and War) concentrates 
on children and war, and the issue of child soldiers specifically. Based on current 
literature, the chapter provides an overview of the global child soldiering phenomenon 
                                                
87 Due to the transient nature of peacekeeping and peacebuilding environments such as Liberia, many of 
the people that were part of the initial disarmament process have moved on and left Liberia. Where 
possible, they were tracked and interviewed to gain their insight. 
88 The author participated in a high-level consultations addressing security sector governance with senior 
government officials, security sector practitioners, scholars, and civil society. Many of the transitional 
government representatives were integrally involved in the DDR programme and provided valuable 
insights. 
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and discourse. The evolution of the child soldier discourse will be addressed, along with 
the theories that have come to underpin it, explaining why child soldiering is a problem, 
how children are recruited, what their roles are and what their involvement in war means 
to peace and security. This chapter goes on to examine the international community’s 
(UN, AU’s and NGOs) engagement with the issue of child soldiering, and locate the 
child soldiering response within international approaches, policies and programmes. In 
doing so, the story of child soldiers will be told, complete with an overview of how the 
international community has responded on a global and regional level.  
 
The history of Liberia is the focus of chapter three (War and Peace in Liberia). It 
provides an overview of Liberia, including the contemporary political, economic, and 
social context in which the war took place. Liberia’s civil war, from 1989 through 2003, 
will be addressed - including root causes, how the war was conducted, and an 
explanation of the various warring factions. Special emphasis will be given to the 
implications of the war on children and their role in the war. This chapter will present 
the various interventions to the Liberian war, including the past attempts at child 
disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration.  
 
Chapter four (Peacebuilding, DDR and Children) provides an overview and theory 
behind the concept of peacebuilding - including specifically disarmament, demobilisation, 
and reintegration. The chapter will explore issues such as: what determines successful 
peacebuilding, why security is crucial for development, why reforming the security sector 
is important, and an explanation of the logic for disarmament, demobilisation, and 
reintegration. In doing so, the chapter provides an overview of the strategic framework 
of Liberia’s DDR programme, including institutional arrangements, its objectives and 
structure. This chapter addresses the need for children to be included in post-conflict 
peacebuilding endeavours. Liberia’s post-2003 child disarmament, demobilisation, and 
reintegration efforts are dealt with in-depth in the subsequent three chapters. 
 
Chapter five (Disarmament in Liberia) examines the most recent attempt at disarming 
combatants- including child soldiers, during the post-conflict peacebuilding phase in 
Liberia. This chapter not only analyses the guidelines of all components of the 
disarmament process, but also provides a comprehensive assessment of how the 
programme was implemented. The challenges, such as planning, operational 
   
  
- 31 - 
 
implementation, and combatants’ access are examined, as are the implications of 
disarmament in the overall success of the DDR programme. 
 
Chapter six (Demobilisation in Liberia) builds on the previous chapter and examines the 
subsequent step in the peacebuilding process, child demobilisation. Using a similar 
framework of analysis and structure, this chapter describes the implementation of 
demobilisation and assesses its effectiveness and impact to peacebuilding. Some key 
issues raised in this chapter include the various components of demobilisation, the 
payment of cash allowances to children and the link between the disarmament and 
demobilisation.  
 
An assessment of the child reintegration process is the focus of chapter seven 
(Reintegration in Liberia). Building on the previous two chapters and using a similar 
framework of analysis and structure, the reintegration process is explored in detail. 
Although the reintegration process is more disparate than the disarmament and 
demobilisation processes, conclusions are drawn as to whether the programmes are 
equipped to adequately address the needs of child soldiers and the society at large, and 
whether the reintegration of former child soldiers was in fact improved as a result of the 
programmes implementation.  
 
The conclusion (chapter 8) addresses the various lessons, the implications and 
perspectives drawn from the Liberian child DDR programme. The link between security 
and development in Liberia in relation to effectively dealing with the legacy and 
involvement of the child soldiers that participated in the country’s war is elaborated 
upon. Furthermore, the contribution of child DDR to the overall peacebuilding 
endeavour is considered while wider lessons from the Liberian experience and their 
relevance to future similar processes are drawn. 
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Seeing images of children carrying guns in war zones around the world are no longer an 
uncommon sight. If anything, to see such images is now the norm rather than an exception. 
Policymakers, NGOs and academics alike have claimed there has been a militarization of 
childhood throughout the world.89 This is true in both the developed and developing world, 
although the attention often falls on the latter. Both governments and non-state actors utilise 
children in their ranks. Although there is now a plethora of global human rights instruments, 
protocols, declarations and frameworks to protect children both in peace and in war, the reality 
on the ground shows that they are flagrantly ignored and for the most part ineffectual. Not only 
does war devastate children’s lives in terms of displacement, destroying basic needs, 
development infrastructure, and cause physical harm, but adults are recruiting children to fight 
beside them at an alarming rate. Despite a wave of moral condemnation children are not only 
falling victim to war, but are also being used to wage wars around the world. The issue of 
children and war, of which child soldiering is a component, is now permanently placed on the 
United Nations’ Security Council’s agenda and is acknowledged as a threat to international peace 
and security. 
 
This chapter provides an overview of the child soldier issue— defining what is meant by the 
term child soldier, the scope of the problem, the causes and means of recruitment explores the 
reasons why children are used to soldier, the impact their participation has and the wider 
implications of the use of child soldiers on war. Lastly, a brief analysis of the UN’s engagement 
and response to child soldiering problem is provided. 
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What is a child? 
The Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) is ratified by every country excluding Somalia 
and the United States and bestows children with a myriad of rights relating to health, education, 
privacy, citizenship, and protection. According to the CRC, adopted in 1989, a child includes 
‘every human being below the age of eighteen years.’90 Although the definition of a child is 
enshrined in the first article of the CRC and seems pretty straightforward it is not that clear cut. 
As the notion of a child is socially and culturally constructed it is continues to be contested.  
 
Within this discourse some argue that the notion of childhood is a relative concept that is 
constructed relative to historical time, geography, culture, and social-economic conditions.91 That 
being said, in some non-Western cultures adulthood is achieved at an earlier age (in the early 
teens). Once a child goes through an initiation process normally conducted by an elder (or a 
group of elders), in many cultures is a rite of passage, that child passes the threshold of 
childhood and enters adulthood. So culturally anyone who has been initiated is considered an 
adult in that society, be they thirteen, fourteen or fifteen. Although these cultural differences are 
acknowledged and appreciated they do not change nor do they negate the legal obligations of 
states to protect children from participation in armed conflicts as per the CRC.92 Every state 
except the United States and Somalia are parties to the CRC. 
  
This being said, there are serious limitations within the CRC regarding child protection. The 
CRC only covers States Parties and their obligations to protect. Therefore, the activities of non-
state actors are not covered within the legal obligation or framework of the treaty. This is a 
reflection of the times when the treaty was codified, international conflicts were still perceived as 
the norm and the scourge of internal civil wars had not yet become a reality. 
 
Another limitation of the CRC with regard to child protection is the discrepancy in Article 38, 
which lowers the minimum age of recruitment of children as soldiers to fifteen years. Although a 
child is defined as anyone under the age of eighteen a lower threshold has been set within the 
CRC with regard to children being utilised as soldiers. This legalises and leaves children between 
the age of fifteen and eighteen years of age vulnerable to recruitment and participation in armed 
conflicts. This discrepancy was on the insistence of countries, such as the United States and the 
United Kingdom, who were unwilling to change their recruitment practices which allow for the 
                                                
90 United Nations, "Convention on the Rights of the Child ", Article 1. 
91 Kuper, 13. 
92 The Convention on the Rights of the Child applies exclusively to State Parties. 
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recruitment of children as young as 15 into their cadet and soldier-in-training programmes.93  
 
Since the codification of the CRC there have been concerted efforts to raise the age of 
recruitment and participation of children by both state and non-state actors to 18, both in inter- 
and intra-state conflicts. Although limited in its application and scope, the African Charter on 
the Rights and Welfare of the Child (1990) went further to protecting children than did the CRC 
with regard to armed conflict. The Charter was adopted on 11 July 1990, by member-states of 
the Organisation of African States (OAU), which has transitioned into what is now the African 
Union. The Charter only covers African States and defined a child as anyone under the age of 
eighteen. The Charter mirrors the CRC by afforded the child many rights regarding basic needs 
such as health, education, freedom of expression, and various protection. With specific regard to 
armed conflict, the Charter requires the States to respect international humanitarian law, ‘to take 
all necessary measures to ensure that no child shall take a direct part in hostilities and refrain in 
particular, from recruiting any child’.94 Moreover according to the Charter, States shall ‘protect 
civilian populations in armed conflicts and shall take all feasible measures to ensure the 
protection and care of children who are affected by armed conflict… [including in] situations of 
internal conflicts, tension and strife.’95 Although this Charter in some ways was more inclusive 
and forward thinking than the CRC, like the CRC it was wholly unsuccessful in stemming the 
recruitment of children on the African continent.96  
 
The next international attempt to strengthen the CRC with regard to child protection was the 
Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children 
in Armed Conflict (OP) which was signed in May 2000, and came into force on 12 February 
2002.97 The OP further developed child protection specifically with regard to minimum age of 
recruitment and covering armed conflict both international and internal in nature. Although less 
problematic than the original CRC with regard to the age restriction and the inclusion of 
protection within internal conflicts the OP is not as comprehensive as some child protection 
advocates desired or called for. The political negotiation process produced a compromised treaty 
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(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2005), 71-4. 
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that watered down its potential impact in a number of ways.98  
 
Although the OP managed to raise the minimum age of participation of children in armed 
conflicts it is not universal. The OP says that non-state groups are explicitly prohibited from 
recruiting and using under eighteen year olds in any form or method of recruitment. States are 
prohibited only from compulsory recruitment of soldiers under 18 years old. Meaning that States 
Parties are allowed to accept children who have ‘volunteered’ for service, albeit with flimsy 
safeguards. It also calls for the States Parties to do everything they feasibly can to prevent the 
recruitment of under eighteen and their involvement in direct hostilities.99 This vagueness allows 
for the broadest interpretation, resulting in many 15-18 year olds being allowed to enlist in state 
armed forces. So a different standard was applied to state and non-state actors. However, over 
the years through strong advocacy and campaigning the under-18 consensus became to be seen 
as the minimum threshold for the recruitment of child soldiers.  
 
What is a Child Soldier 
Although not quite as contentious as the definition of a child, the definition of a child soldier has 
evolved over the past decade to be fairly comprehensive. The historic image of a soldier is 
statistically a man in uniform, armed, and part of an organised, if not, state armed forces. Given 
the changes in the nature of war, which have moved away from inter-state combat to intra-state 
civil wars, this historical image of a soldier is only part of the reality. In many intra-state wars 
civilian populations are mobilised and provide means to perpetrate conflict. With little training 
these mobilised civilians are armed and sent to civilian villages and towns that have become the 
frontlines, battlefields and areas for plunder. With that changed reality the image of a young 
soldier, be it a boy or a girl, carrying an AK-47 has gained the attention of not only the 
international media but of international policymakers in part because of their age and party 
because of the atrocities that are committed to them, and the ones they commit. Child soldiers 
are now regularly in the mainstream media, documented in newspapers, sung about in songs, 
their experiences written about in books.100 
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Today, the term child soldier means more than simply a child  (boy or girl) who is armed. It has 
come to include any child that is associated with a fighting faction, in both state or non-state 
forces. The term child soldier now applies to a wide range of youngsters with enormously 
varying experiences and roles.101 The term child soldier or children associated with fighting 
forces (CAFF) is used to describe children in auxiliary roles such as a messenger, porter, cook, 
spies or as a wife; as well as combatants on the frontlines, as executioners, guards or bodyguards. 
 
The Cape Town Principles provide the most accepted definition of a child soldier. They were 
drafted and adopted as a collaborative effort of leading scholars and practitioners and UNICEF 
in 1997. Despite being adopted in South Africa, they apply to the children regardless of their 
location. This thesis uses its definition of a child soldier for two main reasons. First, it is the 
most comprehensive and widely accepted definition within the UN system. Second, it was this 
definition that both the United Nations and UNICEF used during the Liberian peacebuilding 
exercise and DDR programme (of 2003). A child soldier is defined as: 
‘any person under eighteen years of age who is part of any kind of regular or irregular 
armed force in any capacity, including but not limited to cooks, porters, messengers, and 
those accompanying such groups, other than purely family members. Girls recruited for 
sexual purposes and forced marriage are included in this definition. It does not, therefore, 
only refer to a child who is carrying or has carried arms.’102 
 
The Scope of the Issue 
The victimization of children by war and their militarization as soldiers are by no means a new 
phenomenon, and have been well documented through history. The practice of recruiting and 
using children as soldiers dates back to almost the first record of war. Children have historically 
played a part in battles in both auxiliary and combat roles. Some examples of the militarization of 
children include the Spartans of Ancient Greece who trained and used children as young as six 
years old as soldiers.103 In the early nineteenth century both Napoleon’s and the Prussian armies 
included soldiers as young as twelve year old. For instance, Karl von Clausewitz, one of the most 
famous military theorists, joined the Prussian army at the tender age of twelve.104 In the 
American Civil war (1861) ten year olds were used in both auxiliary positions (such as drummers) 
as well as combatants. During World War II, the Hitler Youth was a prime example of the 
militarization of young people. In the 1980’s during the Iran-Iraq War Iranian children were used 
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as mine-clearers and cannon fodder.105 They were encouraged and forced to run through fields 
littered with mines to clear the way for adult forces. Unfortunately there is no shortage of 
conflicts where children have been both victims and perpetrators of violence.  
 
Child soldiering is not a new phenomenon, however what is now known as the ‘modern child 
soldier’ is quite novel.106 This modern child soldier is a product of the times—characterised by 
internal civil wars, the targeting of civilians, the proliferation of small and light weapons, bad 
governance structures in vulnerable countries, and poverty including all its discontents (including 
political, economic and social marginalization). This idea of a ‘modern child soldier’ is in part due 
to the distinct concept and articulation of child rights that coincided with the end of the Cold 
War and the subsequent unravelling of some places in the developing world. In some places this 
unravelling translated into civil unrest and armed conflict produced the demand for soldiers of 
which children provided the supply.  
 
Despite Africa being the epicentre of the child soldiering phenomenon, it is by no means the 
only continent where children are militarised. The child soldiering phenomenon is a global one. 
According to research conducted between 1999 and 2001 child soldiering, as part of either 
government forces or armed-groups, featured in 36 countries afflicted by armed conflict 
worldwide (see map).107 Furthermore, ‘in more than 85 countries, hundreds of thousands more 
under-18s have been recruited into government armed forces, paramilitaries, civil militia and a 
wide variety of non-state armed-groups’ not engaged in active combat.108 Between 2001 and 2004 
armed conflict in 28 countries in Africa, Asia, Europe, the Middle East and the Americas 
involved child soldiers.109 Their ages ranged from eighteen years old to as young as seven.  
 
 
Although the precise number is difficult to obtain, it is estimated, and generally accepted, that 
approximately 300,000 child soldiers are mobilised in armed conflict regions at any time.110 This 
is a rolling figure, and by no means the aggregate number of child soldiers that have participated 
in conflicts to date. These global statistics should help break the stereotype that child soldiering 
is unique to Africa, a stereotype purported by the many images that are shown portraying young 
Africans armed with AK-47s.  
                                                
105 Singer, 22. 
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Africa 
Africa is a continent that has experienced much armed conflict over the past half century, a large 
number of which either pre-dated the conclusion of the Cold War or began once it ended. The 
scourge of violence that has raged through Africa is not specific to one corner of Africa. In 
addition to the countries that suffered from armed conflict and the participation of child soldiers 
between 2001-4 which total approximately 100,000 child soldiers, other countries have had to 
either struggle with the legacy of previous conflicts including the involvement of child soldiers 
such as-- Guinea Bissau, Mozambique and South Africa; or were struggling with political 
violence including armed conflict such as— Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Nigeria, Sudan and 
Zimbabwe.111 That being said, approximately 22 out of the 53 nations in Africa have a legacy of 
the use of children as soldiers. It has been said that there is an ‘almost endemic link between 
children and warfare in Africa.’112 Moreover, it could probably be said that armed conflict in 
general has been endemic in Africa since post-colonial times.  
 
Asia 
The prevalence of child soldiering is high in Asia and has been for some time.113 Like Africa, 
armed conflict and political instability has been quite present in pockets of the Asian region 
during the past few decades. Apart from the countries listed above that were engaged in active 
conflict between 2001 and 2004, many more have either had to or are in the process of having to 
deal the legacy of children’s involvement in conflict or political violence and civil unrest. 
Although to varying degrees such countries include Azerbaijan, Cambodia, Laos, Pakistan, 
Pakistan, Papau New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Tajikistan and Vietnam.114 Moreover, North 
Korea is an example of a nation that since the Korean War in 1953 has been highly militarised 
and has affected many children. Throughout the years it is estimated that over one million 
secondary school aged children (14-16) have received military training and are members of the 
government sponsored Red Youth Guard Militia.115 Since they are not currently engaged in war 
the true number of militarised children are not included in the global figure of child soldiers even 
though the country has been on the brink of war since the conclusion of the Korean War. 
 
Apart from the listed countries engaged in active conflict between 2001 and 2004, Myanmar 
(Burma) is a country that warrants being highlighted in order to grasp the gravity of the situation 
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of its nation’s children. Myanmar has been under a military dictatorship since 1962 and has 
flagrantly abused its children for a long time. Both the state, and almost all of the thirty-plus 
non-state armed-groups opposing the state are responsible for recruiting and using children in 
their struggle.116 Myanmar is reported to have more child soldiers than any other country in the 
world, with approximately 70,000 currently mobilised in the government forces and up to 
another 7,000 in the various non-state armed-groups.117 Moreover, children represent up to 45 
percent of all new recruits into the government forces. This is particularly worrisome when 
considering the aggregate number of children that grown up and passed through military ranks.  
 
Europe 
European countries are on the list of countries where recruitment of child soldiers occurs. In 
2004, child soldiers were present in the conflict in Chechnya-Russia and although with varying 
intensity children have previously been known to used as soldiers were mobilised in struggles in 
Balkan countries (such as Croatia, Albania, Serbia, Kosovo), Spain and Turkey.118 
 
Despite all of efforts of many European governments with regard to safeguarding children, one 
notable feature in Europe is that many of the countries allow for the ‘voluntary’ enlistment of 
under-18s (above the age of 16 years old). In some countries children under eighteen years old 
and in some cases as young as sixteen can enlist themselves into armed forces or military training 
programmes. These countries include Belgium, Croatia, United Kingdom, Austria, Germany, 
Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg, Macedonia, Netherlands, Norway, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, 
Spain and Switzerland.119 Only until recently the United Kingdom allowed its 17-year-old soldiers 
to enter combat, while actively recruiting 16 and 17 year olds with their parents permission.120 
Although many of these countries have now come to pledge that they would not send children 
into combat, this shows that child protection, and specifically the issue of child soldiering is also 
a concern in some of the world’s most developed countries. The global child soldier figure does 
not include these recruited non-mobilised children outside the theatres of conflict. 
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The Middle  East  
The Middle East is another region that is highly militarised with a high prevalence of child 
soldiering. It is another region, like Africa, that armed conflict or struggles are endemic. Between 
2004 and 2007, armed conflicts were raging in Iraq, Israel, the Occupied Palestinian Territories, 
and Lebanon. A common feature in all of these conflicts was the use of child soldiers either by 
government forces (or sponsored forces of the government) or non-state armed forces. In some 
cases the involvement of child soldiers ranged from throwing rocks at opposing forces to 
frontline fighting, or terrorist activity (in the form of suicide bombing).121 Apart from the 
countries listed above that were engaged in active conflict between 2001 and 2004, some other 
countries in the region, such as Algeria, Lebanon and Iran, have a legacy of children’s 
involvement in conflict or political violence or civil unrest. Moreover, many countries in the 
region permit either voluntary enlistment or military training of under-18s into their national 




Although the Americas have been relatively stable over the past decade (with a few exceptions—
Colombia, Haiti, Mexico and Peru), the region is not exempt from concern with regard to the 
use of child soldiers. The conflict in Colombia is notorious for the paramilitary and armed 
opposition group’s use of child soldiers. It is estimated in 2004 that as many as 14,000 children 
were soldiers in Colombia.123 Many countries, particularly in Central America, including El 
Salvador, Guatemala and Nicaragua, but also Haiti in the Caribbean, are recovering from armed 
conflicts that employed or had a devastating effect on children.  
 
Like in Europe, most countries in the Americas permit the voluntary enlistment of under-18s 
into their armed forces or their training programmes. Those countries include Argentina, Bolivia, 
Brazil, Canada, Chile, Cuba, Dominic Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Jamaica, 
Mexico, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago, the United States, Uruguay and 
Venezuela. In Canada and the United States under-18s are recruited for the national armed 
forces, although in Canada they mostly end up as reserve troops and the government has 
pledged not to send them to combat. The United States actively recruits under-18s to the tone of 
10,000 per year. And approximately 470,000 children are part of the military training programme. 
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These children are not reflected in the global child soldiering figures. The United States 
government actively uses public (or state) schools as recruitment grounds for their armed forces. 
There are documented cases of 17-year-old children being deployed into combat in Bosnia, and 
the Gulf War I, and Somalia. Since 2002, most of the branches of the US armed force, with the 




Source: Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers. Child Soldiers Global Report. London: Coalition to Stop the Use of 
Child Soldiers 2004. 
 
 
There are similarities between child soldiers and children involved in violent organised crime.125 
Both represent a militarisation of children to serve the needs of larger causes, together with both 
the dangers and benefits that come along with that. Children involved in organised crime 
movements in countries such as Brazil, Mexico, and the United States. This is cause for grave 
concern within those countries. Some similarities include the treatment of members of armed 
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gangs and that of child soldiers, many of the factors that influence or motivate young people’s 
participation, a lack of alternative means of supporting themselves and their families, geography 
or living inside a gang infested area, and the physical danger and social stigma associated to their 
involvement in a gang. Moreover, it is clear that the issue of violent gangs is both a security and a 
children protection concern, much like child soldiering. Although armed and violent youth gangs 
and child soldiers may be motivated by a myriad of similar factors and although their experiences 
may overlap, the issue differ drastically from child soldiering by its lack of context— with regard 
to political violence.126  
 
Although the common image of a child soldier is that of an AK-47 toting African child, the 
statistics and prevalence of the militarization of children it is truly a global issue. Furthermore, 
though it is technically legal according to the OP for children to voluntarily enlist into national 
armies, once they have done so they technically become child soldiers whether they are deployed 
or not. As we have seen, this corruption of childhood is not unique to the developing or under-
developed world, but is also happening in some of the world’s richest nations. 
 
The New Face of War 
Many academics and policymakers comment on the changing face or nature of modern war. 
That modern war is qualitatively different from what it was even fifty years ago despite the reality 
that war has always negatively affected those in its wake and killed and displaced masses of 
people. Wars, today, are mostly fought within countries, rather than between countries. Today, 
war is seldom about governments fighting other governments (although there are exceptions, for 
instance, the United States vs. Iraq). Historically, soldiers in uniform fought wars. Today, 
militarised civilians mainly fight wars with civilian populations suffering the main casualty. All of 
these various and interrelated elements are important to understanding the causes of child soldier 
recruitment. 
 
The proliferation of small arms has had a devastating impact on modern warfare. The presence 
of armed conflict and access to small arms and light weapons has significantly contributed to the 
emergence of the ‘modern child soldier.’ Small arms are ‘hand-held small calibre firearms, usually 
consisting of handguns, rifles, shotguns, manual, semi-automatic, and full automatic weapons, 
and man-portable machineguns.’127 Light weapons ‘includes a wide range of medium-calibre and 
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explosive ordnance, including man-portable and vehicle-mounted antipersonnel, antitank and 
antiaircraft rockets, missiles, landmines, antiaircraft guns, mortars, hand grenades and rocket-
propelled grenades (RPGs).’’128 Small arms and light weapons (SALW) include most weapons up 
to 100mm in calibre, they are inexpensive, relatively low-tech and do not require substantial 
training. SALW are highly mobile and can be used by children as young as 10 years old. For 
example, widely used throughout Africa, the Russian AK-47 assault rifle, weights under 11 
pounds fully loaded, shots 600 rounds a minute, has only nine-moving parts making it very easy 
to use even for children and costs as little as $5 (depending on where and how it is purchased) 
making it an effective and extremely dangerous fighting tool.129 
 
After the end of the Cold War in the late 1980s, many of the weapons that were previously 
guarding the Warsaw Pact found their way out of the Eastern European arsenals and into the 
developing world. Countries in the developing world, and Africa in particular, are flooded with 
plenty of cheap weapons (mainly from Eastern Europe, but also from other arms manufacturing 
countries), providing a market and the opportunity to arm challengers of government. The 
availability of inexpensive and mobile weapons provided the means to wage war easily. That was 
certainly the case in Africa, where in the 1990s, 46 out of 49 conflicts were low-tech wars only 
employing SALW.130 Of the estimated 639 million small arms and light weapons in circulation 
throughout the world, it is estimated that approximately 8 million are in West Africa.131 The UN 
claims that SALW not only enable wars to start, but prolong conflicts and make them harder to 
resolve.132 In doing so, the proliferation of SALW contribute to the destabilisation of regions, 
intensify the violence, exacerbate human rights abuses and create what has come to be known as 
complex emergencies—a man-made humanitarian crisis, caused by armed conflict, that 
necessitates a system-wide response for international actors such as the UN.  
 
Regardless of the specific motives behind wars, whether they are structural or related to issues 
such as greed or grievance, the widespread prevalence of armed conflict is inextricably linked to 
the proliferation and easy access to small arms and light weapons.133 In 2005, it was estimated 
that more than 600 million SALW are in circulation, making small arms and an integral 
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component in armed conflict and violence worldwide.134 Furthermore, the failure to effectively 
disarm warring societies after armed conflicts and the recycling of weapons in other conflicts 
makes SALW a continuous threat to international peace and security even after the conflict has 
formally ended.  
 
Impact of War on Children 
War has always had a devastating toll on civilians, and as a subset of society children are not 
exempt from that. War does a lot more than kill. It severely increases children’s vulnerability, 
including their vulnerability to be recruited as a soldier in a number of alarming ways. War has 
catastrophic consequences on development and is often ‘seen as a form of “developmental 
malaise.”135 War can quickly erase the gains of development, or reverse development.136 War 
exacerbates and furthers the grip of poverty on a society. War, whether directly or indirectly 
through the diversion of funds, destroys economic, educational, health, sanitation and 
transportation infrastructures. Food insecurity often becomes a serious concern, which has a 
great toll on children in conflict zones due to malnutrition. It is common that populations are 
displaced either internationally as refugees or domestically as internally displaced persons further 
increasing the vulnerability of those populations. War divides societies allowing for ethnic 
tensions to either flare up or be manipulated for political purposes (whether it is for the 
recruitment of fighters or to distinguish between groups). However less visible, war can have a 
severe psychological impact leaving adults and children traumatised for many years. Due to a 
child’s vulnerability to their environment, children often suffer tremendously as a result of armed 
conflict. 
 
Over the past few decades, civilians have been affected by armed conflict at unprecedented and 
disproportionate levels and women and children are now specifically targeted. Wars in the 18th 
and 19th century and the first half of the 20th century yielded a significantly lower civilian casualty 
ratio than wars in the latter part of the 20th century.137 World War II was the turning point where 
the figure of civilian casualties rose to 48 percent. Post-Cold War, it is estimated that up to 90 
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percent of the total casualties from armed conflict are civilians—most of whom are women and 
children.138  
UNICEF estimated that during the internecine conflicts between 1986-1996, 2 million children 
have been killed, more than 6 million children have been disabled or injured, over 1 million 
children have been orphaned, and an innumerable amount have been traumatised.139 Between 
2002 and 2006, of the 1.5 billion global child population two thirds of them live in countries 
affected by violent conflict. It is estimated, in 2007, children represented 41 percent of the 14.2 
million refugees worldwide and 36 percent of the 24.5 million internally displaced populations 
due to armed conflict.140 That is a total approximately 5.8 million child refugees and slightly over 
8.8 million child IDPs worldwide. These statistics illustrate the victimization of children as a 
result of armed conflict.  
 
Many of the characteristics of modern war and its diverse impacts increase children’s 
insecurity— whether referring to the proliferation of SALW, the prevalence of armed conflict 
throughout the developing world, the negative impact on development or social, economic or 
political marginalisation. The mere presence of armed conflict and its consequences have a 
causal relationship on the recruitment of child soldiering. Crudely put, most young people 
become soldiers because there is a war or a struggle.141 In Africa, the prevalence of child 
soldiering in peaceful countries (and not struggling with the legacy of a recent war) is negligible. 
Children do not start wars, but they do fight in them when it comes to them. The likelihood of 
children being recruited as soldiers increases the more protracted and the longer a war lasts. 
Moreover, being displaced or living in a refugee or IDP camp can increase the vulnerability of 
children being recruited. While the more affluent one’s family is, the less likely it is that their 
children will soldier as they are less able to send the children away from the conflict zone to 
safety.  
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Why Child Soldiers Are Used 
Children are used as soldiers for a number of reasons. Children can now be made into soldiers 
due to a number of reasons such as technological advancements of weaponry, their widespread 
availability, low cost, and the mere presence of armed conflict. Moreover, the primary reason 
child soldiers are used is because they can be made into effective fighters. If they served no 
utility to armed-groups, children would not be used as soldiers. Just like inexpensive and readily 
available weaponry, children are a force-enabler allowing previous unsustainable groups to gain 
the military capacity to sustain and fight their war.142  
 
The utility of child soldiers is motivated by convenience, pragmatism and economics. Children 
are malleable, obedient, cheap, exploitable, readily available and are seen to be expendable.143 In 
war zones, children often represent a large percentage of the population, possibly more than half 
the population, providing a ready supply of recruits.144 This not only makes it convenient and 
easier for armed-groups to recruit, but it gives them the sense that the child soldier is 
expendable. Moreover children are inherently vulnerable and often physically less able to protect 
themselves, making them easy targets for forced recruitment and en-masse round ups. Once 
recruited, children continue to be less able to protect themselves against abuse and mistreatment 
within the forces. Unlike adult soldiers, children’s morality is less developed and they ask fewer 
questions. Children are impressionable and can be indoctrinated to do as they are ordered often 
through brutality, terror tactics or under the influence of alcohol or drugs. Moreover, children 
are often happy to live off of plunder, and unlike their adult counterparts often do not demand 
payment. Until 1989, it was not illegal for states or non-state actors to use children as soldiers 
and until the late 1990’s their use was not properly documented. Even today, few are held 
responsible for their recruitment and use of child soldiers due to the lack of enforcement 
mechanisms.  
Recruitment Methods 
How children are recruited into armed-groups is dynamic and ‘disturbingly simple.’145 There are 
certain groups of young people more at risk of recruitment than others—for instance, 
youngsters in proximity to armed conflict are at a higher risk to their peers in stable and secure 
environments, teenagers are more at risk than younger children because of their physical ability 
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and prowess, and poorer children are at a higher risk because their families are unable to send 
them away to avoid recruitment. Although there are many different narratives how child are 
made or are turned into fighters, it happens either through forced or unforced means.146 
Regardless of whether the children are recruited through forced or unforced means, once part of 
an armed-group children are usually not free to disassociate themselves or exit the group 
voluntarily. In most cases deserting can be and is often punishable by death.  
 
Forced Recrui tment  
Forced recruitment is quite straightforward. Some children are recruited through national service 
either through conscription or compulsory recruitment by states. Although it is illegal for 
countries to compulsory recruit under the age of fifteen years of age according to the CRC, 
several countries have a compulsory conscription age of less than eighteen years old either 
enshrined in their constitutions or through emergency powers.147 Conscription is unique to 
states, as non-state armed-groups do not have a constitutional right to access to children as such.  
 
In the context of modern civil wars and the modern child soldier, forced recruitment has come 
to mean much more than conscription or national service and by no means is it limited to 
governments. As a result of a shortfall of manpower or to bolster military capacity, both 
governments and armed non-state armed-groups rely on forced recruitment. Other methods of 
forced recruitment are generally more brutal than government conscription. These methods 
include forced abduction, forcibly rounding up children or press-ganging, and recruitment 
through a quota system. As governments and armed-groups are reluctant to admit they recruit 
child soldiers, the information about how this is done is often gathered through testimonials. 
Such methods have been documented by human rights organisations either as the recruitment 
happens or after the fact. Furthermore, once recruited children often have no choice but to 
follow their captures orders or the threat of death. 
 
Forced abductions happen in many different ways. It is common for children to be collected in 
war zone or enemy villages after an attack and forced to join the attacking armed faction. They 
can simply be rounded up or may be forced to kill someone of their village in an attempt to 
sever ties to that community and further alienate that child into the faction’s grasp. If they refuse 
to do as they are told, they may be threatened with their life. In these cases, often at gunpoint, 
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they are offered two options—to be abducted or killed.148 Although different conflicts employ 
different recruitment methods, this is a common feature in many conflicts where children are 
recruited. There are many documented cases of children being forced to kill their parents, 
relatives or members of their communities in the threat of being executed themselves. This was 
quite common in Sierra Leone during the war for example. Many the armed factions take no 
prisoners and abduct anyone in their path.  
 
Children are targets of abduction in war zones wherever forced recruitment is utilised. Armed 
groups send soldiers or recruiters to sweep market places, go to schools, orphanages, places of 
religious worship and anywhere that may have a large proportion of young people present to 
forcibly abduct children into their ranks. Street children, orphans and other already vulnerability 
children are often at higher risk of recruitment. Refugee and IDP camps have become 
recruitment grounds for armed-groups, partly because there is a large supply of children present 
and like schools and market places are often not policed and when there are security 
arrangements they are often inadequate to prevent such abductions.149 Porous national borders 
do little to prevent the movement of soldiers and their new child recruits.  
 
To access young people, some armed-groups will terrorise families and villages in order to force 
them to provide the armed-group with a certain number of young people or quota. The families 
and villages will often comply with the armed-group not out of desire, but out of fear of reprisal, 
attack or destruction. In many ways this is not too dissimilar to a form of non-state localised 
conscription. This quota system was used in places such as Afghanistan, Angolan, and Sri 
Lanka.150 Like other means of forced recruitment, both governments and non-state actors are 
not the only perpetrators of this quota system method of recruitment.  
 
Unforced Recrui tment  
Not all children become soldiers in armed conflict through fear death or the barrel of a gun.151 
To fully understand how unforced recruitment works; one must have an appreciation of the 
context in which conflict exists. Often in and around war zones, there is a high level of poverty. 
There is systemic destruction of not only social and economic infrastructures, but of social and 
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economic opportunities as well as a sense of despair and hopelessness. With little or no rule of 
law insecurity is high. Local populations are often at the whim of both state and non-state 
armed-groups who despite proclaiming to be protectorates routinely loot, rape and pillage. 
Civilians are often further marginalised by conflict. In many ways the poorer you are (and more 
vulnerable), the higher price you pay. It is within this common context, of high insecurity and 
little opportunity, that children become party to conflicts through unforced means. Although it is 
undeniably an extremely dangerous route, children may find alternatives associating themselves 
with or joining armed-groups. By joining armed forces children, albeit through the barrel of a 
gun, can gain access to power, wealth, women and in some circumstances education or other 
things that are unobtainable in civilian life.152 Moreover, they may see their participation in war in 
very rational terms as their best hope of protection and survival. 
 
There are several assumptions with regard to unforced recruitment that need addressing. This 
process is routinely referred to as voluntary enlistment, or describes children as volunteering into 
armed-groups. This is highly misleading. Rather than children exercising their free-will in an 
environment outside of conflict or with other options (lacking the stresses of war), they are 
heavily influenced by the environment they live in. This environment is often highly militarised 
and presents few opportunities. They may see joining an armed-group as the best opportunity 
for them to access those things that are not available to them as civilians. This is not to discount 
or negate that children have agency and are quite capable of making decisions freely. But with 
regard to the realities of war zones, seldom can children’s lives be divorced of coercion or 
desperation. It can be seen as a continuum ranging from fully voluntary recruitment on one end 
to forced recruitment on the other end of the spectrum, within which only the extreme ends are 
fully mutually exclusive.153 That being said, not all children in war zones choose to fight, and 
child soldiers represent only a very small percentage of the child population in conflict regions. 
Although some of the literature on child soldiers speaks of children volunteering to join armed-
groups, the literature often undermines their agency and children’s ability to make their own 
choice with regard to recruitment. Acknowledging that children may ‘chose’ to fight requires a 
different approach in the post-conflict phase. 
 
Another common assumption made in the literature is that the plight of child soldiers is the 
worst among war-affected children.154 The opposite is sometimes true. Child soldiers can often 
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provide themselves with basic needs such as food albeit through looting, while civilian children 
are at the whim of combatants. To portray this can be misleading, especially in light of the reality 
that many children join armed forces in a hope for survival and protection. These two common 
assumptions may be a product of the reality that much of the literature on child soldier is 
produced by activists who’s underlying goal is to eradicate the use of child soldiers. Their 
literature is commonly used for their fundraising, and to show child soldiers as having free-will, 
having chosen to fight or not having the worst plight among children in war changes the highly 
emotive narrative and changes the perception of the issue. Moreover, if it was acknowledged that 
children were choosing to fight, the response to child soldiering would also have to be adapted 
and deepened.  
 
Like most complex things, the recruitment and motives of child soldiers are not homogenous 
and often represent a combination of factors. There are push and pull factors that influence a 
child’s unforced participation as a soldier. Once again, it is important to appreciate the context in 
which they live in. Push factors ‘are negatives that children escape by joining an armed-group… 
[which can include]… abuse, boredom, physical insecurity, extreme poverty, and the humiliation 
associated with personal or family victimization and shame.’155 Pull factors ‘are positive rewards or 
incentives for joining armed-groups.’156 Many children who join armed-group do so because of 
the perceived benefits. Having much influence over children, pull factors include a sense of 
family or support structure, a sense of protection, power, women, revenge, wealth, education, 
excitement or a sense of adventure, being part of something important and in a way giving their 
life meaning.157 Whether it is to revenge the death or abuse of their family, or whether to gain 
access to wealth or women, these different elements of push and pull factors are common cited 
by former child soldiers as important reasons why they joined an armed movement. 
 
Recruiters understand these complexities and are very aware as well as keen to manipulate these 
diverse factors in their favour. Also, the many reasons that children choose to fight are not static 
and may change as their participation evolves and deepens. For instance, a child may have 
initially joined to seek revenge for the murder of his family; although his/her motivation may 
change once exposed to the loot and perceived wealth. Moreover, children are seldom only 
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motivated by only one factor, as the reasons for fighting are highly contextual they can vary from 
individual to individual even within the same conflict.158  
 
The Experience of Child Soldiers 
Once children join armed-groups and in order to adapt to their plight as a soldier they undergo a 
profound transition from their former civilian life.159 They enter into a world of excess danger 
and heightened risk often governed by subjugation at the hands of their commanders. To 
survive, the children have to accept their group’s rules and are often go through a re-socialization 
process. This re-socialization process and the child’s acceptance of their situation vary depending 
on their method of entry into the group, the children’s context and their role.160 Youngsters who 
were abducted or recruited against their will are often controlled through terror or brutal means 
such as beatings. This terror may start under the fear of death when the child is abducted and 
forced to kill a family member or member of their community. It forces them into becoming 
highly obedient. While on the other hand, youngsters who were not forced into joining an 
armed-group often receive propaganda to engage them rather than beatings as a means of 
demanding obedience. However, they may still be beaten in order to discipline them.  
 
Once within a group, children often receive some form of training or indoctrination. Training is 
primarily aimed at subjugating and re-socializing the recruits to the group rules, to a new set of 
behaviour and morality.161 This is an integral part of the process of turning children into an 
effective soldier and fighter. All armed-groups require obedience, as to break rules, especially in 
combat situations, could jeopardise the entire group. Some armed-groups teach their new 
recruits fighting techniques – such as how assemble and disassemble automatic weapons, how to 
shoot, and other combat tasks. However, most of the training is inadequate to protect or equip 
the soldiers against the danger they face in combat. Not all groups that use child soldiers give 
them survival or fighting training, and depending on the child’s role it may not be necessary to 
receive training (for instance, cooks). In some situations children and adults receive similar 
training upon entry into the armed-group.  
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In spite of and to a large part being constantly exposed to abuse, death, killing and through the 
manipulation or denial of personal responsibility children are made into effective killers. 
Although some child soldiers struggle to embrace their new identity, many child recruits re-
constitute their identity as fighters. They are forced into a context or new moral space, where 
brutality and killing is not only seen as normal, but is often encouraged and even rewarded. 
Fighters are given nicknames or combat names often inspired by their fighting style or level of 
brutality. Combat nicknames can hold a certain level of expectation (for example, if it is a name 
connoted with brutality), and can help to change the behaviour of the child soldier in order to 
conform to his/her nickname. For example, Liberian child soldiers were given nicknames such 
as “Ball Crusher” and “Castrator” based on how they treated enemy captives, something that 
probably meant that they continued such treatment of captives.162 The identities of child soldiers 
are very fluid and like most children are heavily influenced by their context, their surroundings, 
their peers and their survival instincts. 
 
It is common for soldiers to be influenced by media. This influence can be in the form of 
political or religious propaganda or something more sinister. Child soldiers in Africa are 
frequently shown graphic Hollywood war films such as Rambo and Platoon. This is done in 
order to not only get them excited about combat, but to de-sensitise them to violence, show a 
macho image, help justify of the violence in the conflict, in addition to illustrate military 
command structures and basic jungle warfare.163  
 
Some armed-groups prohibited drugs and alcohol to be consumed by their fighters. Others 
encourage this practice and in some cases forced their soldiers to consume alcohol and drugs. 
The use of alcohol and drugs has been well documented by former child soldier testimony across 
the globe as a means of solidarity or social bonding and a tool to dull inhibitions. In many 
conflicts in Africa, for instance in Angola, Liberia and Sierra Leone, commanders not only 
encouraged but forced their fighters to drink alcohol in the form of palm wine, cane-spirit, or 
beer, smoke marijuana and take amphetamines, locally known as ‘bubble’ or ‘brown-brown’ 
which was a mixture of cocaine and gunpowder.164 The alcohol and drugs serve a few 
purposes— to instil courage, ferocity, and a sense of invincibility into the fighters, as well as to 
further help blur the distinction between right and wrong. The alcohol and drugs also helped 
keep the fighters dependent on their commanders who often controlled their supply and would 
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distribute the alcohol/drugs before battle. During their participation in the war many of the 
fighters became dependant to alcohol and drugs.165  
 
Children’s roles may vary according to their size, gender, ability, and the needs of their armed-
group. For instance, one must be of a certain physical build to carry heavy loads or handle and 
carry a weapon. Children are often used in auxiliary roles—as messengers, porters, cooks, spies 
or as wives. Children are also often used as combatants—on the frontlines, as executioners, 
bodyguards or to guard checkpoints. Child soldiers often engage in looting, which many armed-
groups rely on for their basic supplies and needs. It is not uncommon for children’s roles to 
evolve over time. For instance, they may start out as a porter and soon be wielding a gun on 
frontlines. Some child soldiers never see the frontlines or combat, while others spend the bulk of 
their time fighting. The experiences of child soldiers are diverse, even within the same conflict. 
Some children fight reluctantly always looking for an opportunity to escape and rejecting to 
embrace their soldier identity, while others willingly take on their fighter identities and enjoy 
perpetrating war.166 As every conflict is unique, the combatants’ experiences within it vary. 
 
War has huge impacts on civilian populations, as well as those directly involved in the 
perpetuation of conflict. In many ways the impacts that war has on child soldiers is similar to the 
various impacts that war has on the society as a whole and are not necessarily distinct from their 
adult counterparts. The structural elements such as the economic, educational, health and 
transportation infrastructures are usually left in ruins as a result of conflict. Houses, schools, 
hospitals, and farms are commonly burnt down or looted and people are often displaced or 
killed. Many if not most children receive no education and often receive no or inadequate 
healthcare during wars. By soldiering the danger of disease, physical ailments, such as being shot, 
stabbed, taken captive, deafness, being maimed and ultimately death is severely heightened. For 
example, in Sierra Leone 92 percent of the rebels were tested positive for sexually transmitted 
diseases.167 Many child soldiers die as a result of their participation, exactly how many though is 
not known and this is not reflected in the aggregate number of child soldiers.  
 
Like the general population, beyond the structural hardships and physical ailments caused by the 
war and their participation in it, child soldiers also suffer many psychological and social impacts. 
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It is common for former child soldiers to experience varying degrees of trauma, shame, guilt, 
isolation and/or stigma due to their involvement in war. Trauma can be caused by the 
victimisation, witnessing and/or perpetration of violence or experiencing loss. This trauma can 
be severely debilitating if not dealt with effectively. To what extent a person is traumatised 
depends on their individual experience (both during and after war), exposure to hardship, their 
coping mechanisms, and resilience as well as their support structures. Although trauma can 
manifest itself differently, some common affects are headaches, dizziness, nightmares, 
nervousness, social isolation, difficulty concentrating, violent behaviour, inability to distinguish 
between fact and fiction, or substance abuse.168 These are commonly referred to as the 
psychosocial impacts of war. Many traumatised former child soldiers experience difficulties 
adjusting their behaviour in post-conflict societies. That being said, not all children are affected 
equally and many exhibit a great deal of resilience to overcome these psychological issues.169 Just 
as the children had to readjust to life as a soldier, the former soldiers must readjust back to life as 
a civilian. This process can be complex, take time and may also further isolate the ex-combatant. 
And these feelings and stresses do not magically disappear once they exit from the armed-group 
or the war ends. Addressing these psychosocial stresses is integral to the demobilisation and 
reintegration processes. This will be dealt with in greater detail in subsequent chapters. 
 
The Girl Soldier  
Just as child soldiers are a subset of armed-groups, girl soldiers represent a subsection of the 
child soldier group. Like their boy soldier counterparts, their reasons for joining, the roles that 
they fulfil, and the experiences are extremely diverse and complex even within the same conflict. 
Although this has improved over the last decade, the issue of girl soldiers has not received the 
same attention and acknowledgement as their boy counterparts despite them being present in 
almost every conflict were child soldiers are employed, albeit in smaller numbers than boys. 
Despite the Cape Town Principles explicitly including the girl soldier in their definition of a child 
soldier, they were virtually invisible in armed conflict, its analysis and early peacebuilding 
initiatives. However, there is now a body of literature and special practices dealing distinctly with 
girl soldiers. Just as there is danger in not fully understanding or addressing the reasons for 
participation, the roles, and the holistic impact that armed conflict has on children in general, the 
same is true for the girl soldier subset. The participation and experience of girl soldiers varies 
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from that of the boy soldier. These differences need to be explicitly addressed if peacebuilding is 
going to work.  
 
Much of the early literature on girl soldiers only superficially dealt with the issue and did not take 
into account the holistic context of those girls’ lives. The literature saw them inherently and 
exclusively as victims. Moreover, the literature over-generalises girl soldiers being abducted and 
taken as ‘wives’ for sexual exploitation.170 Although it is true that girl soldiers and girls in war 
zones generally do suffer from high rates of sexual exploitation, by no means does this accurately 
address the complexity or dynamism of the issue. Although there are many differences between 
the experience of boy and girl soldiers, the logic behind their uses is very much the same. Girls 
are recruited for many of the same reasons boys are. Girls can be very useful to armed-groups as 
highly effective fighters, and they represent a large and ready pool of recruits that can bolster the 
military capacity of and support armed-groups. These factors result in girls being actively 
recruited. From a military perspective, a bullet fired by a girl, is just as dangerous as one fired by 
an adult or a boy soldier.  
 
Conflict affects the vulnerability of all children resulting in girls, like boys, being recruited both 
forcibly and through unforced methods. In some cases, military service is compulsory for girls 
too (for example, Cuba and the Philippines).171 Just like boys, girls in and around conflict zones 
are rounded up through abductions, press ganging and quota systems. It was recorded that 
between 1990 and 2003, girls were forcibly recruited into armed-groups in twenty-eight 
countries.172 That being said, although sexual exploitation is often high and has been used as a 
weapon of war, it is not always a factor in the recruitment of girls. Heavily influenced by their 
environment and context, many girls choose to join armed-groups for a number of reasons. 
Many of the same push and pull factors, such as poverty, marginalization, abuse, or gaining 
protection; wanting to be rewarded with wealth and training are equal motivational factors to girl 
recruits. In the dangerous context of war, joining an armed-group may be seen as the best option 
for security, protection and accessing basic needs. However, like boys, regardless of how they are 
recruited, girls are not generally free to disassociate themselves with the armed-group once they 
have joined. 
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Girls often fulfil as diverse roles as soldiers. They often carry out many of the same tasks that 
they would perform in society, things like cooking, cleaning and minding children.173 However, 
beyond these societal roles, gender does not necessarily dictate the other functions and roles of 
girls within armed-groups. Although girls are often primarily portrayed as camp followers, 
porters, or sexual exploits, in addition to these roles girls also spy, guard checkpoints, fight on 
frontlines and can command other fighters. Small arms and light weapons have allowed girls to 
take up arms. Girls can be equally as effective and brutal as either boy or adult counterparts. It 
has been said that as girls often fulfil many overlapping functions (be it as a frontline fighter, 
wife, and/or cook) their roles are dynamic and should be seen in the larger political, social, and 
economic context of the conflict, especially in the post-conflict peacebuilding initiatives such as 
DDR.174  
Girls often suffer the same hardships and fear as their boy counterparts, although they have the 
added danger of gender-based violence or sexual exploitation. Many abducted girls are taken by 
boy and men soldiers as their ‘wives’ or concubines. These girls are effectively turned into sex 
slaves and are frequently raped and forced to have sex with the soldiers or face severe 
punishments or death.175 Some girls enter into relationships with fighters and commanders to 
receive a degree of protection from being sexually assaulted by other men. Often there are 
complex dynamics regarding the relationships that are forged in conflict.  
 
The sexual vulnerability and targeting of girls and women is a common feature in modern war. 
This can have a devastating legacy on the girls on these girls specially and on the community as a 
whole. Many girls get infected with sexually transmitted diseases, such as HIV, syphilis and 
gonorrhoea, due to their sexual abuse and the promiscuity of wartime sexual exploits/relations. 
Moreover, it is not uncommon for many of these girl soldiers or soldiers’ wives to give birth, 
which often comes with a number of complications. For instance, if the mother is HIV positive, 
the disease is often given to the baby due to inadequate medical care and attention. Once there is 
a baby in the picture, it becomes more difficult for the woman to break the relationship with the 
soldier or father (if she knows who it is) both emotionally and for very practical reasons such as 
financial support. In some circumstances there is negative stigma attached to giving birth to a 
war-baby. The reality of the sexual abuse of girls during armed conflict necessitates a targeted 
response in the post-conflict peacebuilding stage. Despite improvements in the international 
response, the implementation and protection of women in armed conflict has been weak. 
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The Implications of Child Soldiers on War 
The use of child soldiers has important implications, none of which are positive. The 
participation of children in armed conflict adds a new dynamic to force generation. Without the 
need to have a popular base of support or a strong ideology, children make potentially weak 
groups strong enough to wage and sustain war.176 As it is now easier for armed-groups to 
generate force in order to perpetuate war, the prevalence of wars has also increased—thus 
resulting in increased insecurity. Beyond influencing the ease of starting war, the participation of 
children in wars also lengthen the duration of a war by adding to the fighting capacity of the 
armed-groups making it harder for military victories. Conflicts that use child soldiers are 
inherently more likely to have increased atrocities and civilian casualties. That is because child 
soldiers exacerbate the level of violence and atrocities within a conflict. Child soldiers do not 
know, nor do they respect any of the rules of war. Generally, it is civilians that bear the brunt of 
the violence committed by child soldiers, as we have seen resulting in civilians bearing the brunt 
of the atrocities and casualties. Moreover, the use of young combatants establishes a legacy of 
violence, which unless broken and addressed, makes it more likely that violence and insecurity 
will persist or return.177 In sum, child soldiers make wars easier to start, more brutal, last longer, 
and harder to end. This last point emphasises the need for effective DDR of child soldiers.  
 
The International Response to Child Soldiering 
The UN took up the issue of child soldiers as it became clear that the nature of war had changed, 
the prevalence of civil wars increased, and children’s participation in war caught the attention of 
the world. In 1996, with the support and pressure of NGOs, the UN General Assembly 
published the groundbreaking report titled ‘Impact of Armed Conflict on Children.’178 In this 
report the author Mrs. Graça Machel was tasked with examining five key issues related to armed 
conflict: (1) children’s participation, (2) preventive measures, (3) the adequacy of existing 
standards, (4) measures to improve protection of children, and (5) the promotion of children’s 
physical and psychological recovery and social reintegration.179 The report was groundbreaking 
not only because of its topic which had not yet been thoroughly explored, but because of its 
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impact on the emerging field. The Machel Report examined, investigating and exposed many of 
the complexities and hardships children bear as a result of war. The report brought much needed 
attention to and increased the UN’s and policymakers’ understanding of the issues relating to 
children and armed conflict. Moreover, it provided a blue-print and recommendations, placing 
the issue of child soldiers within the general context of children and armed conflict. Importantly, 
the UN implemented the reports recommendation by appointing a Special Representative of the 
Secretary-General on Children and Armed Conflict and establishing an office to support that 
effort.180 By 1996 that the UN had become committed to improving its understanding about the 
impact armed conflict had on children, and since then has become extremely active in attempting 
to improve the plight of war affected children. 
 
The mandate of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Children and Armed 
Conflict (SRSG-CAAC) included: (i) Public advocacy to build greater awareness and mobilise the 
international community for action; (ii) promoting the application of international norms and 
traditional value systems that provide for the protection of children in times of conflict; (iii) 
undertaking political and humanitarian diplomacy and proposing concrete initiatives to protect 
children in the midst of war; and (iv) making the protection and welfare of children a central 
concern in peace processes and in post-conflict programmes for healing and rebuilding.181 
Beginning in 1998, every year the SRSG-CAAC presented the UNGA with a comprehensive 
report documenting the office’s activities and strategies, the context and plight of the world’s 
children with regard to armed conflict, and provide recommendations to improve the situation. 
The work of the office of the SRSG-CAAC succeeded in elevating the international political 
profile of children and armed conflict, including and especially that of child soldiers. 
 
In 1999, at the request of the SRSG-CAAC the UN Security Council placed the issue of children 
and armed conflict on its annual agenda. This initial debate resulted in UNSC Resolution 1261 
which not only confirmed that the general issue of children and armed conflict and specifically 
the recruitment and use of child soldiers was of concern to the UNSC, but also to international 
peace and security.182 Setting the foundation for future resolutions, the UNSC recognises the 
impact that proliferation of arms on the security of civilians and children in particular, and called 
for an end of the recruitment and use of child soldiers. Moreover, the resolution called on states 
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to include provisions for child protection mechanisms during conflicts, in peace negotiations, 
and in post-conflict peacebuilding when and where relevant.  
 
Since 1999, there have been six UNSC resolutions and five statements by the President of the 
Security Council each progressively stronger providing greater scope for engagement and 
mechanisms to deal with children and armed conflict.183 The UNSC resolutions addressed a 
multitude of important issue. They provided much needed clarification as well as required action 
regarding: the development of international legal instruments; training of peacekeeping and 
humanitarian personnel; monitoring and reporting on the use of child soldiers; the need to 
address the impact of HIV/AIDS on children at war; called for addressing the links between the 
illegal trade in natural resources and small arms and children; mainstreaming children rights in 
peacekeeping, negotiations and peacebuilding; justice issues; and the punishment of those who 
recruit and use children soldiers.184 The last two resolutions articulate the UNSC’s concerns of 
the lack of progress on the ground in protecting children from the impact of armed conflict and 
call for the identification of groups that recruit and use child soldiers in addition to a time-bound 
action plan to stop such practices.185 Moreover, as the UNSC resolutions represented the 
evolving interests, concerns and understanding of the severity of the problem, the UNSC went 
as far as developing country specific targeted sanctions and other graduated measures against 
those responsible for violating international law with regard to the protection of children and 
armed conflict.186 Unfortunately this practice of naming and shaming has not been successful 
enough to halt the recruitment or use of child soldiers all together. 
 
Besides providing a framework for the protection of children affected by armed conflict within a 
series of UNSC resolutions, the UN has spearheaded several other relevant initiatives relating to 
children and armed conflict—including the criminalization of the recruitment and use of child 
soldiers, assisting in raising the minimum age of recruitment through the CRC-OP and diligently 
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monitoring the plight of child soldiers. In 1998, the codification and establishment of the 
International Criminal Court’s statute represented an important moment and shift of legal 
frameworks. As a result of the creation of the International Criminal Court, the recruitment and 
use of children under the age of 15 was criminalised and was categorised as a war crime.187 The 
International Labour Organisation ranked child recruitment and child soldiering as one of the 
worst forms of child labour in its Convention 182 (1999). The UN played an integral role in the 
creation of the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the 
Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict (2000) which raises the minimum age of recruitment 
to 18. In addition, other relevant UN agencies such as UNICEF, UNHCR, and UNDP have 
been engaged and have aligned or mainstreamed their policies with regard to child protection. 
Despite the field progressing aggressively in a relatively short amount of time (since 1996), and 
the development of a framework for child protection there are still very many vulnerable 
children around the world and recruitment and use of child soldiers has not noticeably reduced. 
 
The field of children and armed conflict has greatly benefited by the support of the donor 
community, the work of international as well as local NGOs, think-tanks and academics. NGOs 
have played a vital role not only in giving children and armed conflict international exposure, but 
also in helping design and deliver services on the ground to mitigating war’s impacts on 
children.188 NGOs have been responsible for documenting, and framing the context of the 
human rights abuses. Their literature often provides testimonials and manages to put a face to 
the human right violations endured.189 The Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers is a 
collaborative organisation that has emerged as one of the leaders with regard to child soldiering. 
The Coalition has quickly become the gate-keeper of statistical data on child soldiers, and has 
published general information, thematic reports, and Global Reports documenting every 
country’s information on the recruitment and use of child soldiers. These organisations in many 
ways provide checks-and-balances of the UN as well as governments on the ground attempting 
to hold them to account for their actions positive or negative. Since 1996 academics have shown 
an interest in the area of children and armed conflict, and have helped better understand the 
situation through their publications. Although there is much repetition in academic and NGO 
literature, the analysis had overall contributed positively to the field. 
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The use of children in armed conflict is by no means a new phenomenon. Since the late 1990’s 
the use of child soldiers has gained the attention of policymakers, scholars the international 
media and human rights advocates. Although there is now a greater understanding about the 
reasons why children are mobilised as soldiers, how they are recruited and the roles they fulfil, all 
of which vary and are numerous, it is undeniable that children can be made into effective 
fighters. There are political, moral and ethical challenges presented in the use of child soldiers. 
When children are used as soldiers, wars are more violent, last longer and are harder to bring to 
an end. With varying degrees of success, this attention on child soldiers has translated into 
tangible responses on an international and national level in an attempt to try to protect children. 
It is in this context that the Liberian war was fought.   
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Liberia is Africa’s oldest republic, founded on 26 July 1847. Liberia is a small West 
African country bordering Sierra Leone to the west, Guinea to the north, and Côte 
d’Ivoire to the east. Geographically the country covers 43,000 square miles 
(approximately the same size as the State of Tennessee in USA or slightly larger than 
Portugal or Hungary) with a 340-mile coastline along the Atlantic Ocean to the south.190 
The country is well endowed with natural resources including timber, diamonds, iron ore, 
gold, and rubber. Before the outbreak of civil war in 1989, its population was 
approximately two and half million people.191 In 2007, its population was estimated at 
slightly over three million.192  
 
In order to understand the roots of the Liberian conflict, it is necessary to appreciate the 
nation’s unique past, its political landscape, as well as demographic composition and 
previous attempts at peacebuilding. The antecedents of the Liberian civil war date back 
to 1847, when the country was founded by black American settlers who were sent back 
to Africa after the abolition of slavery. These ex-slaves represented only 5% of the 
population, estimated at 1.8 million in 1847.193 They colonised Liberia and established a 
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political system where they consolidated all political and economic control as well as used 
their power to subjugate the indigenous Africans.194  
 
Liberia’s exclusionary history 
The oligarchy of American settlers, known as the Americo-Liberians, established the 
True Whig Party (TWP) in 1870, ‘which became a vehicle of total control over the state 
apparatus and oppression of the so-called hinterlanders [indigenous 
Africans/Liberians].’195 Until 1904 indigenous Africans or non-Americo-Liberians were 
denied citizenship and until 1964 they could not own land or vote.196 Indigenous 
Africans were commonly used as slave labour and were economically exploited. The 
Americo-Liberians elite physically tried to keep themselves separate from the Africans. 
They tried to prevent them from organising opposition amongst themselves in the 
hinterland (the inside of the country which was almost exclusively populated by 
Indigenous Africans). The hinterland was left undeveloped with poor roads, 
transportation and communication.197 Moreover, Americo-Liberians set an early 
precedent, they used the Liberian army, then known as the Liberian Frontier Force, to 
subjugate the majority population by using force to quell dissent or disobedience.198 The 
use of national armed forces to subjugate and terrorise Liberians continued until 2003. 
 
Although the plight of the Indigenous Africans started improving slightly in the 1960’s 
due to the superficial reform initiatives of two presidents (William Tubman (1944-71) 
and then William Tolbert (1971-80)) the TWP exclusively dominated politics 
uninterrupted for over 100 years. Liberia was ‘de facto both a one-party state and an 
apartheid state.’199 Where the elite created a system that prevented social cohesion and 
used patronage and their political control to enrich themselves while ruling the country.  
 
The 1970s was marked by economic decline which fuelled frustration among the 
majority of Liberians. The oil crisis of 1973 coupled with a decline in global demand for 
two of Liberia’s main exports, iron ore and rubber, adversely affected much of the 
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population. The flow of international aid into Liberia declined from $80 million in 1975 
to $44 million in 1976, while external debt rose from $156 million in 1970 to $600 
million in 1979.200 In April 1979 President Tolbert made an announcement that sent the 
nation into chaos. He proposed a 50 percent price increase to rice, one of the staple 
foods. This price hike resulted in riots throughout the country, which were violently put 
down by the armed forces. As a result of the Rice Riots, a state-of-emergency was 
declared and habeas corpus was suspended. The government used this opportunity to 
purge the opposition, rounding up opposition leaders who were arrested and indicted of 
treason. Members of the armed forces seen to be sympathetic to the opposition were 
also rounded up and arrested.  
 
Doe’s Coup 
The Americo-Liberian dominance in politics ended abruptly on 12 April 1980, when a 
group of seventeen low-ranking, barely literate, soldiers stormed the President’s 
residence and killed all its occupants including President Tolbert.201 One of the soldiers, a 
twenty-eight year old indigenous Liberian named Master-Sergeant Samuel Doe emerged 
as Liberia’s head of state and announced the successful coup on the radio. On 22 April 
1980, thirteen True Whig senior officials were publicly executed on a beach in Monrovia.  
 
Initially indigenous Liberians were pleased by the change in power and the perceived end 
of their subjugation by the Americo-Liberians. Although President Doe enjoyed initial 
popular support, this enthusiasm was short lived when his regime proved to be corrupt, 
opportunistic, self-serving, and repressive. Doe was a member of the Krahn tribe (who 
represented slightly less than 5 percent of the population) and quickly consolidated 
control over the country by created a patronage system to help his fellow tribe, 
marginalizing just about everyone else (except the Mandigos who he formed a strategic 
alliance with).202 A disproportionate number of senior posts in his administration, in the 
military and security forces were filled by members of the Krahn tribe loyal to Doe. 
Non-Krahn officials were either demoted or removed from their posts. Despite the 
country’s dire economic situation, the military and civil servants received between a 100 
and 150 percent salary increase to gain their loyalty and support.203 Doe created a 
repressive system where the Krahns replaced the dominance of the Americo-Liberians, 
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in what was seen by the majority of the population as a “changing of the guards” rather 
than a revolution for the indigenous Liberian or majority.204  
 
During Doe’s regime, corruption was pervasive, human rights abuses rampant, 
independent newspapers were shut down and all forms of dissidence was outlawed and 
punished heavily. His consolidation of power was absolute. He isolated or arrested 
anyone with political ambitions or popularity. Notably, in late 1983 Doe saw General 
Quicwonkpa, a member of the Gio tribe, and one of the members of the 1980 military 
coup that removed President Tolbert from office, as a threat to his regime due to his 
growing popularity. Doe ordered a military raid on Nimba County which was a base of 
support of General Quicwonkpa. The raid resulted in scores of dead, villages being 
looted and razed, and hundreds of people fleeing the country, including General 
Quicwonkpa.205  
 
From a Cold War perspective, in the early 1980’s the United States (US) lured Liberia 
away from Soviet and Libyan influences. Liberia quickly gained strategic importance to 
the US as a host of a military command centre (that could guide nuclear submarines), a 
re-fuelling point for US military planes and a powerful radio transmitter that relayed 
Voice of America broadcasts throughout Sub-Saharan Africa.206 Doe’s regime greatly 
benefited as a recipient to US support as well as financial aid.207 Between 1980 and 1985, 
receiving nearly $500 million, Liberia became the largest per capita recipient of United 
States aid in Sub-Saharan Africa.208 In same period, the US was ‘responsible for a third of 
the Liberian government’s revenues.’209 In 1984, the Regan Administration of the US 
applied pressure to return Liberia to civilian rule, resulting in Doe organised presidential 
elections. As the founder of the National Democratic Party of Liberia, President Doe 
contested (and rigged) the October 1985 presidential elections. Unsurprisingly he won by 
a 51 percent margin, and his party won 84 percent of the legislative vote.210 Marred by 
allegations of fraud and intimidation, Doe managed to hold on to power. As a civilian 
president he changed little, he continued to rule as a tyrant abusing human rights, taking 
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political prisoners, closing more newspapers, limiting freedom of speech and 
expression.211  
 
On 12 November 1985, a month after the election that was neither free nor fair, there 
was a failed coup attempt. Exiled General Thomas Quiwonkpa, entering Liberia from 
Sierra Leone and proceeded to pre-emptively proclaimed on national radio that his 
National Patriotic Forces of Liberia (NPFL) had taken control of the government. 
Quiwonka’s coup was motivated by the previous Nimba raids against his native Gio 
tribe, the rigged elections and general dissatisfaction towards Doe’s regime. Doe quickly 
mobilised the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) violently quelled Quiwonka’s revolt. In 
retaliation the AFL was used to further force to clamp down and punish supporters of 
Quiwonka discriminately killing approximately 3,000-4,000 Gio and Manos civilians from 
Nimba County, further exacerbating ethnic divisions throughout the country.212 ‘This 
single episode, more than any other, set the stage for the exploitation of ethnic rivalries 
that would eventually culminate in Liberia’s civil war.’213  
 
However, after Doe retaliated against the Gio and Manos in Nimba County President 
Doe’s position became untenable. The US drastically reduced and started withholding aid 
to Liberia due to human rights abuses and lack of democratic governance. This 
withholding of aid, coupled with further economic decline (by 1989 Liberia’s external 
debt was $1.4 billion214 and Liberia had defaulted on some of its international loans) and 
the decline of Liberia’s strategic importance to the US due to the end of the Cold War 
further isolated the Doe regime. Sub-regional politics became complicated and over the 
years Doe became an unpopular and disliked leader throughout West Africa. In 1980, 
Doe had broken a promise to the Ivorian President Félix Houphouët-Boigny by 
assassinating Adolphus Tolbert (President Tolbert’s son) who had been married to the 
President Houphouët-Boigny’s god-daughter/adopted daughter.215 Due to Cold War 
politics, in 1981, Doe broke ties with Libya in favour of the United States. Doe’s snub, 
coupled with Muammar Qaddafi’s revolutionary ambition and anti-American posture 
later prompted Libya to train and arm soldiers to revolt against Liberia’s leader. In 1987, 
the new Burkinabe president, Blaise Compaore, became indebted to a small group of 
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Liberian exiles (mainly Charles Taylor) for helping him in a successful coup d’état against 
Thomas Sankara. Both President Houphouët-Boigny of Côte d'Ivoire and Compaore of 
Burkina Faso later supported efforts to oust Doe.216 It is said that political exclusion, 
economic decline, corruption, murder and ethnic rivalry propagated by the Doe’s regime 
laid the seed for Liberia’s civil war.  
 
Outbreak of War 
Approximately 168 soldiers from Liberia, Burkina Faso, Gambia as well as Sierra Leone 
who had received training in Libyan and Burkinabe military camps sparking the Liberian 
civil war with a Christmas-eve attack (24 December 1989).217 Quiwonka’s failed coup in 
1985 and President Doe’s retaliation on Gio and Mano civilians effectively not only 
placed Nimba County at the epicentre of Doe’s opposition but also created a recruitment 
centre for future fighters, which Charles Taylor dutifully exploited in his 1989 insurgency 
against Doe. Many of these 168 soldiers were either supporters of Quiwonko or were 
themselves in exiled. The National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) headed by Charles 
Taylor, aimed to liberate Liberia of its military leader turned civilian president, Samuel 
Doe.  
 
A key feature of the Liberian conflict from the outset was the abandonment of all rules 
and conventions of war.218 Civilians were explicitly targeted and recruited as soldiers by 
all parties involved in this conflict, which was quickly galvanised by ethnicity. 219 The 
NPFL entered Liberia through Côte d'Ivoire, and openly declared war against President 
Doe by invading his troops in Nimba County. Doe responded quickly by deploying units 
of the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) to the area. The AFL retaliated against the 
insurgency by punishing ‘local villagers, killing, looting and raping, singling out people 
from the Gio and Mano ethnic groups whom they regarded as supporters of the invasion 
by reasons of their ethnic identity alone.’220 The government’s retaliation in addition to 
the collective experience of Nimba County’s Gio and Mano population supplied the 
NPFL with disaffected civilians ready to take up arms to avenge Doe’s maltreatment. 
NPFL recruited civilians, resulting in their numbers instantly swelling into the thousands. 
By June 1990, six months after their initial attack, the NPFL had grown to almost 5,000 
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men, women and children and then doubled in three months.221 Once armed, with little 
or no training, the new recruits targeted the Krahn and Mandingo populations perceived 
as Doe sympathisers. Many of the new recruits were children, who were readily 
integrated into the warring faction and organised into particular units known as Small 
Boy Units.222 Due to Doe’s lack of popularity and the brutality of the AFL’s strategy 
which contributed to the large number of civilian recruits, Taylor’s soldiers took control 
of Nimba County within a month. The war quickly spread beyond Nimba County, in a 
bloody attempt to capture Monrovia. However, Doe’s military managed to maintain 
control of Monrovia creating a military stalemate for control of the capital. 
 
Liberia’s civil war soon became characterised by the fracturing and emergence of warring 
factions. Initially, the NPFL was the sole contending faction against the Liberian 
government. Leading their approach on Monrovia, under two separate military 
commands, the NPFL formally split into two faction. Taylor retained control of the 
NPLF composed of the new civilian recruits, the Small Boys Units, and soldiers supplied 
to him by the Burkina Faso’s president. Prince Johnson (the former NPFL special force 
military commander) took control of the Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia 
(INPFL) which was composed of mostly trained soldiers. Although the NPFL and 
INPFL originated from a common entity they were not only fighting against government 
forces but between and amongst themselves. By 1996 there had been a total of six 
warring factions vying for not only control of territory, but of the defunct state. 
However, throughout the conflict Charles Taylor and his NPFL posed the biggest treat. 
 
Enter ECOWAS 
By August 1990, the Liberian conflict gained global attention. The West African sub-
region was particularly worried. The conflict had caused thousands of deaths and forced 
approximately 700,000 to seek refuge in neighbouring countries.223 There was a clear 
need for not only humanitarian but also peacekeeping assistance. However, attempts to 
engage the United States and to United Nations to intervened failed. America’s attention 
was focused on the Middle East, where Iraq had invaded Kuwait (August 1990) and the 
fresh memory of the failure of Somali intervention was on their mind.224 Furthermore, 
the United States along with Ethiopia and Zaire (now called the Democratic Republic of 
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Congo), the two African United Nations Security Council members, claimed the Liberian 
civil war was an internal matter, thus invoking sovereignty as a reason for non-
intervention.225  
 
From the onset of the war, members of the Economic Community of West African 
States (ECOWAS) had met to discuss a possible resolution to the conflict. On 7 August 
1990, spearheaded by Nigeria’s leader, General Babangida, and under Nigerian pressure 
ECOWAS voted to intervene militarily in the Liberian conflict. ECOWAS’s intervention 
brought with it dynamics involving sub-regional rivalries. This intervention was initially 
seen as a peacekeeping force aimed at: ending the large scale killing and displacement of 
civilians; protecting property and foreign nationals; protecting international peace and 
security in West Africa; and restoring order to Liberia.226 On 24 August 1990, ECOWAS 
deployed its Military Observer Group (ECOMOG) to Monrovia. The 3,500 strong 
peacekeeping force (which was increased to 6,000) was led by Nigeria, with Gambia, 
Ghana, Guinea, and Sierra Leone also contributed troops.227 Although two of the three 
Liberian warring factions (Doe’s government and Johnson’s INPFL) welcomed the 
presence of the Nigerian-dominated peacekeeping force and the attempt to resolve the 
conflict, Taylor adamantly opposed ECOMOG’s involvement in Liberia and vowed to 
attack the peacekeepers upon their arrival in Liberia. Taylor perceived Nigeria as a 
supporter of President Doe and ECOWAS’s involvement as an obstacle to his political, 
economic, and military advances in Liberia.  
 
Upon ECOMOG’s arrival to Monrovia, the peacekeepers came under attack by Taylor’s 
NPFL forces. Under attack, ECOMOG responded by defending themselves and within 
days managed to secure the first of many failed ceasefires. The ceasefire failed only days 
later on 10 September 1990, when President Doe was captured and killed by Johnson’s 
INPFL while visiting ECOMOG’s headquarters in Monrovia. Embarrassed by the 
capture and murder of Doe, ECOMOG replaced its commander and immediately 
switched their military posture from a peacekeeping to a peace-enforcement. ECOMOG 
went on the offensive against the NPFL in an attempt to defeat them. Meanwhile in 
October 1990, with Doe dead, the AFL and the INPFL signed an ECOMOG supported 
peace agreement creating an interim government. An academic, Professor Amos Sawyer, 
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was named interim President and the foundation was laid for further political 
negotiations. Although this peace agreement failed, it led the way to a series of 
subsequent peace agreements which inevitably also failed. The series of peace agreements 
excluded the NPFL (the main warring faction) and were flawed in various ways (such as 
not addressing disarmament or excluding key actors).228 By mid-November 1990, 
ECOMOG forces successfully pushed Taylor’s troops out of Monrovia. This prevented 
the NPFL from its likely military victory. Monrovia became a non-NPFL enclave. By 
doing so, ECOMOG had engaged itself in the war against the NPFL.  
 
From its inception, Taylor rejected the legitimacy of the interim government installed by 
ECOWAS which was protected by ECOMOG. Apart from Monrovia, by late 1990, 
NPFL controlled approximately 80-90% of Liberia, dubbed “Greater Liberia.” Taylor 
was its de facto leader, and had continuous support from his initial sponsors—the 
governments of Libya, Burkina Faso, and Côte d’Ivoire. Taylor established a parallel 
government based out of Gbarnga, the capital of Bong County. With control of the 
country and its territory came wealth from Liberia’s vast natural resources. Taylor quickly 
started amassing a fortune from the production and trade of resources, which he used to 
run his parallel government and finance his war efforts. Taylor was courted by countries 
interested in acquiring its natural resources. It was estimated that between 1990 and 
1994, annual exports of diamond, timber, rubber, gold and iron ore export averaged a 
total of $422 million.229 As the troops received no salary, they quickly became motivated 
by loot, booty and plunder. Roadblocks were set up throughout the territory providing 
the soldiers with plenty of opportunity for extortion.230 Greater Liberia was patrolled by 
NPFL troops, many of whom were children. As the NPFL strived throughout Greater 
Liberia, the ‘official’ Liberian government controlled little territory outside of Monrovia 
and ceased to function as a state.  
  
Taylor exported war to Sierra Leone. Taylor sought revenge against the Sierra Leonean 
government for providing a launching point for ECOMOG troops in 1990.231 The 
NPFL supported and financed Sierra Leonean dissidents creating the Revolutionary 
United Front (RUF). The RUF waged war against the Sierra Leonean government in 
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March 1991, and their invasion triggered the country’s ten-year civil war.232 The war in 
Sierra Leone quickly gained a logic of its own, mainly control of Sierra Leone’s natural 
resources. In September 1991, Taylor’s support of the RUF insurgency led the Sierra 
Leonean and Guinean governments supported and armed a proxy army, the United 
Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy (ULIMO), to fight against Taylor in 
Liberia. ULIMO was composed of mainly Krahn and Mandingos Liberian refugees in 
Sierra Leone, and were avenging Taylor’s persecution of Mandingos in Liberia and the 
burning down of more than one thousand mosques throughout the country.233 
Combatants that joined ULIMO were easily recruited and were united by their anti-
Taylor position. Although ULIMO initially fought in Sierra Leone against the RUF 
alongside the Sierra Leone’s government troops, they crossed the border and attacked 
the NPFL in Liberia. ULIMO quickly grew in strength as it joined forces and forged 
alliances in Liberia with the AFL, which were predominately Krahns. Just as Liberia was 
fighting a war by proxy in Sierra Leone through the RUF, Sierra Leone and Guinea were 
fighting in Liberia by proxy through ULIMO.234 Sierra Leonean and Guinean support of 
ULIMO further complicated the situation in Liberia as both countries had forces in 
ECOMOG in Liberia. There were allegations that ECOMOG helped arm ULIMO 
forces because they were united in their anti-Taylor stance.235 
 
Operat ion Octopus 
Fighting escalated after two years of failed ceasefire agreements in Liberia—including the 
Bamako Agreement of November 1990, the Banjul Agreement of December 1990, the 
Lome Agreement of February 1991, and a series of four agreements between June and 
October 1991 in Yamoussoukro. 236 In October 1992, the NPFL invaded Monrovia in 
hopes of capturing the capital and engaged ECOMOG forces in what became known as 
‘Operation Octopus’. Taking ECOMOG forces totally by surprise NPFL heavily shelled 
Monrovia targeting ECOMOG headquarters, the interim government’s headquarters, 
and the Nigerian embassy.237  
 
Initially under-equipped and under-resourced ECOMOG defended themselves fighting 
alongside AFL and ULIMO forces, further raising questions of partiality of the 
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intervention force. By the end of October, ECOMOG was able to bring the fighting 
under control and received reinforcements bringing the total number of troops to 10,000 
(of which 7,000 were Nigerian).238 ECOMOG went on a strong offensive, 
counterattacking NPFL strongholds and strategic locations throughout the countryside. 
ECOMOG used (Nigerian) warplanes to bomb the airport, ports, and used its (Nigerian) 
navy resources to isolate NPFL controlled ports reducing the movement of resources 
and arms. By December 1992, even though ECOMOG had been successful in defending 
Monrovia, several thousand people had died as a result of violence on both sides.239  
 
For the first time ECOMOG’s counter-offensive against NPFL put Taylor’s NPFL on 
the defensive. ECOWAS’s bombardment allowed ULIMO and other factions to gain 
control of territories previously controlled by NPFL. This push resulted in the NPFL 
losing its control of the port of Buchanan in the east, Roberts International Airport in 
the outskirts of Monrovia, as well as Lofa, Bomi and Cape Mount counties (cutting off 
Taylor’s access to Sierra Leone and his RUF sponsored allies.240 By July 1993, Taylor 
controlled only half of Liberia’s territory instead of the 95 percent that he controlled in 
early 1990.241 Moreover, it was estimated that by 1993, a total of 150,000 people had died 
as a result of the civil war, which by this point had gained the attention of the 
international media.242 For the first time since the war began, the UN Security Council 
intervened in the Liberian conflict by passing resolution 788, which imposed a complete 
arms embargo on all the Liberian warring factions.243 The UN Security Council also 
established UN Observer Mission in Liberia (or UNOMIL) aimed at balancing the 
partiality of ECOMOG, protect Liberia’s borders and enforce the arms embargo. 
Through a culmination of factors, most notably Taylor’s losing his ability to generate 
funds to continue waging war and restricted access to guns; Taylor became interested in 
negotiating a peace for the first time. This resulted in the Contonou agreement signed in 
July 1993.244  
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A Push for Peace 
Although the Contonou agreement built on the failures of previous agreements it did not 
provide a lasting peace. That said, it was significant in a number of ways. Unlike previous 
agreements all the main fighting factions (NPFL, AFL and ULIMO) signed up to the 
terms indicating for the first time that all factions were willing to negotiate a settlement. 
Although the factions were allowed to keep the territory under their control, the 
agreement called for the dissolution of the interim government (which was pretty much 
ineffective since its inception) and established a power-sharing transitional government 
composed of representatives from the warring factions and the interim government.245 
The agreement set a timetable for not only disarmament, but elections and a return to a 
constitutional government. As a result of this agreement for the first time the NPFL was 
part of the central government of Liberia and showed a willingness to disarm.  
 
Unfortunately it was not too long before the Contonou agreement broke down and 
fighting continued, although less intensively. The transitional government outlined by the 
Contonou agreement was plagued by factional politics and disagreement. Resulting in a 
stalled attempt to form a transitional government, disarmament never genuinely 
happened. By August 1994, due to the lack of political will among the factions and the 
inadequately equipped ECOMOG forces only 3,612 combatants (out of the estimated 
60,000) from the AFL, ULIMO, and NPFL had been disarmed.246 The attempt to broker 
peace was further complicated by the emergence of multiple additional factions due to 
shifting opportunistic alliances and ambitious warlords, which were not part of the 
Contonou agreement. In 1994, ULIMO split into two distinct factions along ethnic lines 
and waged war upon each other— Mandingo controlled ULIMO-K and Krahn 
controlled ULIMO-J. Taylor supported a NPFL splinter group, called the Lofa Defence 
Force, to locally fight ULIMO-K in resource rich Lofa County. After five years of 
fighting and multiple failed peace agreements, the Liberian conflict was more 
complicated than before. Old and new factions were fighting each other as well as sub-
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A shi f t  in the reg ion 
Although ECOWAS acknowledged the need for a lasting peace in Liberia, they could not 
bring the war to an end either by political or military means. In late-1993, there were 
significant changes within the West African sub-region which had an impact on the 
Liberian conflict. Nigeria, ECOMOG’s largest financier and contributor, was under new 
management. General Babangida a staunch supporter of ECOMOG’s efforts and friend 
of former President Doe (which was a strong reason why he took an anti-NPFL/Taylor 
approach to the conflict) resigned from power.247 After a short-lived unelected interim 
government led by a businessman Ernest Shonekan, General Abacha assumed power 
over Nigeria. As Nigeria’s chief of staff (Nigeria’s second most powerful military officer) 
for eight years under Babangida, Abacha had been intimately involved in Nigeria’s efforts 
with ECOMOG and immediately after assuming power pledged his commitment to 
helping resolve the conflict in Liberia.248 There was a change in policy and Nigeria took a 
more pragmatic approach, one that was less confrontational. The change in power meant 
that the personal animosity between Babangida and Taylor was no longer an issue.249 
There was also a new leader in Côte d’Ivoire. The death of President Félix Houphouët-
Boigny ‘depersonalised the conflict and removed the family reasons for which Abidjan 
had initially backed Charles Taylor and opposed Doe.’250 Côte d’Ivoire’s new president, 
Henri Konan Bédié, immediately distanced itself from the NPFL and pledged better 
cooperation with ECOWAS to end the war. Ghana, ECOMOG’s second largest 
contributor, was growing more concerned as well as frustrated by with the lack of 
progress in Liberia when it was appointed as ECOWAS’s Chairman. For the first time, 
the governments of Nigeria, Côte d’Ivoire, and Ghana shared the common interest of 
seeing a resolution to the Liberian conflict. And they saw conciliation with Charles 
Taylor as an avenue to arriving at that resolution.251  
 
With renewed interest, Ghana brokered the Abosombo Agreement in September 1994 
while fighting raged throughout Liberia. The agreement was meant to supplement the 
failed Contonou agreement and clarify obstacles. The main elements of this agreement 
addressed decision-making structures, and called for the Armed Forces of Liberia to be 
reformed to address the nation’s post-conflict challenges.252 The agreement set up a 
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decision-making body composed of a five member Council of State— comprised of 
representatives of NPFL, ULIMO-K, ULIMO-J, the Coalition (composed of LPC, LDF, 
the CRC-NPFL and the AFL), the Liberian National Conference, and one representative 
elected by the electoral college of the transitional government. The Abosombo 
Agreement also created nine ECOMOG-protected safe havens throughout Liberia 
(Monrovia, Gbarnga, Buchanan, Greenville, Harper, Totota, Tubmanburg, Voinjama, 
and Zwedru).253 However like all previous attempts, this agreement failed due to lack of 
cohesion amongst the warring factions and over-ambitious desires. The failure of the 
Abosombo Agreement led to negotiations resulting in the Abuja Accords (beginning in 
August 1995) which finally concluded the fighting and outlined for elections to be held 
the following year. 
 
The Abuja Accords 
As the leader of the strongest faction and greatest spoiler, Charles Taylor, was heavily 
courted by Nigeria’s President Abacha. In June 1995 they had come to an agreement that 
gave promise to a lasting ceasefire.254 Under Nigerian influence, the heads of states from 
all the nine ECOWAS nations, all the Liberian warlords, as well as representatives of 
Tanzania and Uganda (who had contributed troops to Liberia’s peacekeeping efforts) 
met in Abuja to discuss a possible solution to the Liberian conflict. Building on the 
failure of previous attempts (twelve failed agreements), they negotiated and signed an 
agreement (in August 1995) that had the consensus of all participating parties.255 The 
main obstacles preventing previous agreements were overcome. A six-member Council 
was created, with a chairman and five vice-chairmen of equal status, which included the 
three most powerful warlords—Taylor (NPFL), Kromah (ULIMO-K), Boley (the 
Coalition). Placing the head of the main fighting factions on the Council gave it the 
authority that previous reconciliation attempts lacked.256 The agreement gave the factions 
joint control of the Liberian government, ‘encouraging them to pursue by political means 
the interests which they had previously contested in battle.’257 The agreement stipulated 
that in the coming elections (scheduled for 20 August 1996), all members of the council 
could run for office as long as they resigned from the council three months before the 
elections (except the chairman—who was a fairly unknown player).258 Like its 
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predecessor, the Abuja Accord outlined the deployment of ECOMOG and UN observer 
forces throughout Liberia (UNOMIL). This agreement contained the best effort to 
address a disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration plan which would take place 
between October 1995 and February 1996. Moreover, for the first time, all the faction 
leaders agreed what the DDR process should entail.259 The factions provided a list of 
59,370 fighters that would participate in the disarmament process (this inflated figure was 
later reduced to cover 33,000 fighters).260  
 
Although the Accord showed much promise when the Council was inaugurated in 
Monrovia, like previous peace agreements fell short of their expectations as fighting 
erupted again. Like on the battlefield, Taylor tried to usurp political power through his 
role in the Council. In violation of the Abuja agreement and as disarmament began, 
localised fighting erupted. An incident where ULIMO-J troops led by Roosevelt Johnson 
attacked ECOMOG forces in Tubmanburg in December 1995, led to an escalation of 
fighting.261 Sixteen Nigerian peacekeepers were killed, seventy-eight were wounded and 
lots of heavily weaponry was seized. After weeks of fighting, this caused ECOMOG to 
demand the return of its weapons while retreating from Tubmanburg and suspending its 
plans to deploy troops throughout Liberia to implement the scheduled disarmament 
processes. ECOMOG would not put its troops in harm’s way, without the main warlords 
guaranteeing their safety. In the east, cross-border attacks occurred as fighting spilt into 
Côte d’Ivoire.  
 
Responding to ECOMOG’s demands, the executive council of ULIMO-J removed 
Roosevelt Johnson as its chairman (and replacing him with William Karyee) and 
demanded the return of the weapons seized. This caused a further breakdown of security 
and brought Monrovia under attack when in April 1996; the Council of State condemned 
ULIMO-J’s attack on ECOMOG troops and ordered the arrest of Johnson. Taylor and 
Krohmah ordered their NPFL and ULIMO-K troops to assist with the arrest Johnson 
which led to all out war between NPFL and ULIMO-K forces against Johnson loyalists 
within ULIMO-J, AFL, and LPC. The NPFL troops took the opportunity to looted 
Monrovia in what they called ‘Operation Pay Yourself’ resulting in the seizure of 322 UN 
vehicles and 167 NGO vehicles worth $4.9 million and $3.2 million respectively.262 When 
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the fighting had subsided in late May 1996, Taylor had regained control of some resource 
rich areas in the south-east and around Kakata and an estimated 3,000 people had died in 
the fighting, mostly civilians.263 
 
Embarrassed by the latest outbreak of fighting, Nigeria replaced its ECOMOG 
commander and once again brought everyone to the negotiation table to restore the 
peace timetable agreed upon in Abuja.264 On 17 August a new timetable was agreed 
upon, known as Abuja II. The agreement brought the first Abuja Agreement back on 
track as well as outlining a very clear schedule for disarmament beginning August 1997 
and national elections being held in May 1997 with the elected government being sworn 
in no later than 15 June 1997.265 Shortly thereafter, ECOMOG and UNOMIL forces 
were reinforced. Although slightly delayed by March 1997, 21,315 fighters had disarmed 
and 9,570 weapons and 1.2 million rounds of ammunition were collected.266  
 
Taylor had realised that he would not be able to wrestle control of Liberia by force alone, 
and led the trend to turn his war machine in a political entity to compete in the 
upcoming election. To be eligible to contest the presidential elections, 28 February 1997, 
the three main warlords—Taylor Kromah and Boley resigned from the Council of State 
and converted their factions into political parties. Taylor’s NPFL became the National 
Patriotic Party (NPP), Krohmah’s ULIMO-K became the All Liberian Coalition Party 
(ALCOP), and Boley’s Coalition became the National Democratic Party of Liberia 
(NDPL). Taylor had the most sophisticated approach and an advantage. He had for 
many years controlled a shadow government of ‘Greater Liberia’ and already controlled 
media outlets such as radio stations which broadcasted throughout Liberia.267  
 
Postponed by two months, with international support Liberia went to the polls on 19 
July 1997 in which 85 percent of the eligible population of 750,000 voted.268 The 
international community (the United Nations, many of its member states as well as 
international observers) hailed the poll as Liberia’s fairest election in history.269 The 
elections were declared free and fair. Charles Taylor and his NPP party won the elections 
by a land-slide. Taylor received 75 percent of the presidential vote, and his NPP party 
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won a decisive majority in both the Senate and House of Representatives (twenty-one 
out of twenty six seats and forty-nine of sixty-four seats respectively).270 Apart from 
being a charismatic leader who appealed to young voters, the citizenry had voted for 
Taylor because of their desire for peace. They knew that if he did not win the elections, 
he would likely re-arm and return war to Liberia.271 So after 7 year of fighting, and 
ECOWAS’s attempt to prevent what became unavoidable, Taylor became Liberia’s 
president. 
 
Mechanics  o f  War 
From the very start of the war, civilians suffered the highest causalities. The conflict 
inflicted damage on every Liberian, whether it was through displacement, malnutrition, 
or direct exposure to combat. The cost of the war was tragic in every sense of the term. 
Civilians were recruited as fighters by every faction, and waged war on their fellow 
Liberian citizens. Ethnicity was galvanised and manipulated by the various factions to 
fuel the fires of war. Human rights abuses were committed by all participating faction, 
including ECOMOG.272 Civilians were the main targets of the war and an estimated 
200,000 deaths occurred. More than half of the population was displaced resulting in the 
flight of between 700,000 and 1.75 million people (depending on the source).273 Liberia 
was looted and its citizens were not only terrorised but also traumatised. Politically, the 
Liberian war plagued the West African region and entangled the sub-region in to a 
complex war fuelled by personal animosity. ECOWAS’s legitimacy was severely 
questioned due to its actions as both peacekeeper and peace-enforcer. The entanglement 
and involvement of the ECOWAS nations (such as Burkina Faso, Ghana, Côte d’Ivoire 
and Nigeria) illustrated the highly personalised nature of the regional dynamics. Nigeria 
suffered the loss of approximately 500 soldiers and spent an estimated $8 billion on the 
intervention efforts.274 
 
Taylor as pres ident 
When President Taylor was inauguration there was the gigantic task of rebuilding Liberia 
after its devastating war. Taylor dutifully pledged to promote national unity, to reconcile 
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Liberia’s people, to respect human rights, and re-establish peace and security both at 
home and abroad.275 Although Liberia was relatively stable and peaceful between 1997 
and 2000, President Taylor made little effort to genuinely accomplish any of these goals. 
This included any efforts to reintegrate former soldiers (many of whom were his former 
enemies). Apart from ensued discontent, this failure to reintegrate former combatants 
and soldiers proved to be a strong factor in the remobilisation of factions against him. 
Months after his inauguration he abandoned these goals in favour of consolidating his 
power and control over Liberia. He fell out with the ECOMOG commander over the 
restructuring of the Armed Forces of Liberia as outlined in the Abuja Accords, which 
ultimately resulted in full withdrawal of ECOMOG by the end of 1998. In a move that 
mirrored his political predecessors, Taylor did not honour his commitment to restructure 
the Armed Forces of Liberia based on national interests and instead replaced all 2,500 
Krahn soldiers with veteran NPFL soldiers.276 Taylor created the Anti-Terrorist Unit 
(ATU) which was an institutionalised militia of Taylor-loyalist. Taylor used the security 
services to consolidate his power and repress dissent.  
 
Taylor was unable and unwilling to convert himself from a warlord to a statesman. 
Under the guise of president, Taylor continued to loot Liberia. He ran the country as 
though it was his own fiefdom, which it quickly became. Through his own actions, 
Taylor became Liberia’s greatest obstacle to long-term security, stability and prosperity.277 
Taylor took control of Liberia with a $2 billion external debt and dysfunctional 
government institutions.278 Although the UN, IFIs and donors were expected to perform 
the bulk of the socio-economic reconstruction of Liberia, Taylor’s actions further 
isolated Liberia (including from the very parties would intended to lend their support). 
Due to corruption, human rights abuses and Taylor actions Liberia never receive the 
necessary assistance to rebuild the devastation caused by the war. Although the UN 
established a Peacebuilding Office in Liberia in 1997, it was rendered ineffectual due to 
its limited resources. The UN Peacebuilding Office was heavily criticised for being too 
pro-Taylor and too non-intrusive.279 Development efforts and reconstruction completely 
stalled. Although people started to resettle throughout Liberia, the economic situation of 
the average Liberian did not improve much. By most socioeconomic indices, by 2003, 
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the average Liberian was worse off than at the start of the civil war in 1989, and Liberia 
was second-to-last at the bottom of the UNDP’s Human Development Index (174 of 
175 countries).280  
 
As Taylor misgoverned Liberia, Sierra Leone was still engulfed in its civil war (which was 
supported by Taylor). Although ECOMOG forces were deployed in neighbouring Sierra 
Leone, by 1999, the war had taken the lives of 7,000 civilians and displaced more than 
two-thirds of the four million population.281 Taylor consolidated his place in the 
international forum as a pariah, when in March 2001, he was sanctioned by the UN 
Security Council (UNSC) for his continual support of the Sierra Leonean rebel group.282 
An arms embargo was placed on Liberia, because of its role in funding the war efforts in 
Sierra Leone. In an attempt to restrict Taylor’s ability to support the Sierra Leonean 
(RUF) war efforts, the sale of Liberian diamonds was outlawed, senior members of the 
Liberian government were placed on an international travel ban and their international 
assets were frozen. Timber was added to the sanctions list in 2003, which also adversely 
affected Taylor’s regime.283 
 
In response to their dissatisfaction with Taylor’s regime, and in particular, his continual 
support of the RUF in Sierra Leone, a group of exiled Liberians formed a fighting force 
called the Liberian United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) in February 2000. 
Many of members were former fighters of the mainly Krahn, Mandingo and former-
AFL, ULIMO-K, ULIMO-J and LPC fighters. LURD originally found support within 
Sierra Leone, but then moved their activities to Guinea after gaining the support of 
President General Lansana Conté.284 General Conté and Taylor had an acrimonious 
relationship dating back to 1990, even before the ECOWAS intervention in Liberia.285 In 
July 2000, from the border towns of Guinea, LURD invaded Liberia (Lofa County) but 
were fought back.286 Taylor retaliated by organizing a dual invasion into Guinea by RUF 
forces in Sierra Leone and militia forces in Liberia. This led to sporadic fighting in 
Liberia and Guinea that later escalated into Liberia falling into civil war in 2002. Liberia 
had once again become a ‘textbook case of all the major warning signs of a deteriorating 
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situation across a range of political, military, economic and social fronts.’287 Taylor had 
done little to correct any of the political legacies of the previous regimes. Liberia was 
economically weakened by Liberia’s isolation as well as the desperate state of its 
economy which further suffered from the UN Security Council sanction. Unemployment 
was rampant, estimated at between 75 and 80 percent.288 Ethnic tensions were high due 
to Taylor’s consolidation of power and marginalization of Krahns and Mandingos.  
 
The Civil War Re-Starts 
In 2001, Taylor mobilised and deployed 15,000 former NPFL fighters to Lofa County to 
repel the rebel LURD forces.289 The resumption of hostilities was a result of ‘ignored and 
unfinished business of the earlier civil war.’290 All forces heavily recruited former fighters. 
The recruitment was mad easier by the lack of reintegration and restructuring of the 
army in 1997-2000 and the marginalization of fighter not loyal to Taylor (non-NPFL 
fighters). Once again, civilians including many children were recruited into Taylor’s 
faction, and later into the LURD forces.291 And once again, human rights abuses, 
displacement, looting, and pillaging quickly became so prevalent, they became the norm. 
Fighters were not paid, and they relied on looting and booty to pay themselves. Initially 
the fighting was concentrated in Lofa County, but by mid-2002 much of Liberia was 
engulfed in full-fledged civil war, with civilians paying the biggest price. Taylor’s forces 
were defending itself against LURD’s attacks and for control of strategic locations. 
Although Taylor was weakened by the arms embargo, he smuggling arms into country.292 
Although LURD was receiving support and arms from the Guinean government they 
were not able to defeat the Taylor’s forces outright.  
 
In early 2003, due to lack of trust between the Mandingos and Krahns, LURD splintered 
into two factions. The Krahns in LURD formed a new faction called the Movement for 
Democracy in Liberia or MODEL. MODEL is a descendant of the old ULIMO-J 
faction, and was given support (logistical and armaments) by Côte d’Ivoire due to the 
suspicion that Taylor was supporting the rebels fighting against the government.293 Just 
as the Guinean government explicitly supported LURD’s war efforts, the Ivorian 
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government explicitly supported MODEL’s efforts against the Liberian government.294 
Despite their differences, LURD and MODEL remained allied and did not engage each 
other in war. Their common enemy was Taylor and his forces who were now engaged in 
a two-front war. LURD attacked the government from the north and west, while 
MODEL concentrated its attacks in the south-east of the country.  
 
By April 2003, the fighting in Liberia was fierce. LURD and MODEL were making 
ground against Taylor’s government forces. LURD had captured Tubmanburg and the 
main roads leading into Monrovia, while MODEL had captured Buchanan which was 
the main port of the timber exportation. On May 6, the UN Security Council once again 
cited Taylor’s government on their lack of compliance to their embargos (the banning of 
the sale/purchasing of arms, diamonds, and an international travel ban of Taylor and 
associates), and added the importation of Liberian timber to the embargo.295 That being 
said, the UN or the donors initially had not been too vocal about the war, nor did they 
strongly condemn the rebels (LURD and MODEL) for their part in it. Some suspected 
that was because the United States, the United Kingdom, and France were indirectly 
arming and supporting the rebels.296 By May 2003, 60 percent of Liberia’s territory was 
under the control of either LURD or MODEL forces.297  
 
Another Push for Peace  
It was the sub-region, under ECOWAS, that once engaged Liberia in an attempt to 
resolve the conflict in June 2003. As ECOWAS’s chief mediator and former Nigerian 
head of state, General Abubakar, persuaded all the factions (Taylor, LURD and 
MODEL) to meet in Accra, Ghana to discuss a peace agreement. However, shortly after 
arriving Taylor promptly fled Ghana and returned to Monrovia after the sealed 
indictment and arrest warrant of the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) was made 
public on 4 June.298 The peace talks in Accra continued in Taylor’s absence and his 
representative (Daniel Chea, Defence Minister), and representatives of both LURD and 
MODEL signed a ceasefire agreement on 17 June.299 The ceasefire granted access to 
ECOWAS and the UN on humanitarian grounds, called for the establishment of an 
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international stabilization force and political reconciliation (which included DDR, 
restructuring of the armed forces, socio-economic reforms, and democratization).300  
 
Despite the ceasefire and emboldened by the Taylor’s indictment, fighting intensified as 
LURD made an offensive to capture Monrovia. In the weeks that followed, the capital 
suffered heavy bombardment, extensive civilian casualties and severe displacement.301 
These attacks on Monrovia, which came to be called World War One (4 June), World 
War Two (25 June) and World War Three (18 July) were characterised by mortar attacks, 
heavy machine gun fire and the use of AK-47s.302 LURD had captured half of Monrovia 
and was separated by a bridge that divides the city. On 26 July, United States President, 
George W. Bush, publicly declared the US’s support of the 17 June ceasefire agreement, 
and stated that 
‘Taylor needs to step down so that his country can be spared further bloodshed. All the parties in 
Liberia must pursue a comprehensive peace agreement. And the United States is working with 
regional governments to support those negotiations and to map out a secure transition to 
elections. We are determined to help the people of Liberia find the path to peace.’303 
 
This statement and show of support set the next step of the consolidation of peace in 
Liberia into motion. With the political and logistical support of the UN on 4 August 
ECOWAS deployed a 3,600 strong multinational peacekeeping force to Liberia.304 It was 
called ECOWAS Mission in Liberia or ECOMIL and its mandate was to support the 
implementation of the 17 June ceasefire agreement until a larger UN peacekeeping force 
could be deployed which would happen no later than 1 October 2003.305 Unlike 
ECOMOG, its predecessor, ECOMIL had political clarity as well as a very clear 
mandate, support among not only regional actors (such as Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea, and 
Nigeria) but also international support (such as the US who helped logistically with the 
deployment of troops and the UN) and an exit strategy.306 Under an agreement with 
Nigeria’s President Obasanjo on 11 August 2003, President Charles Taylor resigned and 
went into exile in Calabar, Nigeria. And after three months of hard negotiations between 
the Government of Liberia, LURD, and MODEL signed the Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement in Accra on 18 August 2003 effectively ending Liberia’s prolonged civil war.  
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The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) built upon the failings of the previous 
peace agreements and set the outline for peacebuilding activities in Liberia. It called for 
an immediate cessation of hostilities, the establishment of a National Transitional 
Government of Liberia (NTGL) a power-sharing transitional government that would 
stay in power for a period of two years until democratic elections could be held (15 
October 2005), the establishment and deployment of an International Stabilisation Force 
under UN Chapter VII authority, it called for the implementation of a comprehensive 
DDR programme (highlighting the special needs of children), and provided for other 
peacebuilding activities such as the establishment of a governance reform commission 
and an anti-corruption commission.307  
 
In September 2003, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1509, establishing the 
UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) and authorising the deployment of 15,000 
peacekeeping troops and civilians personnel for an initial period of twelve months 
starting on 1 October 2003.308 UNMIL’s mandate was to support the implementation of 
the CPA and the peace process; protect UN staff, facilities and civilians; support 
humanitarian and human rights activities; as well as assist in national security reform, 
including DDRR, national police training and formation of a new, restructured 
military.309 Secretary-General Kofi Annan said that in due course ‘UNMIL would be a 
multidimensional operation composed of political, military, police, criminal justice, civil 
affairs, human rights, gender, child protection, disarmament, demobilisation and 
reintegration, public information and support components, as well as an electoral 
component.’310 Retired US Air Force Major-General Jacques Paul Klein was appointed as 
the Special Representative of the Secretary-General in Liberia (SRSG) to head UNMIL. 
And on 1 October, UNMIL became operational. ECOMIL forces were transferred to 
UNMIL command and got fitted with the traditional blue berets of UN peacekeepers.  
 
Fighting in Liberia had cessed and on 14 October the NTGL, including the power-
sharing National Transitional Legislative Assembly (NTLA) and ministers, were 
inaugurated and took power. The NTGL was headed by Chairman Charles Gyude 
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Bryant and Vice-Chairman Wesley Momo Johnson neither of whom could contest in the 
scheduled October 2005 elections. As per the CPA, all of the NTLA, government 
ministry portfolios and corporations were divided amongst Taylor’s NPP party (as 
former Government of Liberia or GOL), LURD, and MODEL, with civil society being 
given token representation. The most recent negotiated peace between warlords within 
the warring factions and the involvement and deployment of international peacekeepers 
finally gave hope to Liberians that war might finally be behind them.  
 
Children and War in Liberia  
The Liberian conflict that lasted from 1989 – 2003 had terrible consequences on the 
population, and on children specifically. As undeniable victims, almost all Liberian 
children suffered ‘one or more traumatic war-related experiences’ whether they were 
innocent bystanders or party to the conflict.311 Rampant human rights abuses, looting, 
the proliferation of arms and splintering of fighting factions were but some of the 
distinct characteristics of the civil war, almost all of which negatively affected children 
directly as victims or participants. Regardless of where the children were or their level of 
involvement in the conflict the collective damage on them was immeasurable.  
 
Although there is a need to be cautious due to the source, motives and methods of 
collection, most accounts of the conduct of the various factions and parties to the 
conflict were documented by human rights organisations and NGOs. The body of 
literature claims that factions were indistinguishable in their conduct. Human rights 
abuses were pervasive resulting with all Liberian children being denied of their right to 
education, shelter, health and protection. Unfortunately the Liberian conflict left no 
shortages of examples to draw from. Below are examples of such abuses: 
 
Education – During the war, like many of the other decrepit state services, the 
education system, including schools, ceased to function.312 Approximately 80 
percent of the schools in Liberia were destroyed between 1989 and 1997, and 
many of the remaining schools were damaged in the fighting which ended in 
2003.313  
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Displacement— Houses were regularly looted and villages were burnt down 
causing massive displacement throughout the country. At different stages of the 
conflict it was estimated that up to 80 percent of displaced population were 
women and children equalling literally hundreds of thousands of children.314 At 
the height of the conflict in 1996, it was estimated that there were one million 
Liberians internally displaced and 755,000 refugees.315 In 2003, when Monrovia 
was attacked by LURD forces hundreds of thousands of civilians were once 
again displaced from their homes as the city was under siege. 
 
Health— As is often the case in war, malnutrition was exacerbated due to the 
conflict. Between June and July 2003, the French NGO Action Contre la Faim 
detected moderate, severe, or acute malnutrition in slightly more than half of the 
6,500 screened displaced children in Monrovia.316  
 
Sexual Assault— Sexual assault was rampant throughout the conflict. Many 
children had been separated from their parents either because they were killed or 
through displacement, and as a result fell victim to sexual assault. Estimates of 
sexual assault claim that as many as 40 percent of all Liberian women were raped 
during 1989-1997.317 And in 2003, 74 percent of all interviewed Liberian women 
and adolescents (age 15-49) living in refugee camps in Sierra Leone were victim 
of at least one incident of sexual violence before they fled Liberia.318 
 
Protection—The vast majority of the casualties of the war were civilians either 
directly through fighting or the consequences of conflict, and naturally children 
are among those casualties. Civilians were regularly attacked and fired upon by 
the fighting factions (including ECOMOG). The modus operati of the factions was 
to eliminate any implicit or explicit supporters of the opposition, whoever they 
might have been. To take a few examples, Taylor’s initial attempt to seize 
Monrovia from Doe in 1990 resulted in between 13,000 and 20,000 deaths, 
mostly civilians.319 In 1992 Operation Octopus resulted in over 6,500 casualties 
which were mostly civilians.320 600 civilians, mostly women and children, were 
killed in a town called Harbel in an area disputed between NPFL and the AFL in 
June 1993.321 In 1996, Taylor’s last attempt to seize Monrovia cost the lives of 
two thousand people within a few days of fighting.322  
 
The Liberian population suffered horrible abuses at the hands of adults as well as 
children. Although adults started the war, children were an integral part of all of the 
fighting factions (except ECOMOG), and the collective history of events and suffering 
endured does not always explicitly distinguish between adult or child perpetration. Many 
children have paid the ultimate price as both victims and perpetrators of killings, 
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terrorizing civilians, rape and sexual assault, torture, forced labour, and joining or being 
recruited into fighting factions. 
 
Children as Perpetrators of War 
When putting the war in Liberia in to context one must keep in mind the situation in 
Liberia during the outbreak of war. The majority of the population had suffered from 
severe economic hardship and gross human rights abuses by the Doe regime, and at least 
initially many saw the NPFL insurgency as a vehicle of political change. As the NPFL 
insurgency gained ground in Lofa and Nimba County towards the beginning of the war, 
and as a result of general dissatisfaction there was a ready pool of civilians who were 
prepared to take up arms for this struggle.323 The NPFL had little problems recruiting 
fighters as much of the population was interested in revenging many of the injustices 
endured at the hands of the Doe regime. Compounded by demographics (Liberia being a 
very young country with a high percentage of its population under the age of 18 years 
old), social marginalization and exclusion, lack of social mobility or employment, and 
being surrounded by conflict, the first generation of Liberian child soldiers emerged 
within the NPFL known as the Small Boys Unit.324 The use of children as fighters quickly 
became a characterising feature of the Liberian civil war.  
 
By historical standards, rates of child soldiers in Liberia’s wars were very high.325 Child 
soldiers became party to the war shortly after Taylor’s insurgency in 1989 and although 
Taylor’s NPFL initiated and set a dangerous precedent of recruiting children as fighters, 
to varying degrees encouraging every subsequent emergent force to follow suit. As early 
as 1990, the international media published photos and reports of AK-47 toting child 
fighters, high on drugs and drunk on alcohol wearing t-shirts resembling clothes that 
could have easily been found in the inner city in any American city.326  
 
Used by the factions as an alternative military source, whether as firepower or auxiliary 
support, children were used as soldiers to capture territory and maintain control over 
it.327 As is generally the case, in comparison to their adult counterparts, child soldiers are 
perceived as cheap labour, more malleable, more obedient to following orders, and less 
concerned with the differences between right and wrong. These are some of the reasons 
                                                
323 Abiodun Alao, John Mackinlay, and Funmi Olonisakin, 20-24. 
324 Ellis, "Liberia's Warlord Insurgency ", 168. 
325 Vera Achvarina and Simon F. Reich, "No Place to Hide," International Security 31, no. 1 (2006): 162. 
326 Reno, "The Organisation of Warlord Politics in Liberia," 79. 
327 Singer, 56. 
   
- 88 - 
 
that make children such powerful tools with which to perpetuate war, this was certainly 
the case in Liberia. 
 
The use of child soldiers in Liberia has been well documented by academics, 
international organisations (such as the UN, Amnesty International, and Human Rights 
Watch) and media. The use of children within the factions’ ranks was confirmed in battle 
when the NPFL attacked ECOMOG forces in 1992. Although ECOMOG troops 
initially hesitated to engage their attackers who they realised there were AK-47 wielding 
children, they reluctantly returned fire to protect themselves.328 Bullets shot by children 
are no less dangerous than those shot by adults. Further confirmation of the presence of 
child combatants came later when 21 percent of the demobilised soldiers in the 1996/7 
process were children who were represented in every faction.329 By 2002, all three of the 
factions (GOL, LURD, and MODEL) recruited and employed children, some of whom 
later went through the DDR process. It was estimated that during 1989 and 1997 
between 6,000 and 15,000 children fought in the war, and up to 21,000 children fought 
between 1999 and 2003.330 Simply put, all of the factions that fought in Liberia’s civil war 
to varying degrees deliberately and continuously recruited and used child soldiers with 
the exception of ECOMOG and ECOMIL. 
 
Methods of Child Recruitment 
Although the NPFL mainly recruited along ethnic lines, with regard to children they 
initially recruited among more vulnerable populations, such as orphans or street children. 
The NPFL’s Small Boys Unit was initially composed of many orphans from Doe’s 
campaign against the Gio and Mano civilians in Nimba County.331 However, this trend 
changed as the war continued. There was a contagion and domino effect—where once 
the threshold of using children as soldiers was crossed by the NPFL, all the subsequent 
factions engaged in similar activities to bolster their forces. As the factions splintered and 
emerged, they recruited anyone who was able and/or willing to fight in order to bolster 
their strength and capacity. The push and pull factors were abound. Some children joined 
the forces because they thought it was the only option available to them, while others 
choose to fight because of what that would provide them with.  
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During the conflict, recruitment was made easier for all factions due to the failure of 
previous DDR attempts and the institutionalization of children within the security forces 
by the GOL under Taylor. In many instances, children who fought in the civil war 
between 1989 and 1997 were re-recruited in 2002 and 2003, many as adults, and have 
spent much of their young lives associated with fighting forces.332 It was reported that at 
times children and their families were offered or promised a payment of $100 for their 
recruitment and participation in the factions.333 
 
Although many of the recruits (if not most of them) were seen to have joined the fight 
voluntarily, whether it was to seek revenge or as a means of survival, some children were 
forcibly recruited. It was not uncommon for factions to abduct children from their 
schools, villages, and families threatening them at gun-point. Although the brutality of 
the forceful abductions was not on the same scale of those in Sierra Leone or Northern 
Uganda, there is documentation of children being gang pressed and being forced to kill 
relatives and people from their village to sever ties with their communities.334 In the first 
years of fighting, ‘only a small percentage of children report having been forced by a 
warring faction to join [the factions].’335 In the fighting that ensued between 2000-2003, 
all three factions (GOL, LURD, MODEL) targeted displaced populations (refugee 
camps, IDP camps) for recruitment, including child recruitment.  
 
The level of a child’s voluntarism or choice associated with fighting is an extremely 
complex as well as contentious issue. There is a continuum ranging from fully free 
recruitment on the one end to forced recruitment on the other end of the spectrum, 
within which only the extreme ends are fully mutually exclusive.336 That being said, few 
children in Liberia exclusively fall at the extreme ends of the continuum, and if they did, 
they seldom stay there as the reasons for fighting are fluid and are often changing.  
 
The nature of the war meant that being associated with a fighting faction, through either 
your affiliation or the possession of a gun you could access food, clothing, security 
(possibly a false sense of security), women and/or loot. Some academics argued that the 
war was as a vehicle for social transformation.337 It has been argued that the war gave the 
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opportunity and motivation for young people to access things that previously were not 
accessible to them as a result of their marginalization from the social, economic and 
political spheres. Furthermore, the fighting was the only means available for them to 
improve their plight albeit temporarily.  
 
Profile of a Liberian Child Soldier 
During the 1996/7 DDR process, information was gathered by UNICEF from the 4,306 
children or 21 percent of the total 21,315 fighters that went through the process.338 That 
information provided a better understanding of who the children were in the earlier 
stages of the war, the role they served within the factions, their experiences and their 
post-conflict ambitions.  
 
UNICEF found that Liberian child soldier typically joined the fighting factions between 
the ages of eight and twelve years old.339 After spending between three and five years 
fighting the child would disarm between the ages of 15 and 17. Fifty-eight percent of the 
disarmed child soldiers said they spent more than four years fighting, and sixty-nine 
percent were between the ages of 15-17 when they disarmed. If the information is 
consistent, this means that a large portion of soldiers between the ages 18 and 22 would 
have joined when they were children. None of the subsequent DDR programming was 
not designed to mitigate or account for this dynamic. 
 
One common feature was that all of the children had limited education. Some 1,200 
child soldiers reported to have no education whatsoever. Eighty-two percent of the child 
fighters were attending school prior to joining the factions, of those, 82 percent were in 
primary school, only 16 percent were in junior high school and 2 percent were in high 
school. This lack of education certainly is not the cause of their participation; however it 
may be a factor of their involvement. After the war, 77 percent of those disarmed wanted 
to return to school, while 10 percent wanted to learn a vocation and another 10 percent 
wanted to get involved with petty trading.  
 
Contrary to what people have written about Liberian child soldiers, only less than one 
percent of the children said they were orphaned by the war. Sixty-one percent said they 
knew both parents to be alive, while the remaining 37 percent knew of one parent to be 
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alive. However, once integrated in to the factions many of the fighters were separated 
from their parents.  
 
Two unrelated factors influenced the military rank of children: level of education and 
ruthlessness. The higher the education level, the faster the children would be promoted. 
And the more vigilant or ruthless they were, the more recognition they would receive by 
their commanders. Although often self-proclaimed, children demobilised as lieutenants, 
captains, colonels and generals. And it was not uncommon for higher-ranking children to 
lead other groups of children.  
 
The figures capturing the disarmed and demobilised fighters illustrated the differences 
between the factions (see chart). Children constituted 18 percent of Taylor’s NPFL 
demobilised force, ULIMO-K, Lofa Defence Force, ULIMO-J and LPC demobilised 
children at 21, 32, 36 and 37 percent respectively.340 AFL forces demobilised the fewest 
percentage of children within their forces, at two percent. However, it is important to 
keep in mind that the figures only reflect those children that were demobilised from the 
forces, and it was estimated that many children did not go through the formal DDR 
process and are therefore not reflected in the above-mentioned figures. 
 
Breakdown of Children Disarmed per Faction 
Faction Percentage of total 
NPFL 18% * 
ULIMO-K 21% 
ULIMO-J 36% 
Lofa Defence Force 32% 
AFL 2% 
*This figure is arguable low because he did not demobilise many of his loyal soldiers, and many of them 
including children were then institutionalised into the state security instruments. 
 
Source: Cohn, Ilene. "The Protection of Child Soldiers During the Liberian Peace Process." The 
International Journal of Children's Rights 6 (1998): 195-96 
 
 
The Treatment of Child Soldiers 
Civilians, including children, were armed and deployed throughout the country with little 
or no military experience as the violence spread. It was not too long before the young 
inexperienced fighters quickly became acquainted with military command and technique 
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‘attributing to themselves military ranks and grandiose war names, the latter often 
inspired by the Hollywood action videos which became so popular during the war-
years.’341 Authors such as Richards write about the important role such films have on 
shaping modern consciousness and activities in war in the West African context.342 And 
specifically in Liberia soldiers’ indoctrination into violence was reinforced by repetitive 
viewings of films such as Rambo, Platoon, Full Metal Jacket, Deer Hunter, Kung Fu.343  
 
Even though the collective experience of child soldiers varied greatly, the roles the 
children fulfilled within the factions were similar to the role of their adult counterparts. 
Although some children were used as auxiliary support and forced labour, such as the 
running of errands, carry ammunition or food, cooking and setting up camps, their roles 
went well beyond support. Children served as bodyguards, acted as spies, informants and 
carried out reconnaissance for their forces. They carried out ambushes, and often 
manned checkpoints which posed as violent flashpoints to the general population. 
Under-age fighters, like their adult counter-parts, served as executioners and often fought 
on the front lines.344 Moreover, as children were often seen as dispensable they were sent 
out to fight in dangerously forward positions, and were sometimes used as cannon 
fodder during battle. 
 
Soldiers, including children, were generally not paid and relied on stealing loot and 
plunder in order to survive. Exception to this was government forces and militia who 
received occasion payment up until 2003 under Taylor.345 In some cases, to provide an 
incentive for combat children government militias would be paid when they fought on 
the front lines.346 However, in most other cases guns were their means to procuring food, 
clothes, women, and equally important a sense of security.  
 
As the war became protracted it gained a momentum and logic of its own. It became 
clear that a key motivating factor on several levels (from the individual soldier right up to 
the faction commanders) was opportunity, be it loot, plunder, and/or social re-
engineering. This reliance on plunder encouraged the abuses suffered by their main 
targets, civilians. There were no supply systems, the factions didn’t need them because 
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they took what they needed or wanted from the people in the areas they were in.347 Apart 
from the distribution of arms and ammunition, this remained true for the duration of the 
war. It was even reported that soldiers of competing factions would trade looted goods 
with one another. 348 This was yet another example or illustration of how opportunism 
was pervasive amongst soldiers.  
 
The consumption of alcohol and drugs were commonplace among all fighters, including 
children. Commanders encouraged their fighters to drink alcohol in the form of palm 
wine, cane-spirit, or beer, smoke marijuana and take amphetamines, locally known as 
‘bubble’ or ‘brown-brown’ which was a mixture of cocaine and gunpowder.349 Like 
multiple viewings of Hollywood action films, the alcohol and drugs served a few 
purposes— to instil courage, ferocity, and a sense of invincibility into the fighters, as well 
as to further blur the distinction between right and wrong. Alcohol and drugs also helped 
keep the fighters dependent on their commanders who controlled the supply and would 
often distribute the alcohol/drugs out before battle. Throughout the duration of the war 
many of the fighters became dependant to alcohol and drugs.350  
 
Outfits and Weapons used by Child Soldiers 
One of the ways in which the Liberian conflict differed from what we know as 
‘traditional warfare’ is that the various factions were indistinguishable not only from one 
another but also from the general population. Few military uniforms were distributed, 
and the fighters either wore their own clothes or in some cases were given T-shirts 
identifying their faction.351 As the factions were mostly composed of civilians all the 
factions looked like the general population and more or less the same (as well as 
indistinguishable from one another). It was not uncommon for child soldiers to be sent 
into villages and enemy controlled areas posing as civilians for the purpose of gaining 
information or conducting stealth attacks.  
 
The UN Arms Embargo imposed in 2003, did not seriously restrict the flow of arms or 
their use in Liberia. As mentioned earlier, although the arms embargo slightly reduced 
the arms supply to Taylor’s forces, it did not have the overall desired effect. Liberia’s 
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borders remained porous throughout the conflict which allowed arms to be smuggled 
both in and out of the country. A UN Panel of Experts tasked with monitoring the 
timber, arms, and diamond sanctions documented some major arms transfers to Taylor’s 
forces (GOL) between 2000 and 2003.352 And it was well documented that LURD was 
being supplied weaponry by the Guinean government and MODEL being supplied 
weaponry by the Ivorian government.  
 
Like in most contemporary civil wars, small arms and light weapons were the weapons 
most heavily used. More specifically, submachine guns, AK-47s, rocket propelled 
grenades (RPGs), and mortar rounds (60 or 81mm mortars) were used.353 These weapons 
allowed children to be involved in front-line fighting because they were simple to use and 
light weight. These were the weapons children predominately fought with. Evidence of 
children using of these arms was captured in the international media as from the early 
stages of the conflict, and evidence of the use of such armaments is evident in structures 
(such as buildings, light-posts, bridges, etc.) throughout Liberia in 2007. During the war, 
children were given different weapons than their adult counterparts, either based on 
ability to operate and carry the weapon (heavier weapons were reserved for adults) or 
military stature (i.e., handguns were reserved for senior members).354  
 
Research conducted on one hundred Liberian child soldiers in 2003 (covering all the 
major factions) showed some insightful information.355 Obviously it is not the whole 
picture, but may be indicative of the trends: 
• 94 percent claimed to have access to firearms (either AK-47s or submachine 
guns). 
• Among the ones who did not have access to firearms were younger respondents, 
suggesting that arms were reserved for more mature and stronger fighters.  
• Factions with limited ammunition supply would ration the munitions according 
to ability of soldiers, because it was perceived that children were more wasteful 
and less effective with their weapons than their adult counterparts.  
                                                
352 United Nations, "United Nations Security Council Report of the Panel of Experts Concerning Liberia 
Sanctions " (New York: United Nations, 23 April 2003). 
353 For more information about the origin of the guns and ammunitions see Human Rights Watch, Weapons 
Sanctions, Military Supplies, and Human Suffering: Illegal Arms Flows to Liberia and the June-July 2003 Shelling of 
Monrovia (3 November 2003).; Global Witness, The Usual Suspects: Liberia's Weapons and Mercenaries in Cote 
D'ivoire and Sierra Leone (London: Global Witness, March 2003).; The Graduate Institute of International 
Studies, Small Arms Survey 2005 : Weapons at War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 167-9.  
354 Wille, 198. 
355 Wille, 197-208. 
   
- 95 - 
 
• Although contrary to other credible reports this research reported that it was rare 
for children in Liberia to use heavier arms such as RPGs or mortars.356 
• It was also suggested that the widespread availability of arms and ammunition 
was a contributing factor in the recruitment of children. 
• Weapons were not necessarily provided to all child soldiers on a permanent basis, 
but either on a shift or mission specific basis. 
• As per an observed pattern of combat, initial RPG shelling followed by small 
arms fire, it can be extrapolated that due to the differences in weapons between 
adults (with the heavier weaponry) and child soldiers (with the light weapons), 
adults held more strategic positions and were responsible for initiating combat 
while their younger counterparts held front-line positions. 
• Child soldiers participated in both highly structured units (such as the Small Boys 
Unit of the NPFL), as well as unstructured or unorganised units. 
• There were varying degrees of drug and alcohol abuse depending on personalities 
and discipline levels of the factions children were associated with. 
 
This survey confirmed what was already known in the child protection community about 
the roles, responsibilities and participation of children in the conflict. 
 
Girl Soldiers 
Although less is known about the involvement of girls in the early years of the conflict, 
their usage increased in the later years of fighting. Girls constituted a portion of child 
soldiers throughout the duration of the war, although at smaller proportions than boys. 
Girls, like boys, had a diverse range of roles within their factions. Girls mostly served as 
“wartime women” or as the fighters’ wives. They were often responsible for auxiliary 
roles such as cooking, cleaning, and carrying heavy loads. However like their boy 
counter-parts, they also served as spies, and fought on front lines. Older girls generally 
organised themselves into effective fighting units, while the younger girls served as 
auxiliary support. Many of the former girl soldiers reported to have been used as forced 
labour in addition to being raped and forcibly recruited into their factions. During their 
affiliation with the factions the girls continued to be sexually exploited.357 Many of the 
girl soldiers would become pregnant and have their babies in the midst of fighting, while 
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expected to remain with the factions and continue to serve their other functions. In 
2004, 75 percent of girls that were demobilised reported suffering some form of sexual 
abuse or exploitation during their tenure within the factions.358 
 
Conclusion 
Since its independence in 1847, Liberia has suffered a turbulent history characterised by 
subjugation, exclusionary political and economic systems, abusive leaders and pervasive 
insecurity for the majority of the population. Since 1980, the only way political power 
changed was through military means. Liberia’s civil war (1989-2003) was fought to gain 
political and economic control of the country, in a bid to pry power away from President 
Doe, who himself gained power through a coup d’état a decade earlier. During the war, the 
Liberian population suffered at the hands of the state and those attempting to gain 
control of it. There was mass displacement, human rights violations and over 250,000 
people killed. Although the war was a civil war, the personalities and friendships of 
regional leaders significantly impacted the course of events, both in the perpetration of 
the war as well as its resolution, thus the war had a regional dimension. ECOWAS was 
the first to intervene in Liberia, in April 1990 and again in June 2003, by sending 
peacekeeping troops in an attempt to bring the war to an end. In 2003, this ECOWAS 
peacekeeping force was transferred to the United Nations, who were mandated to 
implement and monitor the Accra Peace Agreement that brought an end to the war.  
 
Charles Taylor, the leader of the initial insurgency against President Doe and one of the 
main antagonists of the war, aggressively recruited boys and girls from the start of his 
campaign. This set a precedent resulting in the use of child soldiers being a feature 
throughout the war. Every warring faction in Liberia followed the suit and also recruited 
child soldiers. Regardless of the method of their recruitment, or their motives or those of 
the factions that used them, children are partially responsible for the countless loss of life 
and havoc wreaked in Liberia. The participation of child soldiers contributed to the 
brutality and level of atrocities of the war.  
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Peacebuilding is a concept and strategy that is ambiguous, ambitious, continuously 
evolving and elastic. There is no universally recognised or concrete definition to 
peacebuilding as it has come to mean different things to different people and 
organisations. Generally, peacebuilding is used to describe a plethora of external 
interventions aimed at reducing the risk that war will either erupt or return to a 
country.359 Other synonymous terms used to describe peacebuilding activities include— 
post-conflict reconstruction, post-conflict recovery, post-conflict stabilization, nation 
building (in some contexts), transitional issues, and conflict reduction. Peacebuilding and 
its synonymous terms emerged at the end of the Cold War as a response to the unsettling 
realities of international affairs and as a consequence of the increased demand on the 
UN.  
 
The end of the Cold War fundamentally changed the status quo of international affairs. 
Starting from its inception in 1945 through 1989, the UN’s mandate to maintain peace 
and security was severely diminished by the insurmountable, sacred and inflexible 
concept of national sovereignty. The UN was rendered virtually ineffective to keep the 
peace as the wars were strategically fought, often by proxy, between the two super-
powers, the United States and the Soviet Union, and their respective allies. Due to the 
design of the UN Security Council and the veto-power of its permanent members, wars 
were fought unabated throughout the developing world with little international redress 
or intervention. However, this changed dramatically once the iron curtain collapsed and 
the Cold War ended in 1989, leaving the UN in great demand.  
 
It was generally acknowledged by policymakers and scholars that of wars post-1989 had 
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shifted from international conflict to civil or internal armed conflicts. No longer severely 
constrained by Cold War realities, civil wars were testing the UN and its Security Council 
whose responsibility it was to maintain international peace and security. New concerns 
and threats—such as human rights abuses, issues relating to the protection of civilians in 
war and small arms were being were brought to the Security Council. In the face of 
globalisation, and as a result of UNSC’s decisions, the idea of sovereignty appeared more 
flexible than ever before enabling international interventions to take place.360 The very 
definition of what constituted a threat to international peace and security shifted. Non-
military issues were now seen by the Security Council as potential threats to international 
peace and security.  
 
In January 1992 the Heads of State and Government on the UNSC met to discuss the 
responsibility of the Security Council and its mandate in the maintenance of international 
peace and security. As a result of this meeting, the Security Council for the first time 
explicitly broadened the notion of international peace and security to include non-
military threats. The President of the Security Council noted:  
‘The absence of war and military conflicts amongst States does not in itself ensure 
international peace and security. The non-military sources of instability in the economic, 
social, humanitarian and ecological fields have become threats to peace and security. The 
United Nations membership as a whole, working through the appropriate bodies, needs 
to give the highest priority to the solution of these matters.’361 
 
This acknowledgement and statement by the UNSC now meant that economic, social, 
humanitarian and ecological factors both external and internal to states fell within the 
aegis of the Security Council and were considered threats to international peace and 
security, albeit selectively. The concept of security shifted from military or ‘hard’ security 
to a more comprehensive or ‘soft’ security. Security’s referent was no longer exclusively 
the state, but now included societies, the environment and human rights. This 
redefinition of security marked a shift in international affairs, and laid the seed for a new 
security agenda, what became known as human security.362 In their statement, the UNSC 
invited the Secretary-General to circulate to UN member-states ‘his analysis and 
recommendations on ways of strengthening and making more efficient with the 
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framework and provisions of the Charter the capacity of the United Nations for 
preventive diplomacy, for peacemaking and for peacekeeping.’363 These shifts and 
increased demand on the UN resulted in the need to re-think the UN’s 
conceptualisation, involvement and methodology of peacekeeping and peacebuilding 
interventions.  
 
Responding to the UNSC’s invitation, the term post-conflict peacebuilding was born and 
entered the international policy lexicon after the United Nations Secretary-General 
Boutros Boutros-Ghali published An Agenda for Peace in 1992.364 However, by no means 
were the various components that make up peacebuilding a new concept. Modern post-
war reconstruction has antecedents in reconstruction efforts after World War II in 
Western Europe and Japan.365 Building on previous peacebuilding thinking,366 what was 
novel about Boutros-Ghali’s Agenda for Peace was not the originality of peacebuilding but 
that he was specifically articulating peacebuilding with regard to the UN’s role in 
maintaining international peace and security.367  
 
Post-conflict peacebuilding as defined by Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali and thus the 
UN was seen as the process of identifying and supporting structures, which tend to 
strengthen peace in order to avoid the recurrence of conflict and foster a sustainable 
environment so that economic and social development can prosper.368 Peacebuilding was 
seen as integral to the UN’s work and supplemental as well as inherently linked to 
preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, and peacekeeping. As envisioned by Boutros-Ghali 
peacebuilding included processes such as negotiating peace settlements, security sector 
reform, disarmament, repatriating displaced persons, restoring law and order, election 
monitoring, enhancing human rights, and governance reform.369 These collective 
processes were seen as essential steps aimed at transforming a conflict country towards 
stability. 
 
The conceptualization and implementation of peacekeeping and peacebuilding 
interventions have emerged due to the failure of preventative diplomacy, peacemaking 
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initiatives and traditional military interventions to achieve peace on their own.370 
Although peacebuilding is supplementary to preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, and 
peacekeeping it differs from these processes in a number of ways. Preventive diplomacy 
is aimed at preventing the escalation, limiting the spread, and resolving disputes between 
parties prior to the breakout of physical violence.371 Peacemaking refers to bringing 
hostile parties together through peaceful and diplomatic means to negotiate an official 
settlement or end to conflict.372 Peacekeeping is the deployment of a third-party 
intervention to the field (in this context, UN peacekeepers—military, civilian police, 
and/or civilians) in order to reduce or maintain the absence of violence.373 These three 
processes are to be used at different stages of conflict—preventative diplomacy is used 
before the breakout of violence, during conflicts peacemaking is used and lastly, in order 
to monitor and implement the negotiated peace, peacekeeping is used.374 Peacebuilding, 
on the other hand, is aimed at addressing the root cause of the conflict, and preventing 
the recurrence of violence.375 Peacebuilding not only guards against the absence of 
violence, like peacekeeping, but also aspires to build a positive peace—that is the absence 
of structural and cultural violence resulting in the presence of justice, reconciliation and 
equity or in other words increased human security (freedom from want and/or freedom 
from fear).376  
 
As the concept of peacebuilding was being developed, the concept and implementation 
of peacekeeping was also being re-examined and enhanced to better respond to the post-
Cold War world. Traditional peacekeeping (i.e., military intervention) was no longer seen 
as adequate in dealing with the reality and plethora of problems created by conflict (and 
indeed creating conflict), peacebuilding was envisioned as an integral and complementary 
component of peacekeeping’s re-development.  
 
Since Boutros-Ghali’s initial introduction of post-conflict peacebuilding, the concept of 
peacebuilding has been further developed, broadened and repositioned. Like democracy, 
peacebuilding is now seen to be relevant to the prevention of armed conflict (i.e., before 
violence starts), not merely as response to the consequences of war. Peacebuilding is now 
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understood to cover ‘a broad range of measures implemented in the context of emerging, 
current or post-conflict situations and which are explicitly guided and motivated by a 
primary commitment to the prevention of violent conflict and the promotion of lasting 
and sustainable peace.’377 Outside the context of conflict, peacebuilding and development 
activities are much the same.378 Post-conflict peacebuilding creates unique challenges 
requiring different responses.379 For instance, in the wake of armed conflict in order to 
return a country (or society) to normalcy or a state where active conflict is no longer 
present while addressing the causes of the conflict, it is necessary to not only create a 
secure environment, but also to deal with the large number of weapons and combatants 
in society, repair deficient national structures—whether they are infrastructure or 
governmental deficits, as well as the need for social and economic reconstruction.380  
 
During its evolution, peacebuilding has reformed policy and clarified how programmes 
should be implemented within the UN system and beyond. Firstly, peacebuilding has 
spawned many normative and policy developments. Starting with An Agenda for Peace and 
the subsequent UN documents and resolutions (such as Brahimi Report, Prevention of 
Armed Conflict (2001)) the need for effective peacebuilding has been outlined and 
addressed. Moreover, the broadening the definition and referent of security has helped 
push an agenda of human security. This has allowed the UNSC to pass thematic 
resolutions dealing with issues such as children and armed conflict, human rights, and 
small arms.381 Outside the UN, organisations such as the OECD and governments such 
as United States, United Kingdom and Norway have contributed to peacebuilding issues 
by increasing their understanding, and addressing peacebuilding issues in their security 
and development policies.  
 
Peacebuilding has also inspired operational responses. The UN has transformed its 
ability to deploy multifunctional peacekeeping operations, and has changed its modus 
operatus in the field by going beyond traditional military peacekeeping. Beyond its 
peacebuilding initiatives, the UN has had to get creative in dealing with the complex 
problems brought to it, and has intervened in conflict situations by governing transitional 
                                                
377 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Peacebuilding Overview, 2. 
378 Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Peacebuilding- a Development Perspective (Oslo: Norwegian Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs, August 2004), 15. 
379 Ibid. 
380 It is important to note that what is ‘normal’ is problematic highly contested in the literature.  
381 Tschirgi, 3. 
   
- 102 - 
 
administrations in Kosovo (1999), East Timor (1999) and Afghanistan (2002).382 
Operationally, governments and other organisations such as NATO, OSCE, and 
ECOWAS, have complemented the UN’s work by actively engaging in resolving armed 
conflicts around the globe.  
 
The importance of peacebuilding to the work of the UN in its role in the maintenance 
and resolution of armed conflict has been confirmed by not only Boutros-Ghali’s 
successor, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, but also by the UN Security Council, 
many advisors and various expert panels—such as the Panel on UN Peace Operations, 
and the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change.383 However, despite all 
the high-level political support, the implementation of peacebuilding has had mixed 
results and gaps in the UN’s peacebuilding infrastructure remained until 2005. There was 
a ‘gaping hole in the UN institutional machinery: no part of the UN system effectively 
addresses the challenge of helping countries with the transition from war to lasting 
peace.’384 Moreover, the problem was not only structural, but also operational. 
Peacebuilding initiatives undertaken by the UN had mixed results. In 2005, Secretary-
General Kofi Annan recommended the creation of a Peacebuilding Commission, 
Peacebuilding Support Office, and Peacebuilding Fund to address the gap in the UN’s 
institutional framework regarding peacebuilding activities.385 The establishment of these 
peacebuilding entities aimed to further the UN’s peacebuilding agenda by coordinating, 
overseeing, and support peacebuilding when and where relevant. The peacebuilding 
Commission is now part of the permanent UN infrastructure, reflecting the evolution 
and demands on the organisation.  
 
Many international organisations and several governments have either created new 
institutions or reformed some of their institutions to cope with and address the new 
challenges that fall under the rubric of peacebuilding. In order to address conflict and its 
various impacts the UN has created the new institutions such as the Office for the 
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and the Office of the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR); and new departments such as the 
Department of Political Affairs (DPA) and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations 
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(DPKO). Institutions, such as the International Criminal Court and the Peacebuilding 
Commission are new additions to deal with the peacebuilding issues. Attesting to the 
importance of peacebuilding beyond the UN, governments have created new 
departments dealing with peacebuilding issues such as the Office of Transition Initiatives 
at USAID or the United Kingdom’s Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance Department 
at DFID, or equivalents at organisations such as the World Bank’s Post-Conflict Unit.386 
 
Peacebuilding in Action 
The end of armed conflict does not mark the end of suffering, divisions, and rivalries. 
Most post-conflict countries suffer from ethnic, political, economic, social and possibly 
religious rifts well past the conclusion of armed conflict.387 Large parts of the population 
is often physically, mentally (emotionally), socially and economically traumatised by the 
war. These experiences require a robust response. Peacebuilding is about creating a 
sustainable and positive peace. Thus, peacebuilding goes beyond peacekeeping and the 
monitoring of a cease-fire. Peacebuilding activities are directly aimed at reducing not only 
the means available, but also the incentives for actors to return to conflict.388 
Peacebuilding is about re-establishing the social contract between the state and its 
citizens, such as security, welfare and representation.389 Peacebuilding, and more 
specifically post-conflict peacebuilding, is much more than a checklist of activities, aims 
to address security, governance, social, economic and developmental deficits through 
building capacity, addressing root-causes of war and supporting government initiatives. 
Addressing these deficits or pillars is often mutually reinforcing and necessary for 
achieving lasting peace and security.390 Addressing these complex dimensions require 
complementary and often-competing priorities, with both in the short-term and long-
term.391  
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Security Dimension 
Security and the cessation of violent conflict are paramount for a country to accomplish 
a transition from conflict to peace. Security is crucial for short and long-term goals to be 
met, such as the formation of a new government, the strengthening of political entities, 
economic and social development. Whether on a state or individual level, insecurity 
undermines the legitimacy of state institutions and hinders the prospect of reconciliation. 
In post-conflict environments, political, economic and social insecurity is generally 
heightened as a result of conflict and its legacy. This insecurity must be dealt with in 
order for not only relief efforts to gain root in the short-term, but also for long-term 
development regardless of whether that insecurity was a cause for conflict or as a result 
of it. Unfortunately, security does not return to a previously warring nation or within 
communities by virtue of a negotiated peace.392 
 
Armed conflict stresses countries in a myriad of ways. The proliferation of fighters and 
weapons are common problem in the wake of war. These combatants are potential 
spoilers of the peace, and are often inadequately prepared for life as a civilian. Where 
relevant, land mines must be removed from land so that it can once again be 
productively used. As there is typically a breakdown of the rule of law during armed 
conflicts there is a need to restore order to prevent outbreaks of criminal activity in the 
aftermath of conflicts. The security apparatus is often in need of being reformed in order 
it to re-establish its authority, get it in line with norms and standards to be able to 
provide security for both the state and its citizens. Police and security forces, which in 
many conflicts are themselves the worse perpetrators of human rights abuses must be 
vetted, re-trained and confidence in them must be restored. In post-conflict 
environments the protection of human rights becomes paramount, whether the abuse is 
at the hands of fighters, government entities, or criminal banditry.  
 
There is an urgency to address the immediate security challenges, however peacebuilding 
activities must not only provide public and state security in a fragile environment, but 
must also build up domestic capacity to provide security in the medium and long-term.393 
This is done through processes including security sector reform; disarmament, 
                                                
392 These issues are covered in detail in Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development 
(OECD), The Development Assistance Committee Guidelines- Helping Prevent Violent Conflict (Paris: OECD, 2001). 
Alan Bryden and Heiner Hänggi, eds., Security Governance in Post-Conflict Peacebuilding (Geneva: Lit Verlag 
Münster, 2005). 
393 Bryden and Hänggi, eds., Security Governance in Post-Conflict Peacebuilding, 13. 
   
- 105 - 
 
demobilisation, and reintegration; mine clearance; small arms and light weapons control; 
and the consolidation of the rule of law. 
 
Governance and Political Dimension 
The governance and political dimension of peacebuilding are aimed at addressing root 
causes of armed conflict, and assisting in creating a conducive and reconciliatory political 
environment. Too often, political grievances including lack of good governance, weak or 
illegitimate government institutions, pervasive corruption, political exclusion or a sense 
of widespread injustice spark and motivate actors to perpetrate war. Whether these 
grievances are real or perceived, they are often manipulated for political purposes. If 
political change is not possible through peaceful or democratic means, some elements 
may try to achieve their political ends through war. This pillar of peacebuilding is meant 
to reform systems and structures to reflect good governance while addressing some of 
the structural deficits that either resulted in war, or were damaged by the war. Enabling a 
political environment founded on good governance, which includes democracy, sound 
economic management, respect for human rights and the rule of law are essential in this 
task.394 
 
War causes resources that would have, or may have gone, towards state services (such as 
education or health) to be diverted to pay for the war effort. War often drives 
technocrats and those capable of running government ministries to be displaced for 
safety reasons. Prolonged war often causes key functions of the state to cease to exist. In 
this respect, it is again the citizens of the country that suffer the most from the brunt of 
war. In order to build a sustainable peace it is necessary to strengthen political processes, 
structures, and confidence in order to restore the authority and functions of the 
government in post-conflict countries. 
 
To this end, the UN and regional organisations (such as the AU) provide both support 
and technical expertise in order to create accountable, transparent and participatory 
political systems. The UN often, at least in Africa, is the vehicle for such support, 
whether through peacekeeping or peacebuilding missions. Peacebuilding, either through 
the UN or NGOs (or a combination of the two) either replace the state or partner up 
with them in the short to medium term in order to build their capacity in providing basic 
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services or reforming structures such as educational and health infrastructure, public 
administration, and rule of law systems.395 Much of the financial resources used to help 
post-conflict governments metaphorically get back on their feet is provided through 
traditional donors (such as the EU, US, Japan, etc.). This was certainly the case in Liberia 
with UNMIL. 
 
Democratization is part of the peacebuilding paradigm. Normally there is a big push 
from the lead international/regional mediator or international organisation during the 
peace negotiation phase to push towards holding multi-party elections and for this 
inclusion to be part of a peace agreement. Depending on the nature of the conclusion of 
the conflict and the terms of the negotiated peace, a power-sharing transitional 
government may be established. This power-sharing government generally controls the 
functions of the state for a designated amount of time until national elections can be held 
and the administration can be transferred to elected officials. During the transitional 
process, the transitional government has time and support to try to restore the 
government’s core functions and authority. However although this is not always possible 
given the composition and short-term goals of members of the transitional government. 
With varying degrees of success, as is often the case, the former warring factions 
transform themselves into either new political entities or merge with former structures or 
parties in order to contest in the elections.  
 
Dealing with past events, grievances, and injustices are unavoidable when trying to re-
build a nation through a peacebuilding process.396 Depending again on the nature of the 
armed conflict and the terms of the ceasefire agreement, the creation of new government 
institutions may be established, either temporarily or permanently, to address the root 
causes of the war. Institutions are geared towards reconciling people’s trust between 
different groups, but also their relationships with government institutions and 
policymakers. Although social healing happens on many various levels and through 
different means the creation of institutions such as anti-corruption commissions, 
governance reform commissions, transitional justice institutions (for instance, truth-
seeking processes— such as and reconciliation commissions or punitive instruments— 
such as war crimes tribunals) may serve those ends.  
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Another vital part of the governance and political dimension of peacebuilding is to 
support and encourage a strong civil society and media. Civil society can serve many 
purposes in the post-conflict situation ranging from providing linkages between 
communities, contributing towards reconciliation through facilitating public engagement, 
dialogue and advocacy, mobilizing resources and expertise (or capacity). Moreover, civil 
society can provide services to complement government or international community 
efforts (such as training programmes or provide health services) as well as provide check 
and balances on government’s and the international community’s policies and actions 
(whether the UN, IFIs or donors).397 Civil society can contribute to political, economic 
and social reconstruction through various activities. In post-conflict environments civil 
society is often composed of both international NGOs as well as local NGOs, which 
often functions on multiple levels from local initiatives on a grassroots level to national 
initiatives, assisting government develop policies or implement peacebuilding efforts. 
Supporting the media is also important for many of the same reasons. The media plays 
an important role in democracy by providing the public with information. Moreover the 
media is capable of providing important checks and balances on the activities and 
policies of the government and various political actors. Depending on the quality, media 
can, in turn, increase accountability and allow the public to make better-informed 
decisions. Civil society and the media can be important actors in providing an alternative 
arena for post-conflict reform and can contribute to keeping the peacebuilding process 
on track including keeping the public engaged. 
 
The governance and political dimension of peacebuilding includes: supporting 
governance reform, support for political and administrative authorities and structures; 
strengthening democratic processes; addressing transitional justice issues such as judicial 
reform, instruments for reconciliation and the consolidation of the rule of law; and 
strengthening civil society and media.  
 
Social, Economic and Environmental Dimension 
This dimension of the peacebuilding paradigm seeks to addresses the various social, 
economic and environmental causes as well as consequences of conflict. War has 
devastating effects on populations and destroys vital infrastructures (economic, 
education, health, transportation and communication). War often exacerbates poverty 
and reverses developmental gains. Populations get displaced either internally or 
                                                
397 Prendergast and Plumb, 327-329. 
   
- 108 - 
 
internationally and as a consequence of ware are often traumatised. Moreover, war can 
exacerbate competition for, access to, and/or mismanagement of natural resources, 
whether basic resources such as water or arable land or commodities such as cocoa, 
diamonds and oil. In the aftermath of war there are often many fundamental social, 
economic and environmental needs that must be addressed in the short, medium and 
long-term in order to successfully transition from war to peace. Many of social, 
economic, and environmental elements that are implemented rely on the other 
peacebuilding dimensions such as security and good governance. As time passes and the 
country transitions away from the emergency phase, there must be a shift away from 
short and medium-term initiatives such as relief efforts and repatriation towards more 
meaningful development enabling the population to live harmoniously.  
 
The displacement of people creates complex challenges in post-conflict situations in 
terms of logistics, basic services, and repatriation or re-settlement. In the short to 
medium-term, the displaced populations need to be provided for. The displaced 
populations composed of IDPs and refugees need protection, shelter, basic health 
provisions, food, water, and education provisions for the children. Although the 
provisions for displaced persons generally pre-date the ceasefire agreements, they 
continue well into the future until either the displaced population get repatriated, 
voluntarily return, re-settle elsewhere or funding becomes unavailable. The willingness of 
IDPs and refugees to return to their communities or elsewhere in their countries greatly 
depends on not only the implementation of the peace agreement and the security 
situation, but on their ability to access basic needs such as shelter, health, food, and in 
many cases education for their children in their communities of return. In many cases 
their temporary accommodation (whether in an IDP or refugee camp) can provide them 
with more security and better access to basic needs. Much like soldiers through DDR 
programmes, refugees and IDPs are often encouraged to return to their communities 
and are given assistance reintegrating back into society (such as building materials, 
training packages, food assistance, etc.) once the conflict is concluded and the situation 
allows for it.398 This reality emphasises the importance for a country to transition from 
war to peace as well as the importance of moving away from relief towards 
development.399 The challenges of displaced persons also emphasises the urgency, 
importance and need for communities to be supported in their efforts to not only reform 
but to be seen as socio-economically viable. Moreover, it highlights the need for 
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supporting the social and economic welfare of the population support and effectively 
communicating progress made. 
 
Displaced persons are not the only ones to be negatively affected by the devastation of 
war. The challenges of restoring deficient infrastructures and defunct services often 
affect the whole nation. Depending on the context and the duration of the war nation-
wide infrastructures and services could be in ruins, and there are often high levels of 
unemployment. This ruin could have pre-date the conflict, or it could have been either a 
cause or a consequence of the war. Nonetheless, a main effort of the peacebuilding and 
development processes is to rehabilitate or create these essential functions to assist to 
return the country to normalcy. Key to this is increasing security through the restoration 
as well as investment of education, health, transportation, and agricultural infrastructures 
as well as shifting the nation away from a war economy towards economic revitalization 
and growth. These complex set processes takes time, adequate resources, ambition, a 
vision and suitable expertise. Infrastructural challenges, human capacity deficits and 
macro-economic policies need to be addressed simultaneously. For instance, teachers 
and healthcare workers need to be trained, schools and healthcare facilities need to be 
built, roads often need to be built, and sound economic policies need to be developed, 
agreed upon and implemented. In the short-term, income generating activities (whether 
vocational training, agricultural support or something similar) or quick impact projects 
are needed in order to alleviate immediate challenges of transitioning from war. Quick 
impact projects are designed to have high-impact benefits for local communities through 
focusing on tangible economic activities and immediate re-settlement challenges.400  
 
Economic and social rehabilitation, including local capacity building, are essential for 
long-term prosperity and obtaining a positive sustainable peace.401 In sum, the social, 
economic and environmental dimension attempts to empower the population by: 
repatriating as well as reintegrating refugees and internally displaced persons; assisting in 
the re-building of socio-economic infrastructures; supporting short-term projects 
(commonly known as quick impact projects); and supporting efforts for long-term 
sustainable development.  
 
Together, these mutually reinforcing dimensions of peacebuilding are seen as a 
comprehensive way of fostering an environment in which the root causes of conflict are 
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addressed and alleviated. The failure of one dimension, be it security, economic growth, 
good governance or reconciliation, can have devastating effects on the success of the 
other vital dimensions.402 For instance, there can be no socio-economic development 
without security or political reform.403 Just like failing to address the large numbers of 
combatants and weapons in a post-conflict environment poses a problem for the 
consolidation of security. The UN and donors have learned and accepted that without 
addressing these concerns the likelihood of succeeding in transitioning a country from 
war to peace is severely reduced.404 This is the model that the UN and IFIs have 
embraced, and is being implementing around the world in war torn countries.405  
 
Peacebuilding in Liberia 
As envisaged in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement of 18 August 2003, a UN 
peacekeeping mission (the United Nations Mission in Liberia or UNMIL) was 
established on the recommendation of the UN Secretary-General, spearheading the UN’s 
peacebuilding efforts. The mandate of the mission was under Chapter VII of the UN 
Charter, amongst other objectives aimed to support the effective and timely 
implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement; monitor the ceasefire 
agreement; assist the National Government extend state authority throughout Liberia; 
and assist with implementation of a DDR programme, the establishment of the Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission and preparations for elections.406 UNMIL was a 
comprehensive and multidimensional mission composed of ‘political, military, civilian 
police, criminal justice, civil affairs, human rights, gender, child protection, disarmament, 
demobilisation and reintegration, public information,’ electoral and support 
components.407 These divisions worked very closely with the newly established NTGL to 
build their capacity, capabilities and transfer knowledge. The various components of the 
peacekeeping mission provided peacebuilding support and aimed at addressing many of 
the root causes of the armed conflict.408 Liberia’s security was paramount in this 
endeavour, as was the implementation of the country’s DDR programme. 
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Historically Liberia’s government institutions did not serve the majority of the people. 
The NTGL unfortunately was comprised of warlords and faction leaders who signed the 
peace agreement. That was the price of bringing the war to an end. Few of the members 
of the transitional government had experience governing, few had expertise running 
ministries and few had the ambition to improve the plight of the average Liberian. From 
its inception on 1 October 2003, UNMIL was the de facto government in Liberia. The UN 
was responsible for providing the physical security of the country, it provided 
humanitarian assistance that allowed most citizens to subsist, it assisted in the 
rehabilitation of government authority (including paying the salaries of many government 
employees who were ‘seconded’ to help rebuild capacity), it organised multiparty 
elections and was largely responsible for Liberia’s transition from a nation of conflict to a 
peaceful nation on the path to development. In line with the CPA, one of the main 
functions of UNMIL was to implement a comprehensive DDR programme. UNSC 
resolution 1509 explicitly gave UNMIL thirty days to produce a plan for a DDR 
programme, paying particular attention to the special needs of child soldiers and 
women.409 
 
The Strategic Framework for Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration  
By mid-October, a taskforce including key stakeholders from UNDP, UNMIL, the 
World Bank, USAID, UNICEF, UNHCR, OCHA and World Vision produced the 
Liberian Disarmament, Demobilisation, Rehabilitation and Reintegration Programme- Strategy and 
Implementation Framework. After consultations with other stakeholders including the 
NTGL (which had been inaugurated on 13 October 2003) this draft framework was 
finalised and in line with UN Resolution 1509 was adopted by the end of October.410 The 
Strategic Framework provides the context, justification and rationale for the DDR 
programme, as well as, its objectives, identifies the target groups and provides guiding 
principles and assumptions. A detailed programme description of the structure of various 
components including information and sensitisation, disarmament and demobilisation, 
reinsertion, social reintegration, economic reintegration and special target groups 
including child combatants, the roles and responsibility of various actors and estimates 
the DDR programme costs are provided.411 The Strategic Framework, like the CPA and 
UNMIL’s mandate, explicitly acknowledges the special needs of vulnerable target groups 
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such as children, women and the disabled. As such, provisions for them are included in 
the DDR programme. 
The Strategic Framework proclaims DDR integral to the consolidation of peace and 
security in Liberia’s transition from war to peace. The stated objective of the DDR 
programme is ‘the consolidation of peace through comprehensive disarmament, 
demobilisation and sustainable reintegration of all ex-combatants into civilian society. It 
is therefore the hope that the programme will enable ex-combatants to contribute to 
national development and reconciliation in Liberia instead of posing a threat to peace 
and stability.’412 Moreover, the Strategic Framework acknowledges that only a well-
coordinated and well-structured DDR programme will assist the government and the the 
UN and the IFIs in achieving their immediate objectives – including to ‘consolidate 
national security as a precondition to facilitating humanitarian assistance, restoration of 
civil authority, promotion of economic growth and development.’413 
 
Inst i tut ional  Arrangements  
The institutional roles and responsibilities were clearly spelt out within the framework. 
As mandated by the CPA, the temporary interdisciplinary and interdepartmental called 
the National Commission on Disarmament, Demobilisation, Rehabilitation and 
Reintegration (NCDDRR) was established and was mandated to provide policy guidance 
and supervision of the DDR programme.414 The NCDDRR was co-chaired by the 
Chairman of the NTGL and the UNMIL’s SRSG. The Commission was comprised of 
representatives of relevant government agencies, representatives of the three signatures 
of the CPA (GOL, LURD, MODEL), ECOWAS, the UN, the AU and the International 
Contact Group for Liberia (ICGL).415 The composition of the NCDDRR was very 
important, as it held the ultimate responsibility over the policy decision-making for the 
DDR programme, and as co-chairs both the NTGL and UNMIL shared a great deal of 
responsibility for policy decisions. UNICEF had no representation in the NCDDRR, 
and thus was not within the inner circle of decision-making regarding DDR policy. In 
November 2003, the NTGL Chairman appointed Dr. Moses Jarbo, a Liberia associated 
with LURD faction, as the Executive Director of the NCDDRR. 
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The Joint Implementation Unit (JIU) staffed by UNMIL, OCHA and UNDP had the 
primary responsibility for planning and implementing the day-to-day operations of the 
DDR and in theory, it was supposed to receive its guidance from the NCDDRR. The 
head of the JIU reported in to the SRSG of UNMIL. As an interdisciplinary and 
interdepartmental body, the JIU was composed of four units: i) disarmament and 
demobilisation staff from UNMIL; ii) rehabilitation and reintegration staff from UNDP; 
iii) monitoring and evaluation staff from UNDP; and iv) information and sensitization 
from both UNMIL and OCHA. It was envisaged that by pooling expertise from various 
agencies the necessary expertise would be utilised to efficiently develop and implement 
the DDR programme, reduce costs and also ensure continuity.416 
 
 
The JIU was mandated to open five DDR field offices across the country, to be located 
within UNMIL field offices. These field offices would serve as one-stop-shops for DDR. 
They would be responsible for providing ex-combatants and their communities with 
accurate and up-to-date information, counselling, administering reintegration assistance, 
monitoring and evaluating, coordinating with local leaders and other community-based 
reconstruction initiatives, sensitizing the local population, reporting on progress and 
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trouble-shooting.417 The field offices were to be staffed with experts dedicated to 
reintegration, counselling and financial management. The Strategic Framework did not 
specify where the field offices would be established, nor did it specify a time-frame for 
their establishment. 
 
As articulated in the CPA and UNSC Resolution 1509, UNMIL had a clear mandate to 
implement the DDR programme. UNMIL had a great deal of responsibility, not only in 
the planning phase, but also in providing security, logistical support and ensuring 
effective execution of DDR and peacebuilding. The success of the DDR programme 
depended on a number of elements of which were squarely under the aegis of UNMIL – 
for instance providing physical security and logistical support. Moreover, as disarmament 
and demobilisation is seen as a military task UNMIL had a leading role above and 
beyond providing staffing. UNMIL would be responsible for bearing the cost of the 
military-related activities of disarmament and demobilisation processes, covered within 
the assessed contribution and budget of UNMIL. The initial cost estimate based on 
initial estimate of 38,000 combatants was $20 million for the deployment of 
peacekeepers, the construction of and supplies to the six cantonment sites and the 
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  -­‐Provide	  technical	  input	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  process	  of	  disarmament,	  registration,	  documentation	  	  	  	  and	  screening	  of	  potential	  candidates	  for	  demobilisation;	  -­‐Develop	  and	  install	  systems	  for	  arms	  control	  and	  advise	  on	  a	  larger	  legislative	  framework	  to	  	  	  	  monitor	  and	  control	  arms	  recycling;	  -­‐Monitor	  and	  verify	  the	  conformity	  of	  the	  DDR	  process	  along	  recognised	  and	  acceptable	  	  	  	  standards;	  -­‐Assume	  responsibility	  for	  effecting	  disarmament	  of	  combatants,	  maintain	  a	  pertinent	  registry	  of	  	  	  	  surrendered	  weaponry	  and	  conduct	  pre-­‐demobilisation	  screening	  and	  evaluation;	  and	  -­‐Ensure	  the	  destruction	  of	  all	  weapons	  surrendered.	  	  Source:	  Draft	  Interim	  Secretariat.	  Liberian	  Disarmament,	  Demobilisation,	  Rehabilitation	  and	  
Reintegration	  Programme:	  Strategy	  and	  Implementation	  Framework.	  Monrovia:	  Draft	  Interim	  Secretariat,	  October	  2003,	  21-­‐22.	  	  	  	  	  UNMIL’s	  responsibilities	  include:	  Provide	  relevant	  input	  and	  information	  as	  well	  as	  security	  assistance	  and	  advice	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  selection	  of	  potential	  sites	  of	  disarmament	  and	  demobilisation;	  Provide	  technical	  input	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  process	  of	  disarmament,	  registration,	  documentation	  and	  screening	  of	  potential	  candidates	  for	  demobilisation;	  Develop	  and	  install	  systems	  for	  arms	  control	  and	  advise	  on	  a	  larger	  legislative	  framework	  to	  monitor	  and	  control	  arms	  recycling;	  Monitor	  and	  verify	  the	  conformity	  of	  the	  DDR	  process	  along	  recognised	  and	  acceptable	  standards;	  Assume	  responsibility	  for	  effecting	  disarmament	  of	  combatants,	  maintain	  a	  pertinent	  registry	  of	  surrendered	  weaponry	  and	  conduct	  pre-­‐demobilisation	  screening	  and	  evaluation;	  and	  Ensure	  the	  destruction	  of	  all	  weapons	  surrendered.	  	  
   
- 115 - 
 
UNDP had an integral role in the DDR programme and in supporting other 
peacebuilding initiatives. UNDP was entrusted with the management of a multi-donor 
DDRR Trust Fund, it participated in various DDR related committees and working 
groups (such as the Technical Coordinating Committee, the Project Approval 
Committee and DDR Working Group) as well as provided staff and expertise and was 
responsible for contracting the service providers or implementing partners for the non-
military components of the demobilisation process and was wholly responsible for the 
reintegration component of the DDR programme. Regarding demobilisation and 
reintegration processes, UNDP managed all administrative arrangements of the 
implementing partners (their contracting, oversight, financial reporting, etc.).  
 
Most of the money for the DDR programme flowed through the DDR Trust Fund. 
UNDP created the DEX Unit to administer the Trust Fund. The DEX Unit was 
responsible for (i) establishing and maintaining accurate records of commitments made 
to the Fund; (ii) the procurement of goods and services; (iii) screening and the approval 
of payments; and (iv) monitoring all expenditures and reporting to donors.419 The Trust 
Fund was created with a set of regulations and rules of procedures with transparency in 
mind – including mandatory audits and reporting requirements. The estimated cost for 
the DDR programme (again, based on 38,000 combatants and excluding UNMIL’s 
estimated contribution of $20 million mentioned above) was approximately $50 million, 
with an average cost per head for the duration of the programme estimated at $1,410 per 
combatant.420  
 
According to the Strategic Framework, specialist UN agencies and NGOs had an 
important role to play in the planning and implementation of the DDR programme. The 
programme heavily relied upon the expertise and capacity of implementing partners, 
including UN agencies, local and international NGOs.421 Implementing partners with 
specific expertise and capacity were contracted to fulfil specific and crucial roles. For 
instance, UNICEF was tasked with the overall responsible for the child DDR 
components and World Health Organisation (WHO) was responsible for the medical 
screening and health services during the DDR programme. In both cases, implementing 
partners were sought to carry out projects or specific services. It is important to note, 
                                                
419 Ibid., 23-24. 
420 Ibid., 39. 
421 Ibid., 22. 
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however, that the contracting of NGOs and specialists were not intended to diminish the 
JIU’s overall responsibility over the programme. 
 
A Project Approval Committee (PAC) was established to facilitate the transparent 
disbursement of funds and mainstream the programme components. The PAC’s 
responsibility included the review and approval DDR projects irrespective of whether 
funding for such projects came from the DDR Trust Fund or from other sources 
(bilateral or other project funding). Implementing partners would submit their proposals 
to the JIU for the PAC’s approval. Membership of the PAC included representation 
from the EU, USAID, UNDP, UNMIL, UNICEF and the NTGL.422 
 
The Strategic Framework called for the creation of a multi-departmental Technical 
Coordinating Committee (TCC) to advise the JIU and external programme partners on 
key issues of planning to provide a forum for technical and strategic consultation.423 The 
membership of the TCC included both service providers and donors with a wide range 
of expertise from relevant agencies with a role in the sector specific elements of 
programme such as UNMIL, UNDP, UNICEF, UNHCR, WFP, WHO, FOA, EU, 
USAID, and appropriate government agencies.424 The Strategic Framework called for the 
TCC to hold meetings every fortnight, or as required. 
 
Disarmament ,  Demobi l i sat ion and Reintegrat ion 
There were many moving pieces in the planning and execution of the DDR programme. 
The Strategic Framework called for the DDR programme to commence on 7 December 
2003. It acknowledged that despite the proposal for DDR to begin within ninety-days of 
the inauguration of the NTGL (which happened on 13 October) the start-date would be 
pushed forward several weeks (instead of a mid-January 2004 start) due to fragile political 
and security situation on the ground.425  
 
Based on the estimated caseload of 38,000 combatants, the Strategic Framework called 
for a maximum number of 10 cantonment sites to be established in areas of convenience 
for the three-armed-groups. These locations and arrangements, whether the disarmament 
                                                
422 Ibid., 25. 
423 Ibid.  
424 Ibid. 
425 Ibid., 25-26. 
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and demobilisation sites could either separate sites altogether or could be combined or 
co-located was to be determined by the NCDDRR/JIU in consultation with UNMIL.426  
 
Identifying suitable cantonment sites and preparing them the DD process required the 
upgrading or building of adequate facilities including sanitation, water and 
accommodation. Moreover, there would have to be separate facilities for male, female, 
boy and girl fighters. According to the Strategic Framework, combatants would remain 
within the cantonment site (or enter the disarmament site then get transferred to the 
demobilisation if the sites were separate) for a maximum encampment period of 30 days 
to allow for adequate time to be disarmed, processed and demobilised.427  
 
UNMIL was responsible for not only securing the sites and the surrounding areas 
throughout the DD process but also constructing and preparing the sites. In order to 
remain neutral and foster confidence in the process, the cantonment sites for the various 
factions would open simultaneously and operate concurrently. Each site would have the 
capacity for 1,000 combatants at a time, with the daily intake of groups of 250.428 
UNMIL would deploy and provide a minimum of 10 MILOBs to each cantonment site, 
as well as a minimum of a company of peacekeepers at each site to provide security in 
the area as well as in the cantonment sites.429 
 
Disarmament  
The stated objective of the disarmament of both adults and children was to consolidate 
and enhance security in the country through weapons collection.430 According to the 
Strategic Framework the process would be straightforward. Upon arrival at the 
disarmament site, an interview would be conducted by UNMIL peacekeepers to compile 
the combatant’s basic information (such as name, age, affiliation, rank, etc.). The 
combatant would surrender a weapon or ammunition and a disarmament form would be 
completed. The weapon would be disabled, catalogued, stored and later destroyed on 
site. The eligibility of the combatant to formally be admitted into the programme would 
be assessed by UNMIL MILOBs.  
 
                                                
426 Ibid., 42. 
427 Ibid., 43. 
428 Ibid., 42-43. 
429 Ibid., 43. 
430 Ibid., 28. 
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Although the Strategic Framework outlines a skeletal-framework for the eligibility criteria 
of combatants in the DDR programme, it declared that the NCDDRR (which had at that 
point not yet been established) would be responsible for the policy decision-making and 
providing specifics about the entry criteria.431 The Strategic Framework suggested that in 
order to be eligible to participate in the DDR programme, every combatant must: 
Demonstrate participation as an adult combatant member of one of the fighting 
forces at the time of the signature of the CPA;  
or 
Be an underage combatant, accompanying minor, unaccompanied minor, or any 
other participant under the age of 18 or female, presenting with any of the 
fighting factions;  
or 
Present acceptable proof of participation in the armed conflict as a member of at 
least one of the mentioned groups which includes: 
A weapon presented by each combatant;  
or 
A group comprised of up to five combatants with a group weapon.432 
 
This indeed was the basis of the entry criteria decided by the NCDDRR, although they 
slightly revised it.  
 
If the combatants met the criteria, their disarmament form would be validated entitling 
combatants to benefit from the DDR programme, and they would then be assembled 
with other combatants to be transferred to the demobilisation site. If the combatant was 
determined not to be eligible for whatever reason, their form would not be validated and 
they would not proceed to the demobilisation site. This was the outline of the 
disarmament process which would be completed in one day. 
 
The Strategic Framework indicated some of the preparatory tasks that needed to happen 
if the disarmament process were to succeed. For instance, the main stakeholders, such as 
UNMIL, NCDDRR, JIU, needed to develop procedures for each step of the 
disarmament process. UNMIL needed to identify and prepare the cantonment sites. Staff 
needed training, including how to interview, how to process the combatants, how to 
handle child combatants and how to fill in the disarmament forms. UNMIL needed to 
procure the hardware to roll out the disarmament process – such as computers, printers, 
wristbands and forms. These were all elements that needed greater attention, to be 
planned for and organised. 
 
                                                
431 Ibid., 13. 
432 Ibid. 
   





An information and sensitization campaign was planned, encouraging all fighting factions 
to release their women and children, in order for them to participate in the DDR 
programme as per the CPA and the fighting factions’ commitments to the peace process. 
Women and children were to be disarmed and processes as a matter of priority ahead of 
everyone else. Children would be processed according to the Cape Town Principles and 
in compliance with the Conventions on the Rights of the Child.433 This meant that they 
were to be admitted whether they were frontline combatants or auxiliary support. The 
entry criteria for women and children were different from men. Unlike men who had to 
surrender a weapon or ammunition, women and children were to be ‘accepted in the 
programme regardless of having submitted or not weapons or ammunition provided they 
come as part of a fighting unit with any group.’434 Once they were processed and 
completed disarmament, they were to be transported to the demobilisation site where 
men and women, boys and girls would be housed in separate facilities for the duration 
demobilisation process (see chart).  
 
 
                                                
433 Ibid., 69. 
434 Ibid., 43. 
Summary	  of	  specific	  disarmament	  activities	  and	  preparatory	  tasks	  -­‐Elaborating	  disarmament	  procedure	  plan/manual;	  -­‐Cantonment	  identification	  and	  preparation;	  -­‐Preparation	  of	  cantonment	  administrators	  to	  receive	  combatants;	  -­‐Training	  of	  UNMIL	  interviewing	  personnel;	  -­‐Disarmament	  forms	  designed	  and	  reproduced;	  -­‐Rejection	  procedures	  established	  for	  non-­‐qualifying	  personnel;	  -­‐Training	  of	  UNMIL	  MILOBs	  in	  registration	  procedures;	  -­‐Procurement	  and	  distribution	  of	  wrist	  bracelets	  for	  personnel	  and	  weapons;	  -­‐Procurement	  of	  weapon	  storage	  facilities	  and	  destruction.	  	  Source:	  Draft	  Interim	  Secretariat.	  Liberian	  Disarmament,	  Demobilisation,	  Rehabilitation	  and	  
Reintegration	  Programme:	  Strategy	  and	  Implementation	  Framework.	  Monrovia:	  Draft	  Interim	  Secretariat,	  October	  2003,	  46.	  	  Summary	  of	  specific	  disarmament	  activities	  and	  preparatory	  tasks	  Elaborating	  disarmament	  procedure	  plan/manual;	  Cantonment	  identification	  and	  preparation;	  Preparation	  of	  cantonment	  administrators	  to	  receive	  combatants;	  Training	  of	  UNMIL	  interviewing	  personnel;	  Disarmament	  forms	  designed	  and	  reproduced;	  Rejection	  procedures	  established	  for	  non-­‐qualifying	  personnel;	  Training	  of	  UNMIL	  MILOBs	  in	  registration	  procedures;	  Procure nt	  and	  distribution	  of	  wrist	  bracelets	  for	  personnel	  and	  weapons;	  Procurement	  of	  weapon	  storage	  facilities	  and	  destruction.	  	  Cited	  from	  page	  46	  
   






The Strategic Framework stated a threefold objective for the demobilisation process. 
First, the legal status of the combatant would be registered and transferring from 
combatant to civilian status. Second, the command structures of the group would be 
broken down. Lastly, the beneficiary would be provided with initial services then return 
to civilian life.435 
 
The male demobilisation process was different from the women or child process. Once 
the combatants completed the disarmament process, they would be transferred to the 
reception areas of demobilisation site. Men, women and children would be separated and 
receive orientation briefings about the process (the process’s objectives, et.), practical 
information such as the site’s facilities and activities. Males would be briefed by 
MILOBs, while UNICEF would brief both women and children albeit separately. A 
demobilisation screening interview would be conducted by UNMIL personnel, the 
combatants would be registered and presented with an identification card confirming 
their status as civilians. This ID card entitled them to the programme’s benefits. The ex-
combatant would then be medically screened by WHO staff or contracted specialised 
medical NGOs.  
 
After being medically screened adults were to undergo reintegration interviews 
conducted by JIU personnel intended to inform the beneficiaries of their benefits as well 
                                                
435 Ibid., 28. 
The	  Child	  Disarmament	  Process	  	  Children	  will	  be	  disarmed	  through	  a	  rapid	  process	  with	  the	  following	  key	  activities:	  -­‐Arrival/delivery	  of	  child	  troops	  at	  designated	  sites;	  -­‐Collection	  of	  arms	  and	  weapons	  from	  child	  troops	  (although	  this	  was	  not	  required	  for	  	  	  	  admittance);	  -­‐Registration	  of	  arms	  and	  weapons;	  -­‐Registration	  and	  issuance	  child	  identification	  tags;	  -­‐Transportation	  of	  troops	  to	  demobilisation	  site.	  	  Participating	  agencies	  for	  the	  child	  disarmament	  process	  at	  a	  minimum	  include	  UNMIL,	  ICRC,	  JIU	  and	  UNICEF	  as	  the	  representative	  of	  the	  Child	  Protection	  Working	  Group.	  	  	  Source:	  Draft	  Interim	  Secretariat.	  Liberian	  Disarmament,	  Demobilisation,	  Rehabilitation	  and	  
Reintegration	  Programme:	  Strategy	  and	  Implementation	  Framework.	  Monrovia:	  Draft	  Interim	  Secretariat,	  October	  2003,	  70.	  	  	  The	  Child	  Disarmament	  Process	  	  Children	  will	  be	  disarmed	  through	  a	  rapid	  process	  with	  the	  following	  key	  activities:	  Arrival/delivery	  of	  child	  troops	  at	  designated	  sites;	  Collection	  of	  arms	  and	  weapons	  from	  child	  troops	  (although	  this	  was	  not	  required	  for	  admitt nce);	  Registration	  of	  arms	  and	  weapons;	  Registration	  and	  issuance	  child	  identification	  tags;	  Transportation	  of	  troops	  to	  demobilisation	  site.	  	  Participating	  agencies	  for	  th 	  child	  disarmament	  process	  at	  a	  m nimum	  include	  UNMIL,	  ICRC,	  JIU	  and	  UNICEF	  as	  the	  representative	  of	  the	  Child	  Protection	  Working	  Group.	  	  Source:	  Cited from page 70 	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as help the JIU gather information in order to assist in the planning and coordinate 
reintegration programmes. The penultimate step in the adult demobilisation process 
involved the pre-discharge orientation process where the ex-combatants received career, 
psychological and health counselling; civic education; and information about the role of 
the DDRR field offices, the JIU, the reintegration opportunities, etc. Before being 
discharged the ex-combatants received the first of two instalments of their Transitional 
Safety Allowance (TSA) totalling $150, as well as three months of supplementary food 
support from WFP. The beneficiaries would be discharged, and receive transportation 
assistance to reach their desired locations for resettlement.436 The TSA was intended as 
part of a package to assist the resettlement of ex-combatant into their communities, as a 
safety-net of sorts intended to cover living costs for up to six-months. Their second and 
final TSA instalment, another $150, would be available three months later.437 The 
demobilisation process was envisaged to take a maximum of 30 days before the ex-
combatant resettled back into the community of their choice. 
 
Upon entry into the demobilisation process women and children are separated from their 
male counterparts. This separation of distinct groups of combatants was intended to 
enable better targeting of special needs. It was also intended to protect them from 
further abuse by their commanders. UNIFEM would guide and be responsible for the 
women DDR process, while UNICEF and child protection agencies would play an 
integral role in the child DDR processes. It was envisaged that during the demobilisation 
both women and children would be processed and dispatched within 72 hours. After the 
medical screening, the children would be transferred to UNICEF to be transferred to the 
Interim Care Centres (ICCs) and women are transferred to separate female-only 
cantonment site. 
 
The Strategic Framework highlighted many of the practical aspects that needed to be 
addressed ahead of the launch of the programme. A minimum of six demobilisation sites 
were called for with the initial prioritisation of three so that simultaneous DD could 
begin. Due to its sequential and multifaceted process, like disarmament, the 
demobilisation process necessitated much preparatory work by the responsible entities. 
For instance, first and foremost, demobilisation sites would need to be identified based 
                                                
436 Ibid., 47-50. 
437 There was no specific mention of whether children would also receive TSA. It says – the 
NCDDRR/JIU will coordinate with specialised agencies, including UNICEF, to facilitate the reinsertion of 
children under the age of 16 based on family-based assistance, while 16-18 year olds will be provided with 
adult assistance, although processed as children. See Ibid., 31. 
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on an indication of the number of combatants to go through the process. Procedures 
and operational plans would need to be developed and made operational for tasks such 
as the transportation of combatants to and from the disarmament and demobilisation 
sites, how the demobilisation interviews would be conducted, how the pre-discharge 
orientation (PDO) would be handled and the modalities for the payment of the TSA. 
Materials would need to be procured and staff would need to be trained to gain 
competency and knowledge about the various processes to be undertaken, such as the 
administration of questionnaires, the processing of identification cards and PDO 
modules and discharge procedures. Lastly, arrangements with implementing partners and 




The child demobilisation process was intended to serve and address the special needs of 
children while providing a child-friendly environment. Separated from women and men 
upon arrival at the demobilisation site, children would be screened by UNMIL with the 
assistance of child demobilisation officers and social workers. Children would then be 
provided with basic provisions including rations of food, water, shelter and personal 
items (such as a blanket, mat, hygiene kit, clothing, and a bucket). The children would 
undergo a medical examination conducted by WHO staff or staff from a specialised 
medical NGO. Within 72 hours of being disarmed (or in exceptional cases 5 day) 
children would receive their photo ID card and be briefed on the DDR procedures and 
entitlements before being discharged and transferred to the ICCs for the duration of the 
demobilisation process.439 The Strategic Framework identified UNICEF, UNMIL, JIU, 
WHO, medical NGOs, and WFP as playing an important role in the child 
demobilisation.440 UNICEF and child protection agencies would provide guidelines in 
conjunction with JIU for the operations, procedures and standards for the ICCs and 






                                                
438 Ibid., 49-50. 
439 Ibid., 65-69. 
440 Ibid., 70. 
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Disarmament and demobilisation process 
 
Assistance 
component Disarmament assistance 
Demobilisation and discharge 
assistance 
Objective Disarmament of Groups to consolidate 
and enhance security situation in the 
country  
Recognition and legal classification of 
disarmed combatants as individual 
civilians, renunciation of allegiance to the 
command structure of any group and 
provision of initial services to individuals 
to facilitate return to civilian life 
Type  Opportunity (adult & children) Benefit (adult & children) 
Nature 
 
Pre-disarmament sensitisation  
Operational meetings with commanders 
and UNMIL.    Security 
Transportation of ex-combatant and 
families to demobilisation centre  





Transport allowance and discharge 
Timing 1 day Maximum 30 days  
Location Cantonments Cantonments 
Implementation UNMIL with NCDDRR policies, 
technical and operational 
Guidelines 
NCDDRR establishment and 
management. 
  
Source: Draft Interim Secretariat. Liberian Disarmament, Demobilisation, Rehabilitation and Reintegration 




The stated objective of the reintegration programme is to provide the ex-combatant with 
the opportunity to learn basic skills to support themselves through employment, enabling 
them to contribute towards the community reconstruction process and to facilitate their 
social reintegration.441 The Strategic Framework differentiates between social and 
economic reintegration. Social reintegration refers to the reinsertion of ex-combatants 
into their communities, as well as the sensitisation and reconciliation that is needed to 
ensure the ex-combatants can return to and are received by the community of their 
choice. Economic reintegration relates to the economic, education and employability of 
the ex-combatants. The objective of economic reintegration is to improve the 
educational or skills level of the ex-combatant in order to improve their economic 
viability and thus their reintegration prospects.442 Given the history and complexity of the 
Liberian conflict both components of reintegration are complex, but essential to 
transforming the country towards peaceful existence. 
 
The Strategic Framework outlined the need for social reintegration to comprise activities 
for both the ex-combatants and their communities. Adult ex-combatants were to 
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undergo much of the social reintegration activities during the pre-discharge orientation 
and the information and sensitization process of demobilisation. Getting the ex-
combatants to better understand and abide by their role in society, such as how to 
peacefully manage their social and economic expectations in the post-conflict 
environment, and an increased understanding of their civic duties was seen by the 
architects of the Strategic Framework as vital. 
  
In terms of the communities’ social reintegration interventions, the Strategic Framework 
called on the JIU to design and implement an extensive community sensitisation 
programme that would facilitate the ex-combatants’ acceptance into communities and 
contribute towards the reconciliation between fighters and communities, inform the 
general public about the DDR’s objectives and rationale. The hope was that this would 
help facilitate social cohesion.443 The DDR Field Offices were to organise post-discharge 
counselling activities for ex-combatants and communities, and refer ex-combatants to 
employment and economic opportunities. Reconciliation or cleansing meetings through 
traditional means were identified to potentially play a positive role in the successful 
return of ex-combatants into local communities. Moreover, to strengthen social cohesion 
and help diminish the sense of reward towards the ex-combatants the DDR programme 
was to finance activities that the community at large could benefit from such as adult 
education programmes, civic and peace education, the rehabilitation of public spaces 
such as religious centre and community centres.444 
 
The economic prospects of ex-combatant were bleak given the combined impact of the 
protracted conflict, the absolute breakdown of state services, the 80% illiteracy rate, the 
astronomical unemployment rate (estimated at 80%) and the inflexible absorption 
capacity of the market. The economic reintegration assistance was intended to improve 
their chances of being able to provide themselves with gainful employment, rather than 
resorting to rent-seeking through the barrel of a gun.445 The activities of the economic 
reintegration assistance were to consist of job counselling, referral services and skills 
development.  
 
There were various means aimed at developing skills of the ex-combatants such as 
formal education and an accelerated learning programme; vocational training or 
                                                
443 Ibid., 32, 61. 
444 Ibid., 33. 
445 Ibid., 39. 
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apprenticeships where ex-combatants could learn a trade either through classes or on-
the-job training; micro-enterprise support schemes where beneficiaries develop a 
business plan and receive support to implement their plan; and agriculture support and 
training. 446 Where relevant tools and hardware were necessary it would be provided as 
part of the benefits package (i.e., mechanics would receive tools). The ex-combatants 
would choose their assistance package depending on their needs, interests and 
availability. The structure and requirements of each assistance programme were 
articulated in the Strategic Framework.447 
 
The Strategic Framework acknowledged several bottlenecks regarding training of service 
providers and ex-combatants. It was noted that in Liberia there was a dearth of training 
courses and service providers. Moreover, it noted an urban-bias of the few courses that 
were available, both in terms of location and in terms of usefulness in rural areas.448 The 
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Child Reintegration 
According to the Strategic Framework, the reintegration of ex-child soldiers was to begin 
at the Interim Care Centres (ICCs). The best interests of the child were to be taken into 
account at all stages and the child (where possible) was to be an active part of the 
decision-making process regarding her/her reintegration. For instance, the older children 
had the opportunity to choose their reintegration package. 
 
Following demobilisation, child ex-combatants were to remain at the ICCs for between 
six weeks and a maximum of twelve weeks. During this period, the family tracing and 
reunification process would be initiated and children would receive psychosocial 
counselling to assist with the reintegration of the family and broader community, 
information about their reintegration benefits, education and skills training, medical care, 
as well as the time and space for games and recreation. Moreover, where needed services 
were to be provided for child with special needs (such as disabled, girl mothers, etc…).449 
Consensus within the child protection community believed that reuniting children with 
their family was the best thing for children. The hope was that most, if not all, the 
children would be reunited with their families or at a minimum placed in safe alternate 
arrangements (either foster care or independent living arrangements for older 
children).450  
 
Communities have a large part to play in the successful reintegration of ex-child soldiers. 
The Strategic Framework called for child protection agencies to not only sensitise 
communities to the return of ex-child soldiers, but also open a dialogue to voice their 
communities’ concerns about the perceptions of roles and expected conduct of the ex-
combatants.451 To diminish the perception of rewarding ex-child soldiers, communities 
were encouraged to participate in the identification of initiatives supportive of all 
community members rather than interventions solely benefiting ex-child soldiers.452 This 
community-based approach was intended to help the acceptance of ex-child soldiers 
back into communities, and hence their successful reintegration. 
 
The economic outlook for ex-child soldiers was as bleak as it is for adults, if not even 
more so. The absorption capacity of the Liberian economy was not encouraging. Like 
                                                
449 Ibid., 71-72. 
450 Ibid., 71. 
451 Interview 77. 
452 Draft Interim Secretariat, 72. 
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their adult counterparts, in order to facilitate the future economic viability, children need 
to acquire skills. Moreover, most, if not all, the children had grown up in a conflict 
environment had little or no education (or at a minimum, quality education). To acquire 
and develop skills, the Strategic Framework called for the JIU in consultation with 
UNICEF and child protection agencies to work out the details of the child reintegration 
programme. Like the adult programme, formal education, apprenticeship and 







Reinsertion benefit Reintegration programme 
Objective To assist the ex-combatants resettlement 
and meet some basic household needs 
during critical period of post discharge 
To provide the ex-combatant 
opportunity to acquire basic skills (for 
employment or self-employment) to 
support themselves and to participate in 
the community reconstruction process. 
And, to provide of referral and 
counselling services to facilitate their 
social reintegration  




two payments  
Child:  
Interim care centre.  
Family tracing and unification, 
reintegration assistance 
Programme opportunities including 






Timing Sufficient for an initial period of 3 
months resettlement needs. First 
payment issued upon discharge and the 
second three months later 
Programme is on the average 6 to 12 
months depending on type of 
opportunity selected. Ex-combatants are 
expected to select one programme. 
Location In area of return and through DDRR 
Field office  
In area of return and through DDRR 
Field office 
Implementation NCDDRR NCDDRR:  
Contracts with NGOs 
Co-financing with NGOs based on 
MoUs 
 Parallel placement 
Source: Draft Interim Secretariat. Liberian Disarmament, Demobilisation, Rehabilitation and Reintegration 
Programme: Strategy and Implementation Framework. Monrovia: Draft Interim Secretariat, October 2003, 27-8. 
 
Conclusion 
Peacebuilding is an evolving concept based upon the need to address the root causes of 
war in an attempt to either end armed conflict or prevent its recurrence. Liberia was an 
ideal example of a country where peacebuilding initiative should be implemented. In 
many ways intervention in Liberia set the standard of peacebuilding interventions. 
Liberia’s post conflict peacebuilding started with the negotiation of a comprehensive 
peace agreement, followed by the deployment of UNMIL which was a robust 
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peacekeeping mission with various peacebuilding interventions to support the security, 
political, social and economic dimensions to assist the nation with its transition from war 
to peace. Children were acknowledged in the peace agreement, which explicitly called for 
the implementation of a child DDR programme to address the special needs of children 
that were recruited and mobilised in warring factions.  
 
The Strategic Framework was a document prepared by the taskforce comprised of UN 
agencies, donors and representation from civil society intended to provide an outline for 
the DDR programme, articulate the programme’s objectives, the roles and 
responsibilities of the various actors, and outlined the various processes as well as the 
necessary preparations. That being said, it explicitly differed decision-making to the 
responsible actors, such as the NCDDRR. It called on various organisations, such as 
UNMIL, JIU, and the TCC, to further develop the preparatory plans, procedures and 
implementation strategy. Although the Strategic Framework was a preliminary input into 
the process, it was nevertheless an important document and provided significant 
guidance and the foundation of the DDR programme. It was clear from the Strategic 
Framework that the special needs of children were acknowledged, and that effectively 
disarming, demobilising and reintegrating children soldiers was seen as central to the 
consolidation of peace and security in Liberia. UNICEF and child protection agencies 
had important roles to play in the DDR programme, not only by advising the JIU and 
UNMIL on child related activities/processes, but also assist in designing and 
implementing the child DDR programme.  
 
Given the fact that the Strategic Framework was only finalised at the end of October for 
a December start date, much remained to be done in terms of planning and preparations 
and time limited. Important decisions needed to be made quickly by entities not-yet fully 
functional, such as the NCDDRR or JIU or that lacked the expertise. Moreover, 
UNMIL’s limited deployment and the opportunistic and uncertain political landscape 
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This chapter focuses on Liberia’s disarmament process, the first component of their 
DDR programme. Disarmament processes are complex, further complicated by a 
multitude of actors, competing interests and pressures including time and capacity 
constraints and security concerns. The Liberian experience was no exception. 
 
Several documents, including the CPA, UNMIL’s mandate (UN Security Council 
Resolution 1509) and the Liberian Disarmament, Demobilisation, Rehabilitation and 
Reintegration Programme Strategy and Implementation Framework (or Strategic 
Framework), provided a policy and implementation framework for the DDR 
programme, including and specifically the child process. These documents clearly 
outlined how the process should have been implemented, its timelines and delineation of 
responsibility. However, many challenges, deficits and the complex reality on the ground 
quickly complicated the ‘plan’.  
 
The disarmament process, which ran concurrently with the demobilisation process, 
began on 7 December 2003 and formally ended on 31 December 2004. It was initially 
estimated that 38,000 (this figure was later revised to 53,000) combatants would be 
disarmed. However, by the time disarmament concluded in December 2004, a total of 
103,019 people were voluntary disarmed.453 Although it was estimated that as many as 
21,000 child soldiers were thought to be mobilised within the fighting factions, only 
8,000 were included in the original DDR estimate.454 The actual number of children that 
went through the disarmament process totalled 11,282 (8771 boys and 2,511 girls) or 11 
percent of the total disarmed population.455 
                                                
453 NCDDRR. 
454 Draft Interim Secretariat, 39. 
455 NCDDRR. 
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An examination of both the theory as well as an analysis of the practice or 
implementation regarding the Liberian disarmament experience will be provided. There 
will be a specific focus in this chapter on the child disarmament process. In short, the 
theory component is what should have happened regarding the strategy and implementation 
framework, delineation of responsibility, ownership issues and the overall 
conceptualization of the disarmament process. The analysis of the practice explores what 
actually happened on the ground, assessing the child disarmament’s strengths and 
weaknesses as well as its implications for the subsequent demobilisation and 
reintegration processes.  
 
Children had different requirements for entry into the disarmament process, and were 
meant to be given special attention over their adult counterparts and were meant to be 
processed expeditiously. It was clear from the eligibility criteria that the objective of the 
child process also differed from that of adult combatants. Although the arms collection 
was the most important element and objective of adult disarmament, children were not 
required to submit arms to enter or be accepted into the programme. For children, arms 
collection was a bonus. The main objective was accessing and including children in the 
process, and enabling them to be demobilised from the fighting factions. 
 
Despite the specific emphasis on the child disarmament process in this chapter, it is 
important to bear in mind that many, if not most, of the structural and operational 
challenges that impacted the adult disarmament process had similar effects on the child 
process. For example, the security situation across the country impacted children and 
adults alike, as did many of the practical challenges such as the preparedness of the 
cantonment sites. That being said, the child process necessitated different and sometimes 
additional elements and resources (human, logistic and financial) compared to the adult 
process – such as the training of MILOBs and a specific information campaign, aimed at 
child soldiers, the wider population and their communities.  
 
This chapter is divided into three sections. The first is a description of the overall 
disarmament process, including its various phases and a description of the child 
disarmament process. An analysis of the key structural and operational challenges of the 
child process is provided. Lastly, the third section addresses the implication of the 
challenges on the child disarmament process, as well as, the implications to the 
   
 
- 131 - 
 
subsequent demobilisation and reintegration processes. Conclusions are drawn as to 
whether the child disarmament process was a success and whether it contributed to the 
overall peacebuilding endeavour.  
 
The Disarmament Process  
In accordance with the Strategic Framework, the DDR programme officially started on 7 
December 2003. Camp Scheiffelin, an old army barracks outside Monrovia, was quickly 
prepared by UNMIL to handle the first 1,000 combatants to be disarmed. Despite 
numerous calls to postpone the start of the disarmament process due to inadequate 
planning and preparations, including from senior UNMIL management, the disarmament 
programme started as scheduled and soldiers were encouraged to turn up to begin the 
process.456 Although simultaneous disarmament sites were supposed to run concurrently 
for all the three fighting factions, this was not possible due to the limited deployment of 
UNMIL peacekeepers throughout the country and a lack of security. In December 2003, 
UNMIL’s peacekeeping and civilian presence was limited to in and around Monrovia 
with only 5,900 out of the mandated 15,000 peacekeepers being deployed in Liberia.457 
Suitable disarmament sites beyond Monrovia had not yet been located, let alone 
equipped for the disarmament or demobilisation processes.  
 
Camp Scheiffelin  
The first day of the disarmament process did not go as planned at Camp Scheiffelin the 
first disarmament site to open. Over 1,000 combatants presented themselves to be 
disarmed overwhelming UNMIL officials and the facilities that were expecting to process 
only 250 combatants at a time.458 By nightfall, with frustration levels rising, only 500 
people had been disarmed and processed. The others remained in a cue outside the 
disarmament site with their weapons in hand. When word spread that there was a 
misunderstanding about the benefits (the combatants expected to immediately receive 
$150 for surrendering their weapon) things turned violent and riots ensued. Several 
disgruntle armed combatants began firing their weapons into the air, and the relative 
stability quickly broke down. Dissatisfied and disgruntle combatants returned to 
Monrovia and instigated riots and went on a looting spree, which lasted two days and 
                                                
456 Interviews 10, 20, 57, 76 and 84.  
457 United Nations, "First Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in 
Liberia," (15 December 2003), 2. 
458 Ryan Nichols, "Disarming Liberia: Progress and Pitfalls," in Armed and Aimless: Armed Groups, Guns, and 
Human Security in the ECOWAS Region, ed. Nicolas Florquin and Eric G. Berman(Geneva: Small Arms 
Survey, 2005), 113. 
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resulted in the death of nine people.459 The situation only improved once the decision 
and announcement was made by the NTGL Chairman and UNMIL SRSG that disarmed 
soldiers would immediately receive an advance payment of $75 for their weapons.460 
Over the subsequent days, despite the chaos, the overwhelmed staff and facilities, 
UNMIL managed to disarm a total of 13,125 combatants and collect a total of 8,679 
weapons including 2,720,318 rounds of ammunition.461 A total of 1,189 children were 
disarmed, many of whom surrendered weapons (had they not surrendered weapons, they 
wouldn’t have been admitted).462 Of the combatants that were disarmed at Camp 
Scheiffelin, information on economic reintegration preferences was only available for 50 
combatants.463 Due to the breakdown of security and recognition of lack of 
preparedness, the disarmament process was formally suspended on 17 December 2003 
to allow for further planning and preparations.  
 
The decision to pay soldiers $75 for surrendering their weapons was seen by many as 
UNMIL and the NTGL compromising and bowing down to the fighters setting a 
dangerous precedent that plagued the subsequent DDR process as well as the overall 
perception of security. It emboldened the ex-combatants to protest whenever they did 
not get their way, and taught them the power they still had over their communities, with 
or without guns.464 Ex-combatants, whether in a group or not, were perpetually seen as a 
security threat, and dealt with as such – sometimes through reason, sometimes by 
peacekeepers dispersing the group, sometime through compromise. The fragile peace 
process could not afford to test the ex-combatants’ resolve (including that of the former 
child soldiers) as to whether they were a perceived threat or whether they would actually 
mobilise to threaten the peace through violence or unrest if left dissatisfied. It hardly 
mattered if this dissatisfaction was due to frustrated expectations or something more 
serious. To varying degrees the outcome was like to be the same. 
 
Some children under 16 years of age were inadvertently paid the $75 advance, which also 
set a precedent of giving children cash for participating in the DDR process. The 
decision whether to give children cash allowances rather than in-kind assistance (which is 
                                                
459 Interview 90. 
460 Interview 90. 
461 NCDDRR.  
462 Ibid. 
463 United Nations Development Programme, "Strategic and Operational Framework of Reintegration 
Support for Ex-Combatants," (Monrovia: UNDP, 2004), 18. 
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what UNICEF and the child protection agencies were advocating) had not yet been 
made. This precedent further complicated this decision process. 
 
UNMIL, but more specifically SRSG Klein and his senior management team, were 
heavily criticised for the stalled disarmament attempt and inadequate preparations. 
Moreover, Klein had a reputation for unilaterally making decision.465 Prior to the 
commencement of the disarmament process many NGOs, service providers and people 
at UN headquarters in New York knew there were serious problems and that there was a 
lack of operational readiness. Furthermore, UNMIL was in the start-up phase of the 
mission. The peacekeeping troop level was low and field deployment of both 
peacekeepers and civilian staff was limited and as a result the outside the capital security 
was questionable. The NCDDRR responsible for DDR policy had only met once, on 27 
November and that meeting was mired and hijacked by the unresolved appointments of 
government deputy ministers. UNMIL, UNDP and the JIU were severely 
understaffed.466 Besides the Klein and the NTGL Chairman, who were both worried 
about the consequences of delaying the DDR programme, there was little support for the 
7 December start date. There was an evident split in the UNMIL senior leadership. 
UNMIL’s Force Commander, in charge of the peacekeeping troops responsible for not 
only the Liberia’s security but for handling the disarmament process had only been in 
charge of peacekeeping forces for over a month and did not support this start date.467 It 
later emerged that while some key DDR implementing partners had mobilised the 
necessary funding to conduct their DDR responsibilities (namely WHO and UNFPA).468  
 
UNICEF together with other child protection agencies drafted a strong communiqué 
voicing their concerns about the Liberian DDR programme and starting the process too 
early which was submitted to both UNMIL and UN headquarters.469 The document 
claimed that although UNICEF and the NGO community were involved in the planning 
of the child processes, they felt severely marginalised from decision-making and that 
their advice was being disregarded. They cited the lack of preparedness and inadequate 
facilities of the cantonment sites; insecurity or the lack of security (including around the 
ICCs); the lack of separate facilities for men, women, boys and girls; the lack of 
                                                
465 Interviews 75, 76 and 84.  
466 United Nations, "First Progress Report," para 28. 
467 Interview 39. 
468 Interview 20 
469 UNICEF, "Draft Communiqué on Concerns About the Liberian Disarmament, Demobilisation, 
Rehabilitation and Reintegration Programme." 
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integrated planning for the implementation of the reintegration process; and the lack of 
community sensitisation due to an insufficient presence beyond Monrovia as major areas 
of concern.  
 
Preparation for resumption of DDR 
The suspension of the disarmament process allowed for greater planning for the process 
and review of operational weaknesses. On 15 January 2004 a meeting was held between 
UNMIL, representative of the NTGL, NCDDRR, the ICGL and commanders of GOL, 
LURD and MODEL to assess the situation. There was unanimous agreement of four 
pre-conditions that would need to be satisfied before the DDR programme was to 
resume. First, an intensive sensitization campaign would be conducted for the 
combatants to inform them of the DDR process and their benefits. Second, crucial for 
planning purposes the warring factions (GOL, LURD and MODEL) were required to 
provide UNMIL with comprehensive lists of their combatants, their locations and their 
weapons. Third, the cantonment sites and facilities would need to be adequately prepared 
to be able to handle the influx of combatants. Lastly, UNMIL would need adequate 
deployment of troops to provide security.470  
 
In the following months, much progress was made towards fulfilling these requirements. 
UNMIL, with support from the JIU and implementing partners, conducted an intensive 
information campaign to inform combatants of the DDR process, the eligibility process 
and what benefits they would receive. UNICEF and the Child Protection Working 
Group developed and conducted a comprehensive and complementary information 
campaign471 Target groups of UNICEF’s communication campaign included boy and girl 
soldiers, women associated with fighting forces, commanders, as well as their 
communities. The strategies of the campaign included advocacy and lobbying of 
commanders, religious leaders and communities. The purpose was to provide 
information about the process and explain what rights and benefits children and women 
were entitled to. The campaign was designed to run for the full duration of the DDR 
programme. 
 
                                                
470 United Nations, "Second Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in 
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The technical and operational plans were finalised and approved by the TCC. UNMIL 
identified suitable cantonment sites, which were subsequently prepared in collaboration 
with service providers.472 UNMIL troop deployment was steadily increasing throughout 
the country and as a result security beyond Monrovia was improved. Many staffing 
vacancies were filled within UNMIL, UNDP and the JIU. However there were a few 
notable exceptions of persistent vacancies, notably the position of the UNMIL’s Child 
Protection Officer.  
 
The NCDDRR and TCC met several times between January and April and arrived at 
several important policy decisions that had big implications on the DDR programme. 
The estimate of combatants was increased to 53,000 from the initial estimate of 38,000 
(including an estimated 8,000 children).473 The eligibility criteria for the DDR programme 
were slightly revised. Male combatants no longer strictly needed weapons to enter the 
process. In lieu of surrendering a weapon, combatants could surrender 150 rounds of 
ammunition. This drastically reduced the threshold for entry into the process. Due to 
logistic and funding limitations (partly due to the increased estimate of combatants) the 
encampment period of the demobilisation process was reduced to five days, from the 
original 30 day maximum. The modalities of the TSA had been agreed upon. Of 
particular interest to this thesis, on 22 March 2004, the policy decision was made by the 
NCDDRR to pay children TSA ($300 total). This decision was made contrary to the 
advice and stark warning of UNICEF and child protection agencies. The implications of 
this decision will be discussed at greater length later in the demobilisation chapter. 
 
UNMIL’s SRSG announced that the DDR programme would recommence on 15 April 
2004, with three additional phases.474 The recommencement of the DDR programme 
was scheduled to happen despite one of the four pre-conditions not being met. None of 
the fighting factions had provided UNMIL with comprehensive lists of their combatants, 
locations or weapons. Despite not knowing the exact number of expected combatants or 
their locations there was wide support (and pressure) from the key stakeholders for re-
starting the programme.475 
 
                                                
472 United Nations, "Second Progress Report," para 22. 
473 This increased estimate has funding implications. National Transitional Government of Liberia, Liberia 
Needs Assessment Sector Report on Demobilisation, Disarmament, Rehabilitation and Reintegration (Monrovia: 
National Transitional Government of Liberia, 21 January 2004), 4. 
474 Camp Scheiffelin, 7-17 December 2003 was considered Phase One. 
475 Interviews 20, 33 and 84. 
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Restart of Disarmament Process 
The disarmament sites in Phase II were to be opened in a staggered manner, opening 5 
days apart. A total of four disarmament sites would be opened to service the various 
factions in Gbarnga, Bong County to service LURD on 15 April; Buchanan, Grand 
Bassa County to service MODEL on 20 April; Tubmanburg, Bomi County on 25 April; 
and Monrovia, Monserrado County on 30 April (see chart). Although there were still 
concerns about the preparedness of the sites and despite some minor operational 
hiccups, the process at all the sites proceeded without great incident. In accordance with 
the Strategic Framework and Joint Operational Plan a maximum of 250 combatants was 
admitted in to each site per day. Phase II commenced on 15 April, concluded with the 
closure of the final site on 15 September (see chart). A total of 51,341 combatants, 
including 5,227 children were disarmed in this phase and a total of 9,417 weapons and 
2,307,980 rounds of ammunition were collected and destroyed.476 Phase II alone nearly 
serviced the total estimated number of combatants (53,000). The reasons for this will be 
addressed in following sections of this chapter. 
 
Phase III of the DD process commenced in July 2004 with the opening of four new 
disarmament and demobilisation sites in: Zwedru, Grand Gedah County on 7 July to 
service MODEL; Ganta, Nimba County on 17 August to service GOL; Voinjama, Lofa 
County on 8 September to service LURD; and Harper, Maryland County on 1 October. 
The roll out of these sites was also staggered to allow UNMIL peacekeeping deployment 
and adequate site preparations. This stage of the disarmament process was in many ways 
the most difficult due to the remote locations and the logistical complications regarding 
transportation of combatants and the necessary supplies.477 For operational purposes, 
namely practical issues such as food, water and transportation constraints, the 
demobilisation encampment period was further reduced from five days to four days.478 
Phase III ended on 31 October with the closure of the four final disarmament sites. A 
total of 38,349 combatants including 4,547 children were disarmed and 8,904 weapons 
and 1,155,127 pieces of ammunition were collected during this phase.479 The tally of the 
number of combatants at the conclusion of phase three was 103,019 including 11,282 
children.480 
                                                
476 NCDDRR. 
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Mobile ‘Mop-Up’ Operations were conducted and lasted two months running through 
November and December. The mop-up operations were aimed at disarming residual 
combatants in remote and inaccessible regions in the north-west and south-east regions 
who missed previous disarmament attempts. Although the eligibility criteria did not 
change, due to the nature of this operation participants of this final phase did not go 
through a full-blown demobilisation process or encampment. UNMIL peacekeepers and 
MILOBs went to remote areas and disarmed combatants that came forward. Combatants 
were given identification cards, were medically screened, and were given their full TSA 
(of $300) as well as their food/non-food benefits.481 Due to the remote locations and 
lack of encampment facilities, the disarmament of this residual caseload was condensed. 
 
 
























Gbarnga Bong 15 April 2004 8 July 2004 2 Months and  
21 Days 
Buchanan Grand Bassa 20 April 2004 5 July 2004 2 Months and  
15 Days 
Tubmanburg Bomi 25 April 2004 15 Sept.2004 4 Months and  
22 Days 









Zwedru Grand Gedeh 7 July 2004 31 Oct. 2004 3 Months and  
24 Days 
Ganta Nimba 17 August 
2004 
31 Oct. 2004 2 Months and  
14 Days 
Voinjama Lofa  8 Sept. 2004 31 Oct. 2004 1 Month and  
23 Days 
Harper Maryland 1 Oct. 2004 31 Oct. 2004 1 Month 
 
 Source: Draft Interim Secretariat. Liberian Disarmament, Demobilisation, Rehabilitation and Reintegration 
Programme: Strategy and Implementation Framework. Monrovia: Draft Interim Secretariat, October 2003, 28. 
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By the conclusion of the disarmament process in December 2004, the actual number of 
combatants nearly doubled the revised estimate of 53,000 combatants, and nearly tripled 
the original estimate of 38,000. All in all, a total of 103,019 combatants were disarmed 
and a total of 27,000 weapons and over 6 million rounds of ammunition were 
collected.482 A total of 11,780 children were disarmed representing 11% of the total 
disarmed population.  
 
The Child Disarmament Process 
 
The child disarmament process ran concurrently to the adult process. It started at the 
pick-up points, where both adult and child combatants were collected to be transported 
to the disarmament sites (D1 site). In each of the seven counties where disarmament 
took place a child protection agency was appointed to lead field operations, under the 
supervision of UNICEF.483 In order to provide expertise and guidance from the initial 
point of contact child protection personnel were present at the pick-up and transit 
points. Despite the danger associated to this due to the combatants still being armed (it 
was viewed as a military process) the child protection agencies volunteered to be present 
                                                
482 NCDDRR. 
483 Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, Child Soldiers and Disarmament, Demobilisation, Rehabilitation 
and Reintegration in West Africa (London: Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, November 2006), 10. 
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in order to protect children. When possible, child protection personnel would 
identifiable children, and organise separate transportation for them to the disarmament 
sites. This identification was not always easy because of the lack of combatant lists, 
locations or formal identification providing date of birth (such as an ID cards or birth 
certificates).484 Moreover, because of the differences between the adult and child benefits, 
mainly the immediate payment of the TSA and lack of clarity about benefits, many 
children opted to go through the adult process and often lied about their age. The age 
verification process was an estimation of the child’s age by visual means, a series of 
questions by MILOBs and the child protection personnel about their roles and 
responsibilities during the war and attempted to assess their knowledge of weaponry.485 
In contravention to the eligibility criteria many children were turned away at the pick-up 
points by MILOBs according to credible sources.486  
 
At the D1 sites, children who had been identified were separated from adults and were 
then formally taken through a separate identification and verification process. Any 
combatant suspected to be underage (under 18 years old) was sent to the identification 
and verification centre to be processed. This identification verification process was 
conducted by UNMIL MILOBs with the assistance of child protection personnel. The 
purpose of the verification process was to determine the eligibility and approximate age 
of child combatants to ensure children were admitted according to the Cape Town 
Principles and that the pre-determined eligibility criteria (admittance of children 
regardless of weapon submission) was applied. According to the operational guidelines, 
the age verification process was supposed to be carried out by the child protection 
personnel and the final decision on age would remain with the social worker or child 
protection personnel.487 Like at the pick-up points, the child protection personnel 
determined the combatants’ age range by visual clues, and a number of relevant 
questions. However, despite there being clear procedures for children at disarmament 
sites there were continual problems and the procedures were not standardised or 
followed during the age verification process.488  
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Once children were identified and verified they were admitted into the process. The 
admitted children completed the disarmament process and were transferred to the 
demobilisation or D2 sites. When possible, children were transported separately in 
accordance with their prioritisation in the DD process.  
 
The mop-up operations were implemented differently to the other phases. Instead of the 
combatants travelling to the disarmament sites, groups of UNMIL peacekeepers and 
MILOBs travelled to pre-arranged locations to allow combatants to disarm. UNICEF 
and child protection agencies formed teams to process the child soldiers and to refer 
them to child protection agencies in their areas for reintegration activities. The children 
processed during the mop-up operations did not benefit from ICCs or encampment, 
family tracing or proper demobilisation activities (such as counselling).  
 
Despite all the operational setbacks and obstacles, a total of 11,282 children were 
disarmed and formally released by the fighting factions. UNICEF was at the helm of the 
planning as well as the coordination of the Child Protection Group, which was the main 
vehicle for arriving at technical decisions and advice regarding children. The child 
protection agencies had very good plans and procedures for the child disarmament 
process, although they heavily relied on UNMIL to implement the various components 
which they did not adhere to. The MILOBs lack of implementing the procedures, entry 
criteria or proper screening processes severely hindered the child disarmament process. 
 
UNICEF and child protection agencies conducted extensively prepared and advocated 
on behalf of children ahead of the DDR programme. A thorough sensitization campaign 
was conducted after Phase I of the disarmament process targeting child combatants, 
commanders and communities. Ahead of the April 2004 re-start of the disarmament 
process (Phases II and III) and in the months that followed, as a matter of priority child 
protection agencies facilitated the preparation for the return of child combatants into 
their communities. UNICEF and child protection agencies were part of the TCC and 
provided input and developed operational guidelines to govern child procedures at every 
stage of the disarmament process from age verification to codes of conduct and 
transferring children to demobilisation sites. UNMIL peacekeepers, MILOBs and child 
protection agency staff were provided training on child protection issues – including 
training on the Cape Town Principles, children’s rights, child protection and operational 
guidelines for the DDR programme. Ultimately, it was because of child protection 
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agencies, their continuous advocacy and engagement that children received adequate 
attention during the disarmament process and that they were admitted into the 
programme at all.  
 
Unlike the adult process where there were vast differences of opinion from stakeholders, 
the child protection group remained united in their approach. Throughout the process 
child protection agencies kept the child’s best interest at heart in their planning and 
implementation of services and projects. That being said, unfortunately cohesion and 
goodwill did not change the reality of the situation, which was that the child process was 
a sub-set of the adult disarmament process. As a result of this it was severely impacted by 
many of the same challenges, problems and shortcomings both structurally and 
operationally of the adult disarmament process. On paper, children were meant to be 
given priority status during the disarmament process. In practice, this was not the case 
for reason to be explained. The analysis of these challenges, problems, shortcomings and 
successes of the child disarmament process are the focus of the remainder of this 
chapter. 
 
To reiterate, post-conflict environments are seldom straightforward and fraught with 
complexities. Liberia was no exception to this. Although there was a peace agreement, 
security was fragile and the transitional government was constantly under threat or 
perceived instability. Most political decisions were made under tremendous pressure and 
often had to take into account multiple perspectives – with an eye on the end goal. The 
only problem is the short-, medium and long-term goal. That being said, there was much 
tension between short-, medium- and long-term goals. As with many situations in post-
conflict Liberia, personal gains, self-interest and misguidance often were a powerful 
motivator and at times trumped the common goal of transitioning the country from war 
to peace. It should be noted that personalities, as well as management styles often 
significantly impacted the course of events, not only regarding the DDR programme, but 
the entire peacebuilding endeavour.  
 
Structural Challenges 
It is unequivocal that Phase I (Camp Scheiffelin 7-17 December 2003) suffered from 
inadequate planning, preparation and operational readiness. The events that took place 
during the stalled disarmament attempt were predictable and bound to be problematic 
due to the lack of cohesion within the NTGL, the newly formed but skeletal NCDDRR, 
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the questionable commitment of the fighting factions, the limited deployment of 
UNMIL peacekeepers and inadequate disarmament and demobilisation facilities.489 
UNMIL was under pressure from UN headquarters and donors to return quick 
dividends and saw disarmament as a way to achieve this.490 That being said, these political 
pressures were no excuse for beginning a process that was neither properly planned nor 
ready to commence.  
 
The institutions bearing the greatest responsibility for the DDR programme were not 
properly staffed and in some cases were yet fully functional when the programme began 
on 7 December 2003. The newly formed NCDDRR had only met once on 27 November 
and non-DDR related issues hijacked most of that meeting. Representatives from the 
fighting factions did not want the DDR process to start until there was clarification on 
the appointment of 84 deputy ministerial posts within the NTGL.491 The Strategic 
Framework however was reluctantly endorsed by the NCDDRR at their initial meeting, a 
mere ten days before the programme was to commence.492 At that time, the political will 
of the factions towards the disarmament process and the peace agreement was 
questionable – they were more concerned with their allocation of temporary posts in 
government than their obligation to disarm.493 The JIU was another entity that existed in 
name only and had serious staffing shortages in each of its sections. Funding for the JIU 
was also an issue. 494 The consensus among many people present in Liberia at the time 
was that the timelines were simply too aggressive to succeed. Moreover, political will to 
see the process succeed was wanting or at best was unbalanced in favour of the UN and 
not the warring factions.  
 
In terms of ownership of the disarmament process, it was clear from the CPA and 
Strategic Framework that the Liberian authorities were to provide guidance, policy 
decisions and play an active role in not only mobilising support from the fighting 
factions but also encouraging compliance to the peace agreement. That being said, the 
NTGL was composed of faction commanders whose interests were not necessarily in 
line with those embodied in the CPA or shared by UNMIL or the donors. The cohesion 
was minimal and there were deep divisions within the NTGL. It was unclear whether the 
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NTGL or the former commanders still had the support of and control over their rank-
and-file troops who were quickly feeling disillusioned by them.495 This political fighting 
brought into question how genuinely engaged members of the NTGL, and thus the 
fighting forces, were towards a successful outcome and their ability to objectively advise 
and guide the DDR process. This lack of trust contributed to UNMIL heavily 
influencing the planning and implementation processes, especially during the early phases 
despite presenting many of the key decisions as Liberian owned or driven.496 If 
convenient, both UNMIL and the NTGL blamed each other’s shortcomings for policy 
decisions or shortcomings in the implementation of the process, effectively using each 
other as scapegoats.497  
 
UNMIL was responsible for most of the disarmament planning. That beings said, there 
was a lack of cohesiveness between the political and military command structures within 
UNMIL, which was not only inconsistent with UN policy but was counterproductive to 
the intended programme objectives.498 This ‘political-military divide’ was no secret and 
the separation was both physical and philosophical. The political leadership and military 
leadership were located in separate buildings about a 30-minute drive from one another 
with no traffic. Regarding policies, the Force Commander did not want the DDR 
programme to commence in December 2003, but preferred the programme to start once 
there were sufficient peacekeeping troops in place to provide adequate security 
throughout Liberia. He argued that peacekeeping deployment levels in December were 
inadequate, and that by March 2004, 85 percent of the mandated peacekeepers would be 
deployed.499 Nevertheless despite the advice of many and the disagreement within 
UNMIL as well as between other UN Agencies and NGOs, UNMIL SRSG Klein 
pushed for the 7 December start date. 
  
Human capacity and staff was a big issue for much of the duration of the DD process. 
Civilian recruitment for the mission was very slow, especially in the first five months of 
its operations (October 2003-February 2004). This effected substantive processes 
including the planning and logistics of the DDR programme.500 UNMIL senior 
management, including and specifically the Force Commander as well as the two Deputy 
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SRSGs were not appointed until late September and early October respectively. This 
meant that they were unable to substantially participate in the planning of the mission 
and the DDR process.501 Moreover, the remainder of the team that supported UNMIL’s 
leadership was fairly new since the mission was only a few months old. In the early 
months, the mission lacked a strong political team with in-depth knowledge of the 
country and region, and there was a dearth of expertise on DDR.502 Although many of 
these staffing and capacity issues were improved and expertise was sought before the 
April re-commencement, shortages remained including some key posts. In late March 
and early April there was a rush to hire staff in numerous key positions in the lead up to 
the DD re-start. In hindsight, the mission was criticised (including by its own personnel) 
and questions were raised about the overall structure, as well as lack of adequate and 
insufficient staffing not only during the planning process, but also throughout the DDR 
process.503 
 
One such post with the responsibility for overseeing the entire DDRR programme, 
UNMIL’s Head of the DDRR Section (Clive Jachnik), was only hired in March 2004 and 
only arrived in Liberia on 8 April, one week before 15 April start date.504 It was clear that 
lessons had not been learned from Phase I and the necessary attention had still not be 
paid to the planning of the DDR process. Upon his arrival, he learned that there were no 
operational guidelines in place for the DDR process. Moreover, UNMIL was planning 
on simultaneously and concurrently opening and operating four DD sites during phase 
two despite these sites being not being fully completed.505 To the reluctance of his 
superiors within UNMIL, Jachnik recommended at the NCDDRR meeting on 11 April 
that the opening of the sites be staggered by a few days to allow for a phased approach to 
the re-start of the process. The main reason for this was to provide more time to 
complete the DD sites, train the necessary staff and plan for contingencies were things to 
go wrong. This recommendation was accepted, and the ‘plan’ was altered only 4 days 
before it was meant to start. Unfortunately this contributed to Jachnik’s falling out with 
his superiors, as they wanted to charge ahead. This made his job exponentially harder 
from that point forward. He also spent the following weeks developing operational 
guidelines for the process that incorporated lessons and represented a more cautious 
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approach. The Head of UNMIL’s DDRR section later argued that this staggered re-start 
approach averted a re-run of the December fiasco and allowed the process to continue.506  
 
Unlike the Klein and the deputy-SRSG-Souren Seraydarian, Jachnik was cited by many of 
the child protection agencies as sympathetic towards children, and always ready to listen 
as well as incorporate child sensitive processes in to the process.507 He knew his 
limitation and relied heavily on the specialists, including UNICEF, for advice. His 
relationship and communication with the child protection agencies and with UNICEF 
specifically was very good throughout the DD process. Jachnik would intervene and 
lobby on behalf of the child protection agencies if their messages or objections were not 
being responded to accordingly whether it on the ground at DD sites or by his superiors. 
 
Another key post that remained unstaffed until February of 2005 was that of UNMIL’s 
Child Protection Officer. 508 This post was allocated to the mission from its inception, 
but remained empty until two months after the disarmament and demobilisation process 
formally ended. People within the NGO, child protection community and even back at 
headquarters in NY took this extended delay as an indication of UNMIL’s senior 
management’s low prioritisation towards child protection and their involvement in the 
DDR programme.509 Practically what this meant was that there was no one within 
UNMIL specifically advising senior management on the special needs of children at 
crucial moments. This had become standard practice starting with the peacekeeping 
missions in Sierra Leone and the Democratic Republic of Congo.  
 
The situation and lack of internal advocacy regarding child protection was compounded 
by the reality that the advice that UNMIL received from specialist agencies (such as 
UNICEF and child protection agencies) were often ignored.510 UNICEF and child 
protection agencies felt as though it was a constantly battle to table their concerns and 
get the attention of be UNMIL’s senior management. They were not part of the 
NCDDRR or were they represented in the JIU which meant they were not in the inner 
policy-making circle. Child protection agencies persistently raised their concerns about 
child protection and relevant implementation guidelines however few of 
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recommendations were implemented. 511 Two examples of this, and probably the most 
significant, were the implementation of the guidelines for age verification process and the 
decision to issue of Transitional Subsistence Allowance (TSA) to children.512 
 
The physical infrastructure of the disarmament sites were a perpetual concern. With 
bouts of insufficient water, food, fuel, insufficient accommodation and a breakdown of 
security Camp Scheiffelin was ill prepared and the effects were noticeable. These 
insufficiencies were partly due to the overwhelming number of combatants that 
presented themselves and partly due to the inadequate preparation and operational 
readiness of UNMIL and the DDR programme. Although Phase II ran significantly 
smoother, there were still problems regarding site preparations. Many of the sites were 
completed only after the disarmament process had begun.513 Logistical challenges, such 
as transportation, transporting supplies, adverse weather and road conditions made 
things rather difficult at times. According to the UNMIL staff member in charge of 
camp management, ‘water, sanitation, and food supplies as well as unfinished buildings 
were a constant problem and none of the sites were 100 percent completed when troops 
started arriving for disarmament.’514 Although some argued that such problems were 
inevitable given conditions in Liberia, the dilapidated state of infrastructure, and 
distribution networks, this was no excuse for poor preparation or an aggressive start. 515  
 
The transportation of supplies and combatants was often a formidable task. The rainy 
season, which was between May to October, caused significant challenges and severely 
impacted much of the disarmament process. Heavy rain made many roads impassable. 
This made things rather difficult as all supplies, including building materials, water, fuel, 
food, paper work, and all other supplies were delivered by truck to each of the various 
sites. The collection and movement of combatants also suffered as they needed to be 
transported from the pick-up points to disarmament sites and then to demobilisation 
sites. UNMIL peacekeepers provided transportation until the International Organisation 
for Migration (IOM) was awarded the contract by UNDP in May 2004.516 Despite the 
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tough conditions from the start of their operations on 1 June until 15 November a total 
of 129,472 people were transported.517  
 
Operational challenges 
Apart from the various structural challenges faced by the disarmament process, the 
process was plagued by operational shortcomings that heavily impacted adults and 
children as well as the subsequent demobilisation and reintegration phases. The lack of 
an effective information campaign ahead of the 7 December start had a dramatic impact 
on the first phase of the disarmament process. The unanticipated increase in the number 
of DDR participants, (from the estimated 38,000 to 103,019 combatants) casted serious 
doubts on the efficacy of the eligibility criteria, the screening of combatants and the 
overall legitimacy of the DDR programme. Moreover, although children were meant to 
get priority treatment during the disarmament process, this was not systematically 
translated into action on the ground. The tight timelines of the process stretched the 
operations resources. And lastly, the fourth the ‘Mop-Up’ operations were implemented 
as an after-thought, responding to the recognition that the three earlier disarmament 
phases did not manage to capture all combatants and there was a residual caseload. 
 
There are a multitude of reasons for the various shortcomings – some avoidable, others 
not. Operationally, it was not possible to conduct an effective information campaign 
targeting combatants and communities ahead of Phase I. This was due to very practical 
reasons. UNMIL, UNICEF, child protection agencies, NGOs, nor humanitarian 
agencies were functioning beyond Monrovia in the hinterland of the country due to 
security reasons. UNMIL was still in the start-up phase of its mandate and had not yet 
deployed troops beyond the Monrovia area. There was simply no entity capable of 
reaching people beyond Monrovia. Only after the deployment of more peacekeepers did 
the security situation and the reach of humanitarian actors and NGOs improve. Only 
then was an intensive information campaign developed as a matter of priority. UNMIL’s 
Department of Information and the JIU targeted combatants aimed at informing them 
of the DDR programme, their benefits. The campaign was aimed at clarifying 
misconceptions which had previous disastrous impacts to the DDR programme and 
security. UNICEF and child protection agencies designed an information campaign and 
key messages targeted at child soldiers and women, their commanders, communities and 
religious leaders to complement UNMIL’s campaign. The goals of this campaign were 
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not only to inform child soldiers of their benefits, but also to encourage commanders to 
release their child soldiers and help prepare the communities for their return. Both the 
adult and child campaigns used various forms of media to portray their messages in local 
languages – including radio, public announcements, community meetings and rallies, 
meetings targeting faction leaders, billboards, and newspapers.518 Like the adult 
information campaign, the child campaign was designed to facilitate the successful re-
start of the disarmament process. Each phase of the campaign that ran throughout the 
DDR programme had a slightly different emphasis.519 Unfortunately, however, those 
responsible for implementing the child information campaign had to make do with 
limited resources and complained that given the complexity and duration of the conflict 
the lack of adequate funding prevented the communities from being properly engaged 
regarding the return of ex-child soldiers.520 Moreover, the child protection agencies 
complained that it was difficult to accurately communicate the child benefit package 
because important policy decisions, notably whether they would receive cash-TSA, were 
only made on 22 March by NCDDRR well after the process had re-started. The 
modalities of how children would be paid were not agreed upon until 17 May not leaving 
UNICEF with adequate time to effectively communicate the issue.521  
 
Eligibi l i ty  and Screening 
In order to enter into the disarmament programme the combatant had to be a member 
of one of the fighting factions, present acceptable proof of participation such as a 
weapons or be part of a group of five combatants with a group weapon or be either 
under the age of 18 years of age or a female associated with a fighting force. After Phase 
I and prior to the resumption of the disarmament process, the eligibility criteria were 
revised in recognition that not all combatants were armed. A combatant could qualify for 
disarmament and its benefits by surrendering 150 rounds of ammunition, in lieu of a 
weapon. The eligibility criteria and screening of combatants impacted both the adult and 
children processes although in different ways. Despite the eligibility criteria changed 
slightly after Phase I (Camp Scheiffelin), at least on paper, it was clear what men, women 
and children were required to do to be admitted into the programme. That being said, 
there were three reasons why the disarmament process yielded such a high number of 
combatants and relatively low weapon collect. First, the threshold for entry into the 
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DDR programme was low. Second, the screening process was not rigorous enough and 
its proper implementation depended on the understanding of the MILOBS performing 
the screening. Lastly, there was an underestimation of combatants due to the fact that 
fighting factions never submitted comprehensive lists of fighters. Obviously something 
went very wrong, in the planning, design and implementation of the screening process. 
Not only was the initial estimate of 38,000 combatants was far off the mark, but many 
children could not gain entry into the DDR programme.  
 
In spite of the process being chaotic, turning violent and being suspended a total of 
13,125 combatants turned in 8,679 weapons and 2.7 million rounds of ammunition.522 
Despite all its shortcomings Phase I yielded a high weapons-to-combatants ratio of 0.7, 
which was the highest of the entire disarmament process. Unfortunately the remainder of 
the disarmament process did not benefit from similar ratios. By the end of the process, 
the combatant-to-weapons ratio had dropped to 0.28 (or four combatants for every 
weapon) with 103,019 surrendering 27,000 weapons.523 Prior to the start of the DDR 
programme, based on the original estimate of 38,000 combatants, it was anticipated that 
approximately 70,000 weapons would be collected.524 The final number of weapons 
collected was well below the anticipated number, and the final weapons-to-combatants 
ratio was amongst the lowest in DDR history.525 
 
The Liberian disarmament process has been heavily criticised by academic and 
policymakers for having a weak and low entry criteria and for its low combatant-to-
weapon ratio. The original criteria, combatants surrendering a weapon or being part of a 
group submission, were standard for disarmament processes. The revised possibility to 
gain admittance by presenting 150 rounds of ammunition was considered a very low 
threshold. With regard to women and children, it was recognised that women and 
children ought to be treated differently due to their vulnerabilities, and the DDR 
programme should be as inclusive to them as possible. Although this perceived leniency 
certainly was not universally accepted by all the stakeholders including UNMIL 
peacekeepers or MILOBs it was a way to ensure the inclusion of women and children 
into the DDR programme. Women and children often have their weapons taken away by 
their commanders ahead of disarmament, preventing them from enrolling in the 
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programme.526 Although the eligibility criteria were revised for valid reasons, an attempt 
to access all combatants, this allowed the entry criteria to be exploited. An arms and 
ammunition market was created making the means of entry into the DDR programme 
accessible and readily available. Exploitative commanders and many non-combatants 
could now cheaply buy their entry into the DDR programme. Old weapons and 
ammunition (sometimes filled with sand) were being sold in open markets, and in the 
absence of credible combatant lists, allowed non-combatants to access the $300 TSA and 
reintegration benefits offered by the programme.527 
 
Many adults who were not combatants and children who were not genuine child soldiers 
entered the disarmament process. It became common practice for civilians to either be 
given a weapon or ammunition by commanders or for them to purchase them from the 
markets with the intention of profiting from their TSA money. Commanders saw the 
DDR programme as a way to make money and demanded approximately $100 of the 
TSA for allowing civilians to go through the process.528 Depending on where and when it 
was purchased 150 rounds of ammunition were widely available at local markets for 
between $20-50.529 It was also common practice for women to buy ammunition despite 
not having to surrender either weapons or ammunition. It is impossible to gauge how 
many civilians (men, women and children) went through the process, but sources 
estimate as the figure to be as high as 60 percent of the total caseload.530 There was a fear 
that the dramatic increase of combatants, whether men, women or children, resulted in 
the exclusion of genuine combatants which was not only a potential threat to security, 
but also brought into question the overall credibility of the programme.531 This was an 
unintended consequence of entry criteria and the lax screening process as well as the 
decision to give children cash TSA payments which provided a strong incentive.  
 
As the number of participants was sky-rocketing, there were calls for the eligibility 
criteria to be revised for a second time in order to strengthen the criteria. Despite these 
calls to revise the criteria, no further decisions or changes were made. Nor was the 
MILOBs’ training enhanced to strengthen or standardise the screening processes, which 
                                                
526 United Nations Development Programme, "Liberia Disarmament, Demobilisation, Reintegration and 
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International Peacekeeping 12, no. 2 (2005): 257. 
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could have worked towards reducing fraudulent entry.532 The NCDDRR and UNMIL 
were reluctant to re-visit the criteria at the late stages despite things having gone array for 
several reasons. UNMIL unequivocally denied that the disarmament process was failing. 
Both UNMIL and the NCDDRR feared losing the trust of the fighting factions and did 
not want to renege on their word or send out confused message. Furthermore, the 
criteria were not re-visited because of the potential negative impact it might have had on 
the security situation and the potential to spark protests, riots or incite insecurity.533 
 
When the number of alleged combatants began to soar and weapons collection remained 
low, it became obvious that things were going drastically wrong. Men with little or no 
knowledge of how to use a weapon were being admitted on the basis that they fulfilled 
the criteria. The situation of growing number of participants was further compounded by 
the lack of a rigorous screening process by the MILOBs. The MILOBs were meant to 
ask all disarming combatants questions about their participation including their roles and 
responsibilities during the war, test their knowledge of either their weapons and/or 
ammunition in an attempt to certify that they were genuine combatants. There were no 
standard questions or operating procedures for the screening process. The screening 
process ‘depended entirely on the persistence and ability of the MILOBs to ask the right 
questions and to obtain accurate information.’534 There were language barriers between 
MILOBs and Liberians (despite having translators present), a constant problem 
throughout the entire DDR process, which compounded many problems. This inability 
to prevent the inclusion of non-combatants or opportunistic Liberians into the 
disarmament process had significant impacts to the DDR programme. 
 
It was clear that the number of combatants was underestimated as a result of the armed-
groups never providing accurate information, such as comprehensive lists of combatants 
and their locations, but also because the original figures were abstractly selected. Not 
only was planning impossible without accurate information, it allowed the process to be 
manipulated and exploited throughout. Had there been lists of combatants, this would 
have prevented opportunistic Liberians (men, women and children) from entering into 
the DDR process regardless of how enticing the $300 TSA and benefits were.535 The 
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responsibility for this omission is equally shared by many of the key stakeholders. The 
factions never fulfilled their obligation to provide lists as mandated by the Strategic 
Framework and the CPA. After Phase I, UNMIL set the submission of comprehensive 
lists and the combatants’ locations by all three fighting factions as a pre-condition for the 
resumption of the disarmament process. UNMIL, encouraged by the NTGL, decided to 
resume the process without this pre-condition having been met. The JIU and the TCC 
should have demanded that these lists be submitted prior to the start and subsequently 
the resumption of the DDR process. The genuine combatants should have required their 
commanders to submit lists to ensure their participation and the legitimacy of the 
programme. Although such lists would likely have been problematic had they been 
submitted, many of the operational challenges may have been avoided, and a reduced 
number of people would have accessed the DDR programme.  
 
Children’s  abi l i ty  to  access  the disarmament process  
In theory the Cape Town Principles applied to children throughout the entire 
disarmament process. Unfortunately although there was very little documentation about 
the Phase I’s screening process, there are indications that it was very problematic for 
children.536 Despite all the child protection agencies being present, including Save the 
Children UK, IRC, CAP, Samaritans Purse International Relief, CCF and Don Bosco 
there were reports of children being rejected entry for not having weapons to 
surrender.537 In spite of the best efforts of child protection agencies, children had 
difficulties accessing the disarmament process in phases II and III as well. Although child 
protection agencies were present at the pick-up sites to assist in the identification of 
children, there were many reports of unarmed children having difficulty boarding the 
trucks transporting combatants to D1 sites where the formal disarmament process 
began. At the pick-up points, once the daily quota of 250 combatants was filled, the 
soldiers in the queue would be disarmed, given a blank card (with no names) allowing 
them to return for formal disarmament at a later date. In the absence of comprehensive 
lists of combatants, their commanders would often take these cards away from the 
children so that someone else could claim the DDR benefits – including the TSA. This 
meant that many children were not even getting to the D1 sites to present themselves for 
disarmament. In other cases, children were competing with adults for entry, often 
frustrating them as they were often turned away by the MILOBs. There were reports of 
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children trying to get to the D1 sites for up to seven days before deciding to abandon the 
process altogether despite their alleged prioritisation.538 Children were not given priority 
status, which would have meant they were transported first, ahead of anyone else, to the 
D1 sites to be disarmed – with or without weapons.  
 
If and when children managed to get to the D1 sites, they were then scrutinised by the 
MILOBs, which again resulted in many children being excluded from the programme. 
Despite the criteria and the CTPs, many unarmed children were simply turned away and 
were not admitted into the disarmament process by MILOBs. Many of the MILOBs 
found the eligibility of and procedures for children to be confusing and their 
understanding of the CTP was often limited.539 Some MILOBs disagreed with admitting 
unarmed children who had no knowledge of using a weapon, and who therefore did not 
represent a security threat in their minds. MILOBs often used their discretion whether to 
admit children into the process or not, and arrived at these decisions in unsystematic 
ways. This discretionary application of the entry criteria happened despite the presence 
and advice of the child protection agencies.540 The formal complains, including from the 
Head of UNICEF to the Deputy SRSG and UN headquarters had little impact.541 
Unfortunately no records were kept of how many children were turned away, but this 
may have contributed to the lower-than-expected number of child combatants. 
 
Age Determinat ion 
Determining the age of the combatants was a major challenge during all the disarmament 
phases. Like the challenges children had accessing the disarmament process, determining 
the age of combatants had big implications to the process. In theory, where the MILOBs 
were unable to determine the age of the combatant, social workers representing child 
protection agencies were meant to have the final say in determining the combatants’ age, 
and thus their eligibility. These procedures were very clearly spelt out in the operational 
guidelines.542 However, in practice, the proper procedures were not always applied and 
this issue resulted in a constant point of contention between the MILOBs and child 
protection agencies.  
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MILOBs would interpret the procedures and arrive at decisions on their own without 
referring to or seeking the advice of the child protection personnel. As a result, some 
children were excluded from the process if they had not surrendered weapons. Children 
were brought to representatives from child protection agencies who did their best to 
negotiate with MILOBs to include the excluded children, and when that did not work 
child protection representatives involved superior officers to get children included.543 On 
28 April SRSG-Klein had admitted in correspondence to UNHQ-DPKO that UNMIL 
was having difficulty implementing the Cape Town Principles as they relate to child 
soldiers and determining the age of soldiers was challenging.544 The Head of UNMIL’s 
DDRR Section continuously intervened to persuade MILOBs that child protection 
agencies had the final say in determining eligibility, which sometimes worked and at 
other times had little effect.545 Moreover, the process of correctly identifying one’s age 
was not helped by the fact that some children who had surrendered arms or ammunition 
often lying about their age in order to go through the adult process and access the TSA 
much quicker.546 In such cases, where age was difficult to determine, it was impossible to 
force a combatant to go through the child process unless there was strong supporting 
evidence that the person was underage.  
 
Impli cat ions o f  chal l enges  
No records were kept of how many children were turned away during and as a result of 
the screening process or incorrect implementation of the entry criteria. It is clear that 
fewer children accessed the DDR programme as a result. The children’s rights were 
violated as a result of their exclusion and inability to get to the D1 sites, or to be 
admitted into the disarmament process. It was widely recognised by child protection 
agencies as well as UNMIL that legitimate child soldiers were excluded from the 
programme.547 UNICEF estimated the number of excluded children to be around 
4,000.548 
 
The challenges of getting admitted into the disarmament process were qualitative 
different for the adult and children. Adults (men) were admitted on the basis of their 
submission of a weapon or 150 rounds of ammunition, regardless of age. Although to a 
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much lesser extent there were reports of women being denied access to the process, 
many women and some children came forward with ammunition in the latter phases to 
secure their place despite not being required to surrender a weapon or ammunition to 
enter into the process.549 Of the total 33,738 women and children processed in the 
programme, 13,891 surrendered weapons or ammunition despite not having to. The 
remaining 19,350 were admitted on the basis of the entry criteria as women associated 
with the fighting factions (WAFF) or child soldiers.550 Critics of the revised criteria (the 
addition of 150 rounds of ammunition) argued that women and children provided easier 
access to the programme and would exploit the programme, were proven wrong. Official 
database figures show that 70-80 percent of people admitted into the process through 
the surrendering of ammunition were adult males, not women or children.551 
 
The importance of collaboration and shared understanding between UNICEF, child 
protection agencies and MILOBs cannot be overemphasised.552 It was found that 
MILOBs that had received training from child protection agencies had an increased 
understanding of the Cape Town Principles and actively implemented child friendly 
practices – such as prioritising children at the pick-up and disarmament sites or allowing 
child protection personnel to conduct the age verification process.553 However, this was 
not standard practice due to rapid turnover and rotation schedules of MILOBs, which 
meant that not all MILOBs were trained in child protection or even fully understood the 
child processes prior to their field deployment.  
 
The extremely large number of combatants in the disarmament process had serious 
implications on both children and adults. The sheer quantity of combatants 
overwhelmed the cantonment sites, the MILOBs and forced policy decisions due to 
constrained resources. Moreover, the credibility and accountability of the programme 
was questioned as a result of the significant and unexpected increase of participants.554 
The increased number of beneficiaries impacted the subsequent demobilisation and 
reintegration phases of the programme due to budget and programmatic deficits. More 
combatants meant each solider would either be allocated less resources or alternatively 
more funding would be necessary. This caused an immediate funding shortage, which 
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was not quickly resolved. Although UNMIL was supposed to cover the costs of the 
disarmament process from its regular budget, it was unable to do so. They borrowed 
money from the UNDP Trust Fund, which had not received all the money pledged to it. 
Moreover, the budget was revised to reflect the revised number of combatants expected 
to participate in the DDR programme (53,000). The initial costs of the DDR programme 
were estimated at $50m, which was later revised.555 As UNICEF raised most of the funds 
for the child DDR process on their own and did not rely on the UNDP Trust Fund the 
increase in participation of adults did not directly impact their ability to deliver services. 
Besides the financial implication, the increased number of combatants significantly 
impacted the service providers and their ability to cope with such large numbers. Apart 
from longer-term consequences the increased caseload made it more difficult to mobilise 
funding because of the credibility of the programme.  
 
The Spontaneous Disarmament o f  Chi ldren 
Although the total number of combatants disarming was dramatically more than 
planned, the amount of children that went through the disarmament process was less 
than anticipated. This in part was due to their limited access. Another reason why the 
child figures may have been smaller than estimated is because some children 
spontaneously disarmed and demobilised, meaning they left the fighting forces without 
any assistance and outside the DDR programme. According to UNICEF a number of 
child soldiers returned home and enrolled themselves in school with no assistance 
(although they don’t know how many were in this situation).556 Other child soldiers went 
to work for their commanders at various rubber plantations, such as Guthrie Rubber 
Plantation (again, the number of children there was unclear).557  
 
There were reports that girls were being excluded from disarmament. In some cases their 
commanders and ‘husbands’ were not letting them enter the process.558 Many girl soldiers 
were either pregnant or had given birth during the war and were reluctant to be seen to 
betray their ‘husbands’. Girls were legitimately scared of having to support themselves 
and their children were they to betray their ‘husbands’. ‘You don’t just run away from the 
person providing food and shelter for you, because you will have to see them again one 
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day.’559 The exclusion of girls in DDR programming is unfortunately quite common and 
by no means unique to Liberia. The numbers of excluded girls are unknown, but thought 
to be significant.560 The child protection agencies had anticipated such issues and as a 
result they gave special emphasis on girl soldiers during their information campaign and 
sought them out in communities. It is unclear given the widespread exclusion of girl 
soldiers if this targeted approach worked.  
 
Conclusion 
The adult disarmament process was fraught with shortcomings some severe, some 
minor. Some problems may have been avoidable, while others were not. Few would 
consider the Liberian disarmament process an outright success. Given Liberia’s history 
and previous failures to disarm combatants, an effective disarmament process was seen 
as absolutely essential. Although it was plagued with operational hiccups and in spite of 
the overwhelming number of participants, once disarmament re-started in April 2004 
there were no major security incidents. That being said, the large amount of combatants 
that went through the process and the low ratio of weapons collected prevented the 
disarmament process from being considered a success as a weapons collection exercise. 
Many citizens (non-combatants) saw disarmament as a way to benefit and understood 
that ‘disarming’ was the key to gaining benefits. They exploited the low entry criteria to 
gain access to the process and its benefits. The screening could have and should have 
been more rigorous. However, it should not be forgotten that amongst the 103,019 
participants were genuine combatants in need of assistance. For all of its shortcomings, 
without the disarmament process, the resumption of violence would have been an ever 
present threat. 
 
Child disarmament was also fraught with many challenges, but also significant successes. 
The child disarmament process was affected by many of the same problems and 
challenges faced by the adult process, including the lack of operational readiness of 
UNMIL and politicisation of policy decisions. Ultimately, the Strategic Framework was 
not properly adhered to. Despite the inclusive entry criteria and the prioritisation of 
children on paper, many children were turned away unable to enter the programme. The 
entry criteria, screening and age verification processes were often misinterpreted and 
                                                
559 Interview 62. 
560 Interviews 69 and 76. 
   
 
- 158 - 
 
were not implemented properly by MILOBs who yielded more power than ascribed by 
the guidelines.  
 
In spite of their best efforts the advice of specialist NGOs were often ignored or 
marginalised in decision-making processes. Decisions regarding children were taken on 
political grounds, rather than on grounds of child protection. Operational shortcomings 
remained problematic throughout the process and were not corrected. A smaller number 
of children went through the process than was originally thought to be mobilised within 
the fighting factions. This may have been a miscalculation in the estimates or may have 
been a result of the problems discussed above.561  
 
Although the adult and child disarmament processes experienced many challenges, the 
child process achieved most of what it was supposed to. Unlike the adult process, which 
was intended primarily to collect weapons, in line with the Cape Town Principles, 
children were not required to surrender weapons to enter into the DDR programme. 
The objective of the child disarmament process was access to children encouraging the 
factions to release the children, enabling them to be demobilised and reintegrated. Yes, 
some children were excluded from the process, and yes an undetermined amount of 
children went through the adult process. However, with the objective of accessing 
children as a benchmark, the child disarmament process had 11,282 success stories. 
 
Child protection agencies worked relentlessly throughout the process to ensure that 
children received greater attention and that their best interests were taken into account 
every step of the process. At the disarmament sites, once identified children were 
separated from their adult counterparts as per the guidelines. Generally, once the 
children were handed over to the child protection agencies things ran smoothly.  
 
Obviously this narrative only tells part of the story. Like during conflict, children’s 
experiences during the disarmament are not homogeneous. Some children were 
extremely traumatised, others were less so. Some had good disarmament experiences 
others did not. UNICEF tried to address and mitigate the sense of rewarding the ex-
combatants for their involvement in the conflict through their information and 
sensitization campaign.  
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Many children grew up and were socialised within the ranks and fighting forces. They 
entered as children but by the time the conflict ended in 2003 and when they were 
disarmed, they were adults. This particular experience is not captured in the numbers or 
statistics. 
 
Bearing in mind that the process was far from ideal, the answer is a cautious yes. Yes, 
because as a result of disarmament many children were released from the fighting 
factions and were enabled to demobilise and benefit from the reintegration process. 
Moreover, the disarmament process allowed the subsequent processes to proceed. 
Without the peace agreement explicitly indentifying the special needs children and 
without the efforts of the child protection agencies and donors, children may not have 
been included in the process at all or may have been further marginalised. Yes, some 
children did surrender weapons or ammunition despite not being obliged to. Ultimately, 
the child disarmament process contributed to peacebuilding because having done 
something, although far from perfect, was better than not doing anything at all. Could 
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Sequentially, demobilisation comes after disarmament and is the focus of this chapter. 
The objectives of demobilisation are threefold – to officially transfer the combatants’ 
status from fighter to civilian, to break down the command structures, and lastly to 
inform the ex-combatants of their reintegration benefits and provide them with food 
rations and a TSA before returning to civilian life. The objectives of child demobilisation 
are identical to that of adults, although the elements are qualitatively different and there 
are extra elements such as family-tracing and reunification. 
 
Like disarmament, the demobilisation process got its mandate as well as policy and 
implementation framework from the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, UNMIL’s 
mandate and the Strategic Framework. How the child demobilisation process was to be 
implemented was outlined in the Operational Guidelines for Assisting Children 
Associated with Fighting Forces in the DDRR Programme.562 Various actors had 
differing degrees of roles and responsibilities in the child demobilisation process. The 
NCDDRR and UNMIL were responsible for making key policy decisions, UNICEF and 
the child protection agencies were instrumental in the implementation of and technical 
guidance for this phase.  
 
As with other peacebuilding endeavours, the ability to adequately demobilise combatants 
depended heavily on a certain level of security, funding, trust between the parties, 
economic prospects of the ex-combatants and communities and the capacity of service 
providers to deliver services and programmes. Apart from the incidents around Camp 
Scheiffelin, there were no major security threats or security incidents disrupted the 
demobilisation process.  
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Upon completing the disarmament process, combatants were transferred from the 
disarmament sites to the demobilisation sites (or D2 sites) where they underwent the 
relevant activities. There were a total of eight demobilisation sites, which were close to 
the corresponding disarmament sites. Originally, adults were meant to spend up to 30 
days at the demobilisation sites but due to the increased number of combatants, funding 
and capacity constraints this was reduced to 5 days (and reduced further to 4 days in the 
later stages). Moreover, each demobilisation site remained open far longer than originally 
planned (by up to four months). Although the inflation in the number of combatants 
heavily impacted the adult demobilisation process, child demobilisation was relatively 
unaffected. This was due to several factors including the total number of children that 
participated in the process was less than the original anticipated number. Also apart from 
the initial registration process, UNICEF was both in control of the child demobilisation 
process and the bulk share of its budget. The child demobilisation plan did not alter 
much, and was generally implemented as envisaged in the original plan. A total of 
101,495 combatants were demobilised, including 10,963 children.563 The discrepancy 
between the number of disarmed and demobilised combatants was due to some 
participants either being deemed non-eligible or not completing the demobilisation. 
 
The child demobilisation process was very different from that of their adult process. 
Adults were encamped in the D2 sites for the duration of their demobilisation process, 
which lasted up to five days. Their demobilisation process ended with their discharge and 
receipt of the first tranche of their cash TSA, food and non-food items. They then 
returned to their communities of choice. Children, on the other hand, were immediately 
separated from their adult counterparts after disarmament. Boys and girls were sheltered 
in separate facilities within the D2 sites. Unlike in the disarmament process, once at the 
D2 sites children were given priority. Within 72 hours of entering the D2 sites, children 
were transferred to the Interim Care Centres (ICCs) where they stayed for up to 12 
weeks. Boys and girls were provided with basic services (such as healthcare education, 
food and shelter) and resettlement modules, while their families were traced and 
arrangements for their return could be made. Their demobilisation process ended when 
they were resettled with their families, at which point they too were given the first 
tranche of their TSA as well as food and non-food assistance.564 A total of 34 ICCs were 
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established during the formal demobilisation, with UNICEF provided funding for all but 
nine centres that were funded by the UNDP Trust Fund. 
 
As discussed in the previous chapter, the issue of children being given cash TSA was one 
of the key issues of the demobilisation process – both policy wise and operationally. This 
was an issue that received a disproportionate amount of attention prior to the re-start of 
the disarmament process in April 2004, during the process and even after the 
demobilisation process was completed. This will be dealt with at length through the 
analysis of the child demobilisation process.  
 
The Demobilisation Process  
The demobilisation process ran concurrently to the disarmament process. Like the 
disarmament process, demobilisation had various phases and started in earnest in April 
2004. Many of the structural deficits and challenges in Liberia, including the security 
environment, the dilapidated infrastructure (roads, communication network, and 
buildings), difficult weather conditions during the rainy season, as well as the limited 
capacity of service providers similarly impacted the demobilisation process. However, 
unlike disarmament, which was a purely military endeavour, demobilisation had both 
military and social components. The participants entered as soldiers and exited as 
civilians or ex-combatants, having undergone basic education (literacy and numeracy), 
information and training modules. The child demobilisation process differed from the 
adult process in a number of ways; which will be covered in depth in this chapter.  
 
Poli cy  and Governance o f  Demobi l i sat ion 
UNMIL was ultimately responsible for implementing the disarmament and 
demobilisation operations. Although they oversaw all the activities at the D2 sites, all of 
the services and day-to-day functions of the camps were contracted out to various 
service providers. In most cases the service providers were specialist NGOs.565 These 
services included camp management, delivering pre-discharge orientation, food 
management and distribution, medical screening, reproductive health and gender based 
violence awareness, running the Interim Care Centres and transportation of the 
combatants.566 Policy decisions for the demobilisation process were governed by the 
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NCDDRR and UNMIL, while technical decisions were made by the TCC. UNICEF 
played an integral role in the implementation of the child demobilisation process, 
including overseeing all ICCs and coordinating the Child Protection Working Group 
(CPWG). This working group was established to guide all major decisions regarding child 
protection issues (although their decisions or guidance were not binding). However like 
with the disarmament process, despite their primacy in the implementation, supervision 
and monitoring of the demobilisation process, UNICEF remained marginalised in terms 
of policy decisions, even as they related to children. 
 
Phase I: Camp Scheiffelin 
The circumstances and failings of Camp Scheiffelin prevented genuine demobilisation 
from being implemented in Phase I. It is unclear from the literature, documentation and 
interviews whether any of the soldiers were medically screened during this first phase of 
the DD process, how many went through any counselling, or whether they were 
informed about their reintegration benefits (which at that point had not yet been planned 
or agreed upon). Very little information was gathered from combatants at Camp 
Scheiffelin, in fact of the 12,750 combatants disarmed, information on economic 
reintegration preferences is only available for 50 combatants.567 Also, the events that led 
to the rioting and civil unrest in and around Monrovia was an indication that the early 
stages of demobilisation had failed to break the command structures, to pacify the 
combatants or dismantle the warring factions. Camp Scheiffelin quickly became unruly 
due to an overwhelming number of combatants coming forward, the unpreparedness of 
UNMIL, the lack of operational planning and inadequate facilities. Resulting in the 
suspension of the programme, it was clear that Camp Scheiffelin was more about 
disarmament than anything else. UNMIL mainly saw the DDR programme as an exercise 
to collect arms and ammunition. The bias favouring disarmament over the other 
processes, whether demobilisation or the subsequent reintegration, was very clear at this 
stage of the DDR programme. The Strategic Framework envisaged combatants would 
spend up to thirty days being demobilised, which was later cut down to five days for 
budgetary reasons.  
 
With specific regard to children, representatives of child protection agencies including 
Save the Children (UK), IRC, CAP, Samaritans Purse International Relief, CCF and Don 
                                                
567 United Nations Development Programme, "Strategic and Operational Framework of Reintegration ", 
18.  
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Bosco were present at Camp Scheiffelin from the start; however, only staff from Don 
Bosco spent the night to care for the children.568 Even in the chaos that ensued, boys and 
girls were separated from each other and their adult counterparts. Before the security 
situation deteriorated 76 children (including 10 girls) were transferred to an ICC in 
Monrovia run by Don Bosco. As a result of them being transferred to the ICC they did 
not receive the TSA cash advance (of $75), as did the other combatants. Having been 
excluded from receiving a cash advance, the child soldiers rioted while at the ICC, 
creating a security incident for the ICC.569 This was in spite of Don Bosco having 
nothing to do with providing TSA or with making such policy decisions. This early child 
combatants protests not only taught them the power they held over the DDR organisers 
and society as a whole, but also set a dangerous precedent for the months to follow. 
When they did not get their way, they protested. This would often scare UNMIL and the 
relevant stakeholders into compromising to give them what they wanted.  
 
As evidence that children wielded a considerable amount of attention, three days after 
the DDR programme was suspended, on December 20 the head of the NCDDRR, 
Moses Jarbo, went to the ICC to speak to the children in an attempt to calm them. He 
told them that a mistake had been made and that children should not have been given 
cash advances.570 Needless to say, this was not the response the children were expecting. 
When the decision on whether or not to give children cash TSAs needed to be made, the 
riots were a factor in to the policy decision-making process.571 It is unclear whether these 
child soldiers got their money in the end and what exactly happened to them – whether 
they were reunited with their families or whether they simply left the ICCs or attempted 
to re-join the DDR process as adults when it re-commenced. 
 
The DDR programme was suspended largely to allow UNMIL and the other key 
stakeholders more time to prepare both operational plans and improve the structural 
deficits. As discussed in the previous chapter, during the months following the Camp 
Scheiffelin closure, key staff were recruited and key policy as well as operational 
decisions were taken by UNMIL, the NCDDRR, the JIU and TCC. Procedures were 
prepared for the demobilisation process, including for registering the combatants, their 
daily schedule, pre-discharge orientation and the modules being offered. The service 
                                                
568 Interview 69. 
569 Interview 69. 
570 Huyghebaert, 4. 
571 Interviews 57 and 90. 
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providers, who were responsible for all the services at the D2 sites except for security, 
were contracted and assisted in the planning of procedures and preparation of D2 sites. 
Under UNMIL’s supervision, combatants were used to build some of the sites.572 In 
many cases, the D2 sites were only fully completed after demobilisation re-commenced 
in April 2004, and after the D2 sites became operational. On the insistence of the head 
of UNMIL DDR, Clive Jacknick, prior to the camps becoming operational UNMIL staff 
and the service providers walked each site in a ‘practice run’ prior to them opening the 
gates to combatants.573 This was intended to iron out any wrinkles and to verify the 
camps’ set-up were adequate for the process. Unfortunately, these practice runs were 
only a few days before the sites were scheduled to open and apart from altering 
procedures, this did not allow very much time to change inadequacies (i.e., structural) 
were they to arrive.574 
 
Phase II & III 
The Strategic Framework provided two possibilities with regard to demobilisation sites 
and indicated that that policy decision would be made by UNMIL. The two options were 
whether the disarmament and demobilisation areas were to be combined or co-located in 
one site, or alternatively whether the disarmament and demobilisation sites would be 
separate. In consultation with the TCC, UNMIL decided not combine the disarmament 
(D1) and demobilisation (D2) sites. The implications of this meant a demobilisation site 
would also need to be prepared that in close proximity to each D1 site. Once the sites 
were identified, UNMIL and its contracted service providers started preparing the D2 
sites.575 However this decision was only taken after the DDR programme was suspended 
in December 2003. This was another example that the initial planning of the DDR 
programme was woefully inadequate prior to its commencement. The demobilisation 
schedule was in sync with the disarmament process which after Camp Scheiffelin (Phase 






                                                
572 Interviews 54 and 72. 
573 Jachnik, "Lessons from the UNMIL DDRR Programme ". 
574 Interview 84. 
575 United Nations, "Second Progress Report," 6. 
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Gbarnga Bong 15 April 2004 8 July 2004 2 Months and  
21 Days 
Buchanan Grand Bassa 20 April 2004 5 July 2004 2 Months and  
15 Days 
Tubmanburg Bomi 25 April 2004 15 Sept.2004 4 Months and  
22 Days 









Zwedru Grand Gedeh 7 July 2004 31 Oct. 2004 3 Months and  
24 Days 
Ganta Nimba 17 August 
2004 
31 Oct. 2004 2 Months and  
14 Days 
Voinjama Lofa  8 Sept. 2004 31 Oct. 2004 1 Month and  
23 Days 
Harper Maryland 1 Oct. 2004 31 Oct. 2004 1 Month 
 
Source: Draft Interim Secretariat. Liberian Disarmament, Demobilisation, Rehabilitation and Reintegration 




In line with its mandate, UNMIL was responsible for providing security within the 
demobilisation sites. Due to the restriction of weapons inside the D2 sites, only unarmed 
uniformed military were deployed inside each camp. However, UNMIL was also 
responsible for ensuring that armed troops were within a thirty-minute response time 
from all D2 sites in case the security broke down and the use of force was deemed 
necessary.  
 
At the re-start of the DD process in April 2004, things were better organised. Each D2 
site had its strengths and weakness, and although not all of them were ready, the 
improvement to Camp Scheiffelin was noticeable. All of the camps were intentionally 
located close to main roads and 20km from the capital city of the counties. For instance, 
the Gbarnga D2 site was within 5km to the city, the Tubmanburg camp was just beyond 
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the city limits, the Ganta camp was 18km from the city on the main road.576 Although 
each demobilisation site varied in quality, they were all standardised and required to have: 
• A reception area for the combatants;  
• A camp management area;  
• Separate accommodation areas for male, female, boy and girl ex-combatants;  
• Separate dining and recreation areas for male, female boy and girl ex-
combatants; 
• A cooking area; 
• Storage areas; 
• A discharge area; and 
• An unarmed military force and safety area.577 
 
The coordination and running of the D2 sites was no easy feat. The initial planning was 
based on 38,000 then 53,000 combatants. By the conclusion of the demobilisation a total 
of 101,495 combatants had gone through the process, almost double the highest 
estimate. This was a constant strain on the service providers as the numbers 
overwhelmed them.  
 
Several contracted service providers were responsible for one of the following areas at 
the D2 sites: 1) camp management; 2) food management; 3) pre-discharge orientation; 4) 
medical screening; 5) reproductive health and gender issues; and 6) transportation. The 
implementing partners were contracted by UNDP and funded through the UNDP Trust 
Fund (see chart).578 Child protection agencies were considered implementing partners 
and although the most were funded directly by UNICEF, the DDRR Trust Fund did 
support some of their work. 
 
The Adult Demobilisation Process 
After having been disarmed and in the case of women screened, adults spent up to five 
days at the D2 sites (this was reduced to four days during Phase III for Zwedru, Ganta, 
Voinjama and Harper). Upon entry to the D2 sites the adults were registered, 
photographed for their ID cards, screened and verified. Personal information was 
collected including socio-economic data, county of origin, preferred reintegration 
                                                
576 United Nations Development Programme, "Trust Fund Activity Report: Volume II ", 31. 
577 UNICEF, "Operational Guidelines for CAFF," 10. 
578 United Nations Development Programme, "Trust Fund Activity Report: Volume I," 19. 
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package or occupation and preferred destination of return. This was done by camp 
management at each D2 site. Men and women were separated for the duration of the 
demobilisation process, they had separated accommodation, eating areas and recreational 
space. Every demobilising participant was medically screened under the supervision of 
WHO, given their non-food item kit (such as clothing, toothbrush, soap, etc.) and 
assigned to a dormitory. Everyone was provided three meals a day and participated in 
camp activities everyday (PDO, recreation, and reproductive health and gender 
component discussed above). On their last day, after eating breakfast and collecting their 
personal goods, the combatants were given their ex-combatant identification cards 
(which entitled them to DDRR benefits), collected the first tranche of their TSA and 
were transported to the drop-off point where they would then travel on to the 
destination of their choice. Upon completing the demobilisation process and departing 
the D2 site the combatants were classified as ex-combatant, meaning from that point 
forth were considered civilians.  
 
Camp Management 
A total of three implementing partners (or service providers) were contracted to manage 
the eight D2 sites. The camp managers were responsible for all services provided at the 
camps as well as the overall coordination of activities. More specifically the 
responsibilities of and services provided by camp managers included – orientation and 
briefing of new arrivals; conducting registration and enumeration; providing recreational 
input; managing hygiene and sanitation standards; coordinating and ensuring internal 
security within the camps (although UNMIL provided unarmed security forces); 
organisation of discharge and departure of demobilised ex-combatants; payment of first 
tranche of TSA; and the distribution of non-food items (NFIs). At registration, each 
combatant would be interviewed enabling the camp managers to capture basic personal 
information, as well as a preliminary indication of their reintegration preferences. The 
camp managers were responsible for providing daily roosters of combatants, 
coordinating with all the other implementing partners, ensuring that all the supplies 
arrived on schedule and liaising with UNMIL on security issues and logistical issues. 
Camp managers had the first contact with the combatants upon entry to the camp, and 
the last contact with the ex-combatants upon their discharge.579 Regarding children, the 
camp management worked with the lead child protection agencies to ensure that the 
guidelines governing the child demobilisation were followed.  
                                                
579 Interview 54. 
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Food management 
Two implementing partners were contracted to manage the food at the eight D2 sites. 
Premiere Urgence was responsible for the food at all the camps except one that the 
Norwegian Refugee Council managed (the Tubmanburg camp). The World Food 
Programme (WFP) supervised all operations and provided the demobilisation 
programme with food (specifically cereal, pulses, oil, salt and sugar).580 The food 
manager’s task was threefold: to provide all beneficiaries (averaging 1,000 per day for the 
duration of the demobilisation process) with three cooked meals a day; to distribute take-
home rations totalling one month of food ration for each ex-combatant and two 
dependents; and to distribute take-home ration of child soldiers upon reunification with 
families and departure from ICC.581 Every combatant in the demobilisation was given a 
ration card that would be used at every meal as well as for the take-home rations.  
 
Pre-Discharge Orientat ion  
Three implementing partners were contracted to deliver the pre-discharge orientation 
(PDO) at the demobilisation sites. PDO was a significant component in the 
demobilisation process, apart from the information and sensitisation campaign, it was the 
main source of information for the beneficiaries about the DDR programme. PDO 
provided essential information about the programme’s benefits and payment procedures; 
career and health counselling; information about role of the UNMIL, the NCDDRR and 
JIU; and community social networks of support.582 Each of the implementing partners 
conducting PDA had a slightly different approach (and methodology), they offered 
different modules, which were developed in partnership with UNDP and other specialist 
agencies. The modules covered human rights, child rights, gender issues and women 
rights, civic education, peace education and conflict resolution. The ultimate goal of the 
PDO was ‘to enhance the capacity of ex-combatants in returning to civil society as new 
refined citizens.’583 The PDO consisted of a few hours each day over the duration of 
their encampment. Children did not undergo general PDO sessions, they received all of 
their information from UNICEF and the child protection agencies.  
Medical  Screening 
There were three national implementing partners contracted to medically screen all the 
demobilising men, women, boys and girls albeit separately. The World Health 
                                                
580 United Nations Development Programme, "Trust Fund Activity Report: Volume II ", 33. 
581 Ibid. 
582 Ibid., 35. 
583 Ibid., 36. 
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Organisation (WHO) trained all implementing partners and closely supervised the 
medical screening throughout. Their role was to identify ailments or disease that may 
affect their future economic or social reintegration and when they unable to treat the 
ailment on-site they would refer the patients for treatment.584 Apart from conducting 
physical examinations and lab investigations the medical team was also responsible for 
providing basic health such as vaccinations and when necessary pre- and post-natal 
assistance. Every D2 camp was staffed with at least one doctor, physician assistants, 
nurses, certified midwives, laboratory technicians and support staff.  
 
Reproduct ive  Health and Gender Issues  
The reproductive health and gender component of the demobilisation was only for the 
women and girls.585 There were two implementing partners contracting for the 
reproductive health component, which was developed, monitored and supervised by the 
United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA). The partners were responsible for 
reproductive health screening, counselling and providing treatment including for sexually 
transmitted infections (STIs). When necessary they provided referrals to hospitals, 
providing gender-based violence services and counselling to address the psychosocial 
needs of women and girls.586 Counselling was provided on an individual and group basis. 
In total 25,040 women and girls went through this voluntary component and a great deal 
of information about these women combatants was collected during this process. 
UNFPA also conducted a more general and public sensitisation and awareness campaign 
focussed on reproductive health, safe sexual practices (such as use of contraception), STI 
prevention, gender-based violence that reached in addition to a total of approximately 




As we saw with the disarmament process, that the transportation of combatants was a 
logistical feat. UNMIL provided logistical and transportation support until 1 June 2004 
from the pick-up points. However from June 2004 the International Organisation for 
Migration (IOM) was contracted by UNDP to manage and run all DD transportation 
                                                
584 Ibid., 37. 
585 Ibid., 41. 
586 Ibid. 
587 Ibid., 45. 
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needs. This was a difficult task to coordinate because of the sheer quantity of 
combatants, difficult road conditions and due to the lack of information regarding the 
location and number of combatants. The demobilisation process required collecting the 
combatants from the disarmament site, transporting them to the demobilisation site, 
then upon completion of the demobilisation process (5 days later) to transport them (and 
their non-food items) to the drop off points or to their areas of origin. A total of 129,472 
ex-combatants were transported from 1 June 2004 through 15 November 2004.588 
Children were mainly transported from disarmament sites to demobilisation sites and 
then to the ICCs by IOM and UNHCR.  
 
 
                                                
588 Ibid., 48. 
   
 
- 172 - 
 

















Gbarnga Lutheran World 
Federation-World 
Service 
Premiere Urgence Lutheran World 
Federation-
World Service 
Centre for the 
Rehabilitation of 





Buchanan Lutheran World 
Federation-World 
Service 


















Centre for the 
Rehabilitation of 





VOA United Methodist 
Committee on 
Relief 













Zwedru Lutheran World 
Federation-World 
Service 












Ganta Lutheran World 
Federation-World 
Service 









Voinjama United Methodist 
Committee on 
Relief 









Harper Lutheran World 
Federation-World 
Service 













* Camp management was supervised by UNMIL and NCDDRR 
** Food Management was supervised by the World Food Programme (WFP) 
*** Medical Screening was supervised by the World health Organisation (WHO) 
**** Reproductive Health and Gender Issues was supervised by the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) 
***** Participated in Phase IV, mop-up operations 
 
Source: Draft Interim Secretariat. Liberian Disarmament, Demobilisation, Rehabilitation and Reintegration 
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The Child Demobilisation Process  
Although the child demobilisation process was conducted simultaneously to the adult 
process, the two processes were separate. The child demobilisation process had different 
implementing partners, delivered different modules, had different arrangements and 
timeframes. In line with the DDR guidelines, children were separated from their adult 
counterparts upon entry to the D2 site at the onset of the demobilisation process. Every 
D2 site had designated accommodation, recreation, activities and eating areas exclusively 
for boys and girls (who were also separated from each other). The children remained at 
the D2 site for up to 72 hours, where they were registered, photographed for their 
identification cards, medically screened, and participated in orientation and information 
sessions conducted by UNICEF about their benefits and the DDR process. They would 
then be transferred either by UNMIL, IOM or UNHCR to an ICC in the county, which 
was selected on the basis of gender and available capacity. Children spent the bulk of 
their time during demobilisation, up to twelve weeks, at the ICCs. It was upon arrival at 
the ICCs when their demobilisation programming really kicked into gear, in terms of not 
only distancing themselves from the fighting forces, but also being counselling and 
receiving training programmes.  
 
Prior to the start of the programme in December 2003, in conjunction with the JIU, 
UNICEF, child protection agencies finalised the guidelines and protocols for Interim 
Care Centres in Liberia.589 These guidelines aimed to provide guidance and outline 
specifications for the ICCs, in terms of the activities, the facilities as well as the 
management, allowing for the standardisation of all centres. The guidelines and 
specifications very clearly outlined who would participate in ICC activities; how long 
children would stay at the centres; what the centres’ staffing structure would be; what 
training staff would receive; details about the minimum standards for ICC facilities; what 
non-food items and services the children would receive; what the children’s involvement 
would be regarding the ICCs management and ground rules; the community’s 
involvement with the children at the ICCs; and the monitoring system.590  
 
In every county where demobilisation took place a child protection agency was 
appointed the lead child protection agency and was responsible for coordinating child 
protection activities in the county. There were a total of 34 ICCs established during the 
                                                
589 UNICEF, "Guidelines and Protocols for Interim Care Centres in Liberia," (Monrovia, Liberia: 3 
December 2003). 
590 Ibid. 
   
 
- 174 - 
 
demobilisation process (see chart). Under UNICEF’s supervision, eight implementing 
partners were responsible for the wellbeing of the child combatants and the operations 
of the centres. Out of the 34 established ICCs, UNICEF funding all but 9, which were 
funded by the UNDP Trust Fund.591 
 
Interim Care Centres (ICCs)-Implementing Partners and Funders 
 
Cantonment Site Implementing Partner Number 
of ICCs 
FUNDER 
Gbarnga Christian Children’s Fund 






UNDP Trust Fund 
UNDP Trust Fund 
UNICEF 











Tubmanburg Christian Children’s Fund 
World Vision International 
Don Bosco Homes* 
World Vision International 







UNDP Trust Fund 
UNICEF 
UNDP Trust Fund 
UNDP Trust Fund 














Zwedru Save the Children-UK* 2 UNICEF 
Ganta International Rescue 
Committee* 
2 UNDP Trust Fund 
& UNICEF 
Voinjama International Rescue 
Committee* 
2 UNDP Trust Fund 
& UNICEF 
Harper SEARCH* Drop-In Centre 2 UNICEF 
* Lead child protection agency in county 
 
Draft Interim Secretariat. Liberian Disarmament, Demobilisation, Rehabilitation and Reintegration Programme: 
Strategy and Implementation Framework. Monrovia: Draft Interim Secretariat, October 2003, 45-46. 
 
 
The broad objectives of the ICCs were: 
• To provide interim temporary care, services, and protection for former child 
combatants and other separated children. Each ICC aimed to improve the 
educational, psychosocial and physical wellbeing of the children. 
• To facilitate the reintegration of former child combatants and other separated 
children into communities by re-unifying the children with their families through 
family tracing, or providing alternative care communities. 
• To increase the capacity of communities to create and strengthen community-
based mechanisms and improve child protection by forming and supporting 
Child Welfare Committees (CWC) in the communities surrounding the ICCs. 
                                                
591 Draft Interim Secretariat, 72. 
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These Committees aimed to ensure a community based and sustainable social 
reintegration of demobilised children.592 
 
Through providing a safe, secure and child friendly space the ICCs attempted to achieve 
these objectives through a number of methods ranging from delivering modules, 
counselling, and increasing both the children’s as well as their communities’ awareness of 
key peacebuilding issues. While at the ICC, children received daily care and their basic 
needs were provided including food, water and sanitation, medical attention (if and when 
needed), recreation (time, space and activities), psychological support, informal 
education, life skills and cultural activities.593 Each child was provided with supplies 
including clothing, footwear, blankets, a mat, toiletries, a bucket and eating utensils.594  
 
The ICC guidelines outlined the requisite staff structure for each centre. Each ICC would 
have: a centre manager (1), a reintegration officer (1), social workers/tracing agents (1 
per 20 children), caregivers (1 per 8-10 children), community outreach workers (2), 
activity leaders (1 per 40 children), a logistics officer (1), support officers (3), cooks (4 per 
100 children), a data clerk (1) and support staff. Staff members either had the expertise 
or were trained in the areas of child rights, child protection, how to communicate with 
children, and/or how to conduct family tracing and reunification. All staff members were 
informed of the ICC guidelines and procedures. When relevant or necessary, staff 
received specialised training on counselling, gender-based violence and alcohol/drug 
abuse.595 Each implementing partner would determine their competencies and that of 
their own staff and when necessary supplement it with training, supported by UNICEF. 
 
In the ICCs children were encouraged to develop their own codes of conduct to govern 
their behaviour. Children were actively involved in the development and implementation 
of the activities and the centre’s programming. This was intended to increase their 
ownership and participation in the demobilisation process, as well as give them a sense 
of involvement in their community. This was based on a principle of child protection, 
that being involved in the creation of ground rules (as well as punishments for breaking 
them) children would not only increase their involvement the centre’s activities, but also 
                                                
592 United Nations Development Programme, "Trust Fund Activity Report: Volume I," 31. 
593 UNICEF, "Guidelines and Protocols for Interim Care Centres in Liberia," 5-6. 
594 Ibid., 7. 
595 Ibid., 2. 
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increase their acceptance of the programme, its rules which would help reduce 
transgressions to the rules that the children themselves set.596  
 
Personal histories and information were collected from the children during registration at 
both the D2 site and upon arrival at the ICCs. The information gathered included the 
child’s name and that of his/her relatives, where they were geographically from, their 
level of education, details about their recruitment, information about their participation 
and time associated with the fighting forces. Preliminary indications of their reintegration 
preferences were also taken. This information was necessary for initiating the family 
tracking process, which in most cases had begun as soon as that information was 
gathered and analyzed. Family tracing and re-unification was seen as an integral 
component of the child demobilisation process based on the principle that their families 
were the best place for children, in terms of protecting and provided for them and their 
personal, social and economic development. 
 
The information gathered also helped the ICC better understand who the children that 
were at the centres, their specific needs and the extent to which they were involved in the 
conflict. Unfortunately, the personal information gathered during registration was not 
made public (for understandable reasons) or used to develop profiles of the ex-child 
soldiers for institutional knowledge purposes.597 
 
During their stay at the ICCs the children had daily activities and participated in the 
counselling session offered by the ICC staff. Most activities were group activities, with 
the underlining objective of disassociating the children from the fighting forces and 
changing their mindsets to cope with their experiences and the grip or influence their 
commanders had on them. Children were given basic literacy and numeracy classes, 
social skills training (how to behave in society and with each other), and were informed 
about their reintegration options.  
 
The line between demobilisation, rehabilitation and reintegration was not clear cut. Child 
rehabilitation efforts began while at they were in the ICCs. It consisted of educational 
(literacy, numeracy and social skills), medical, and counselling provisions. Many children 
found these services amongst the most useful during the DDR process.598 
                                                
596 Interview 69. 
597 Interview 65. 
598 Interviews 46, 61, 62 and focus group III. 
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The intention was for children to stay at the ICCs for between 4-6 weeks (with a 
maximum of 12 weeks) while their families were located. During this time they were 
demobilised, rehabilitated, received counselling, their families were located and their 
communities were prepared for their return. The 4-6 week timeframe was seen as 
adequate time to do all of the above, except in extreme cases or where the families could 
not be located. However, the duration children stay in ICCs varied greatly, the shortest 
stay being two days and the longest stay was 6 months.599 Because of capacity constraints 
at the ICCs, some children were released before both they and their communities were 
adequately prepared.  
 
In terms of family tracing and reunification, the ICCs and child protection agencies had 
an exceptional track record. By 1 March 2005, it was reported that 98% of all children 
had either been reunited with their families or placed under alternative care 
arrangements.600 Alternative care arrangements, either being placed with foster families or 
communal independent living arrangements were used when a child’s parents (or 
extended family) either could not be located or for security reasons the child could not 
return to their community. The remaining 2% of children were foreign CAFF awaiting 
repatriation and reunification, which was facilitated by the ICRC. UNICEF coordinated 
the Inter-Agency Task Force on Family Tracing and Reunification that oversaw the 
family reunification programme. 
 
Drop-in Centres 
A total of five Drop-in Centres (DICs) were established to provide services to children 
who had self-demobilised and had returned home without going through the formal 
DDR programme. The DICs were set up to provide services to ex-child soldiers who 
had been resettled back into their communities or spontaneously disarmed and were not 
part of the formal process. The DICs provided former child soldiers with psychosocial 
care, counselling, life skills training, recreation and educational opportunities. Moreover, 
DICs provide accurate information about available services and projects, which were in 
high demand (especially in the rural areas) for former-child soldiers enrolled in the DDR 
programme. The DICs also mediated disputes were they to arise between former child 
soldiers and their communities. Although the focus of the centres was former child 
                                                
599 Interview 69. 
600 United Nations, "Sixth Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in 
Liberia," (17 March 2005), 5. 
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soldiers, in line with UNICEF’s community-based approach, services were accessible to 
all the children in the community.  
 
Child TSA 
The issue of the child TSA received disproportionate attention in Monrovia, New York 
and in other capitals around the world in comparison to the rest of the DDR process. 
Giving children cash for participating in DDR quickly became polarised for many. The 
evolution of the issue and the decisions taken were well documented by UNICEF 
through their official correspondence with UNMIL and UN HQ. Despite UNICEF 
being responsible for the child DDR process, the policy-decision entitling children to 
cash TSAs was made against their advice.  
 
On 16 February 2004, UNICEF prepared a policy paper on the issue of child-TSA after 
a TCC meeting on 11 February. UNICEF argued children should by no means receive 
cash allowances for participating in DDR and that the Liberian DDR experience should 
follow previous examples where ‘children have traditionally received a reintegration 
package which can be equated to TSA in kind.’601 UNICEF argued that the TSA for 
children should be placed in a fund managed by UNICEF and other child protection 
agencies to cover the costs and needs for resettlement of children. Their logic was that 
unlike their adult counterparts, children had their basic needs provided for at the ICCs 
(for up to twelve weeks) and therefore there was no need for them to be given money.602 
Moreover, it was felt that giving children cash-TSA may be counterproductive to 
protecting children. It was argued that the cash allowances would likely fuel recruitment 
and that it would be seen as rewarding children’s participation in the conflict, something 
that child protection agencies were trying hard to avoid. Children would also be put in 
harm’s way from the exploitation of their former commanders who may try to force the 
children to share their allowances.603 This was the view shared by all the child protection 
agencies who were very vocal with their objections. 
 
Nevertheless the attempts of the child protection agencies were insufficient in 
persuading policymakers. On 2 April 2004, the UNCEF Representative Angela Kearney 
received a letter from Deputy-SRSG Souren Seraydarian informing her that on 22 March 
2004, the NCDDRR at their second meeting had taken the decision regarding children 
                                                
601 UNICEF, "TSA Payment for Children: Discussion Paper," (Monrovia: UNICEF, 16 February 2004). 
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and TSA. 604 It was decided that all child combatants were eligible and would receive 
payment of TSA; and to assuage the fears of child protection agencies stated ‘that an 
utmost care should be exercised in ensuring that child combatants directly benefit from 
the assistance, regardless of the modalities, or at what point the payment is affected.’605 
UNMIL was to take full responsibility of and provide the payments from their budget as 
well as also be responsible for physically paying the children directly. UNICEF was called 
upon to assist in developing the modalities of payment and to ensure relevant protection 
issues were adhered to.606  
 
A series of letters were exchanged between UNICEF (originating from either Kearney or 
the UNICEF Executive Director Carol Bellamy) and the head of UN DPKO formally 
logging complaints, discussing the issue, providing policy advice and advice on 
implementation concerns while continuously trying to dissuade UNMIL and NCDDRR’s 
decision. On 15 April 2004, Carol Bellamy in a letter to head of UN DPKO head Jean-
Marie Guéhenno, articulated why giving cash TSAs could increase children’s 
vulnerability. She argued that the prospect of cash may: 
• Encourage commanders to continue recruiting children since the case is often 
shared with them; 
• Create the expectation of future payments in other conflicts, and could be used 
by recruiters for armed-groups to convince children to join other armed-groups – 
a particular risk in the context of this sub-region where children are often 
‘recycled’ from one conflict to another; 
• Be misused by ex-child soldiers – many of whom were dependent on drugs; and  
• Stigmatise children in their communities because they are de facto being 
rewarded for their association with armed-groups that may have committed 
violent acts against these communities.607 
 
There was a growing recognition including within UNMIL that paying children did 
represent danger if not handled correctly.608 The next few weeks were spent developing 
the best modalities for paying children. The child protection agencies were weary of 
being implicated in this decision and did not want to be seen to be responsible for the 
payment of TSA.  
 
The modalities of paying the children raised security concerns for the ICCs and the 
implementing partners who ran them. They did not want to handle the money nor be 
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associated with giving money on behalf of UNMIL/NCDDRR. The memory of the riot 
that took place the Don Bosco Home ICC in December 2003 during Phase I was fresh 
in their minds, and rightly so. Before the modalities for the payment of TSA for children 
were finalised by UNMIL/JIU/NCDDRR/UNICEF, there were riots at several ICCs 
creating a very volatile security situation. The children demanded their cash while at the 
ICCs and rioting ensued at the Don Bosco Homes ICC in Buchanan on 8 May, CAP III 
on 9 May and CCF’s in Gbarnga on 20 May.609 It turned out their concerns regarding the 
potential for the payment of TSAs to pose security flash points were well founded. 
 
Over a month after the DDR process resumed, after much to and fro between UNMIL 
and the child protection agencies, the modalities of how children would be paid their 
TSA were finally approved on 24 May 2004. It was decided that children would only be 
given their TSA upon being reunified with and in the company of their parents, family 
members or guardian. UNMIL would designate sites where the cash would be 
distributed (not at the ICC for security reasons) to the adult guardian and the child ex-
combatant’s identification card would be punched, indicating receipt of the first tranche 
payment. Also upon reunification, the ex-combatant and family member would be given 
one-month’s food rations from WFP. The children would then receive their second 
tranche of their cash TSA three months later, where their identification card would again 
be punched indicating the receipt of the second and final tranche. 
 
Once the modalities of paying the children were announced and word got out, the 
security situation became more settled in the ICCs. How the children would be paid, 
when and who would pay them was spread through an information sensitisation 
campaign to both the children directly through the ICC management and to their 
communities. A week after the decision was made of the 700 demobilised and reunified 
children 500 had received their first tranche of TSA by 31 May.610  
 
Mobile  Mop-Up Operat ions 
Mobile DD operations were intended to access child soldiers in remote locations. These 
remote locations were Barclayville, Grand Kru county; Foya, Kolahun and Vahun in 
Lofa county. UNICEF was part of the mobile units and a total of 588 children were 
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disarmed and demobilised in these operations.611 The mop-up phases differed from 
Phase II and III in so far as they were condensed, not nearly as comprehensive and 
required no encampment. During these operations the combatants disarmed (although 
children were not required to surrender weapons their entry into the process was also as 
problematic as in the earlier phases), they were medically screened, received information 
about the DDR programme and their benefits, and were paid their entire $300 cash TSA 
on the spot. Although the mop-up operations were condensed and not as comprehensive 
they did serve a purpose of addressing a residual caseload and managed to get 588 
children released from the fighting factions.  
 
A total of 10,963 children went through the demobilisation process (see chart). This 
number was slightly less than the number of disarmed children due to some of the 
children not completing the demobilisation process, and some foreign children being 
transferred back to their countries of origin. 
 
Total Demobilised Children 
 Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 Total 
Boys 1,072 4,039 3,412 8,523 
Girls 117 1,188 1,135 2,440 
Total 1,189 5,227 4,547 10,963 
Source: NCDDRR. "DDRR Consolidated Report Phase 1, 2, & 3." Monrovia: NCDDRR, 16 January 
2005. 
 
Analysing the Child Demobilisation Process 
Like the disarmament process, demobilisation was aggressively started and arguably 
began before all plans were in place and the facilities were completed. UNMIL and the 
NCDDRR needed for the disarmament process to start for political reasons, to save face, 
but also to address an increasing potentially explosive security risk. The combatants were 
starting to get more and more hostile by the inactivity. Some of the challenges of the 
adult and child processes overlapped, and although some of these challenges could have 
been avoided; others were a consequence of the harsh and inhospitable conditions in 
Liberia. The preparation of the D2 sites, UNIL’s operational readiness and the duration 
of the demobilisation process was a constant challenge. 
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Like the disarmament process and despite the structural and operational challenges a 
total of 10,963 children (8,523 boys and 2,440 girls) were demobilised.612 After Camp 
Scheiffelin things more or less went to plan, with only minor security incidents mainly 
relating to child TSA. Subsequent to the disarmament process, the demobilisation 
process was forced to cope with a larger than expected number of adult combatants. The 
consequence of which reduced encampment periods, from the originally planned 30 day 
period to five days, (and then four days in the later phases). Funding was constantly 
constrained due to the large increase in participants, but also donor’s delays in disbursing 
their pledges. The D2 sites, also because of the large number of participants, were forced 
to stay open for months (in some cases by four months) longer than anticipated.  
 
The large number of combatants put a huge strain on the service providers and their 
ability to deliver quality services, as well as on UNMIL in terms of their supervisory role 
over the whole process. Pledged funding originally estimated for 38,000 combatants and 
then revised for 53,000 was also revised and had to stretch to cover the demobilisation of 
101,000 combatants. However despite all of these critical issues, including the reduced 
encampment period, the demobilisation programme was relatively comprehensive in 
terms of what was delivered to the combatants.  
 
Although UNICEF was ultimately responsible for much of the child demobilisation 
process and responsible for important operational decisions through their involvement 
TCC and despite their responsibility for contracting service providers, they were 
disempowered to make any policy decisions.613 Despite UNICEF’s vast expertise, 
experience with child DDR programmes and good intentions, and UNMIL and the 
NCDDRR’s lack of expertise, experience or interest in children, UNICEF was sidelined 
during policy decision-making processes.  
 
Comparing Adult  and Chi ld Demobi l i sat ion 
From the onset of their arrival at the demobilisation sites, boys and girls were physically 
separated from their each other as well as from their adult counterparts. Children were 
housed, medically screened, fed and played in separate areas within the camp. While 
adults received all of the programme’s activities at the demobilisation sites delivered by 
various implementing partners, children received all of their information from UNICEF 
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representatives and received no modules while at the D2 sites. Adults stayed at the D2 
sites for the duration of their demobilisation, which was a total of five days (later reduced 
to four in Phase III). It was at the D2 sites that they received all their demobilisation 
programming before being discharged. In contrast, children were registered, 
photographed for the ID cards, medically screened, fed, and received initial counselling 
by social workers at the D2 sites. After 72 hours at the D2 site children were then 
transferred to ICCs where they spent between four to six weeks (and up to 12 weeks) 
before being reunited with their families. If the reunification failed, the children were 
placed in either foster care or independent living arrangements. It was at the ICCs where 
children received the bulk of demobilisation programming, including education sessions, 
life skills training and counselling. Although both adults and children were given a $300 
TSA, the modalities of disbursement were different. Adults received their first tranche 
upon discharge (hence five days after they entered the DDR process), and children 
received their first tranche upon reunification with their families (after their encampment 
at the ICCs, up to twelve weeks after entering the DDR process). The second tranche 
followed three months later. In both instances, communities throughout Liberia were 
included in and benefited from the communications campaigns to increase awareness 
about the DDR programme in a bid to assist the return, acceptance and reintegration of 
ex-combatants.  
 
Unlike the adult process, child demobilisation was not significantly affected by the large 
number of people who came forward to benefit from the DDR programme. Yes, the 
large number of adults put a strain on the service providers at the D2 sites and extended 
the duration of the demobilisation process, but the impact this had on children was 
mitigated by the 72 hours they spent at the camps before being transferred to the ICCs. 
Moreover, the large number of combatants did not force any specific policy or 
operational decisions regarding children, such as shortening their stay at either the D2 
sites or ICCs. There were two reasons for this. Firstly, as UNICEF had operational 
control of the child demobilisation process, they were able to manage the process as they 
saw fit. They did this through their participation on the TCC and through control over 
the child demobilisation budget and through the supervision of the service providers. 
Secondly, unlike the number of adult combatants, which tripled original estimates, the 
number of children that accessed the programme was only slightly over the original 
estimate of 8,000 and thus did not strain services or budgets in the same way as the adult 
process.  
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The Implementat ion o f  Chi ld Demobi l i sat ion Process   
Operationally the child demobilisation process was implemented according to plan. 
Unlike the adult process, which only had its operational guidelines agreed a week before 
the re-start of Phase II, UNICEF and the child protection agencies developed a set of 
guidelines to govern the child process and agreed on a set of standards. These guidelines 
included the operational guidelines for child DDR; the guidelines and protocols for the 
ICCs (adopted in December 2003); and a code of conduct for staff of child protection 
agencies (later finalised in July 2004). A consultation process between UNICEF and the 
child protection agencies responsible for implementing the programme and services 
produced these comprehensive and detailed documents. The operational guidelines 
outlined very clearly the special treatment children were to receive during demobilisation, 
the roles and responsibilities of various actors (including UNMIL, MILOBs, child 
protection agencies, etc.), what modules and information children were to receive (and 
by whom) and the procedures regarding the transferring of children to ICCs.614 The 
guidelines and protocols for the ICCs clearly outline all aspects of the activities 
conducted at the ICCs, including procedures relating to the child’s intake registration, the 
length of stay, staffing structures and necessary skills, standards the ICC must meet or 
exceed, the services and activities to be provided, and the monitoring systems.615 The 
code of conduct intended to provide guide child protection agency staff behaviour of 
was based on five principles: 1) basic needs, safety and protection; 2) non-discrimination; 
3) prohibition of sexual abuse and exploitation; 4) personal and professional conduct of 
highest standard; and 5) child participation.616 The guidelines were adhered to throughout 
the demobilisation process and despite a few transgressions that were dealt with swiftly 
there were no major catastrophes and the rights of the children were respected.617 
 
Throughout the demobilisation process, UNICEF and the child protection agencies were 
well coordinated and cooperative with one another, contributing to the success of the 
programme.618 Effective information sharing systems were established, such as monthly 
monitoring reports and the creation of the Child Protection Working Group that 
contributed to the coordination of efforts. The lines of communication between child 
protection agencies throughout the country were very open, and there were weekly 
meetings and forums held to ensure that the process remained on track, and any 
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problems that arose were dealt with quickly. The establishment of these real-time 
reporting mechanisms were very effective. 
 
The activities delivered at the ICCs were very dynamic, making it hard to categorise them 
within just one domain – be it rehabilitative, educational, social training, or more broadly 
demobilisation or reintegration. The activities allowed the children to be nurtured, 
educated (both in life-skills and numeracy/literacy), counselled and prepared for 
reintegration. There is no doubt that many of the children arriving at the D2 sites were 
distrustful of authority, elders and social structures and in many cases were considered 
“damaged goods”.619 They were distrustful of their commanders, UNMIL and the 
NCDDRRR (if they knew what or who they were), but also of their communities that 
had failed them in the past.620 Many of the children had spent some of their most 
informative years associated to the fighting factions, having missed out on education and 
were raised in an environment plagued with armed conflict and temporary social 
structures. With this came a great deal of uncertainty as to their place in society. The 
activities delivered during the demobilisation process were geared to addressing these 
concerns and help the children integrate into a society where armed conflict was no 
longer was the norm or seen to be acceptable and more traditional social structures re-
emerged. The activities were implemented as they were designed. Although slight 
differences and comparative advantages between service providers existed, UNICEF 
provided and ensured minimum standards and consistency. The successes and 




The mere reality that child demobilisation happened at all was a success in and of itself. 
If the child demobilisation process was not separated, it is unlikely that children would 
have been ejected from the factions and received reintegration assistance. UNICEF and 
the child protection agencies lobbied extremely hard to ensure separate procedures for 
children and for children to receive special attention in the DDR programme. This 
special attention was entrusted to children as a result of the CPA and UNMIL’s mandate. 
The success of the demobilisation process can be measured in several ways. The first set 
of question relates to the design, implementation and organisation of the child 
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demobilisation process. Were the guidelines implemented? Was the process properly 
designed or organised? The second set of questions relates to the success and impact of 
the child demobilisation process. Did the process achieve its objectives? Did the 
demobilisation process have a positive impact on the child soldiers?  
 
The answer to the first set of questions is quite straightforward. Regarding the first 
question, yes, the guidelines were developed in a consultative fashion and were followed; 
the process was well organised and implemented appropriately.  
 
Regarding the second set of questions and whether the quality of the response was 
adequate to addressing the troubles of the child soldiers, the answer is not as 
straightforward. It depends on what qualifies as a success, and in what timeframe. It 
depends on the experience of individual child soldiers going through the process (the 
experiences of participants varied greatly) and to what extent they can or have been 
rehabilitated. It depends on the quality of the care provided, which was not standardised 
across all child protection agencies and service providers or implementing partners. But 
most importantly, it depends on the resilience of every child going through the process. 
The impact of the demobilisation process can be seen as a success. Although the 
activities delivered during the demobilisation process impacted each child in a different 
way, they were for the most part well received and the children found them to be 
useful.621 Although the care of children varied slightly, their time at the D2 sites and ICCs 
served the purpose of isolating the boys and girls, removing them from the immediate 
control of their commanders and informing them of their rights. Specific areas of success 
are mentioned below.  
 
Child-Friendly Environment and Comprehensive Procedures  
The ICCs unequivocally provided the children with secure and child-friendly 
environments. Once at the ICCs, intended to provide space and time to heal, the 
children were cut off from communities and from their former commanders some of 
who were demanding access to the children (mostly to access their TSA). Children were 
able to play games, and engage in recreational activities that had evaded them during the 
conflict. Children were able to participate in classes aimed at addressing their absent 
school years. At the ICCs, children played an active role in determining the centre’s rules 
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and in organizing their leadership in bid to allow them to participate in the management 
of the centre.622 While in their care the child protection agencies, children were 
empowered to actively participate as much as possible in their rehabilitation. Children 
were given options regarding the activities they could participate in while at the ICCs, 
they were asked whether they were ready to return to their families and ultimately the 
older children (above 14 years old) were given the choice of reintegration options. 
Logistically all elements of the child demobilisation process were well executed.  
 
Family-Tracing and Reuni f i cat ion 
Time spent in the ICCs allowed the children time to readjust to life in a non-violent, 
non-conflict environment. It was an intermediary stage between being associated with 
the fighting forces and returning to their communities. The emphasis was placed on 
children family reunification because of the belief that family and their communities were 
the best places for the children. Rightly or wrongly, this belief is entrenched in the child 
protection principles and regime. The child protection agencies’ staff were specifically 
trained to conduct family tracing and reunification. Moreover, the extensive sensitization 
campaigns designed and conducted by UNICEF (in collaboration with UNMIL) in the 
communities of return played a large role in the communities’ willingness to receive the 
former child soldiers.623 
 
Family tracing and reunification was arguably the most successful component of the 
demobilisation process. Initially some children initially gave false information about their 
families because they were unsure of the ramifications of being returned to their 
communities or having their families located. Once it became clear that the child 
protection agencies and the family reunification process was legitimate (or once the 
children realised it consisted of what the child protection agencies said) they came 
forward with accurate information. By the end of the demobilisation programme, 98% of 
all CAFF were reunited with their families. Some children were placed in temporary 
independent living arrangements. The remained 2% were repatriated internationally back 
to their families. The family tracing process yielded an almost perfect result. 
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Coordinat ion between Chi ld Protec t ion Agencies   
The coordination and collaborative nature between the child protection agencies, 
including UNICEF, was a positive contribution to the child demobilisation process. 
UNICEF was responsible for overseeing the components of child demobilisation and 
successfully nurtured an open and effective relationship with the child protection agency 
as well as the broader NGO community.624 UNICEF chaired the Child Protection 
Working Group which allowed it to keep on top of all of the key issues in real-time. 
UNICEF and the child protection agencies met regularly to either resolve concerns or 
problems that either arose or were proactive in preventing problems from arising.  
 
With the responsibility of overseeing the child demobilisation process, UNICEF was the 
main interlocutor between UNMIL. On behalf of child protection agencies, UNICEF 
was in constant contact with UNMIL to voice the concerns and grievances. Depending 
on the urgency, grievances were either taken up in real-time, i.e., UNICEF officers 
speaking directly to UNMIL officers or MILOBs in an attempt to resolve an issue, or via 
the respective headquarters through letter or cables. The irony was that when the 
headquarters communicated with one another, as was the case with the issue of child 
TSA, it was normally the field offices that would inform the discussion, then 
headquarters would initiate the complaint with their counterpart, followed by a response 
from the field offices via the headquarters. So effectively, UNICEF-Liberia was 
communicating to UNMIL, through headquarters in New York and vice versa. 
 
Shortcomings  
Despite the successes of the demobilisation process, including demobilisation of 
children, the processes were not flawless. Most of the shortcomings of the adult process 
were either due to the lack of information collected about the combatants prior to the 
DDR programme which could have influenced subsequent programming, an 
unwillingness to adapt the programme to the needs of the combatants or were structural 
in nature. These problems were universal for the entire DDR process for both adults and 
child combatants alike. The lack of information or unwillingness to use the information 
gathered severely impacted the organisers’ (UNMIL as well as service providers) ability 
to differentiate between different categories of combatants in order to tailor their 
demobilisation experience or programme. The programme was the same regardless of 
whether the combatants were frontline fighters, auxiliary support, sex slaves, new recruits 
                                                
624 Interviews 34 and 43.  
   
 
- 189 - 
 
or veterans. The structural problems highlight the DDR programme’s inability to address 
problems beyond the scope of DDR, such as strengthening governance structures or 
improving the economic situation or social services (such as healthcare or schooling). 
Other shortcomings of the demobilisation experience were due to limited human 
resources. Some child protection agency staff also complained that the time children 
spent at the ICCs was inadequate to properly disassociate the child soldiers from their 
former commanders.625  
 
Inadequate Information on the Combatants  
Information about adults and children in terms of their experiences, their motivation for 
joining the fighting factions and how the war affected them simply was not available. 
During the planning process the service providers made certain assumptions about 
combatants that influenced all the services they provided, making them very 
homogenous. Where information about the combatants was available (for example, 
information gathered upon registration at both disarmament and demobilisation) its 
impact on subsequent planning was limited. The combatants experienced different levels 
of anxiety or trauma; their coping mechanisms were diverse and dependent on multiple 
factors. Moreover, their roles during the war varied vastly as did the amount of time 
spent in the fighting faction, the level of victimization or agency. Given the UN’s prior 
experience with DDR programmes, this should have been planned for rather than 
applying a one-size-fits-all approach. These variances simply were not accounted for in 
the programming or in the benefits provided. The combatants were viewed as 
homogenous and received generic programming. All the men received a particular 
programme, all women went through the similar modules and children went through a 
set of child modules. What this meant was that porters received exactly the same services 
as hardened frontline fighters. A combatant that only spent one week associated to a 
fighting faction received the same treatment to someone that fought for five or even ten 
years. A sexual slave and a cook were treated the same during and after demobilisation. A 
child soldier that was associated to their warring faction for 5 years received the same 
treatment and services as a child that was associated to a warring faction for a month. 
 
Despite the information gathered, children were seen as a homogenous group regardless 
of their backgrounds, method of recruitment, the duration they spent with and role they 
performed in the fighting forces. Although the child protection agencies often learned 
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much about the child soldiers, there was no categorisation of children. They all received 
the same treatment during their stay at the ICC. This meant that the children that served 
as frontline fighters, cooks, porters, or sex slaves regardless of whether they were forcibly 
recruited or ‘volunteered’ all went through identical activities together with other kids of 
very different backgrounds and needs.  
 
With better information and a better capacity or a greater willingness to adapt to the 
acquired information, this dimension could have been mitigated and improved. The 
organisers made little effort to address particular issues or individualise or tailor the 
demobilisation process for different experiences or categories of combatants. Not 
knowing such details about the combatants’ their level of anxiety, abuse or trauma 
experienced made it harder to achieve the demobilisation objectives in terms of 
dissociating, breaking bonds or better preparing for the reintegration process. Moreover, 
it made it difficult to both solicit certain expertise or to train staff to deal with the variety 
of issues or cases. 
 
Human Resources  
Service providers and specifically the child protection agencies did an admiral job in an 
amazingly hard environment, against many odds and for a longer period than any had 
been agreed or anticipated. Because of the protracted nature of the conflict and the 
dilapidated state of national institutions it was very difficult to find pre-qualified staff. All 
the child protection agencies provided training for their staff, especially for staff working 
directly with children, such as counsellors or social workers. That being said, out of 
necessity, the training was done quickly and the depth of training was therefore limited. 
For example, in developed countries such as the UK or the United States to be a 
counsellor or social worker requires years of post-graduate training, clinical practice and 
close supervision. In Liberia, counsellors and social worker were trained in a few weeks. 
Limitations in the abilities of staff became apparent with children that were very 
traumatised or that did not respond positively to the counselling they received.626 That is 
not to say that the children did not receive good care and in many cases the care they got 
was certainly better than not receiving any care at all. However, the ‘easy’ and ‘hard’ cases 
were dealt with in the same way. In many cases a one-size-fits-all approach was taken 
when it came to counselling.627  
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Problems with Disassoc iat ion 
As one of the main objectives of demobilisation, breaking the bond between fighters and 
commanders is a very difficult to achieve. The need for disassociation is especially 
relevant with child soldiers, where complex relations exist and where many children may 
turn to their commanders for guidance, security and basic needs such as shelter or food.  
 
Part of the reason why disassociation was not as successful as it should or could have 
been was because every child soldiers was treated the same irrespective their experiences. 
Like the rest of the demobilisation process there was not an individualised approach to 
attempt to pry the children from their commanders’ control or influence. Prior to the 
DDR programme information was not gathered for very practical reasons, the reach of 
humanitarian organisations was severely limited beyond Monrovia and the warring 
factions were reluctant to provide specifics. There was little information about child 
soldiers, their experiences and specifics about their recruitment. Moreover, those 
responsible for DDR (UNMIL, NCDDRR, JIU, UNICEF, UNDP, etc.) were unable to 
control contact and social relations beyond the encampment phase. In many cases, adults 
and children were in contact with their former commanders once they completed the 
demobilisation process and returned to their communities. Contact between children and 
their former commanders could be re-established very easily and patterns of this 
emerged.628  
 
Lack of  Alcohol  and Drug Counse l l ing 
Although it was documented that alcohol and drug abuse of both adults and child 
soldiers was rampant throughout the conflict there was almost no alcohol and drug abuse 
counselling during demobilisation. Although alcohol and drugs were prohibited from the 
ICCs and children were counselled that drugs were ‘bad’ and underwent awareness 
modules, there were few programmes to deal with the possible addiction developed 
during the course of the conflict. There were a few cases of drug use in the ICCs, but 
were isolated cases and they were dealt with immediately.629 This was a huge oversight 
due to the fact that these habits were part of their everyday existence within the fighting 
factions and complicated their ability to reintegrate into society. This oversight was 
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completely avoidable, preventable and went unaddressed.630 Granted there was no way of 
controlling the children’s conduct once they exited from the ICCs and returned back into 
their communities, but this only increased the urgency to address their possible addition 
while the children were encamped at the ICCs.  
 
 
Inabi l i ty  to Adequate ly  Address Def i c i t s  in Return Communit i es  
Children returned to communities where education systems remained in shambles, health 
systems were broken and basic services were not being provided or met as a 
consequence of years of neglect and war. In many cases, high levels of insecurity 
continued, or insecurity took a different shape. In some cases, having returned to their 
communities some children did not know where their next meal would come from. 
These structural problems were beyond the scope of the DDR process, but impacted the 
success of the DDR programme heavily. Although UNICEF worked to support the 
reconstruction of communities overall, this was a complex and slow process. The 
national reconstruction would certainly take longer than the envisaged 12 weeks allocated 
for the ICC encampment or even the demobilisation process. Teachers needed to be 
trained, schools rebuilt, government services needed to be restored, the economy need to 
be revitalised and ministries needed to re-assert their control. Opportunities for ex-child 
soldiers to earn a living were limited after being formally demobilised due to these 
factors, in particular the state of the formal and informal economies.  
 
The Issue o f  Chi ld TSA 
Interestingly, many child protection advocates identify the payment of the child TSA as 
one of the main shortcomings of the child DDR process. The decision whether to give 
children TSA polarised and divided all stakeholders involved. Neither UNMIL SRSG 
Jacques Klein, NTGL Chairman Bryant nor the head of the NCDDRR Moses Jarbo saw 
a problem with child soldiers receiving cash allowances. Reflecting on the issue, Angela 
Kearney saw this shortcoming as a personal failure and her inability to convince UNMIL 
and the NCDDRR that cash TSAs were not in the best interest of the children and that 
it may increase their insecurity.631 That beings said, she initially underestimated the 
political nature of this issue and the complexity of the conflict created various 
constituencies, including amongst commanders and the NCDDRR who needed to be 
seen to provide for their child soldiers. The commanders felt children receiving cash 
                                                
630 Interview 20. 
631 Interview 76. 
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allowances were in their best interest in case the conflict reignited to and they needed to 
re-recruitment them. Moreover, the NCDDRR was vested in trying to ensure the ex-
combatants were placated by the DDR benefits. The cash TSA was a means to this end.  
 
The difference of opinion between senior UN management (both in Liberia and New 
York) remained evident throughout and beyond the decision-making process. During a 
‘DD lessons learned’ meeting intended to inform planning and decision-making for the 
reintegration process (held 8 December 2004 in Monrovia), the head of the JIU Charles 
Achodo commented on the issue of cash TSA for children and said that a balance 
needed to be made ‘between protection issues and the consideration for incentives’ and 
that it would have been dangerous excluding so many fighters from receiving the cash 
incentive.632 
 
There were some negative consequences of children receiving cash TSAs. Giving 
children cash TSA did in some cases result in increased insecurity.633 There were 
documented cases of former child soldiers having to share their TSA and being extorted 
by their former commanders. Although there were cases of children using the cash for 
drugs and alcohol, due to lack of information, it is inconclusive whether the negative 
scenarios portrayed by the child protection agencies were the norm or exception. 
Moreover, it is also unclear whether children (or adults for that matter) responsibly 
invested the money. Members of communities where former soldiers returned perceived 
the TSA, whether given to adults or children, as ‘blood money’ and resented them for 
being rewarded for their involvement in the conflict.634 To some this justified the misuse 
of the cash.635 
 
On the other hand, a potential positive response to children being given cash TSA was 
that it attracted child soldiers to participate in the DDR programme and did help placate 
them. It became pretty clear that had children not be given cash TSA, riots and insecurity 
may have ensued as was seen at the CCF ICC. Moreover, the decision to not pay 
children cash TSAs certainly would have undermined the perceived ‘fairness’ of the 
DDR process in the eyes of the child combatants and their commanders, which could 
have put the whole DDR programme in a precarious position. This was the position 
                                                
632 UNICEF, The DD Wrap up Session: Meeting Notes (Monrovia, Liberia, 8 December 2004). 
633 Interviews 12, 14, 15, 46, 47 and 50. 
634 Focus group II. 
635 Interview 96. 
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taken by Klein, Achoda and Jarbo, who all publicly spoke about child soldiers being 
entitled to cash TSAs.636  
 
The above examples of successes and shortcomings prove that the demobilisation was 
not perfect. What was also proven was that as much as child demobilisation was a 
separate but simultaneous process to the adult process, it was heavily influenced by both 
the adult disarmament and to a lesser degree the adult demobilisation processes. Despite 
the list of shortcomings, the child demobilisation process was generally seen as successful 
in terms of delivering the necessary modules, assisting the child soldiers disassociate 
themselves from the fighting forces, reunify them with their families and prepare them 
for the reintegration process and their transition back into civilian life.  
 
Conclusion 
A total of 101,495 combatants, including 90,532 adults and 10,963 children went through 
the demobilisation process by its completion in December 2004.637 The number of 
children that participated in the demobilisation process was slightly more than the 8,000 
originally planned for participants, but less than the 15,000 – 21,000 children thought to 
have been recruited and mobilised in the factions. Child demobilisation was also better 
integrated into the subsequent child reintegration process. Apart from the policy 
decisions, the fact that child protection agencies handling all the components increased 
the continuity of the demobilisation process with relation to both the disarmament and 
reintegration processes, and also improved the monitoring and oversight of the child 
components. Moreover, many of the reintegration programmes that eventually emerged 
were delivered by many of the same organisations that had established and managed the 
ICCs adding to the continuity of service.  
 
The children’s demobilisation consisted of 72 hours in separate facilities at the 
demobilisation sites, before being transferred to ICCs where they stayed between 4-12 
weeks. At the ICCs they received the demobilisation modules while their families were 
traced. Although there were a few security problems, such as children rioting in ICC 
camps or some children leaving the camps prematurely, overall the children thought their 
time spent at the ICCs was positive and successful.638 The time spent at the ICCs was 
                                                
636 Interview 90. 
637 NCDDRR. 
638 Interviews 23, 34, 55, 56, 76, 77, 92 and 95.  
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meant to make the former child soldiers gain a sense of self, belonging to their 
community and empower them to resolve conflicts through non-violent methods. This, 
in and of itself, impacted their social reintegration and their ability to benefit from 
further programmes delivered during the reintegration process.  
 
Once the children arrived at the D2 sites, UNMIL was no longer responsible for their 
care. UNICEF and child protection agencies from that point were responsible for the 
children, for their basic needs and the various services that were provided to them. The 
guidelines and protocols that governed the child demobilisation process were developed 
with the best interests of the children at heart and in genuine partnership by the child 
protection agencies. UNICEF provided effective oversight over the whole 
demobilisation process, and acted expeditiously to overcome challenges that arose. These 
various factors enabled the demobilisation process to be a success despite the challenges 
at play. The success of the child demobilisation process was a promising start for the 
transition into the reintegration process.  
 
The fact that the UNICEF and the child protection agencies were able to secure funding, 
separate from the UNDP Trust Fund, meant that they managed their own funds. 
Moreover, as the number of child soldiers who accessed the DDR process was under the 
original estimate, the funds were not depleted due to oversubscription in the same way 
the adult process was. 
 
Despite undergoing counselling and modules in the ICCs, many children returned back 
to communities that had not changed since the conclusion of war. Many of these 
communities were unprepared for the return of children (and their adult counterparts); 
they remained stagnant with high levels of insecurity and stagnant formal and informal 
economies. Although socially the children were accepted, their return was not easy. 
While during the war, the social status of child soldiers was temporarily very good (due 
to the power they wielded as a result of their status as fighters), in the post-conflict 
environment traditional social structures re-emerged. There was a re-adjustment that 
needed to take place. This was made even more difficult due to the fact that some former 
child soldiers learned the power they possessed through protesting and rioting.  
 
The disarmament and demobilisation processes have been criticised for not being linked 
to the reintegration process. The preparation, planning and policy decision-making was 
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very linear and had been done in isolation to the planning of the reintegration process. 
UNMIL was responsible for the DD component and UNDP for the RR further de-
linked the process. Although this was the case with the adult process, the child process 
suffered slightly less from this problem, primarily because of the continuity of 
UNICEF’s involvement and their integral role in all of the phases of the programme. 
However, although UNICEF was tasked with overseeing the child DDR process did not 
have policy decision-making power, which at times made them impotent. At crucial 
moments and decisions, such as the issue of cash TSA, their advice was not taken into 
account. Liberian national ownership over the DDR process and UNMIL’s lack of child 
expertise as well as the stubbornness of UNMIL’s senior management further 
compounded UNICEF’s ability to impact policy decisions, protect children and ensure 
that admittance and participation of children in the process. 
 
Did the child demobilisation process contribute to peacebuilding? Although many of the 
children did not immediately break the bond and influence of their commanders, the 
time spent at the ICCs allowed the children to socialise and experience an environment 
that was not dominated by violence, or drug use and exploitation. An integral part of the 
demobilisation process was the family-tracing component, which was extremely 
successful. A total of 98% of the children were reunited with their families and re-
entered their communities. Moreover, during the demobilisation process children were 
effectively informed about their reintegration options. That is not to say that the 
demobilisation process was perfect, which it was not, but it provided the time and space 
for children to be taught life skills and receive counselling. Although the modules may 




   
 
- 197 - 
 








Reintegration is the final and last stage of the DDR process and in many ways is more 
complex than the previous two phases. Unlike disarmament and demobilisation which are 
more contained, reintegration cannot be done in isolation and is very much dependent on 
the political, social, economic and developmental situation in the country. Its objectives as 
stated by the Strategic Framework are to provide the ex-combatants with the opportunity 
to learn basic skills to support themselves through employment, enable them to contribute 
towards the reconstruction process and to facilitate their acceptance into their 
communities.639 The child reintegration process has the added objective of protecting 
children against recruitment into fighting factions.640 Thus reintegration has both an 
economic and social component to it.641 Both adult and child social reintegration started 
during the demobilisation process. For adults their social reintegration assistance was 
delivered while at the D2 sites. The social reintegration of children started while they were 
encamped at the ICCs, and continued even once they returned back to their communities.  
 
Although formally the reintegration component commenced June 2004, four months 
before the completion of the DD phase (October 2004), the programme could not keep up 
with the number of ex-combatants participating in the DDR programme and the number 
of reintegration projects was limited. Reintegration started in earnest, reintegration projects 
and places, in early 2005 due to many of the issues that plagued the DD processes – 
including severe oversubscription, constrained budgets and slow project selection process. 
There were varying degrees of delays to both the adult and child reintegration processes.  
 
                                                
639 Draft Interim Secretariat, 29. 
640 Interview 76. 
641 Even though the official title of Liberia’s Disarmament, Demobilisation, Rehabilitation and 
Reintegration Programme, included rehabilitation, this component was never defined nor was it made 
operational. Rehabilitation only existed in name.  
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A total of 103,019 adults and children were disarmed and a total of 101,495, ex-
combatants, including 10,963 children had been formally demobilised. These latter figures 
constituted the eligible caseload for the reintegration programme.642 Originally the 
reintegration process was to be completed in three years, taking it through October 2007. 
This timeframe was but was extended until October 2008 in order to compensate for the 
slow commencement and large caseload.643 The final reintegration project was completed in 
July 2009, which marked the formal conclusion of the DDR programme.644 Like the DD 
processes, the reintegration process was fraught with challenges, many of which were 
ultimately overcome. Some of which were not. 
 
While UNMIL had the ultimate responsibility over the DD stages, the reintegration 
process was the main responsibility of UNDP. This is due to the fact that disarmament and 
components of demobilisation are commonly seen as militaristic, while reintegration is seen 
as a developmental or socio-economic component. Unlike UNMIL, UNDP and the other 
UN agencies had a presence in Liberia before the conflict and would be there for the long-
term well after the peacekeepers withdrew. UNDP established a DDR Trust Fund and was 
responsible for its management. The Trust Fund was meant to fund the majority of the 
reintegration process.645 Like the previous DD processes UNICEF was entrusted with the 




Keeping in mind the complexity of peacebuilding it is important to note the other 
numerous complementary initiatives that were underway during the reintegration process 
in the country. During 2004 and 2008, the United Nations was responsible for the security 
in West African sub-region. UN peacekeepers had a presence in Sierra Leone (although the 
mission there was winding down) and a growing presence in Cote d’Ivoire. This was 
                                                
642 United Nations Development Programme, "Liberia Disarmament, Demobilisation, Reintegration and 
Rehabilitation Programme Trust Fund Activity Report: Volume III " (Monrovia: UNDP, 2005), 29. 
643 Government of Liberia, Executive Order No8: Extending the Mandate of the NCDDRR to Complete the RR 
Component of the DDRR Program12 April 2007. 
644 United Nations, "Nineteenth Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in 
Liberia," (10 August 2009), 4. 
645 Interview 52. 
646 The majority of child ex-combatants went through UNICEF supported reintegration programmes. These 
are the programmes that I mainly focus on, as information about the donor sponsored programmes was not 
readily available. 
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significant because between Liberia’s two neighbours one was emerging from an armed 
conflict and the other was embroiled in one. The security situation in Liberia had notably 
improved largely due to the deployment of UNMIL peacekeepers and the DDR 
programme. 
 
Having been one of the main focuses of the country and of the UN, the DD process was 
winding down as the reintegration process began. Liberia’s DDR programme was designed 
and implemented in a very liner fashion. As we saw in earlier chapters, the number of 
combatants that accessed the DDR programme almost tripled original estimates stretching 
resources, both human and financial, and forced the programme to be extended. 
 
Domestic politics were exceedingly a source of insecurity. By mid 2005 the NTGL had not 
accomplished much in terms of strengthening its authority and was frustrating the both the 
UN and the donors in addition to ordinary Liberians. There were frequent and substantial 
allegations of corruption and the NTGL’s term as dictated by the Accra Peace Agreement 
was quickly expiring. Meanwhile the country was preparing itself for the first post-conflict 
elections, slated to be multi-party, free and fair and yield a representative government. 
Towards the end of 2004, the election campaign was receiving the attention that the DDR 
previously benefited from and eclipsed the attention the reintegration received. The whole 
country and foreign stakeholders (UN, IFIs, donors, etc.) were focussed on making the 
election and democratic transition a success. After a successful election and run-off poll, on 
16 January 2006, Liberia inaugurated Africa’s first female president, Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf.  
 
After the inauguration, the political momentum quickly turned to establishing a new 
administration and setting its political, economic and social priorities. Although DDR and 
reconciliation were seen as top priorities, there were many competing priorities such as the 
rehabilitation of the economy, improving rule of law, improving security, and re-
establishing good foreign relations.647 In fact, given Liberia’s political, economic, 
developmental and social deficits over the years there was no shortage of priorities. 
Although very much in full-swing by the end of 2006 the reintegration process had 
dropped to the very back of people’s minds and national consciousness was overtaken by 
other priorities. As the economy grew (not necessarily improving employment) and 
reforms were implemented and took effect, government improved its ability to capture 
                                                
647 Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf, Inaugural Address16 January 2006. 
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domestic revenues. President Johnson-Sirleaf was successful in negotiated substantial debt 
relief and attracting increased foreign direct investment. Liberia was seen as more and more 
stable and started being referred to as a peacekeeping and peacebuilding ‘success story’ by 
the UN and main stakeholders. This was the backdrop to which reintegration took place.  
 
The Adult Reintegration Process 
The governance structure of the reintegration component was identical to that of the DD 
in spite of UNDP being responsible for that phase. The technical committee (TCC) 
provided technical advice and had a prominent role. The programme approval process 
through the PAC did not change. As originally designed donors funded reintegration 
mainly through the UNDP Trust Fund, but also bilaterally through parallel programmes. 
This governance structure was carefully designed to contribute to the effectiveness of the 
programme as well as ensure consistency of the projects in the different phases, oversight 
of both standards; encouraging lessons were learnt and applied. Mainstreaming the 
programme selection and monitoring of programmes was intended to preventing ex-
combatants from ‘double-dipping’ or enrolling in more than one reintegration project. 
Moreover, a Reintegration Working Group was established to oversee, monitor and adjust 
the programme in real-time. The Working Group met regularly to address issues and 
concerns that arose. 
 
The reintegration programme, like the previous DD phases, relied entirely upon service 
providers for the implementation of reintegration activities and programmes. The burden 
for the development of reintegration projects rested with the service providers themselves, 
not with UNDP, UNICEF or UNMIL. UNDP invited project proposals from service 
providers for funding through a tender-process managed by the PAC.648 This meant that 
service providers were responsible for developing projects, and then had to raise funding 
from either the UNDP Trust Fund or alternative sources to implement the projects. 
However regardless of the source of funding, all reintegration programmes still had to go 
through the TCC and PAC process to ensure consistency. Given the limited capacity of 
service providers in Liberia this process of identifying and developing reintegration projects 
was of great concern to many as there was a shortage of both good reintegration projects 
and a dearth of capable implementing partners.649  
                                                
648 Paes: 259. 
649 Ibid. 
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The oversubscription of the DD processes had a significant impact on reintegration 
regarding funding constraints, project design and implementation, but also confidence that 
the reintegration approach was the right one. The adult reintegration process was designed 
to specifically target ex-combatants rather than for the explicit benefit of the community at 
large. Due to the funding constraints and questions about the credibility of the programme, 
donors considered shifting the emphasis away from targeting ex-combatants with 
assistance, instead focussing on community-based support for the war-affected 
population.650 Although this shift of focus did not happen, several funders (namely USAID 
and the European Commission) decided to develop and fund projects directly, in addition 
to their support of the UNDP Trust Fund. These donor-supported projects were called 
‘parallel programmes’ and they helped lower the burden or caseload of ex-combatants 
directly supported by the Trust Fund. These programmes were developed in direct 
response to the inflated number of DDR participants and some included not only ex-
combatants, but war-affected people.  
 
As noted in earlier chapters, the increase in the caseload of combatants had financial 
implications. The original budget for an estimated 38,000 combatants was $55 million. This 
was later revised to $71.3 million for the caseload of 101,495 ex-combatants.651 This meant 
that the DDR programme required not only a greater level of financial investment but also 
to lower the per capita costs. The original reintegration budget was calculated on a $950 
per capita cost, due to the increased caseload and this was revised to an average of $800 per 
capita.652 
 
Although UNMIL was supposed to cover all military-related DD costs through their 
budget, including the cost of contracting service providers, due to the large number of 
participants and constraints within UNMIL, UNDP took a lead in the contracting service 
providers.653 Despite this not being their responsibility, UNDP through the Trust Fund 
paid implementing partners a total of $12 million for services rendered in the DD phases. 
The expectation was that the Trust Fund would be reimbursed this amount by UNMIL. So 
                                                
650 United Nations Development Programme, "Reintegration Briefs: No 3 Reintegration Strategies - an 
Overview of the Implications of Non-Targeted Assistance for Demobilised Ex-Combatants," (Monrovia: 
UNDP, 1 March 2005). 
651 United Nations Development Programme, "Liberia Disarmament, Demobilisation, Reintegration and 
Rehabilitation Programme Trust Fund Activity Report: Volume III ", 13. 
652 United Nations Development Programme, "Trust Fund Activity Report: Volume II ", Section 4.10.1. 
653 United Nations Development Programme, "Liberia Disarmament, Demobilisation, Reintegration and 
Rehabilitation Programme Trust Fund Activity Report: Volume III ", 33-4. 
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not only were there nearly triple the amount of combatants in the DDR programme, but 
$12 million had been depleted from the Trust Fund before reintegration even began. By 
the end of 2005, UNMIL still had not reimbursed the UNDP Trust Fund.654 Until the 
revised budget was approved and the funds disbursed there was a significant funding 
shortfall for the reintegration phase.  
 
Options for Reintegrating Adults 
In the absence of a comprehensive market survey, Liberia’s 1997 DDR process, other 
regional DDR experiences (namely Sierra Leone’s) and the information gathered from the 
ex-combatants during the DD process proved invaluable in informing reintegration 
options and projects.655 The reintegration options were based on previous reintegration 
preferences (from 1997 surveys). As a result, UNDP boosted that the reintegration options 
were demand driven and represented what the ex-combatants themselves wanted to 
pursue.656 The ex-combatants had the opportunity to choose their preferred reintegration 
option and location.  
 
The economic reintegration priorities and programmatic options included formal 
education, vocational training, agricultural assistance and public works projects. During the 
DD phase, the ex-combatants indicated their preference for reintegration programmes –
vocational training (50%), formal education (42%), agriculture (4%), small enterprise 
development (3%) and public works (1%). 657 Each ex-combatant had the option to enrol 
him or herself into one reintegration project. Social reintegration assistance was meant to 
be incorporated into each of the reintegration project, but in reality this did not materialise. 
Below is a description of the reintegration options made available. 
 
Educat ion 
Formal education was identified as a main reintegration priority. The justification for this 
was simple. The education level of ex-combatants was very low due to the country’s 
protracted war and the collapsed education system. According to information gathered 
during the DD phases, 81% of ex-combatants indicated that they were in school before 
joining the fighting factions and despite this the level of education was very low (see 
                                                
654 Ibid. 
655 United Nations Development Programme, "Reintegration Briefs: No 3." 
656 United Nations Development Programme, "Liberia Disarmament, Demobilisation, Reintegration and 
Rehabilitation Programme Trust Fund Activity Report: Volume III ", 39. 
657 United Nations Development Programme, "Trust Fund Activity Report: Volume II ", 55. 
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charts).658 It was believed that educating ex-combatants would help them be more 
competitive in the job market and help them both find gainful employment as well as assist 




Self-reported education levels of ex-combatants 
 
Source: NCDDRR. "DDRR Consolidated Report Phase 1, 2, & 3." Monrovia: NCDDRR, 16 January 2005. 
 
The assistance package of the formal education option was straightforward. Ex-combatants 
would receive free education for three years. Their registration tuition fees, books and 
study materials, uniform and examination fees would all be covered as part of their 
reintegration benefits. Moreover, they would receive a monthly subsistence allowance – 
amounting to $30 per month for the first year (for 9 academic calendar months), $15 per 
month the second year (for 9 academic calendar months), and no cash allowance the third 
year.659 These benefits were dependent on several factors: (1) although the ex-combatants 
could the school they wanted to attend, they must meet the minimum requires for 
admission independent of the JIU or reintegration programme; (2) subsistence support is 
dependent upon a 75% attendance rate that would be monitored regularly throughout the 
programme; and (3) that the school is accredited by the Ministry of Education and enter 
into a contract with the JIU/UNDP.660 
 
                                                
658 NCDDRR. 
659 United Nations Development Programme, "Liberia Disarmament, Demobilisation, Reintegration and 
Rehabilitation Programme Trust Fund Activity Report: Volume III ", 56. and United Nations Development 
Programme, "Reintegration Briefs: Justification for Providing Reintegration Subsistence Allowance for Ex-
Combatants," (Monrovia: UNDP, 26 January 2005). 
660 For the full procedures for placement into formal education see United Nations Development 
Programme, "Reintegration Briefs: No 2 Formal Education Support," (Monrovia: UNDP, 25 February 2005). 
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Vocational Training 
Recognising that formal education was not for everyone, a vocational training option was 
offered. For those that wanted to acquire immediate skills, they were offered training and 
in some cases apprenticeships in the following fields: auto mechanics, carpentry, 
electronics, general mechanics, masonry, plumbing, refrigeration and air-conditioning, 
welding and fabrication, arts and crafts, tailoring, hairdressing, shoe making, tie dye and 
painting/decorating (pastry making and cosmetology were initially offered by were 
discontinued).661 The justification for providing vocational training was to provide the ex-
combatants, many of who did not have skills, with the opportunity to learn or enhance 
skills that would increase their employability. It was thought that this would increase their 
economic security as hence their social reintegration. 
 
The training was intended to provide the beneficiaries with hands-on training. The service 
providers would be equipped with the necessary tools and hardware (such as tools or 
sewing machines) for the trainees to learn on. In addition to the vocational training, each 
project would include basic literacy and numeracy and business skills development training. 
Where possible the trainees would be paired up as an apprentice with a master craftsman to 
continue their learning and enable them to build a client base. The ex-combatants that 
selected this option were given a monthly subsistence allowance of $30 per month for a 
maximum of eight months.662  
 
Agricul ture 
Like in the rest of Sub-Saharan Africa, agriculture is the bedrock of economic life in 
Liberia. In 2003 it was estimated that ‘80% of total employment in subsistence agriculture, 
contributing to about 33% of GDP.’663 Although agricultural assistance would take a 
minimum of a harvest to yield results, it was the best option for becoming self-sufficient. 
Agriculture training was a better prospect than the other reintegration options in terms of 
income generation and contributing to not only the national recovery, but also food 
security. Getting rural communities to be self-sufficient in food production was an 
important goal of the overall development and reconstruction of Liberia and there was an 
                                                
661 United Nations Development Programme, "Liberia Disarmament, Demobilisation, Reintegration and 
Rehabilitation Programme Trust Fund Activity Report: Volume III ", 24-25 and 68-98. 
662 United Nations Development Programme, "Reintegration Briefs: Justification for Providing Reintegration 
Subsistence Allowance for Ex-Combatants." 
663 International Labour Office and UNICEF, "Labour Market and Training Needs Assessment: Mapping of 
Reintegration Opportunities for Children Associated with Fighting Forces," (Monrovia, Liberia: March 2005), 
6. 
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opportunity for ex-combatants to play a role in this recovery. Moreover, agricultural 
assistance would help the urban-rural balance of reintegration projects, which was also an 
intended goal of the reintegration programme. That being said, although agricultural 
assistance was the third most desired reintegration option, only 4% sought to access this 
option.  
 
Beneficiaries of this option were provided with practical training, including how to clear 
swamp land, how to select different seed varieties, use fertiliser and pesticides effectively, 
how to establish and manage nurseries, and crop cultivation.664 The beneficiaries received a 
monthly stipend of $30 for a maximum of eight months and upon completion of the 
programme each trainee was given a set of tools, seeds or seedlings and in some cases the 
use of land to start their operations.665 
 
Publi c  Works 
Recognizing that there would be a lag between the DD processes and the start of most 
reintegration programmes a public works option was presented as a stopgap measure. For 
those ex-combatants who felt the immediate need to earn an income the Liberia 
Community Infrastructure Programme (LCIP) was made available as a reintegration 
option. This programme among other things focused on the rehabilitation of infrastructure 
including roads, schools, government buildings and health clinics.666 The idea was that ex-
combatants could be used to improve the dilapidated condition of infrastructure to the 
benefit of the community. In addition to being feed, the beneficiaries were paid for their 
labour at the rate of $2 per day. This was the only job creation intervention of the 
reintegration programme. USAID funded this option, which was seen as parallel option.  
 
Social  Reintegrat ion 
Each of the reintegration options was meant to have a social integration component 
included in the project design. Initially the emphasis was placed on the economic 
reintegration component, although one of the lessons learnt through the monitoring and 
evaluation process was that more attention needed to be paid to the social reintegration 
                                                
664 United Nations Development Programme, "Trust Fund Activity Report: Volume II ", section 4.12.2. 
665 Ibid. 
666 USAID, The Liberia Community Infrastructure Programme (LCIP) (10 September 2008), 8. 
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component.667 Although PAC approved projects were meant to ensure the inclusion of 
social reintegration components in all approved projects, the implementation was sketchy 
at best, despite an attempt to streamline and identify means to address social 
reintegration.668 The social component included lessons on ‘conflict, violence, forgiveness, 
culture, communication skills, peace education, reconciliation and civic education…[and] 
HIV awareness.’669  
 
Analysing the Adult Reintegration Process 
It is undeniable that the DDR programme was under a great deal of political pressure – 
both internationally and domestically.670 Despite the myriad of challenges the timelines 
were aggressive, the expectations were ambitious and there was a sense that failure would 
simply not be tolerated. Although a lag between the completion of the DD phase and the 
commencement of reintegration was expected, which was one of the justifications for 
giving cash TSAs, for many ex-combatants the delay was longer than anticipated.  
 
There were several key factors that negatively impacted the adult reintegration process. 
Funding was a constant problem, not only regarding the increased budget but also 
fulfilment and timely disbursement of pledges. The reintegration project selection process 
was problematic. The availability of qualified implementing partners and training expertise 
was limited. Administrative arrangements were cumbersome and at times inefficient. The 
establishment of NCDDRR Field Offices were severely delayed. The information 
campaign beyond Monrovia was also severely delayed.671 All these issues will be covered in 
greater detail. 
 
Funding issues  
As is often the case with humanitarian, peacebuilding and/or post-conflict situations there 
is gap between international financial pledges and what is actually delivered. In Liberia, 
pledges for the DDR Trust Fund suffered from this affliction and a delay in disbursement. 
The necessary funding for reintegration was not forthcoming immediately from the 
donors. Moreover, the situation was not helped by the inflation of participants, which in 
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the eyes of the donors damaged the credibility of the DDR programme making them 
reluctant to provide support. The Trust Fund was plagued with funding shortages for 
almost the duration of the DDR programme. This impacted reintegration programmes, 
delaying project approvals, and delaying the projects even once they have started due to the 
inability to complete funding commitments. In July 2005 when reintegration was meant to 
be in full swing the Trust Fund had a shortfall of almost $40 million.672 Although this gap 
had shrunk to $5 million by November 2005 the damage had been done and the 
reintegration programmes had been significantly delayed. Although the Trust Fund was 
fully funded in the end, the delays and shortage of funding caused a domino effect 
negatively impacting the programme.673 This was a direct consequence of the donors.  
 
Although not originally planned, the reintegration process was also implemented in phases. 
Phase I, June 2004 through June 2005, and provided assistance to 45,000 ex-combatants 
through the UNDP Trust Fund.674 Phase II which started in July 2005 provided an 
additional 35,000 beneficiaries.675 There were bilateral reintegration programmes for 
approximately 21,440 ex-combatants that ran concurrently. The final phase of the 
reintegration programme was launched in January 2008 to cover the residual caseload of 
9,000 ex-combatants and the DDR programme formally was completed in July 2009.676 
 
Reintegrat ion Projec t  Selec t ion Process   
Several service providers complained that the approval process was too lengthy and 
cumbersome.677 Just like during the DD phase, after the TCC advised on the reintegration 
projects proposals they went to the PAC for approval. During the DD phase, in 2004, the 
PAC met nine times in total and the first reintegration project was approved on 19 May 
2004.678 In 2005, the PAC approval process markedly slowed down. UNDP took the point 
of view that there was more time to consider the suitability, performance and capabilities of 
NGO partners. Also given the gap in the Trust Fund there was reluctance to approve 
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projects without the means to pay for them.679 As of June 2007, 62,000 had received 
reintegration assistance supported by the Trust Fund and 31,000 ex-combatants went 
through the parallel programmes.680 The residual caseload enrolled in the last phase of the 
reintegration programme which was launched in December 2008.681 
 
The Avai labi l i ty  o f  Capable Servi ce  Providers and Expert i se  
Like during the DD phases NGOs, service providers and child protection agencies were 
responsible for conceiving and developing projects for the reintegration phase. Funding for 
those projects also had to be sought. Rather than developing and implementing 
reintegration projects themselves UNDP invited the submission of projects for funding 
through its Trust Fund. UNDP and ultimately the reintegration programme ‘depended 
therefore on the interest and ability of third parties in designing and running these 
programmes.’682 The impact of Liberia’s conflict was well known and was no surprise that 
there were very few qualified organisations that could deliver the necessary and sufficient 
reintegration programmes. This challenge proved to be a serious constraint in developing 
projects that were capable of absorbing the quantity of combatants necessary. This 
unavailability of reintegration service providers and expertise was a major factor in delaying 
the reintegration process and impacted quality, quantity and speed at which programmes 
were rolled out.  
 
Directly linked to the availability of service providers, the geographic distribution of 
projects beyond Monrovia was also a major challenge. There was a concentration in 
programmes in and around Monrovia despite only 40% of ex-combatants preferring to 
resettle in Montserrado County (Monrovia).683 Due to the limitations of services provider 
and the urban-bias, the reintegration programmes took a while to be rolled out beyond 
Monrovia.684 
 
UNDP has been criticised for not effectively planning for reintegration or having a more 
active role in developing and/or implementing viable projects given the importance of the 
                                                
679 Ibid. 
680 United Nations Development Programme, "Reintegration Assistance to Liberia DDRR Programme 
Residual Caseload," (Monrovia: UNDP, April 2009), 5. 
681 Ibid., 6. 
682 Paes: 259. 
683 NCDDRR. 
684 United Nations Development Programme, "Trust Fund Activity Report: Volume II ", 57. 
   
 
- 209 - 
 
reintegration process, the large caseload and the dearth of capable service providers.685 Had 
reintegration been properly planned, in sync with the DD phases rather than separate from 
it, there might have been enough time to assist in either building the local capacity to 
deliver better programmes or bring in specialised people to develop and implement 
projects. This was an oversight that should have been addressed early on, possible even 
before the DDR programme commenced.  
 
Cumbersome Administrat ive  Arrangements  
Once reintegration projects were approved, service providers needed to be formally 
contracted by UNDP. Despite UNDP being ultimately responsible for the reintegration 
programme, the implementing partners were responsible for financial management of their 
project, the training of their staff and ensuring a certain level of quality. During the DD 
phases there was a sense of urgency, which often trumped administration arrangements 
and other blockages.686 That same sense of urgency was not present during the 
reintegration phase.687 During the reintegration phase, UNDP wanted to ensure the 
capacity of the service providers to deliver on their commitments, both programmatic and 
administratively. This often delayed the contracting of implementing partners. 
 
Developing suitable projects, identifying and verifying the implement partners all took 
time. The contracts then needed to be arranged and terms agreed upon. Administrative 
arrangements with schools, for the formal education component, were particularly 
burdensome.688 In most countries the identification of schools would be a straightforward 
process, but in Liberia this was a complicated matter. Many of the schools had forged their 
accreditation or were no longer in contact with the Ministry of Education. Therefore the 
school’s accreditation needed to be verified with the Ministry of Education on a case-to-
case basis. Then the ex-combatants needed to apply for admission on their own merit, and 
the list of eligible students would then forwarded to the JIU for further validation and 
verification. Next, the schools would be assessed to ensure their capability to deliver the 
curriculum. Only then, if all was satisfactory, would the schools be paid the initial tuition 
payment and the subsistence allowance for the validated students (which would then be 
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disbursed to them). Subsequent payments would depend on monitoring of the student’s 
attendance and performance.689  
 
Supported by the Trust Fund, the formal education programme began in September 2004 
and was available for 12,000 ex-combatants for the 2004/5 academic year. An additional 
9,000 ex-combatants were added to the programme for the 2005/6 academic year bringing 
the total of UNDP Trust Fund supported ex-combatants to 21,000.690 By the end of the 
2005/6 academic year a total of 345 academic schools and 23 computer schools were 
participating in the programme.691 
 
The disbursement of subsistence allowances did not always get paid on time. These delays 
often resulted in the ex-combatants rioting and causing disturbances. Regardless of whose 
fault it was, whether the JIU had not done the necessary verification in order to authorise 
payment or the problem arose from an operational glitch, when the ex-combatants were 
not promptly paid they would descend on the JIU/NCDDRR headquarters in Monrovia. 
If the riots got out of hand UNMIL peacekeepers would be deployed while 
JIU/NCDDRR staff dealt with the ex-combatants’ concerns. The JIU/NCDDRR got 
adept at handling the situations, which were normally diffused by promises to look into the 
delay and rectify the error if one had been made.692 These errors and operational glitches 
regularly created flashpoints and temporary moments of insecurity.  
 
The Establ i shment o f  NCDDRR Fie ld Off i c es   
The NCDDRR was meant to open Field Offices in 2004 to help inform and counsel ex-
combatants of their benefits and the various programmes available to them. These Field 
Offices were intended to monitor reintegration services, track ex-combatants, and facilitate 
reintegration activities in their areas. Similar to the DD phase and the delayed roll-out of 
reintegration programmes, Monrovia was the first to benefit from this facility. The first 
Referral and Counselling Office opened in May 2005.693 The Gbarnga, Buchanan and 
Zwedru branches opened and became operational in June 2005.694 By the end of early 
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January 2006 the Harper and Voinjama offices were still being renovated and not yet 
operational.695 This meant that it was difficult for ex-combatants outside Monrovia to seek 
information about their benefits or what programmes existed. This was the case until these 
field offices were opened. This lack of information and a presence beyond Monrovia 
negatively impacted the monitoring and counselling of ex-combatants and identification of 
reintegration opportunities. In many parts of the country this lack of information 
unfortunately also corresponded with a lack of available programmes for ex-combatants to 
enrol in. This delay was avoidable, and with proper planning and training, the deployment 
of NCDDRR field staff could have been happened much earlier. Overall, ex-combatants 
could have and should have been kept better informed.696  
 
The Information and Communicat ion Campaign 
Like with the DD phases, the reintegration process required a comprehensive nationwide 
information and sensitisation campaign to inform ex-combatants and communities of the 
composition of reintegration benefits, available programmes and the objectives of the 
reintegration programme. This was not only necessary for the flow of accurate information, 
but also necessary to contribute to expectation management given the high expectations 
ex-combatants had. The JIU Information and Sensitisation Unit (ISU) managed this 
process with support and input from the key stakeholders including UNDP, UNMIL, and 
child protection agencies. The campaign used radio, television, print, press releases, 
signboards, billboards and town hall meetings to deliver the information and various 
messages.697 Although the objectives, benefits and options of reintegration programme 
could be discussed, the lack of available projects was a challenge for the campaign. The JIU 
could not inform ex-combatants on the specific projects, because in most cases the 
projects had not yet been approved or even identified. That was part of the domino effect 
of the funding shortage and unavailability of capable service providers. Those in Monrovia 
were decently informed about their reintegration benefits because of the proximity to the 
JIU and NCDDRR headquarters, but the same was not true about the hinterland. From 23 
May until 25 October 2005 a team comprised of JIU-ISU, UNDP, UNMIL and NCDDRR 
started a countrywide information road-show that visited 26 towns in 13 counties to 
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inform ex-combatants on the process.698 Until this campaign ‘Monrovia was the hub or 
source of all information about the RR and related activities.’699 Although the information 
campaign started relatively late and well after the reintegration process had commenced, it 
did play an integral role in informing the ex-combatants of their benefits, facilitating their 
enrolment in programmes. 
  
 
Although most of these interrelated issues were resolved with time, the role-out of and the 
absorption of ex-combatants into reintegration programmes was slow. Ex-combatants had 
high expectations, which in most cases were not fulfilled initially.700 Moreover, serious 
concerns were raised in terms of the quality of services and education that were provided 
to the ex-combatants. With regard to vocational training, there was no standardization of 
programmes or training, meaning quality control was in the hands of the implementing 
partners. This was surprising given the reservations key stakeholders had from the start and 
throughout the DDR programme. With regard to the formal education component, the 
Liberian curriculum had not been revised in over fifteen years and the teachers were of 
varying quality.701 There was the impression that the reintegration process, like DD, was 
more about outputs (i.e., having the bulk share of the ex-combatants access their 
reintegration benefits) rather than the outcome or having a positive impact.702 Moreover, 
the ex-combatants were being trained for jobs that simply did not exist.703 Moreover, it was 
unclear as to whether the vocational training or schooling would increase their 
employability in the short-, medium- or long-term.  
 
The Child Reintegration Process 
A total of 10,963 children were demobilised and were eligible for reintegration benefits. A 
memorandum of understanding was signed between UNDP and UNICEF tasking 
UNICEF with the responsibility of the child reintegration programme. Just as in the DD 
phases, UNICEF played an integral role in the design, implementation and monitoring of 
the child reintegration process. Unlike the adult process, the child reintegration programme 
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was directly linked to the demobilisation phase and the programme provided a certain level 
of continuity for the participants. The time children spent at the ICCs was the beginning of 
their rehabilitation and reintegration. In fact the bulk of the activities at the ICCs such as 
the counselling, life skills training, the basic literacy and numeracy lessons, and recreational 
activities were all geared to mend, teach and re-socialise the child ex-combatants. The child 
reintegration process, like the DD phases, was a truly collaborative endeavour bringing 
together efforts of UNICEF, child protection agencies, Liberia’s ministry of education, 
UNDP, donors and local communities. 
 
Unlike the adult process, in preparation to the reintegration process UNICEF 
commissioned the International Labour Organisation to conduct a labour market survey 
and training needs assessment for children.704 Although this assessment was published in 
March 2005 (well after the ‘official’ start of the reintegration programme), it helped not 
only inform the child reintegration process, but also indirectly assisted the adult process by 
providing a real-time snapshot of Liberia’s economic viability and that of ex-combatants.705 
The survey did a very thorough job of illustrating the dire state of the economy, as well as 
the situation facing Liberia’s children. The survey not only assessed the reintegration 
prospects and options, but also provided recommendations on how best to maximise the 
impact of reintegration. 
 
It was no surprise that Liberia’s economic situation was in shambles. The survey noted that 
only 55% of males and 40.6% of females were economically active, and that the 80% figure 
of unemployment may indeed be higher once underemployment was factored in.706 It 
showed that the formal economy was relatively small, while the informal economy was 
where the majority of Liberian worked.  
 
The market survey claims that the previous failures of the reintegration in Liberia were due 
to: (1) the inability of the vocational training system to provide marketable and non-
diversified skills; (2) poor quality of training programs; (3) the lack of follow-up assistance 
to the trainees; (4) the harsh competition in the labour market; (5) the inadequate length of 
training; and (6) the overall poor economic opportunities that existed in Liberia.707 In 1997 
many of the ex-combatants were not absorbed into the economy, nor did the reintegration 
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programmes leave the participants with employable skills.708 In explicitly naming these 
failures, the survey was attempting to prevent the same mistakes from being repeated in the 
2004 reintegration attempt.  
 
UNICEF and ILO’s assessment of the absorption capacity of child ex-combatants into the 
labour market was bleak. Apart from the economy being in shambles, the labour market 
was a highly competitive place and given the prolonged conflict and the severe damage 
suffered by the educational infrastructure the vast majority of children could not read or 
write and had very few skills.709 The lack of local capacity to provide skills training was of 
particular concern. The reality that child ex-combatants would be competing with their 
adult counterparts, a large population of returning refugees and displaced people many of 
whom were better qualified did not provide reason for optimism.710 For these reasons, it 
was recommended that child ex-combatants receive opportunities of education in order to 
help make them more competitive and that the reintegration programme should focus on 
‘diversification of skills development.’711 
Options for Reintegrating Children 
The priorities and options for child reintegration were very similar to adults. For many of 
the same reasons formal education and vocational training were prioritised. Children over 
the age of 14 years old had the choice of which reintegration option to pursue. It was 
recommended to younger children that they pursue the formal education option. Although 
the options for children were very similar to the adult programme there were some notable 
differences to the approaches as well as the benefit they received.  
 
One notable difference was that unlike their adult counterparts, children were not offered 
monthly subsistence allowances. Following the same logic as with the TSA issue, UNICEF 
did not think it wise or suitable to give children cash support as part of their reintegration 
package. Instead UNICEF took a community-based approach where possible. They 
provided “in kind” assistance targeting their efforts to the benefit of the wider community 
rather than just the individual child ex-combatants. They believed this approached helped 
diminish stigma that ex-combatants would endure but also help diminish the perception of 
rewarding the child ex-combatants.  
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Like the previous stages of the DDR programme child reintegration relied on various 
sources of funding, including bilateral funding, resources from the UNDP Trust Fund and 
UNICEF’s own core funding.712 Also wherever possible, UNICEF integrated and used 
their wider reconstruction interventions to complement their reintegration efforts. 
 
Community Educat ion Investment Programme (CEIP) 
Demobilised children had the option to access free basic primary education (up to 6th 
grade) for three years through the Community Education Investment Programme 
(CEIP).713 Education was seen as vital due to the reality that few child ex-combatants 
would have received much education during the war. However UNICEF took a slightly 
different approach to the formal education option for children than 
UNDP/JIU/NCDDRR did with adults.  
 
Although the reintegration benefits did specifically target the child ex-combatants in terms 
of enabling them to go to school for free, the programme was designed to extend benefits 
to the schools and communities as much as possible. In return for schools waiving the 
tuition and examination fees of child ex-combatants UNICEF provided the participating 
schools with education and recreational kits for the use of the whole school. These kits 
included educational and recreational material, such as books, notebooks, chalk, sporting 
equipment, and board games.714 Also as part of the benefit package school administrators, 
principals, teachers, social workers as well as members of the communities received 
training on how to handle traumatised children. The reintegration package and training was 
ultimately aimed at supporting the ultimate goal for the children’s reintegration supporting 
the community’s ability to more effectively interact and deal with former child soldiers, 
contributing to their learning and reintegration. The programme was explicitly designed to 
benefit government (ministries of education and youth), schools (both public and private), 
teachers, principals, and all pupils, including the child ex-combatants in participating 
schools.715 As a result of this initiative, 3,363 teachers, 479 school principles, 54 district 
education officers and 11 county education officers received psychosocial care training.716 
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Skil l s  Training and Apprent i ceship 
Similar to adults, formal education was not suitable for every child. A very similar skills 
training and apprenticeship programme was designed suitable for children older than 14 
years old. This option provided the opportunity to acquire hands-on training in areas that 
could possibly assist them find gainful employment and provide skills that may lead to 
economic self-sufficiency. The areas covered in the training were similar to those of adults, 
such as carpentry, plumbing, electronics, tie-dye, auto mechanics, and masonry. Areas 
deemed as either inappropriate or dangerous for children, such as rubber tapping or 
bricklaying, were not made available.717  
 
To supplement their skills training, the children would also participate in basic literacy, 
numeracy and small business management skills lessons to support their ability to function 
in the business environment.718 Given the reality that few children could read and write this 
component was seen as essential to their successful engagement with the private sector. 
 
Children that opted for this option received one meal per day during their training 
programme. In lieu of receiving a monthly subsistence allowance, after successfully 
completing the training children received a tool kit and where applicable a small business 
grant to help them start their business.719 Where possible the trainees were placed as 
apprentices working under the guidance and supervision of masters of their trade. This was 
intended to assist the children to continue learning their trade whilst possibly earning an 
income. Children above the age of 14 years old were targeted for this option, while younger 
children were encouraged to select the education option.720 
 
Social  Reintegrat ion Component  
Family tracing was one of the main components of the demobilisation and social 
reintegration of children. As discussed in the demobilisation chapter, family tracing began 
at the ICCs and enabled the placement of the children back into the families and local 
communities. This was a crucial step that enabled the return of children back into their 
communities.  
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It was not uncommon for the behaviour of child ex-combatants to be aggressive, 
disruptive and unpleasant. In many cases schools, families and communities did not know 
how to respond to this. As a response, the social reintegration component was designed to 
address these challenges aimed to contribute to the successful reintegration at both an 
individual and community level. Community child welfare mechanisms were established to 
assist with this – namely Child Welfare Committees (CWC) and Children’s and Youth 
Clubs. The Child Welfare Committees were community-based mechanisms created to 
monitor the welfare of children and institutionalise child protection throughout the 
country.721 Children’s and Youth Clubs were created to provide a forum for child and 
youth activities, whether recreational or educational. Both CWCs and Children’s Clubs 
were intended for both ex-combatants and members of their communities.722 In addition to 
facilitating the social reintegration of children, NGO staff, social workers, teachers, 
principles, community leaders and other interested parties received training from UNICEF 
and child protection agencies on how to deal with traumatised children in order to both 
help them integration and improve the community’s ability to cope and deal with them.723 
This was similar and complementary to the training provided for CEIP. Together, these 
social reintegration interventions were integral of both the education and vocational 
training of the child reintegration programme. 
 
Like during DD, child protection agencies, led by UNICEF, played a big role in the service 
delivery as well as the capacity building for both the education and training components. 
UNICEF worked very closely with the ministry of education to rehabilitate schools, train 
teachers, update and standardise the curriculum, ensure schools were supplied with 
necessary infrastructure (for example latrines and desks) and teaching materials (for 
example chalk boards and chalk).724 This was done as part of UNICEF’s contribution to 
Liberia’s national recovery. Local child protection agencies were relied heavily upon to 
provide a repository of expertise, to monitor and provide real-time reports on child 
protection issues. Local child protection agencies throughout Liberia helped set up and 
maintain the CWCs and Child Clubs. This national wide coverage of child protection 
agencies and their intense collaboration was an integral part of the social reintegration 
component for children.  
                                                
721 Interview 69. 
722 Interview 69. 
723 Interview 69. 
724 Interview 69. 
   
 




Together with the child protection agencies, UNICEF, the JIU and the ministry of 
education embarked on a widespread information campaign to inform communities, 
schools, administrators and child ex-combatants of the reintegration benefits and process. 
This information campaign started while some of the children were at the ICCs, which 
obviously contributed to informing children. The countrywide reach of the child protection 
agencies, their access and frequent contact with a large number of communities was 
integral to the flow of information regarding the child reintegration programme, 
complementing the information campaign for adults.  
 
Analysing the Child Reintegration Process 
UNICEF support for the CEIP programme was intended to cover a total of 5,000 child 
ex-combatants and provide them with a primary school education. In total 85% of this 
target was reached with a total of 4,295 children, 3,295 male and 1,000 female, opting for 
this reintegration option. After long negotiations with the schools, a total of 383 were 
supported during the 2004-5 academic year.725 UNICEF trained a total of teachers 3,363 
and 479 principals in child protection and how to deal with traumatised children.726 This 
training was complemented with the distribution of books on child protection, life-skills, 
leadership skills and human rights to contribute to the reintegration of school children. 
Apart from these books, schools received learning or recreational packages for admitting 
former child combatants. Unfortunately the delivery of materials was fraught with delays 
that in many cases slowed down the reconstruction and rehabilitation of schools and 
training of teachers. Ultimately these distribution problems were resolved without major 
long-term consequence.727 
 
Children equally utilised the vocational training and apprenticeship programme. Of the 
original UNICEF supported 5,000 places, a total of 4,965 child ex-combatants, 3,048 boys 
and 1,881 girls, took advantage of this option.728 Like the adult skills training, the role-out 
and subscription of programmes for children was slower than anticipated. For example, by 
December 2005 only 1,115 children had enrolled in the skills training programme. Liberia’s 
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low training capacity, limited deployment of implementing partners beyond Monrovia and 
administrative hurdles contributed to this. Moreover, the decision to not pay children cash 
allowances and delays in distributing toolkits contributed to the slow enrolment and 
subscription in the skills programme, as older children opted to go through the adult 
reintegration process.729  
 
Where possible parallel programmes also took a community-based approach. USAID and 
the European Commission provided funding for child protection agencies to implement 
reintegration programmes to cover the remaining caseload. USAID committed itself to 
covering the costs of 10,000 war-affected children (CAFF and non-CAFF). For instance, 
Save the Children was contracted to provide reintegration assistance to 5,000 CAFF and 
other children affected by conflict),730 and the Christian Children’s Fund was supported to 
provide 1,500 CAFF with reintegration benefits.731  
The social reintegration component had noticeable and far-reaching achievements. 
Through combined efforts, UNICEF, child protection agencies and donors supported the 
establishment of approximately 300 CWCs and over 200 Children’s Clubs nationwide. 
CWCs effectively monitored child protection in communities and shared information with 
child protection agencies in the counties which was in turn shared with Monrovia.732 The 
Child Clubs created child friendly spaces where both ex-combatant and non-combatant 
children could go to play, learn, and socialise with members of their communities. The 
sorts of activities available at Children’s Clubs were sports (football, volleyball, kickball), 
arts and crafts (drawing, choruses, drama, dance) and board games.733 Besides recreational 
and social activities, the child club were very effective in monitoring children’s activities in 
their area, providing advice to children and when necessary mediating conflicts between 
members of communities. Both the CWCs and Children’s Clubs contributed to the social 
reintegration of children in their communities. 
 
The child reintegration process was distinct from the adult process in design, 
implementation, coordination and funding. That being said there were also significant 
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similarities between the child and adult processes. This reality was somewhat unavoidable 
given the national situation in Liberia. The limited training capacity, the dilapidated state of 
the national and social service (namely the education system) and funding constraints also 
plagued the child reintegration process (although to a lesser extent). Besides their 
membership on the PAC and representation on the NCDDRR, UNMIL had little to do 
with the reintegration programme – adult or child. This was both a blessing and a curse for 
reasons to be discussed. UNDP was responsible for the reintegration programme, and they 
eagerly transferred the responsibility of the child reintegration process to UNICEF.  
 
The child reintegration process went according to plan. That is not to say that all aspects of 
the programme went smoothly or without complications, but UNICEF managed the 
process efficiently given the various challenges faced in Liberia. Unlike disarmament, 
UNICEF had a greater degree of control and autonomy over the child reintegration 
process. They were able to make policy decisions directly, without having to defer to 
UNMIL or UNDP. Moreover, they effectively consulted and collaborated with child 
protection agencies and the Liberian government when needed. 
The adult DDR programme received a lot of criticism, specifically that the reintegration 
process was not properly planned or given the necessary attention compared to the DD 
components. The critics claimed that there was a bias in favour of the military components 
rather than the socio-economic reintegration components. Moreover, critics complained 
that the planning of adult DD phases the reintegration processes were de-linked. This was 
the view of not only many of the service providers, but was also acknowledged by both the 
head of UNMIL’s DDR Section, Clive Jachnik and UNDP.734 One example of this lack of 
planning was the delay in the bulk of reintegration projects available for adult ex-
combatants. The separation in planning of the DD and RR phases was reinforced by the 
structure of the programme. UNMIL was responsible for the DD phases including its 
funding, while UNDP was responsible for the RR, its planning, funding and 
implementation. Communication, coordination and collaboration between the two were 
often strained. That being said, because of UNICEF’s role in both the child DD and 
reintegration phases this problem of separation between the DD and RR phases was more 
problematic for adults than children. The Strategic Framework was very clear that although 
the JIU would have overall responsibility of monitoring and oversight of the reintegration 
                                                
734 Jachnik, "Disarmament and Demobilisation Questionnaire." and United Nations Development 
Programme, "Trust Fund Activity Report: Volume II ", 55. 
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programme, UNICEF would manage the child reintegration programme.735 As a result of 
this mandate and UNICEF’s relentless attention to children, they were able to plan for the 
various components giving the demobilisation and reintegration process continuity, 
without having to rely too heavily on UNMIL and UNDP. That was a key distinction 
between the child and adult reintegration process  
 
The Strategic Framework outlined the objectives and activities of the child reintegration 
programme. The articulated objectives included: (1) family tracing and reunification; (2) 
access to health, education and skills training; (3) increasing awareness and capacity of 
family and community child protection; and (4) the enhancement of the capacity of NGOs 
and agencies to address the needs of child ex-combatants.736 It was envisaged that these 
four objectives would be accomplished through: (1) the provision of reintegration benefits, 
such as covering basic education; (2) providing schools with educational materials and 
enhancing schools’ capacity to handle the special needs of child ex-combatants; (3) training 
social workers in child protection; (4) the support of training and employment of ex-
combatants through apprenticeship schemes; and (5) sensitizing receiving communities to 
the reintegration needs of children.737 Throughout the reintegration programme all these 
objectives and activities were accomplished and fulfilled by UNICEF and the parallel 
reintegration programmes. That being said, there are notable successes and shortcomings 
of the child reintegration process, these will be covered in the following section. 
 
The Cost  o f  Chi ld Reintegrat ion 
It has been extremely difficult to ascertain the precise cost of the child reintegration programme or 
the source of the funding. Despite numerous discussions with representatives from UNMIL 
(former and present), UNDP (NY, Geneva and Liberia), UN Department of Peacekeeping 
Operations, UNICEF (present and former in NY and Liberia) and the UN Office of the Special 
Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict the cost of the child 
reintegration programme and funding sources seems to either very coveted or unavailable (which is 
more likely of the two). That being said, one can extrapolate the total figure with the information 
that is known. The nine-month skills training programme was between $900 and $1,100 per 
child.738 The breakdown of the $900 was as followed: project staff ($210 or 23% of total cost); 
feeding ($108 or 12% of total cost); tools for training ($200 or 22% of total cost); raw materials 
used for training ($100 or 11% of total cost); start-up kits ($250 or 28% of total cost); and cost of 
                                                
735 Draft Interim Secretariat, 37. 
736 Ibid. 
737 Ibid. 
738 UNICEF, "Annual Report: Child Protection and Participation (2004-2009) " (Monrovia). 
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operating skills training ($32 or 4% of total).739 Although UNICEF did not pay the school or 
examination fees of the students, it is unclear what the per capita cost of the CEIP option was, but 
it is less than the skills training.740 It is safe to assume that the child reintegration process cost 
approximately $12 million (inclusive).741  
 
Successes  
That children were given the priority that they received in the Liberian reintegration 
process, like with DD, was a success in and of itself. The latest attempt of child 
reintegration was a huge improvement over previous attempt (i.e., 1997) in terms of the 
number of children it accessed, child retention and community participation. Through the 
UNICEF supported CEIP and vocational training approximately 9,200 former child 
soldiers were provided reintegration benefits, and through UNICEF’s community-based 
approach exponentially more children were impacted.742 The remaining caseload received 
their reintegration benefits through parallel projects implemented by child protection 
agencies.  
 
CEIP undoubtedly improved schools’ abilities to enrol, cope with and address some of the 
needs of child ex-combatants. UNICEF worked closely with the ministry of education to 
help support their ability to manage their schools, teacher training, and oversight 
mechanisms. By 2006, 4,295 child ex-combatants directly benefited from reintegration 
benefits as a result of free education and as a result of the reintegration programme all the 
students at over 582 participating schools benefited, with a total population of 85,867 
students.743 This community-based approach allowed non-combatants to directly benefit 
from the reintegration of former child soldiers.  
 
During the reintegration process UNICEF exhibited its ability to be flexible and adapt its 
policies to benefit as many children as possible. One clear example of this was its policy 
shift regarding supporting private schools with the CEIP. Initially, only public or state 
schools were supported. Given the reality that private schools were more efficient than 
public schools, support was extended to them provided they waived the school fees for 
                                                
739 UNICEF, "A Table Showing the Unit Cost of Training a Demobilised Child in Skills Training," 
(Monrovia: UNICEF). 
740 Interview 23. 
741 This is calculated by using the higher figure of the skills training for safe measures ($1,100), multiplied by 
the total number of children in the child reintegration process (10,963). 
742 Interviews 69 and 78. 
743 UNICEF, "Annual Report: Child Protection and Participation (2004-2009) ". 
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child ex-combatants.744 This improved the services delivered to ex-combatants and 
benefited participating private schools overall. Another example of UNICEF’s flexibility 
was to implement a key recommendation of their Market Survey – combining vocational 
training with an education component. This combination allowed ex-combatants to acquire 
skills while also benefiting from education initiatives. This was identified as an important 
lesson that should be implemented in future child reintegration programmes around the 
world.745 
 
To the benefit of many, UNICEF was able to complement their reintegration efforts with 
their other national programmes, including their reintegration programmes for other 
vulnerable children. Examples of this include UNICEF’s November 2003 launch of the 
Back-to-School campaign enabling more than 800,000 children to return to the 
classrooms.746 In addition to that, an Accelerated Learning Programme (ALP) was designed 
and implemented aimed at rebuilding and furnishing schools around the country. As part 
of this programme UNICEF’s education experts and donors worked with the ministry of 
education to develop a curriculum and trained teachers to deliver six years of primary 
education condensed in three years. The classes were delivered in the afternoon and 
evenings allowing older children and young adults to attend classes without clashing with 
either work, skills training or their family commitments.747 This programme was available to 
all children and adults, and gave the Liberian education system a real boost. Many of the 
child ex-combatants that opted for the vocational training accessed education through the 
ALP.  
 
Children that choose to pursue vocational training and apprenticeships learnt useful skills. 
Approximately 5,000 children benefited from the UNICEF supported projects. Most of 
the children passed their courses and after completion of their course received toolkits. 
That being said, in many ways this was a shallow success as the macro-economic situation 
in Liberia did not drastically improve enough to absorb these former child soldiers 
preventing them from finding gainful employment using their newly learnt skills.748 This 
will be discussed in greater detail in the next section. 
 
                                                
744 United Nations Development Programme, "Trust Fund Activity Report: Volume II ", section 4.11.3. 
745 International Labour Office and UNICEF. 
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The social component of the reintegration programme is arguably where the most success 
was achieved. Unlike the adult process, UNICEF paid particular attention to addressing the 
social reintegration and acceptance of former child soldiers back into their communities. 
This was done through their community-based approach to education as well as through 
direct interventions such as the establishment and support of CWCs and Children’s Clubs. 
Although the long-term sustainability of these institutions was questionable, by the end of 
2007, 217 of the 293 CWCs and 163 of the 228 Children’s Clubs created were still active.749 
A total of over 5,000 members of CWCs and Children’s Clubs received child protection, 
life skills, and conflict resolution training.750 It was estimated that 40,000 children benefited 
from these initiatives.751 However a key ingredient to the success of social rein was the 
resilience of former combatants and communities, as well as a common desire to move 
beyond the impact of the conflict. 
  
In the earlier stages of the reintegration process the behaviour of former child soldiers was 
disruptive. There was a period of readjustment where they resorted to violence, vulgarity 
and abuse to get what they wanted. Initially former child soldiers caused disruption in 
schools, in the skills training programme, in their families and communities. The training 
that teachers, communities and ex-combatants received was invaluable in addressing 
behavioural problems. With time, training and attention the behaviour of former child 
soldiers mellowed.752 They became more integrated into community activities, used 
violence less and befriended non-combatants. The combination of the training, time, 
involvement in school or vocational training and interacting with community members 
helped their overall social acceptance, their reintegration and behavioural changes.  
 
As noted earlier, family tracing and reunification was another extremely successful 
intervention that. Ninety-eight percent of the former child soldiers were reunited with their 
families and the other 2% were transferred internationally. Moreover follow up visits were 
an important element of monitoring their progress. UNICEF and child protection agencies 
conducted at least one follow up visit on the majority of the children. By the end of 2005 
7,344 children had received at least one follow up visit.753 This helped monitor and protect 
                                                
749 Interview 78.  
750 Interview 78. 
751 UNICEF, "Demobilisation and Reintegration Project Document." 
752 Interview 69. 
753 United Nations Development Programme, "Liberia Disarmament, Demobilisation, Reintegration and 
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against abuse, neglect and possible re-recruitment into fighting factions in neighbouring 
countries.  
 
Overall the community-based children’s approach to reintegration was successful in 
mitigating the perceived rewards given to the former child soldiers. The cash TSAs given to 
child ex-combatants left many non-combatants and people within communities with a 
sense of unfairness. This precedent raised the expectation of child ex-combatants and gave 
them the impression that they would receive cash subsistence allowances during the 
reintegration process, like their adult counterparts. When cash allowances did not 
materialise and their expectations were not met two things happened: sporadic riots broke 
out and some of the older children changed their preferences to go through the adult 
programme. Eventually UNICEF was able to effectively explain to former child soldiers 
that the reintegration benefits were never going to include cash allowances. It was 
explained that the participants of the vocational training programme would receive toolkits 
and where relevant or possible small start-up grants. And instead of targeting individual ex-
combatants, UNICEF’s approach was to target communities. This approach helped 
diminish the sense of entitlement and expectation that the child soldiers had about cash 
allowances. Although some children felt betrayed by this, the majority understood.754 
 
One of the goals of the child reintegration process was to address the causes of their 
recruitment into the fighting factions. As noted earlier there were a number of factors that 
either pushed or pulled them into the conflict. These factors included seeking revenge, 
poverty, security, as well as being in close proximity to conflict. The implementation of the 
CPA, including the DDR programme, and the presence of UNMIL peacekeepers were 
responsible for the absence of war, thus eliminating a major factor of the recruitment. The 
social reintegration component helped inform communities of the special needs and rights 
of children, partly aimed to prevent re-recruitment. There were reports in 2005 of children 
being recruited to fight in armed conflicts in neighbouring countries (mostly Cote d’Ivoire, 
but also in Guinea) UNICEF and UNMIL investigated these reports.755 Despite several 
people being arrested (and later released), concrete evidence of recruitment could not be 
proven. UNMIL estimated no more than fifty children were involved in re-recruitment.756  
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Shortcomings  
Despite the notable successes of the child reintegration programme, there were a series of 
shortcomings. Most of these shortcomings resembled challenges experienced during the 
DD processes. Some challenges were a direct result of the failings of the DD process or 
were victim of the situation in Liberia. Other challenges remained inherently beyond the 
scope of the reintegration process. Some of these failings were preventable others were 
not. Some of the failings negatively impacted the overall reintegration process others had 
less impact. Due to the similarities of the adult and child reintegration programmes many 
of the challenges affected in both programmes. 
 
Just like with the adult reintegration process, funding posed a problem at various stages. 
The child reintegration process was slightly more insulated than the adult process, because 
of UNICEF’s arrangements with bilateral donors, but the money that came from the 
UNDP Trust Fund was not as reliable as it should have been. This was partly due to the 
oversubscription of adult combatants in the DD processes, and as a result of the dented 
confidence of donors. Like the adult process, the delay disbursement of funds to the Trust 
Fund compounded the problem. A lot of time and energy was spent fundraising to close 
the funding shortfall when reintegration programmes should have already been in full 
swing. Fortunately these efforts were successful, but this delay did have a few knock-on 
effects. First, the programme approval process slowed down and programmes in the 
pipeline were temporarily put on hold. This had meant that children had to wait to receive 
their reintegration benefits. This had a greater impact on vocational training programmes 
than on the education option. Donors should have disbursed the money necessary for the 
child reintegration process before the programme commenced rather than have the money 
trickle in over time. There were no big surprises with the child reintegration programme. 
The number of child participants was less than the original estimates. The proposed 
reintegration options did not change; and their costs were similar to other comparable 
reintegration programmes.757 The funding shortfalls and delays were completely 
preventable. On 1 March 2006 the Japanese government provided UNICEF with $6.78 
million for child reintegration programmes.758 This donation made all the difference to the 
child reintegration process. 
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UNICEF was faced with having to work with and try to build the capacity of an extremely 
deficient school system that had been neglected for decades. As a result several problems 
arose with the education option. Like with the adult process, the administration 
arrangements with the schools were often cumbersome and took longer than anticipated. 
Although the ministry of education was supportive of CEIP, arrangements had to be made 
with participating schools on an individual basis. Each school needed to be explained the 
terms of the agreement, and specifically that they would only receive “in kind” support for 
the enrolled child ex-combatants and not payment. A serious challenge was the 
procurement and distribution of school supplies (the educational and recreational kits). The 
kits were often delivered well after they were promised. The late distribution of school kits 
negatively impacting the schools’ confidence in UNICEF keeping up its end of the 
agreement, but equally as important it prevented the schools from being properly supplied 
and from delivering their lessons although this lack of confidence was overcome. This was 
a logistical problem, which could and should have been prevented.  
 
The national election campaign, which started in earnest in 2005, disrupted the 2005-6 
academic year. Schools opened late as teachers temporarily left their posts in favour for 
election-related jobs. Although this was understandable given the gravity of the elections 
this delay nonetheless hindered the delivery of education and left the children idly waiting 
to resume their studies.  
 
Unlike the CEIP that was designed and implemented with a community-based approach, 
vocational training specifically targeted former child soldiers. There was a perception 
within some communities that former child soldiers were being rewarded with 
reintegration benefits despite UNICEF’s insistence that children not receive subsistence 
allowances. UNICEF attempted to mitigate these perceptions by allocating a percentage of 
the skills training places to “war-affected” children. These allocations were relatively small 
(in some cases 5-10%), which did little to prevent communities’ from feeling former child 
soldiers were being rewarded with skills training for having been associated to fighting 
factions. It is possible that regardless of efforts to try to mitigate these perceptions, 
communities would harbour such feelings because of the lack of socio-economic 
development throughout the country. This is but one of the many reasons why a national 
recovery and development strategy was so important. 
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As experienced in the DD processes of adults and children, the child vocational 
component was hindered by the limited training capacity in Liberia and dearth in qualified 
organisations capable of delivering vocational training. This problem was universal 
throughout Liberia. Understandably during reintegration the PAC attempted to scrutinise 
the capacity of the service provider before entering into contract with them. However this 
significantly slowed the process. Some of the child protection agencies involved in the 
child DD processes developed training programmes and were eventually contracted by 
UNICEF/UNDP to deliver training programmes to children. The apprenticeship 
programmes needed to be arranged on an individual basis, which also took more time than 
anticipated. Moreover, many reintegration programmes were concentrated in urban areas 
(mostly around Monrovia) despite former child soldiers returning to their communities 
around the country including in rural areas. The late establishment of NCDDRR Field 
Offices contributed to the unavailable rural reintegration programme and access to 
information about benefits. In many cases the high expectations of child ex-combatants 
was not initially fulfilled.  
 
The distribution of material benefits of the vocational training option, toolkits and start-up 
capital, was also plagued by delays. Many of the toolkits, which were promised to the 
trainees upon completion of the programmes, were distributed weeks and in some cases 
months after the children completed their courses. In addition to the delays, there were 
complaints from the recipients that the tools were of poor quality.759 Some child ex-
combatants sold their tools either because they were unable to get paid work or they simply 
needed the money.760 The delay in toolkits had a direct knock-on effect – a delay in the 
distribution of start-up capital. The view was that the trainees should not receive their start-
up capital until they received their tools.761 Coupled together, the delay in the delivery of 
the tools and start-up capital damaged UNICEF’s credibility in the eyes of some 
reintegration participants due to unfulfilled promises. Given that the vocational courses 
were between six and nine months, there was really no excuse for not delivering the 
trainees’ tools and start-up capital when they were promised.762 
 
The quality of both the education and the vocational training the children received were 
means for concern. Although UNICEF spent much effort on training teachers and 
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principals, the education system had suffered from decades of neglect. This is a problem 
that could not be addressed quickly. Unfortunately, however, participating in the UNICEF 
supported training was not a guarantee that students would receive a quality education. 
That being said, the education that former child soldiers received was the same education 
that was being delivered to all other Liberian children, so at a minimum they were on par 
with their peers. Regarding vocational training, the instruction provided by the child 
protection agencies and implementing partners varied in quality, with some projects being 
better than others. This was bound to be the case as there was no standard curriculum and 
it was known that the quality of the service providers varied. UNICEF and the former 
child soldiers had to make do with what was on hand. 
 
One of the main challenges of the economic component of the child reintegration process 
was the slow pace of the economic recovery in Liberia. It was debatable whether sending 
children to school or providing them with skills training was in fact improving their 
employability in an economy that could not absorb them and where few jobs were 
available. This was a structural problem of which remained beyond the scope of the 
reintegration programme. The ultimate goal of reintegration was to provide ex-combatants 
with the opportunity to learn skills to help them achieve economic self-sufficiency. 
However in most cases, regardless of the training or schooling received, economic self-
sufficiency was near impossible given the reality of 80% unemployment.763 Moreover, the 
situation was particularly bleak for former child soldiers who had to compete with adults 
receiving similar training. The reintegration information campaigns gave a glimpse of hope 
and led the ex-combatants to develop high expectations that unfortunately could not be 
realised given the dire state of the economy. They were being trained for jobs that simply 
did not exist. Although the UNICEF/ILO Market Survey addressed the high likelihood of 
this happening, both in terms of the bleak economic prospects and high expectations of 
ex-combatants, there was little that could be done about this in the short-term.  
 
Despite its acclaimed success, the social reintegration component also had a few 
shortcomings. Although it was well documented that there was rampant alcohol and drug 
use during intense periods of fighting, including by children, neither the demobilisation nor 
reintegration processes offered alcohol or drug treatment or counselling.764 This was a large 
oversight. Liberia and the main stakeholders were very lucky that after the war alcohol and 
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drug use seemed to subside, whether due to reduction in supply or a reduction in economic 
means to support such habits. They were also lucky social reintegration did not seem to be 
hindered by disruptive behaviour as a result of addition.765 This oversight should not have 
happened, and substance abuse programmes should be designed in any future reintegration 
programmes where valid reports, documentation or indications of alcohol and drug abuse 
are present. 
 
The extraordinary resilience of both ex-combatants and their communities is undeniable. 
In Liberia there was a strong common desire to ‘put the war behind and move on.’766 This 
was achieved as a result of the overall resilience of communities rather than through 
concerted reconciliation efforts. Unlike in Sierra Leone where organised cleansing rituals 
for ex-combatants were held upon their return to their communities, in Liberia such 
ceremonies with ex-combatants were not common. Although child protection agencies 
assisted with the return of child ex-combatants, which consisted of speaking with village 
elders, community and family members to ensure that the children would in fact be 
welcomed back, formal rituals did not happen on a large scale. In some cases ex-
combatants were presented to the elders and had to ask for forgiveness.767 But again, this 
was not the norm in most communities. One reason for this may have been the inflated 
number of ex-combatants and a diffusion of guilt of ex-combatants as a result.768 Civilians 
claiming DDR benefits or “fake” ex-combatants would not ask for forgiveness for actions 
they themselves were victims of.769 It may also show the fragility of social structures, where 
elders could not get the ex-combatants to ask for forgiveness.770 Although the CPA called 
for a mechanism to address national reconciliation, the establishment of the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission was very slow (it was launched on 22 June 2006) and its remit 
(covering all crimes committed dating back to 1979) was too broad to be particularly useful 
in assisting communities come to terms with injustices in the short-term.771 The Trust and 
Reconciliation Commission published its final report in December 2009, five years after 
the ex-combatants returned back to their communities.772 
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In sum, overall the child reintegration achieved most of its objectives set out by the 
Strategic Framework. Unlike the adult programme, the social reintegration of children 
received significant attention, which was a priority of UNICEF. When possible, a 
community-based approach to reintegration was taken, rather than just targeting individual 
ex-child soldiers. Due to structural challenges, the economic component of the child 
reintegration programme was less successful. Although children received education and 
skills training their prospects of finding gainful employment were slim due to the decrepit 
state of the Liberian economy. Although the reintegration programme had formidable 
challenges, the likelihood of the return to armed conflict was slim. This is in part due to the 
DDR programme, however the presence of UNMIL peacekeepers played a large role in 
preventing the resurgence of conflict.  
 
Conclusion 
The reintegration process was the third and final stage of the DDR programme. The 
reintegration process formally began in October 2004 and was officially closed in July 2009 
by President Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf.773 Over 90,000 former ex-combatants received 
reintegration benefits.774 The adult DD processes had significant knock-on effects to the 
child reintegration process, primarily as a result of the large number of participants and 
specifically in terms of funding and extending the duration of the programme. Although 
the adult and child reintegration programmes were distinct in design and approach, their 
logic and components were very similar. Moreover, because of the different benefits, many 
older children opted to participate in the adult programmes. This is one of the reasons why 
this thesis focuses on both the adult and child reintegration programmes. The reintegration 
options consisted of formal education, vocational or skills training, agricultural assistance 
and public works. Although both the adult and child programmes were meant to have 
social reintegration components, this was not prioritised in the adult process. Adults and 
communities were for the most part left to their own device regarding social reintegration. 
Similarly the adult rehabilitation component was never made operational and existed only 
in name.775 The reintegration programmes (adult and child) were equally challenged by 
Liberia’s multitude of deficits – weak governance structures, decrepit infrastructure and 
social services, limited training capacity and its crippled economy.  
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During the reintegration process Liberia underwent a transformative process. In January 
2006 the NTGL’s tenure ended and as a result of multi-party elections inaugurated Ellen 
Johnson-Sirleaf as Africa’s first female president. She inherited a fragile state, one with very 
weak institutions, huge international debts, and an economy in shambles. The economy 
was incapable of creating necessary jobs or absorbing newly trained ex-combatants or 
returning IDPs. Although security was a major concern, it was UNMIL’s responsibility. 
Prior to the election, DDR was a priority of the NTGL, UNMIL and the country’s main 
stakeholders. The election process shifted focus away from the DDR process despite the 
fact that many of the ex-combatants had not yet received their reintegration benefits or had 
not yet completed the reintegration programmes they were enrolled in. Although President 
Johnson-Sirleaf vowed reintegration to be a top priority, there were many other competing 
issues. 
Ex-combatants that opted for the formal education option received three years of free 
education. In addition to free tuition and examination fees being covered, adults were 
provided with a $30 per month subsistence allowance the first year and a $15 per month 
allowance for eight months during their second academic year. The child formal education 
option (CEIP) took a community-based approach. The children received free primary 
education and were fed a meal everyday while at school. They however did not receive a 
subsistence allowance. Instead schools received educational and recreational supplies in 
addition to teachers receiving training benefited the entire school and their communities.  
 
The vocational training option consisted of the ex-combatants learning a trade during a six 
to nine month course. The skills training were complemented with basic literacy, numeracy 
and business development lessons. Adults received a $30 per month subsistence allowance 
for the duration of the course. Like the education option, instead of receiving an allowance 
children received a toolkit and start-up capital upon completion of their course.  
 
In spite of the agriculture sector’s potential to absorb ex-combatants in addition to 
potentially having a large impact on the national recovery, agricultural assistance was not a 
very popular option amongst the ex-combatants. Ex-combatants that opted for this option 
were taught basic agricultural skills; supplied with tools, agricultural inputs (seeds, fertiliser 
and pesticides) and where possible were given a plot of land to till. Unfortunately few 
agriculture projects were made available to children.  
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Despite the great expense the impact of the economic reintegration programmes was 
ambiguous. Although the ex-combatants learned new skills and/or received education 
many were unable to find employment. Despite their training, the economy was unable to 
absorb them. They were trained for jobs that simply did not exist, and most remained 
unemployed.776  
 
A major shortcoming of the adult programme was the lack of prioritisation of social 
reintegration and rehabilitation. Although adults received psychosocial counselling, conflict 
resolution and peacebuilding education during their five-day stay demobilisation camps, 
when they returned to their communities their social reintegration was not supported. In 
terms of adult social reintegration, communities received very little assistance from UNDP 
or the NCDDRR. In contrast, the reintegration of former child soldiers was a priority of 
UNICEF and was handled more efficiently and effectively through a network of child 
protection mechanisms, children’s clubs and youth clubs that were established. Returning 
ex-combatants were generally well received by their communities, despite their involvement 
in the fighting factions. The neglected adult approach and the concerted social 
reintegration efforts on behalf of children showed the resilience of individual ex-
combatants overcome the stigma associated to being labelled an ex-combatant and the vast 
majority of the Liberian population for accepting ex-combatants back into their 
communities. 
 
Another significant shortcoming of the reintegration programmes (both adults and 
children) was a lack of definition of reintegration. Reintegration was never defined, nor was 
it articulated what would qualify as a success. The Strategic Framework addressed the 
broad objectives and activities needed to accomplish reintegration, but neglected to provide 
benchmarks or indicators of success.  
 
This dramatic omission allowed different stakeholders to use subjective assessments in 
determining whether the DDR programme was a success. For example, UNMIL took an 
output rather than impact approach.777 According to their official line, the DDR 
programme was successful because 103,000 ex-combatants were disarmed and demobilised 
                                                
776 UNICEF, "UNICEF Support to Reintegration of Children Associated with Fighting Forces in Liberia: 
Summary Coverage," (Monrovia: UNICEF). 
777 Interview 82. 
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with the majority having received reintegration benefits.778 UNDP on the other hand took a 
different approach. It saw the inflated number of participants as flawed and questioned the 
credibility of the entire programme. In addition UNDP assessed the quality of the 
reintegration programmes and despite being ultimately responsible for the reintegration 
programme claimed that the reintegration met its objectives ‘on a very minimum level.’779 
UNICEF declared the child reintegration a success, they claimed that not only did the 
demobilised children receive reintegration services, but also the communities benefitted 
from the reintegration programme through training, supplies, and enhanced child 
protection capacities.780 They particularly noted the achievements of the social reintegration 
component as successful. Although the economic component did not necessarily improve 
the economic self-sufficiency of children, UNICEF concerned it a modest success.781 All 
points of view are valid, but this highlights the different priorities as well as lack of a 
common understanding of what qualifies as a successful reintegration programme. 
 
In comparison with the adult process, the child reintegration programme was better 
planned and provided the beneficiaries greater continuity between demobilisation and 
reintegration. Many of the child protection agencies that were active during the DD phases 
remained active throughout the reintegration phase at a local level. The child protection 
agencies were provided training to communities and teachers in addition to monitoring the 
activities and protection of not only former child soldiers, but of all children.  
 
Although both the child and adult reintegration programmes achieved most of their 
modest objectives outlined in the Strategic Framework it may be too early to tell if the child 
or adult reintegration programmes were successful in the long-term. What is clear is that 
for the moment that armed conflict has not returned to Liberia. Although it is impossible 
to determine the exact extent that the reintegration programme contributed to 
peacebuilding, it seemed to have contributed modestly. As part of the DDR programme 
ex-combatants were placated by reintegration benefits, even if they did not result in 
employment. Although the reintegration programme’s economic impact on the ex-
combatants may be negligible, to not have done anything at all and to not have provided 
them with assistance certainly would have disrupted the delicate and fragile peace. 
                                                
778 Interview 90. 
779 United Nations Development Programme, "Liberia Disarmament, Demobilisation, Reintegration and 
Rehabilitation Programme Trust Fund Activity Report: Volume III ", 10. 
780 Interviews 28, 69 and UNICEF, "Press Release: Reintegrating Children Associated with Fighting Forces in 
Liberia A "Success"," (Monrovia: 26 August 2004).  
781 Interview 69 and 78. 
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Reintegration was part of a combination of factors that contributed to the consolidation of 
security.  
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In this thesis an important question was asked: is child disarmament, demobilisation and 
reintegration central to post-conflict peacebuilding? This thesis concludes that a 
comprehensive and dedicated child specific DDR programme, which addresses the needs 
of child soldiers, is vital for the achievement of peacebuilding objectives and is central to 
the consolidation of a peace and security. This conclusion resulted from the analysis of the 
three distinct but interrelated phases of the DDR process, through the prism of the 
Liberian civil war and the UN and donors’ peacebuilding interventions that begin in 2003.  
 
The choice of the Liberian child DDR exercise was motivated by not only the significance 
of the involvement of children throughout the war, but also an interest in preventing, or at 
a minimum learning, from the previous mistakes in an attempt to strengthen the response 
to similar future peacebuilding interventions. Liberia’s latest attempt at DDR has proven a 
valuable source of learning for the UN, donors and World Bank, policymakers, DDR 
experts, civil society and academics.  
 
Main Lessons 
The main lessons of the Liberian child DDR programme fall into five categories: 1) 
planning and implementation; 2) funding and costs; 3) impact; 4) differences between the 
adult and child DDR; and 5) linkages between adult and child DDR processes.  
 
Planning and Implementation 
In Liberia, there was a constant struggle to bridge the gap between the DDR ‘plan’ and the 
programme’s implementation. Throughout the programme many constraints and pressures 
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complicated the implementation of both the adult and child DDR programmes. Among 
the several lessons the Liberian example yielded, it showed that simply having a plan is no 
guarantee for success. Noting the complexity of post-conflict environments and the 
various competing priorities, nor can guidelines entirely address all aspects of the 
implementation of DDR programming. There is an urgent need for contingency planning. 
Throughout the process, strong and decisive leadership that understands the principles and 
application of child protection and its implications to security and peacebuilding more 
generally were crucial in the implementation of the peacebuilding strategy.  
 
The general vision and strategy for the child DDR process was articulated and outlined in 
the Strategic Framework, and expanded upon by UNICEF. Because of their expertise and 
experience with child protection, UNICEF was mandated and made responsible for the 
development and implementation of the child DDR process. They advised policymakers 
on child protection concerns, enhanced child protection mechanisms (including by 
providing training) and participated in the project selection and technical coordination 
committees. It was encouraging that UNICEF had an input regarding technical decisions 
relating to the implementation of the DDR programme (both adult and child), however 
from the NCDDRR, the body empowered to make the policy decisions, was a serious 
omission with far reaching consequences. The most significant of which, was the decision 
to give children cash transitional subsistence allowances for participating in the DDR 
programme. Child protection agencies, such as Save the Children, Oxfam and International 
Rescue Committee, claimed that such cash transfers contributed to children’s insecurity 
overall while also setting a dangerous precedent for future child DDR programmes.  
 
Important policy and operational decisions were made in Liberia with a systematic lack of 
understanding of child protection concerns and principles. This lack of understanding was 
pervasive among UNMIL officials (including MILOBs), Liberian senior decision-makers, 
and a significant portion of Liberia’s civil society. Although UNMIL had allocated and 
budgeted for a Child Protection Advisor meant to advise senior management on relevant 
issues and concerns, the position remained vacant for almost two years until February 
2005, well after the DD phases concluded. This meant that UNMIL lacked the internal 
expertise and guidance to advocate for child protection. Senior UNMIL management were 
neither knowledgeable about nor sympathetic to issues relating to child soldiers or child 
protection and in many ways saw the DDR process as a short-term weapons collection 
exercise. Few understood the principles of child protection, how to address the special 
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needs of child soldiers, or more practically how to the implement some of the child DDR 
guidelines articulated in the Strategic Framework. This unfortunate mixture of ignorance 
and apathy resulted in few of MILOBs fully understanding their responsibility to screen 
children or properly implement the DDR’s entry criteria. This lack of understanding posed 
a serious obstacle for children’s inclusion into the programme throughout the duration of 
the disarmament phase. Although UNICEF and child protection agencies offered child 
protection training in the MILOBs, delays to the disarmament process and out-of-sync 
rotational schedules resulted in high turnover during the disarmament and demobilisation 
phases. This meant that scarce resources had to be re-deployed constantly to train new 
arrivals and this often took time to organise. Liberian decision-makers, many who were 
combatants themselves, paid lip-service to child protection concerns, and in the end based 
their decisions on what benefited their interests rather than what was in the best interest of 
the children. Although, ultimately, there was an increased understanding of child 
protection, the tendency to base decisions on political imperatives was always a recurrent 
threat. 
 
The child DDR experience in Liberia has illustrated that there are several things that would 
help contribute to the success of any DDR programme. The timing and the sequence of 
events are key elements that need careful consideration when planning for DDR. In 
addition to formulating a Strategic Framework, combatants and communities need to be 
made aware of the DDR programme. Practical issues such as timeframe, site locations and 
the benefits given to combatants (including the differences to the adult programme) must 
be made clear; an effective and sufficiently large peacekeeping presence is needed on the 
ground to effectively enforce and maintain a certain amount of security; the cantonment 
sites need to be accessible, ready and properly supplied; those responsible for 
implementing the disarmament and demobilisation processes need to understand how to 
fulfill their responsibilities, including as they relate to children. Moreover, upon 
commencement of disarmament, the demobilisation and reintegration processes must be 
planned for and ready for implementation.  
 
In December 2003, at the initial start of the DDR programme, besides the formulation of 
the Strategic Framework, not many preparations or arrangements were in place. The DDR 
operational plan was flimsy and not fully developed; the cantonment sites were not ready; 
peacekeeping troop deployment was inadequate (deployment was less than half of its 
mandated level). Lastly, the combatants were not properly informed about the DDR 
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process or the benefits they would receive. All of this was known to UNMIL senior 
management and was well documented prior to the commencement. Many of these issues 
were addressed and things ran smoother once the DDR programme re-started in April 
2004. 
 
The near tripling of DDR participants was not only a problem of planning, but also a 
failure of implementing the plan. Despite the warring factions being required to submit a 
comprehensive list of their eligible troops, these lists never materialised. Surprisingly the 
factions were not compelled to produce such lists prior to the start of the DDR 
programme, or after the programme was suspended in December, or even later once it was 
clear the estimates were woefully wrong. Without this crucial information, including 
accurate number of combatants and their locations, it was near impossible to effectively 
plan the DDR programme. 
  
Another major contributing factor to the skyrocketing number of participants was the 
easily manipulated entry criteria. Men had to surrender either a weapon, be part of a group 
submission of a heavy weapon, or surrender 150 rounds of ammunition. This threshold, in 
the absence of confirmed lists, created an open market for weapons and ammunition for 
gaining entry into the programme. Moreover, the MILOBs responsible for screening did 
not adequately test the combatants’ knowledge of weaponry or fighting, a process that 
would have helped prevent civilians attempting to enter the programme. The entry 
criterion for women and children was different from that of men. Women and children did 
not have to surrender a weapon. In theory, they simply needed to be associated to a 
fighting faction and turn up for disarmament. In addition, the definition of a child soldier 
was based on the Cape Town Principles and many of the military observers simply did not 
understand or agree with that definition. In an attempt to implement a comprehensive 
DDR programme, Liberia’s entry criteria favoured the inclusion of women and children 
rather than excluding them based on their ability to surrender weapons. In a misguided 
attempt to apportion blame, the entry criterion of women and child was cited as a main 
contributing factor for the high number of combatants. Although the participation of 
women in the DDR programme was certainly severely underestimated it was not the only 
factor contributing to the large number of participants. It was originally estimated that only 
1,000 women would participate in DDR programme.782 The final total number of women 
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participants was 22,456.783 Moreover, a total of 11,282 children participated in the DDR 
programme, which was only approximately forty percent higher than the original estimate 
of 8,000.784 The total number of child combatants was still below the estimated of children 
of 15,000 – 21,000 children thought to have been recruited and associated with the fighting 
factions.785 Therefore, the forty percent oversubscription of children did not significantly 
contribute to the tripling of combatants in the DDR programme. Although many more 
women came forward and participated in the DDR programme, men represented the 
largest group in the DDR programme, accounting for 67% of the total participants.786 
 
The disarmament and demobilisation processes were delinked in terms of ownership, 
planning, funding, time, sequencing and implementation from the reintegration process. 
UNMIL was responsible for the DD phases, and UNDP was responsible for the adult 
reintegration phase, which consisted of either formal education or vocational training 
programmes. Despite the reintegration process formally starting in June 2004, for the 
majority of the ex-combatants there was a big lapse before they received their reintegration 
benefits. In fact, by June 2007 81,000787 ex-combatants had received their reintegration 
assistance, well short of the total 101,874 eligible ex-combatants.788 The residual or final 
caseload of ex-combatants did not receive their reintegration benefits until the final phase 
started in January 2008, four years after they were demobilised.789 The environment in 
which DDR was being implemented was challenging and the programme suffered from of 
a combination of bad planning, limited capacity, over-stretched human and financial 
resources, but mostly a lack of leadership. The leadership simply failed to bring all these 
elements together in a coordinated way: UNMIL saw the overall DDR process as a 
weapons collection exercise, while UNDP was more concerned with the medium to long-
term goals of the reintegration process but failed to make the necessary arrangements to 
absorb the demobilised ex-combatants into programmes in a timely fashion. 
Understandably, there were many pressures including achieving quick results regarding 
peacebuilding initiatives immediately following the peace agreement. However, these 
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pressures, including the difficult and politically charged post-conflict environment, should 
not have precluded UNMIL and UNDP from devising a coherent plan to expeditiously 
address the programme objectives as well as the needs of the ex-combatants and their 
communities.  
 
Regarding child demobilisation and reintegration, UNICEF did a much better job of 
coordinating, ensuring a greater level of coherence and consistency between the 
demobilisation and reintegration processes, as well as in trying to standardise their 
reintegration programmes. The fact that they oversaw both demobilisation and 
reintegration helped these efforts. That being said, due to the cumbersome and time-
consuming process of registering schools into the formal education programme and 
finding suitable service providers to teach skills training, although less prolonged than the 
adult process, there were significant delays before children could access their reintegration 
benefits. UNICEF’s main concerns during the DDR programme were that the children 
receive the attention they deserved, and that once the child ex-combatants were resettled, 
their communities were supported to receive them and protect the former child soldiers 
from being re-recruited. Through their persistent advocacy and effective implementation of 
the child DDR process, UNICEF and the child protection agencies managed to address 
children’s needs as part of the international peacebuilding intervention, at the local, 
national and international level.  
 
Liberia’s DDR plan as outlined in the Strategic Framework at prima facie looked good. Its 
mandate and objectives were clear, to rid Liberia of weapons and turn combatants into 
productive citizens and by doing so contributing to the consolidation of peace. The 
ownership issues and procedures were simply outlined. But in reality, its implementation 
was not quite as simple as outlined. For instance, even though the NCDDRR was meant to 
substantively contribute to national ownership of the DDR programme, the reality was that 
its capacity was always extremely limited and its leadership highly politicised and not 
necessarily acting in the best interest of children. Until 2006, when the NCDDRR was 
restructured under President Sirleaf Johnson’s administration, the NCDDRR added little 
substantive value. The former commanders pulled strings and made policy decisions that 
served their purposes. Moreover, during the transition period it served both the NTGL and 
UNMIL for the NCDDR to be weak and malleable so they could dictate policy direction. 
The Strategic Framework was a good starting point, which was its purpose. The problem, 
however, was that it was never further expanded upon and a robust monitoring framework 
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was never implemented, no clear benchmarks were set, and data did not drive the process 
as it should or could have. This ambiguity allowed for subjectivity regarding the 
accomplishment of the programme’s objectives and its successes, beyond the number of 
combatants reached.  
 
Funding and Costs 
The DDR programme was supported through several funding streams. The peace 
agreement explicitly called on the financial support of the UN, IFIs and donors to finance 
the entire process. UNMIL was responsible for funding the disarmament phase through its 
operational budget. The demobilisation and reintegration phases were to be funded either 
through a multilateral DDR Trust Fund managed by UNDP or through parallel 
programmes funded by bilateral donors. The main funders of the Trust Fund were the 
European Community, the United Kingdom, Denmark, Sweden, United States of America, 
Norway, Switzerland, Ireland and Iceland.790 The original estimate for the cost of the 
programme was $50 million in addition to UNMIL’s portion of $20 million for the 
military-related activities of DD.791 The Trust Fund estimate was revised to $71.3 million to 
cover more than the increased number of participants (excluding UNMIL’s 
contribution).792 The DDR budget was constantly strained as a result of the 
oversubscription of the DDR programme and delays in the disbursement of funds. Costs 
saving measures to reduce the per capita expenditure were taken in all the disarmament, 
demobilisation and reintegration phases of the adult process. Although the DDR 
programme was fully funded in the end, during the process the donors were slow to 
disburse committed funds therefore contributing to the programme’s many challenges. The 
funds in the Trust Fund were not earmarked for the different implementation phases, 
which meant that the available resources were used when they were needed, exhausting (or 
at a minimum severely depleting) the funds before the reintegration phase. This happened, 
for example, with UNMIL borrowing $12 million from the Trust Fund to run 
demobilisation activities depleting funding for reintegration programme. In response to the 
high number of participants and the many challenges that arose, many donors and critics 
questioned the success, credibility and impact of Liberia’s DDR programme. The persistent 
funding shortages contributed to the inability to deliver reintegration programmes in a 
timely fashion and resulted in the unfulfilled expectations of the ex-combatants. There was 
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always the fear that unfulfilled expectation would lead to insecurity. Operationally, many of 
these challenges were preventable had the necessary information such as accurate 
combatant numbers and locations been ascertained, allowing for proper planning. That 
being said, it is not clear that UNMIL would have effectively used this information in the 
planning process or that it would have improved the planning or execution of the 
programme.  
  
The child DDR process was supported through multilateral and bilateral funding 
channeled through both UNICEF directly and the UNDP DDR Trust Fund. Experience 
taught UNICEF to secure its funding directly rather than to rely upon cumbersome 
multilateral support through the UNDP Trust Fund, although the multilateral funding was 
a good fallback option. The main funders of the child DDR process were the governments 
of the United States, Japan, the United Kingdom and the European Commission. The child 
DDR process also suffered from slow disbursement of funding, although not to the same 
degree as the adult process. Strained budgets slowed down the formalization of 
administrative contracts with reintegration service providers and schools. Although this 
was overcome in the end, it was an avoidable challenge.  
 
Despite the unexpectedly large number of adult participants and the programme’s soaring 
budget, in comparison to UNMIL’s overall budget, the cost of the DDR programme was 
negligible. Between 1 July 2003 and 30 June 2008 UNMIL’s budget was $3.322 billion (see 
chart).793 The cost of the DDR programme was $150 million.794 Of that $150 million, the 
child DDR process cost was approximately $12.4 million (based on the $1,100 cost per 
child).795 Therefore the child DDR costs amounted to 8.5% of the total DDR expenditure, 
again, not a significant amount to enable the peacebuilding process to progress.  
 
The Cost of UNMIL (2003 – 2008) 
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Year (30 June to 1 July) Budget Expenditure 
2003 - 2004 $ 548,278,700 
2004 - 2005 $ 741,084,000 
2005 - 2006 $ 707,368,900 
2006 -2007 $ 676,254,800 
2007 – 2008  $ 649,469,100 
Total $ 3,322,508,300 
Source: A compilation of UN official documents 
 
With the benefit of hindsight, given DDR’s central role in contributing to the consolidation 
of peace and security and the peacebuilding efforts, the total cost of the DDR programme 
can and should be seen as a bargain. Moreover, DDR should be seen as a necessary 
expenditure and investment. However, when DDR was being implemented (between 2003 
and 2008), as the budget was ballooning with the increased number of combatants it was 
not seen as a bargain. At the time, UNMIL’s annual budget (of approximately $548 million 
in 2003796 and $741 million in 2004797) was more than the national GDP of Liberia (which 
was$410 million in 2003 and $459 million in 2004).798 The GDP per capita was $130 and 
the cost of DDR was $1,550 per adult combatant and $1,100 per child.799 A per capita 
DDR expenditure that was more than ten-times the GDP per capita (which was $131 in 
2003) was seen as exorbitant.800 When looking at the big picture, the DDR programme can 
be seen as buying time for peace and security to be consolidated to allow the transitional 
government and UNMIL the time to extend their authority and make progress towards 
other peacebuilding initiatives.  
 
Achievement of Objectives and Impact 
There is a persistent and inherent tension between what is required to set a post-conflict 
country back onto a sustainable path of development, economic growth and good 
governance and what can feasibly be delivered through a DDR programme. A DDR 
programme is not, nor can it be, a job creation programme. Reintegration can provide ex-
combatants with skills, not jobs. A DDR programme cannot change the macro-economic 
situation. Although it can contribute, it cannot on its own alter or improve the structural or 
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governance arrangements in a country. That is well beyond its reach and intention. Those 
are the objectives of other peacebuilding initiatives meant to support and complement 
DDR. In a bid to preventing resurgence in armed conflict DDR is meant to contribute to 
removal of weapons in society, help break down command structures and provide ex-
combatants with educational and skills training opportunities as well as to assist their return 
into their communities. There is a need for the DDR programme to have ambitious but 
achievable objectives.  
 
For many of the ex-combatants DDR was seen as a social protection mechanism. Many 
saw DDR as a good opportunity and in most cases the only way to gain free access to skills 
training, education, cash assistance and the other benefits that were on offer (such as 
counseling or life skills). This is reflected in the inflated number of participants, many of 
who were allegedly not combatants. This was noted in both official documents and 
interviews with respondents.801 Irrespective of whether the cash allowance that the ex-
combatants received was used as it was intended, the cash allowance directly injected $30 
million into local economies. DDR can assist in providing ex-combatants with viable 
options and an alternative to what they could commandeer through the barrel of a gun, But 
these efforts must be complemented by improvements in the socio-economic situation 
throughout the country. The goals of the child DDR programme were to remove them 
from the fighting factions, to reunify them with their families, to break the command 
structure and the influence their commanders have on them, to provide them with access 
to health, basic education and/or skills training, to support their return to as well as 
acceptance of their communities and to improve child protection mechanisms throughout 
the country.802 The best-case scenario is that DDR will create a window of opportunity for 
peace consolidation and complementary peacebuilding initiatives to coalesce. It is this 
enabling effect that DDR programmes should be judged on vis-à-vis peacebuilding.  
 
Liberia’s DDR programme did contribute to the consolidation of peace and security of the 
nation. Exactly how much is impossible to measure as the consolidation of peace resulted 
from a combination of multiple factors and efforts. The DDR programme was only one, 
albeit a notable and integral component of the peacebuilding intervention. The success of 
the DDR programme, and its enabling effect, was in part due to UNMIL’s robust 
peacekeeping presence, its civilian work aimed at addressing security and governance 
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deficits including rule of law, security, state authority, economic growth and recovery, the 
organisation of multiparty elections, humanitarian assistance and the resettlement of 
displaced people.  
 
Differences between Child and Adult DDR 
By the conclusion of the DDR programme both the adult and child DDR processes had 
accomplished most of the objectives articulated in the Strategic Framework. This was not 
because the DDR programmes were flawlessly implemented, but because the objectives 
were not too ambitious. Moreover, the success of the process hinged more on delivering 
services to all of the combatants, rather than the quality of those services or whether they 
resulted in improving the plight of the combatants and their communities. The objectives 
were also remarkably vague and included things such as raising the awareness about the 
DDR processes, ex-combatant using their ID cards to access reintegration services and ex-
combatants being aware of their health profiles.803 UNMIL and the NCDDRR were 
satisfied as long as the combatants received their services, irrespective of the quality of 
services or their impact.  
 
The adult and child DDR processes took slightly different approaches to demobilisation 
and reintegration programming. Adults stayed at the demobilisation sites for a maximum of 
five days, and went through very condensed programming. During reintegration they were 
targeted as the sole beneficiaries and received subsistence allowances while enrolled in 
either formal education or skills training enabling them to support themselves. There was 
an over-reliance on the economic reintegration component at the expense of the social 
reintegration, which received scant attention and little support. Children, on the other 
hand, spent up to twelve weeks in interim care centres where their demobilisation took 
place and their reintegration process began. They received counselling as well as time and 
space to be children again, to learn and play while transitioning back into their 
communities as civilians. Although former child soldiers benefited directly from the 
reintegration programming, UNICEF and the child protection agencies, took a broader 
community-based approach in the delivery of the reintegration benefits. To mitigate the 
perception of rewarding the former child soldiers, they were not given subsistence 
allowance, but instead, their benefits were delivered through in-kind support benefiting the 
wider community. Unlike the adult process, the child process placed a great deal of 
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emphasis on the social reintegration component, training communities in child protection 
and supporting social reintegration. Every former child soldiers that participated in the 
DDR programme, ninety-eight percent in Liberia and two percent internationally, were 
reunited with their families contributing to the success of the social reintegration 
programme. These distinctions between the adult and child processes showed a concerted 
effort on behalf of the UN to respond to the reality of children’s engagement in armed 
conflict and the need to address their special needs as well as their vulnerabilities.  
 
When analysing the impact of child and adult DDR programming on Liberia’s 
peacebuilding efforts, it is important to consider not just the programme’s contribution to 
peacebuilding, but also the impact upon the ex-combatants’ lives both socially and 
economically. Socially, the child reintegration process was supported by a series of 
coordinated activities of child protection agencies throughout the country, although exactly 
how this process contributed to their acceptance by their communities is hard to define. In 
contrast, the adult social reintegration component was neglected. The reasons why the 
former combatants were accepted back into their communities with limited protest or 
problems had little to do with the reintegration process. The macro-economic situation in 
Liberia following the war was dire. Eighty percent of the population was unemployed in 
the years that followed the 2003 peace agreement.804 Economic demand was insufficient to 
fuel economic growth at the level necessary to provide large-scale employment or 
significantly contribute to poverty alleviation. Although adult and child reintegration 
programmes attempted to address economic reintegration through formal education and 
skills training aimed at improving the chances of the ex-combatants’ employability, neither 
achieved this objective en masse. The reason for this failure was structural and simple: jobs 
and demand did not exist, regardless of the skill sets available. The hope was that once the 
economy improved, the newly leant skills would be in demand and jobs would be 
forthcoming but there was no immediate plan to improve job creation.  
 
Although the severity of the economic situation was known prior to the reintegration 
programme, there was need to balance various competing concerns. On the one hand 
through their reintegration programmes the UN and donors needed to provide goods and 
services to the ex-combatants that were not only promised but also demanded. On the 
other hand, there was a need to deliver effective programmes with the hope that they 
                                                
804 International Labour Office and UNICEF, 14. 
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would be economically useful. This inherent tension illustrates the importance of the DDR 
programme not only being in sync with but also their need to be supported by national 
reconstruction efforts and recovery strategies. The individual impact of the social and 
economic reintegration programmes on both adults and children are more ambiguous than 
the DDR programmes’ impact on peacebuilding. 
 
Linkages between Child and Adult DDR 
Despite the adult and child DDR effectively being separate processes, the adult DDR 
process had a significant impact on the child process. This impact was unavoidable and the 
linkages between the adult and child DDR process occurred on multiple levels. Although 
UNICEF had much leeway regarding operational and implementation arrangements, the 
child process had to work within the limitations of the adult process. The NCDDRR had a 
strong say in deciding policy issues. The lack of accurate information regarding combatants 
also affected the child process. As they ran concurrently, extending the duration of the 
adult DDR process had a knock-on effect on the child process. Although it was UNMIL’s 
responsibility to resolve any operational challenges that arose during the disarmament 
process, such as the difficulties with children being screened for entrance into the 
programme, it was an on-going battle for child protection agencies to ensure the Cape 
Town Principles were adhered to. There were constant complaints from the child 
protection agencies that despite being outlined in the Strategic Framework and being 
mandated by UNMIL as a top priority, children were sidelined and marginalised during the 
disarmament process.  
 
Another significant linkage between the adult and child DDR processes was that as a direct 
result of the DDR, children were released from the fighting factions and were given an 
opportunity to return to their families to try and have a life beyond armed conflict. The 
ceasefire and the DDR process allowed many of the children caught up in the armed 
factions an opportunity to benefit from the demobilisation and reintegration processes. If 
the complementary peacebuilding activities and the DDR programme had not managed to 
persuade the combatants to lay down their weapons, the factions would not have been 
disbanded, nor would the recruitment of children been able to be addressed. This process 
started with the peace agreement, had it not explicitly highlighted the special needs of 
children, they may well have been ignored.  
This thesis comes to two main conclusions with regard to the centrality of child DDR to 
peacebuilding. First, Liberia’s adult DDR programme achieved most of its objectives 
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despite significant design flaws and implementation gaps; DDR was a critical contribution 
to peacebuilding and the consolidation of peace and security. It was clear that without a 
DDR programme, even a flawed one, the political situation would not have been enabled 
to improve. After a turbulent start to the process in December 2003, which saw rioting, 
looting and a deterioration of an already fragile state of security, the DDR programme was 
suspended until April 2004 to allow for further planning and necessary preparations. Once 
the programme resumed, from a security perspective, both the adult and child DDR 
processes ran more smoothly. Despite the disarmament process yielding a low weapons-to-
combatant-ratio, the DDR programme still had the intended effect of providing a sense of 
security and was able to incentivise the combatants to renounce violence. This was of 
course supported by a large peacekeeping presence responsible for monitoring and 
enforcing the peace agreement. Although the credibility of the DDR programme was 
severely questioned as a result of the lax implementation of the entry criteria and the 
inflated number of participants (triple the original estimate), this did not necessarily render 
the DDR programme ineffective. And in spite of severe delays in providing reintegration 
benefits the situation remained manageable and as of December 2010, has not deteriorated 
or slid back into conflict. In that sense, the DDR programme served its purpose and 
enabled other peacebuilding initiatives to progress. 
 
Second, despite the DDR programme suffering from numerous structural and operational 
challenges that both slowed down the process and complicated its implementation, the 
child DDR programme was successful in delivering its various components and achieved 
many of its objectives. Although it is clear that many children were not able to access the 
DDR programme, a total of 10,963 took advantage of the DDR programme and its 
benefits. Children spent up to twelve weeks in interim care centres where they received life-
skills, basic education (for numeracy and literacy) and health services. Ninety-eight percent 
of all former child combatants were reunited with their families in Liberia or provided with 
alternative living arrangements; the other two percent were repatriated to their countries of 
origin and reunited with their families there. Formal education was the only reintegration 
option for children younger than fourteen years of age, while older children were given the 
option of pursuing skills training or formal education. All things considered, the child 
DDR process delivered most of its objectives: children were discharged from the ranks of 
the fighting factions, they went through the demobilisation programme, they received 
goods as well as benefited from services to assist in their social and economic reintegration, 
while the child protection capacities of both government and local communities’ were 
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enhanced and improved. Had the children not been included in the DDR programme, they 
may have posed an immediate as well as a long-term threat to security, which was mitigated 
by addressing their needs. 
 
There were many simultaneous efforts that contributed to the effective implementation of 
child DDR in Liberia. With the signing of the peace agreement in 2003, Liberia had an 
opportunity to break the cycle of conflict that plagued the country for fourteen years. A 
crucial political opportunity presented itself in not only the peace agreement, but also in the 
deployment of UNMIL and the transitional government. There was recognition that earlier 
failed DDR attempts were a contributing factor in continuation of the conflict and there 
was a strong desire not to repeat similar mistakes. The desire to prevent previous mistakes 
and break Liberia’s cycle of violence were powerful motivating factors for the  UN, donors 
and IFIs as well as specifically for the leaders of UNMIL who needed to show quick 
progress. By 2003, the importance of child soldiers had gained international recognition 
and earned a permanent place on the UN Security Council’s agenda. The UN Security 
Council and the Secretary-General mandated child protection measures and mechanisms 
be incorporated into peacekeeping missions and peacebuilding efforts where appropriate. 
Liberia fit the bill. It was a prime example of where child protection needed to be taken 
very seriously and incorporated into not only DDR programming but all peacebuilding 
activities.  
 
The Liberian peacebuilding intervention came at an interesting juncture in the evolution 
and development of various concepts, responses and policy frameworks. At that time, the 
UN was reforming how it conducted peacekeeping missions and peacebuilding 
interventions, in an attempt to make them more comprehensive, apply lessons of previous 
interventions and share best practices. Aimed at addressing the root causes of conflict by 
addressing the political, economic and social deficits, the UN’s approach to peacebuilding 
was eventually integrated and implemented as standard operating procedure in post-
conflict situations. Given Liberia’s destabilising effect in the sub-region, the UN needed its 
robust multidimensional peacekeeping intervention to succeed.  
 
Explicitly addressing children’s needs in DDR programming was a fairly novel approach. 
In neighbouring Sierra Leone, the UN was winding down its peacekeeping mission just as 
the Liberian peacebuilding strategy was starting to be implemented. Many of the people 
responsible for DDR in Sierra Leone moved on to Liberia. Although the two countries 
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DDR programmes had similarities, such as the sequencing of events, funding constraints 
and limited local capacity issues, there were also significant differences between the two 
programmes. The political situation in each country was different, as were the scale of the 
programmes, the institutional arrangements and the personalities involved in decision-
making. At a policy level some lessons had been learned in Sierra Leone and were being 
implemented Liberia, particularly the implementation of a child specific DDR programme. 
Following UNICEF's insistence, the Sierra Leonean peace agreement set an important 
precedent by explicitly addressing the need for a child DDR programme and the need to 
integrate child protection into the national policies. Liberia followed suit. Both 
peacekeeping and peacebuilding interventions were in many ways test cases, which in turn 
contributed to the standardization of future child DDR programming.  
 
Wider Implications 
Liberia’s most recent DDR experience has wider implications for the growing field of 
peacebuilding and offers some important lessons. This study has practical and political 
implications, as well as on the research in the relevant fields. What resulted in a long drawn 
out six year process, illustrated not only the importance of addressing the disarmament, 
demobilising and reintegration combatants, but also that addressing the needs of child 
soldiers are integral and crucial to the success of such processes. Liberia has shown that 
DDR, even a flawed DDR process, can help provide an enabling environment allowing for 
the consolidation of peace and also contribute to the appeasement and managing of 
expectation of adult and child combatants. Liberia also illustrates is that DDR is only one 
piece, albeit an important one, of the peacebuilding puzzle and that it needs to be 
accompanied by coordinated political, economic and social interventions. One cannot 
under-estimate the importance of the political environment in the consolidation of peace 
and security in a post-conflict context. Although each post-conflict situation is unique, the 
UN is commonly called upon to ensure relevant issues, such as child protection, are 
addressed explicitly in the peace agreements and implemented in the subsequent 
peacebuilding interventions.  
 
The focus on children during the Liberian DDR process was the result of a combination of 
factors. There was international recognition about the realities of child soldiers, strong 
advocacy work by child protection agencies and the UN’s desire to improve its 
peacekeeping and peacebuilding interventions. The war in Liberia was being fought and its 
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DDR programme implemented as the UN and its members’ response to child soldiers was 
being developed. The anti-child soldiers movement started gaining momentum in the late 
1990’s and has been continuously enhanced through the strengthening of awareness, 
policies, programmes, monitoring and sanctions. It was Graça Machel’s report to the UN 
General Assembly in 1996 that initially guided the UN to acknowledge the impact of armed 
conflict on children and significantly contributed to an increased awareness and 
understanding of the multitude of roles children have in war. Since this breakthrough 
report although there has been an accumulation of experience, knowledge and a series of 
policy instruments at international, regional and national levels to address the issue of child 
soldiers gaps still exist. Child protection is an area where policies have resulted in concrete 
actions on the ground, as we saw in Liberia. It is unlikely that, where appropriate, 
peacekeeping or peacebuilding interventions will in the future not incorporate child 
protection mechanisms. That being said, as we saw in Liberia, policies do not necessarily 
translate into proper implementation or prioritisation. 
 
International policy has made much progress in a relatively short amount of time regarding 
the use and recruitment of child soldiers. Every year since 2000, the UN Security Council 
has discussed children and armed conflict and has considerably strengthened its response. 
In 2005, the Security Council established the Security Council Working Group on Children 
and Armed Conflict, a mechanism to monitor and report grave abuses to children taking 
place in countries already on the Council’s agenda.805 The use and recruitment of child 
soldiers has been criminalised and mechanisms aimed at addressing impunity have been 
established and are operational. Both the International Criminal Court and the Special 
Court for Sierra Leone have indicted suspects for the recruitment and use of child soldiers. 
Embodied in and emboldened by policies, various UN agencies and offices attempted to 
tackle the reality of child soldiers by preventing their use, monitoring, release, reintegration 
and holding those responsible for their abuse accountable. Although these efforts are not 
adequate to deal with the severity of the situation they are a promising development. 
 
Kofi Annan, the former UN Secretary-General acknowledged that UN-implemented DDR 
programmes were being planned in an ad hoc manner and were being inconsistently 
implemented throughout the world.806 In response, a task force was created in 2004 and 
                                                
805 United Nations, "Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed 
Conflict" http://www.un.org/children/conflict/english/securitycouncilwg.html (14 February 2010). 
806 United Nations, "Report of the Secretary-General on Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration." 
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held a consultation process of relevant actors (including representatives from the UN 
system, multilateral financial institutions, civil society, etc.) who were asked to develop a 
comprehensive set of standards to guide DDR programmes. In 2006, the Integrated DDR 
Standards (IDDRS), along with supplementary Operational Guidelines to the IDDRS and 
DDR Briefing Note for Senior Managers were published.807 The IDDRS were intended to 
improve the coordination, cohesiveness, and application of best practices in the planning, 
management and implementation of DDR programmes. The issue of children (and youth) 
in DDR programmes was addressed as a cross-cutting issue, seen as central to the success 
of DDR programming and peacebuilding interventions in the IDDRS. Substantial guidance 
was given on how best to address their special needs. The necessary points were addressed 
in the document. For instance, the planning process and best practices for information 
sensitization processes are outlined. A strong case is presented for the articulation for the 
special needs of children in the formulation of peace agreements is provided, as is the need 
for inclusive eligibility criteria for children in DDR programmes and age-specific 
programming during the national recovery. Moreover, the IDDRS addresses the need for 
any child DDR programme to be seen as a long-term investment, one modeled on a 
community-based approach and complemented by comprehensive national recovery 
plans.808  
 
It was clear from previous attempts at DDR as well as from the Secretary-General’s 
acknowledgment that there was much room for improvement and need for greater clarity 
of the UN’s approach to both adult and child DDR. The development of the IDDRS and 
policy prescriptions were a step in the right direction to addressing these deficiencies. 
Practitioners and policymakers welcomed the guidance and call for a more comprehensive, 
coherent and consistent approach to DDR. Senior managers will now be provided with 
uniform guidance on how to handle the planning process, what DDR should consist of, 
clear and comprehensive policy direction.809 Child protection agencies, participated in the 
development of the IDDRS, welcomed the greater prioritisation of child protection 
principles in DDR programming and strongly supported the centrality of the role of child 
DDR in peacebuilding. This shift of mindset was agreed, at least in principle and on 
paper.810 Although Liberia’s DDR experience was a notable input into the development of 
                                                
807 United Nations, "Integrated Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Standards," (New York: 
United Nations, December 2006).  
808 Ibid., Children and DDR Module 5.30  
809 Interview 103. 
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the guidelines, it was published too late for the guidelines and collective lessons to 
influence or impact its DDR process. The guidance and many of the policy positions 
would have directly helped reduce many of the inconsistencies and weaknesses of Liberia’s 
DDR process.  
 
Another important lesson from the Liberian DDR experience is that regardless of the 
strength of the policies or instruments available regarding child soldiers and child DDR the 
personalities of senior management in peacekeeping and peacebuilding missions have the 
potential to be a positive force, neutral force or negative force. The impact of personalities, 
positive or negative, cannot be underestimated in the implementation of peacebuilding 
activities. Although the supplementary publications encourage senior managers to seek the 
advice and expertise necessary for successfully implementing comprehensive DDR 
programmes, this is no guarantee for success. Some senior managers may not heed the 
advice of others or may be pressured into certain decisions. It certainly helps if senior 
managers are well informed about child protection issues and are appointed a senior 
adviser who bears the responsibility for child protection issues in peacekeeping or 
peacebuilding missions.811 Pressure to ensure child protection must be maintained at all 
levels (local, regional international) and checks and balances must be enforced to ensure 
these standards are adhered to and have the intended impact in post-conflict scenarios. 
 
DDR programmes will undoubtedly continue to be implemented as a necessary 
component of post-conflict peacebuilding. However, only time will tell if the lessons, best 
practices and guidance articulated in the IDDRS will be implemented in future DDR 
programmes, whether they will have the intended impacts or whether the rhetoric 
contained in reports will be translated into concrete action.  
Perspective 
History will determine what the legacy of Liberia’s Child DDR programme is. Some say 
such prognosis cannot be made before ten years lapse allowing for reforms to take effect.812 
If that is true, given that Liberia’s DDR programme officially ended in July 2009, we have 
some time to wait to see whether yesterday’s child soldiers will not be tomorrow’s rebels. 
Comparing preliminary information, in 2010, we are able to see that Liberia has made 
                                                
811 Interview 96.  
812 This claim of ten years was made in Julia Buxton, Reintegration and Long-Term Development: Linkages and 
Challenges (Bradford: Centre for International Cooperation and Security, University of Bradford, 2008). 
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remarkable political, economic and social progress in part due to the adult and child DDR 
programme’s contribution to the country’s peacebuilding. Liberia still faces many problems 
and challenges, but due to the considerable support of the UN, multilateral financial 
institutions (i.e., the World Bank), bilateral donors and the increasing role of the private 
sector, the situation looks more hopeful than it did a few years ago.  
 
Politically, anti-corruption efforts and transparency of government finances have remained 
a priority of President Johnson-Sirleaf’s administration. Although progress has been made, 
the daunting task of strengthening government institutions and capacities continues. The 
country is gearing up to hold its second post-war multiparty elections in 2011, where 
President Johnson-Sirleaf is seeking re-election. Although the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission has published its final report, the messages are mixed as the implementations 
of its recommendations have been slow. Some of the recommendations are unlikely to be 
implemented. – it recommended, for instance, that many of the key political actors, 
including President Johnson-Sirleaf, be prohibited from seeking public office.  
 
Liberia’s economy is being successfully revitalized. Since the end of the war, Liberia’s 
economy consistently improved with steady rises in its GDP: 7.8% in 2006, 9.4% in 2007, 
8.3% in 2008 with projections of 6% for 2009 and 5.5% in 2010.813 As a result of an 
ambitious reform agenda and sustained implementation of strong macro-economic 
policies, Liberia had $4.5 billion of its debt written off by the World Bank and International 
Monetary Fund in June 2010.814 Domestic resource mobilisation has dramatically increased 
to $235 million in 2008/9 providing government with much needed resources to finance 
government budgets and services.815 Better management of Liberia’s natural resources, 
improved government administration (such as tax collection) and increased foreign direct 
investment are main contributing factors to these improvements. However, despite these 
notable improvements to economic indicators, unemployment is stubbornly high and job 
creation remains a top priority of the government.816 Through concerted policy reforms 
and as a result of improved security enabled President Johnson-Sirleaf has been successful 
in instilling and returning confidence to Liberia on the international scene. As a result of 
this, Liberia is no longer a pariah on the international economic or foreign policy stage.  
                                                
813 International Monetary Fund, Liberia: Poverty Reduction Strategy - Progress Report (Washington, DC: 
International Monetary Fund, October 2010), 11. 
814 John Lipsky, "Liberia: Life after Debt", International Monetary Fund 
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A country that only a decade ago was considered a ‘basket-case’ is today being considered 
an exemplar country transitioning from conflict.817 However, in spite of its laudable 
successes and progress, the security situation remains fragile. Liberia’s security apparatus 
does not yet have the capacity to respond independent of UNMIL.818 This is a serious 
concern, as UNMIL’s budget for 1 July 2010 to 30 June 2011 is set at $524 million, which 
is unsustainably high.819 UNMIL is under pressure from UN headquarters to downsize and 
develop its exit strategy. Once certain benchmarks are met UNMIL will start drawing down 
its forces and reducing its presence in the country. Moreover, the current trends and unrest 
in Cote d’Ivoire as a result of their first elections in over a decade are reason for concern – 
there have been reports of significant refugee flows into Liberia, but also the recruitment 
of Liberian fighters. There are reports that Liberian mercenaries, presumably ex-
combatants, are supporting the internationally recognised loser of the election, Laurent 
Gbabgo’s efforts to remain in power.820 
 
Although there are causes for concern and constant threats to progress, these 
improvements show the general positive trends in Liberia’s affairs. It is hard, if not 
impossible, to think any of these improvements would have been possible without the 
combatants agreeing to a ceasefire, participating in the adult and child DDR process, and 
refraining from mobilizing themselves to pursue their interests enabling all the subsequent 
peacebuilding efforts to proceed.  
 
Acknowledging the difficulties in peacebuilding and specifically both adult and child DDR, 
further research into more specific areas is merited. This study sought to assess the 
centrality of child DDR on peacebuilding in Liberia, and although its lessons may be 
applicable to other countries, they are not conclusive and are merely indicative for future 
research agendas. Naturally, given the breadth of peacebuilding, the possibilities of further 
research are extensive and would help address the imbalances in the academic literature on 
peacebuilding more generally, children and war and child soldiers more specifically. 
 
                                                
817 Lipsky. 
818 United Nations, "Twenty-First Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission 
in Liberia," (11 August 2010), 16. 
819 Ibid. 
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Among the multitude of issues worth exploring are the political and financial implications 
of child DDR, including the long-term implications of participating in such programmes. 
Much of the research about DDR focuses on short- or medium-term goals, and although it 
would be burdensome to gather such information and analysis, better understanding the 
long-term benefits and impacts of DDR, and specifically child DDR, at an individual level 
could invaluably contribute to improving programmatic design to better suit the ex-
combatants and their community’s needs. Although this thesis attempted to articulate some 
of the linkages and interactions between adult and child DDR programmes, an in-depth 
assessment could further benefit these important issues. Moreover, girl child soldiers 
warrant much more attention in research than they receive. Girls are said to be a particular 
challenge in the implementation of DDR programmes and further studies on how to how 
to improve girls’ participation as well as maximize the benefits of their involvement in 
DDR programmes would go far to filling this gap. As the field of child soldiers has 
progressed rapidly in a relatively short amount of time, it is clear that the potential for 




   
  
- 258 - 
 
Bibliography and Sources  
 
Meetings :  
 
A. Humanitarian Action Committee Meeting, Monrovia 03/03/05 
B. Security Briefing 22/03/05 
C. Humanitarian Action Committee Meeting 22/03/05 
D. Humanitarian Coordination Meeting, Margibi County 24/03/05 
E. Humanitarian Action Committee Meeting, Monrovia 29/03/05 
F. Working Group Meeting at Guthrie Rubber Plantation, Guthrie – April 2005 
G. Working Group Meeting at Guthrie Rubber Plantation, Guthrie – April 2005 
H. Protection Core Group, Monrovia 12/04/05 
I. Working Group Meeting at Guthrie Rubber Plantation (meeting with Civil Society 
and village elders), Guthrie – April 2005 
J. Protection Core Group, Monrovia 14/04/05 
K. NGO Monitor Steering Group Meeting, Monrovia 15/04/05 
L. Working Group Meeting at Guthrie Rubber Plantation, Guthrie – April 2005 
M. Security Briefing, Monrovia 17/05/05 
N. Protection Core Group, Monrovia 19/05/05 
O. Security Briefing, Monrovia 24/05/05 
P. Working Group Meeting at Guthrie Rubber Plantation (with the Minister of 
Agriculture, Head of NCDDRR and ex-combatant leadership), Monrovia – May 
2005 
Q. Security Briefing, Monrovia 07/06/05 
R. Working Group Meeting at Guthrie Rubber Plantation, Guthrie – June 2005 
S. Security Sector Reform National Dialogue, Monrovia 03-04/08/05 
 
Focus Groups:  
I. A Mixed civilian and ex-combatant group (total approximately 40 men, women and 
children), Gbanga – July 2005 
II. A mixed Group of Community Elders, Leaders, teachers, and ex-combatant 
including child ex-combatant, Gbanga – July 2005  
III. A group of four (2 boys and 2 girls) child ex-combatants at Children’s Assistance 
Programme (CAP), Monrovia – August 2005 
 
Interv iews Conducted 
1. Former Child Soldier, Respondent A, Monrovia – February 2005 
2. Former Child Soldier, Respondent B, Monrovia - February 2005 
3. Ryan Nichols, UNDP, Reintegration Expert, Monrovia – February 2005 
4. John Juech, UNMIL, Civil Affairs Officer, Monrovia – March 2005 
5. Former Child Soldier, Respondent C, Monrovia – March 2005 
6. Former Child Soldier, Respondent E, Monrovia – April 2005 
7. Former Child Soldier, Respondent F, Monrovia – April 2005 
8. Former Child Soldier, Respondent G, Monrovia – April 2005 
9. Former Child Soldier, Respondent D, Monrovia – April 2005 
   
  
- 259 - 
 
10. Tammi Sharpe, UNMIL, Reintegration Officer, Monrovia and Robertsport – April 
2005 
11. Former Child Soldier, Respondent H, Gbapolu – May 2005 
12. Former Child Soldier, Respondent I, Gbapolu – May 2005 
13. Former Child Soldier, Respondent J, Gbapolu – May 2005 
14. Former Child Soldier, Respondent K, Gbapolu – May 2005 
15. Former Child Soldier, Respondent L, Gbapolu – May 2005 
16. Sylvia Bisanz, UNMIL, International Police Service and member of the Child Task 
Force, Monrovia – May 2005 
17. Dennis Johnson, UNMIL, Head of Humanitarian Coordination Section, Monrovia 
– May 2005 
18. Nicky Smith, International Rescue Committee, Head of Office, Monrovia – May 
2005 
19. Mike McGovern, International Crisis Group, Africa Director, Monrovia – May 
2005 
20. Fatuma Ibrahim, UNICEF, Senior Child Protection Officer – May 2005 
21. Damien Callamand, UN Security Council Panel of Experts – May 2005  
22. Josephine Guerrero, UNMIL Public Information, Communications Officer, 
Gbanga – May 2005 
23. Selaisse Atadika, UNDP Reintegration Officer (and former UNICEF Consultant), 
Monrovia – May 2005  
24. Carmen Lopez-Clavero, International Rescue Committee, Country Head, Monrovia 
– May 2005 
25. Art Blundell, UN Security Council Panel of Experts, Chair – May 2005  
26. John Juech, UNMIL, Civil Affairs Officer, Gbapolu – May 2005 
27. Christian Højbjerg, Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology (Denmark), 
Professor, Monrovia – May 2005 
28. Tammi Sharpe, UNMIL Reintegration, Rehabilitation and Recovery Section (RRR), 
Reintegration Officer, Monrovia – May 2005 
29. Lanre Shasore, UNMIL Political Policy and Planning Office, Policy Expert, 
Monrovia – May 2005 
30. Jeremy Farrall, UNMIL Political Policy and Planning Office, Advisor, Monrovia – 
May 2005 
31. Former Child Soldier, Respondent M, Monrovia - June 2005 
32. Former Child Soldier, Respondent N, Monrovia - June 2005 
33. Pradeep Lama, UNMIL DDR Section, former Head of Camp Management, 
Monrovia – June 2005 
34. Wayne Bleier, Christian Children’s Fund (CCF), Head, Monrovia – June 2005 
35. Rosemary Musumba, UNMIL Humanitarian Coordination Section, Senior 
Humanitarian Affairs Officer, Monrovia – June 2005 
36. Maurice, UNMIL Joint Mission Analysis Cell, French Intelligence Officer, 
Monrovia – June 2005 
37. Gloria Ntegeye, UNMIL Reintegration, Rehabilitation and Recovery Section 
(RRR), Reporting Officer, Monrovia – June 2005 
38. Thomas Paquette, UNMIL Reintegration, Rehabilitation and Recovery Section 
(RRR), Chief, Monrovia – June 2005 
39. General Muhammad Tahir, UNMIL, Deputy Force Commander, Monrovia – 
August 2005 
40. Jean Michel, UNMIL Joint Mission Analysis Cell, Monrovia – June 2006  
41. Frances Naiga Muwonge, UNMIL, Electoral Officer, Monrovia – June 2005 
42. Franklyn Henries, UNMIL Humanitarian Coordination Section, Logistics/NGO 
Liaison, Monrovia – June 2005 
   
  
- 260 - 
 
43. David Waines, Equip, Director of Programmes, Monrovia – June 2005 
44. Lanre Shasore, UNMIL Political Policy and Planning Office, Policy Expert, 
Monrovia –June 2005 
45. Jeremy Farrall, UNMIL Political Policy and Planning Office, Advisor, Monrovia –
June 2005 
46. Former Child Soldier, Respondent O, Monrovia - July 2005 
47. Former Child Soldier, Respondent P, Gbanga – July 2005 
48. Former Child Soldier, Respondent Q, Gbanga – July 2005 
49. Former Child Soldier, Respondent R, Monrovia – July 2005 
50. Former Child Soldier, Respondent S, Monrovia –July 2005 
51. Steve Ursino, UNDP, Country Director, Monrovia – July 2005  
52. Sergio Valdini, UNDP, Head of DEX/Trust Fund, Monrovia – July 2005 
53. Nicolas Tillon, Premiere Urgence, Head of Logistics, Monrovia – July 2005 
54. Pradeep Lama, UNMIL DDR Section, former Head of Camp Management, 
Monrovia – July 2005 
55. Claudia Seymour, UNICEF, Child Protection Officer, Monrovia – July 2005 
56. Fatuma Ibrahim, UNICEF, Senior Child Protection Officer, Monrovia – July 2005 
57. Sari Nuro, UNDP Joint Implementation Unit, Gbanga – July 2005 
58. Charles Achoda, JIU, Head, Monrovia – July 2005  
59. Former Child Soldier, Respondent T, Monrovia – August 2005 
60. Former Child Soldier, Respondent U, Monrovia – August 2005 
61. Former Child Soldier, Respondent V, Monrovia – August 2005 
62. Former Child Soldier, Respondent W, Monrovia - August 2005 
63. Former Child Soldier, Respondent X, Monrovia - August 2005 
64. Former Child Soldier, Respondent Y, Monrovia - August 2005 
65. Francis, Children’s Assistance Programme (CAP), Head, Monrovia – August 2005 
66. Comfort Ero, UNMIL Political Policy and Planning Office, Policy Advisor, 
Monrovia – August 2005 
67. Farzana Rasheed, UNDP, Reporting Officer, Monrovia – August 2005 
68. David, Save the Children, Social Protection Officer, August 2005 
69. Fatuma Ibrahim, UNICEF, Senior Child Protection Officer –August 2005 
70. Josephine Guerrero, UNMIL Public Information, Communications Officer, 
Gbanga – August 2005 
71. Art Blundell, UN Security Council Panel of Experts, Chair –August 2005  
72. Patrick Cooker, UNMIL, Civil Affairs Officer, Monrovia – August 2005 
73. Captain Ramy, UNMIL MILOBS, Monrovia – August 2005 
74. Salvator Nkurunzia, UNDP, Reintegration Officer, Monrovia – August 2005 
75. Tracey Hebert, USAID, Reintegration Officer, Monrovia – August 2005 
76. Angela Kerny, UNICEF, Country Director, Monrovia – August 2005 
77. Aine Bhreathnach, Oxfam, Protection Advisor – April 2005 
78. Hiruit Tefferi, UNICEF, Consultant, Monrovia – August 2005 
79. Professor Eboe Hutchful, African Security Network and Wayne State University 
(USA), Monrovia – August 2005 
80. Joe Wylie, NTGL, Deputy-Defence Minister, Monrovia – August 2005 
81. Purusi Sadiki, UNMIL, Child Protection Advisor, Monrovia – August 2005 
82. Erin McCandless, UNMIL, Civil Affairs Officer, Monrovia – August 2005 
83. Charles Achoda, JIU, Head, Monrovia –August 2005  
84. Clive Jachnik, UNMIL, former head DDR Section – September 2005 
85. Alec Wargo, UN Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for 
Children and Armed Conflict, Programme Officer, New York – September 2005  
   
  
- 261 - 
 
86. Tonderai Chikuhwa, UN Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-
General for Children and Armed Conflict, Programme Officer, New York – 
September 2005  
87. Manuel Fontaine, UNICEF, Policy Advisor, New York – September 2005  
88. Rebecca Symington, UNICEF, Senior Child Protection Officer, New York – 
September 2005  
89. Lamin Sise, United Nations, Director for Legal Affairs and Human Rights in the 
Executive Office of the Secretary-General, New York – September 2005 
90. Jacques Klein, UNMIL, former Special Representative of the Secretary-General, 
Princeton – September 2005 
91. Professor Lamin Waristay, Government of Liberia, Advisor to the Liberian 
Chairman on Communications, New York – September 2005 
92. Former Child Soldier, Respondent Z, Monrovia – April 2006  
93. Former Child Soldier, Respondent AA, Monrovia – April 2006 
94. Former Child Soldier, Respondent BB, Monrovia – April 2006 
95. Former Child Soldier, Respondent CC, Monrovia – April 2006 
96. Purusi Sadiki, UNMIL, Child Protection Advisor, London – June 2006 
97. Radhika Coomaraswamy, UN, Special Representative of the Secretary-General for 
Children and Armed Conflict, Programme Officer, New York – August 2006 
98. Erin McCandless, UNMIL Office of the Deputy-SRSG, Policy Advisor, telephone 
interview – June 2007 
99. Richard Tolbert, Chairman of the Liberian National Investment Committee and 
Advisor to the President, Wilton Park – February 2010 
100. Patrick Hayford, United Nations, Director of the Office of the Special 
Adviser on Africa, Toronto – May 2010 
101. Ibrahim Sesay, UNICEF Liberia, Child Protection Officer, telephone/email 
interview – July 2010 
102. Miatta Abdulai-Clark, UNICEF Liberia, Child Protection Officer, 
telephone/email interview – September through December 2010 
103. Kofi Annan, former Secretary-General of the United Nations, Geneva – 
October 2010 
104. Lamin Sise, former Director for Legal Affairs and Human Rights in the 






   
  




Abiodun Alao, John Mackinlay, and Funmi Olonisakin. Peacekeepers, Politicians, and Warlords- 
the Liberian Peace Process Tokyo, Paris, & New York: United Nations University 
Press, 1999. 
 
Aboagye, Festus B., and Alhaji M. S. Bah. Liberia at a Crossroads: A Preliminary Look at the 
United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) and the Protection of Civilians. Institute for 
Security Studies, 2004. 
 
________, eds. A Tortuous Road to Peace. Pretoria, South Africa: Institute for Security 
Studies, 2005. 
 
Achvarina, Vera, and Simon F. Reich. "No Place to Hide." International Security 31, no. 1 
(2006): 127-164. 
 
Adebajo, Adekeye. Building Peace in West Africa- Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea-Bissau 
Boulder & London: Lynne Rienner, 2002. 
 
________. Liberia's Civil War Nigeria, ECOMOG, and Regional Security in West Africa 
Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2002. 
 
Alao, Abiodun. The Burden of Collective Goodwill The International Involvement in the 
Liberian Civil War Aldershot: Ashgate, 1998. 
 
Amnesty International. Liberia: The Promises of Peace for 21,000 Child Soldiers. New York: 
Amnesty International, 2004, AI Index: AFR 34/006/2004. 
 
Angela Kearney. "Letter to UNMIL Deputy-SRSG Souren Seraydarian." Monrovia: 
UNICEF, 14 April 2004. 
 
Annan, Kofi. "In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for 
All." A/59/2005. New York, 2005. 
 
Armon, Jeremy, and Andy Carl, eds. An International Review of Peace Initiatives Accord, The 
Liberian Peace Process 1990-1996. London: Conciliation Resources, 1996. 
 
Atkinson, Philippa. The War Economy in Liberia: A Political Analysis. London: Overseas 
Development Institute, 1997, Network Paper 22. 
 
Ball, Nicole. "Good Practices in Security Sector Reform " In Security Sector Reform edited by 
Herbert  Wulf, 14-23. Bonn: Bonn International Centre for Conversion, 2000. 
 
Ball, Nicole, and Kayode Fayemi. Security Sector Governance: A Handbook Lagos: Centre for 
Democracy & Development and Centre for International Policy, 2004. 
 
Ball, Nicole, and Dylan Hendrickson. Review of International Financing Arrangements for 
Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration. Stockholm Initiative on Disarmament, 
Demobilisation and Reintegration, 2005. 
 
   
  
- 263 - 
 
Barnett, Michael, Hunjoon Kim, Madalene O'Donnell, and Laura Sitea. "Peacebuilding: 
What Is in a Name." Global Governance 13 (2007): 35-58. 
 
BBC News, "Ivory Coast Clashes Kill 173, Says UN" http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-
africa-12067318 (24 December 2010). 
 
Becker, Jo, "A Gun Is as Tall as Me" http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2004/01/20/gun-tall-
me (20 January 2004). 
 
Bellamy, Carol. "Letter to Jean-Marie Guéhenno ", 15 April 2004. 
 
Bennett, T W. Using Children in Armed Conflict: A Legitimate African Tradition? . Vol. 
Monograph No. 32 Institute for Security Studies Pretoria: Institute for Security 
Studies, 1998. 
 
Berdal, Mats. Disarmament and Demobilisation after Civil Wars London: Oxford University 
Press, 1996. 
 
Bøås, Morten. "Africa's Young Guerrillas: Rebel with a Cause?" Current History  (2004): 211-
214. 
 
________. "The Liberian Civil War: New War/Old War?" Global Society 19, no. 1 (2005): 
73-88. 
 
________. DDRed in Liberia: Youth Remarginalisation or Reintegration? Brighton: 
MICROCON, 2010. 
 
Boutros-Ghali, Boutros. "An Agenda for Peace." A/47/277. New York: United Nations, 
17 June 1992. 
 
Brett, Rachel, Margaret McCallin, and Rhone O'Shea. Children: The Invisible Soldiers. New 
York: Quaker UN Office (Geneva), International Catholic Child Bureau on behalf 
of the Child Soldiers Research Project, 1996. 
 
Brett, Rachel, and Irma Specht. Young Soldiers: Why They Choose to Fight Boulder, Colo.: 
Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2004. 
 
Bryden, Alan, and Heiner Hänggi, eds. Reform and Reconstruction of the Security Sector. Geneva: 
Lit Verlag Münster, 2004. 
 
________, eds. Security Governance in Post-Conflict Peacebuilding. Geneva: Lit Verlag Münster, 
2005. 
 
Bush, George W. "President Bush Outlines His Agenda for U.S. - African Relations." 
Washington DC, 26 June 2003. 
 
Buxton, Julia. Reintegration and Long-Term Development: Linkages and Challenges. Bradford: 
Centre for International Cooperation and Security, University of Bradford, 2008. 
 
Cain, Kenneth. "The Rape of Dinah: Human Rights, Civil War in Liberia, and Evil 
Truimphant." Human Rights Quarterly 21, no. 2 (1999): 265-307. 
 
   
  
- 264 - 
 
Cairns, Ed. Children and Political Violence Oxford: Blackwell, 1996. 
 
Call, Charles, and Susan E. Cook. "Introduction: Postconflict Peacebuilding and 
Democratization." Global Governance 9 (2003): 135-139. 
 
Caplan, Richard. International Governance of War-Torn Territories : Rule and Reconstruction New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2005. 
 
Caramés, Albert, Vincenç Fisas, and Daniel Luz. Analysis of Disarmament, Demobilisation and 
Reintegration (DDR) Programmes Existing in the World During 2005. Barcelona: Escola 
de Cultura de Pau, 2006. 
 
Central Intelligence Agency, "Liberia" www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/geos/li.html (17 June 2005). 
 
Chanaa, Jane. Security Sector Reform: Issues, Challenges and Prospects Adelphi Paper 344 Oxford: 
Oxford University Press for the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2002. 
 
Chid Protection Working Group. "Communication Strategy in Support of DDRR for 
Children and Women Associated with Fighting Forces." Liberia, 2004. 
 
Christian Children's Fund. Revitalization of War Affected Communities and Reintegration of Women 
and Children Associated with the Fighting Forces Monrovia, November 2007. 
 
Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers. Global Report on Child Soldiers. London: 
Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, 2001. 
 
________. Child Soldiers Global Report. London: Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers 
2004. 
 
________. Child Soldiers and Disarmament, Demobilisation, Rehabilitation and Reintegration in West 
Africa. London: Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, November 2006. 
 
Cohn, Ilene. "The Protection of Child Soldiers During the Liberian Peace Process." The 
International Journal of Children's Rights 6 (1998): 179-220. 
 
________. "The Protection of Children in Peacemaking and Peacekeeping Processes." 
Harvard Human Rights Journal 12 (1999): 129-197. 
 
Cohn, Ilene, and Guy S. Goodwin-Gill. Child Soldiers: The Role of Children in Armed Conflict 
Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994. 
 
"Comprehensive Peace Agreement between the Government of Liberia and the Liberians 
United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) and the Movement for 
Democracy in Liberia (MODEL) and Political Parties." Accra 13 August 2003. 
 
Cranfield University Centre for Security Sector Management, "Glossary" 
http://www.ssronline.org/glossary.cfm?type=2&value=S (accessed 15 October 
2010). 
 
   
  
- 265 - 
 
Cutillo, Alberto. International Assistance to Countries Emerging from Conflict: A Review of Fifteen 
Years of Interventions and the Future of Peacebuilding. New York: International Peace 
Academy, February 2006. 
 
David Keen. "Incentives and Disincentives for Violence " In Greed and Grievance edited by 
Mats Berdal and David M. Malone, 19-41. Boulder Lynne Rienner, 2000. 
 
David, Kelly. The Disarmament, Demobilisation & Reintegration of Child Soldiers in Liberia, 1994-
1997: The Process and Lessons Learned. UNICEF- Liberia & US National Committee 
for UNICEF, 1998. 
 
Draft Interim Secretariat. Liberian Disarmament, Demobilisation, Rehabilitation and Reintegration 
Programme: Strategy and Implementation Framework. Monrovia: Draft Interim 
Secretariat, October 2003. 
 
Ebo, Adedeji. "Security Sector Reform as an  Instrument of Sub-Regional Transformation  
in West Africa " In Reform and Reconstruction of the Security Sector edited by Alan 
Bryden and Heiner Hänggi, 65-92. Geneva: Lit Verlag Münster, 2004. 
 
________. The Challenges and Opportunities of Security Sector Reform in Post-Conflict Liberia. 
Geneva: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), 
2005. 
 
ECOWAS. Agreement on Ceasefire and Cessation of Hostilities between the Government of the Republic 
of Liberia and Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy and the Movement of 
Democracy in Liberia. 17 June 2003. 
 
Ellis, Stephen. "Liberia 1989-1994: A Study of Ethnic and Spiritual Violence." African 
Affairs 94 (1995): 165-197. 
 
________. "Liberia's Warlord Insurgency " In African Guerrillas edited by Chris Clapham, 
155-171. Oxford: James Currey, 1998. 
 
________. The Mask of Anarchy The Destruction of Liberia and the Religious Dimension of 
an African Civil War London: Hurst & Company, 1999. 
 
Fayemi, 'Koyode. "Governing Insecurity in Post-Conflict States: The Case of Sierra Leone 
and Liberia " In Reform and Reconstruction of the Security Sector edited by Alan Bryden 
and Heiner Hänggi, 179-206. Geneva: Lit Verlag Münster, 2004. 
 
Fox, Mary-Jane. "Girl Soldiers: Human Security and Gendered Insecurity." Security Dialogue 
35, no. 4 (2004): 465-479. 
 
Furley, Oliver. "Child Soldiers in Africa " In Conflict in Africa edited by Oliver Furley, 28-46. 
London: Tauris, 1995. 
 
Galtung, Johan. "Three Approaches to Peace: Peacekeeping, Peacemaking, and 
Peacebuilding " In Peace, War and Defense Copenhagen: Christian Ejlers, 1975. 
 
Galvanek, Janel. "The Reintegration of Child Soldiers in Liberia." University of Hamburg, 
2008. 
 
   
  
- 266 - 
 
Gawerc, M. I. "Peacebuilding: Theoretical and Concrete Perspectives." Peace and Change 31, 
no. 4 (October 2006): 435-478. 
 
Global Witness. The Usual Suspects: Liberia's Weapons and Mercenaries in Cote D'ivoire and Sierra 
Leone. London: Global Witness, March 2003. 
 
Government of Liberia. Executive Order No8: Extending the Mandate of the NCDDRR to 
Complete the RR Component of the DDRR Program, 12 April 2007. 
 
Hänggi, Heiner. "Approaching Peacebuilding from a Security Governance Perspective " In 
Reform and Reconstruction of the Security Sector edited by Alan Bryden and Heiner 
Hänggi, 3-22. Geneva: Lit Verlag Münster, 2004. 
 
Hänggi, Heiner "Conceptualising Security Sector Reform and Reconstruction " In Reform 
and Reconstruction of the Security Sector edited by Alan Bryden and Heiner Hänggi, 3-20. 
Geneva: Lit Verlag Münster, 2004. 
 
Happold, Matthew. Child Soldiers in International Law Melland Schill Studies in International 
Law Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2005. 
 
Harvey, Rachel. Children and Armed Conflict: A Guide to International Humanitarian and Human 
Rights Law. The Children and armed conflict unit (Essex), International Bureau for 
Children's Right, 2003. 
 
Hendrickson, Dylan. A Review of Security Sector Reform. London: The Conflict, Security & 
Development Group at the Centre for Defense Studies, King's College London, 
September 1999. 
 
High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change. A More Secure World: Our Shared 
Responsibility New York: United Nations, 2005. 
 
Hoffman, Danny. "The Civilian Target in Sierra Leone and Liberia: Political Power, 
Military Strategy, and Humanitarian Intervention." African Affairs 103 (2004): 211-
226. 
 
Honwana, Alcinda. "Negotiating Postwar Identities: Child Soldiers in Mozambique and 
Angola " In Contested Terrains and Constructed Categories, Contemporary Africa in Focus 
edited by George Bond and Nigel Gibson. Boulder: Westveiw Press, 2002. 
 
Howard, Michael. Clausewitz : A Very Short Introduction Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2002. 
 
Howe, Herbert M. Ambiguous Order : Military Forces in African States Boulder, Colo.: Lynne 
Rienner, 2001. 
 
Human Rights Watch. Weapons Sanctions, Military Supplies, and Human Suffering: Illegal Arms 
Flows to Liberia and the June-July 2003 Shelling of Monrovia. 3 November 2003. 
 
________. Waging War to Keep the Peace: The ECOMOG Intervention and Human Rights. New 
York: Human Rights Watch, 1993. 
 
   
  
- 267 - 
 
________. "Children in Combat." Human Rights Watch Children's Rights Project 8, no. 1 
(1996). 
 
________. My Gun Was as Tall as Me. New York: Human Rights Watch, 2002. 
 
________. Stolen Children: Abduction and Recruitment in Northern Uganda. New York: Human 
Rights Watch, 2003. 
 
________. "How to Fight, How to Kill: Child Soldiers in Liberia." Human Rights Watch 16, 
no. 2 (2004): 1-43. 
 
________. "Youth, Poverty and Blood: The Lethal Legacy of West Africa's Regional 
Warriors." Vol. 17, no. 5 (March 2005). 
 
________. Sold to Be Soldiers, the Recruitment and Use of Child Soldiers in Burma. New York, 
October 2007. 
 
________. Easy Prey: Child Soldiers in Liberia. New York: Human Rights Watch, September 
1994. 
 
Huyghebaert, Patricia. "Trip Report Liberia (May 16-26 2004): Former Child Soldiers and 
Transitional Safety-Net Allowances in Liberia." New York: UNICEF 
(Unpublished), 7 July 2004. 
 
International Crisis Group. Liberia: Unravelling. Freetown/Brussels: ICG, 2002. 
 
________. Liberia: Security Challenges. Freetown/Brussels: ICG, 2003. 
 
International Labour Office, and UNICEF. "Labour Market and Training Needs 
Assessment: Mapping of Reintegration Opportunities for Children Associated with 
Fighting Forces." Monrovia, Liberia, March 2005. 
 
International Monetary Fund. Liberia: Poverty Reduction Strategy - Progress Report. Washington, 
DC: International Monetary Fund, October 2010. 
 
IRIN. "West Africa Update #580." IRIN 26 October 1999. 
 
Jachnik, Clive. "Lessons from the UNMIL DDRR Programme ". New York: Unpublished 
- Confidential Memo, 04 February 2005. 
 
________. "Disarmament and Demobilisation Questionnaire." August 2005. 
 
Jeong, Ho-Won. Peacebuilding in Postconflict Societies : Strategy and Process Boulder: Lynne 
Rienner, 2005. 
 
Johnson-Sirleaf, Ellen. Inaugural Address, 16 January 2006. 
 
Keairns, Yvone E. The Voices of Girl Child Soldiers. New York, NY: Quaker United Nations 
Office, 2002. 
 
Keating, Thomas F., and W. Andy Knight, eds. Building Sustainable Peace. Edmonton: 
University of Alberta Press, 2004. 
   
  
- 268 - 
 
 
Kieh, George Klay, Jr. "Liberia: Legacies and Leaders " In From Promise to Practice edited by 
Chandra Lekha Sriram and Karin Wermester, 307-326. Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 
2003. 
 
Kingma, Kees. "Demobilisation of Combatants after Civil Wars in Africa and Their 
Reintegration into Civilian Life." Policy Sciences 30 (1997): 151-165. 
 
Knight, Andy. "Linking DDR and SSR in Post-Conflict Peacebuilding in Africa: An 
Overview." African Jorunal of Political Science and International relations 4, no. 1 (2009): 
29-54. 
 
Knight, Mark, and Alpaslan Özerdem. "Guns, Camps and Cash: Disarmament, 
Demobilisation and Reinsertion of Former Combatants in Transitions from War to 
Peace." Journal of Peace Research 41, no. 4 (2004): 499-516. 
 
Krause, Keith, and Oliver Jütersonke. "Peace, Security and Development in Post-Conflict 
Environments." Security Dialogue 36, no. 4 (2005): 447-62. 
 
Krause, Keith, and Michael Williams. "Broadening the Agenda of Security Studies: Politics 
and Methods." Mershon International Studies Review 40, no. 2 (October 1996): 229-254. 
 
Kuper, Jenny. International Law Concerning Child Civilians in Armed Conflict London: 
Clarendon, 1997. 
 
Lang, Anthony F. Just Intervention Carnegie Council on Ethics and International Affairs 
Series Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2003. 
 
Lipsky, John, "Liberia: Life after Debt", International Monetary Fund 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/2010/063010.htm (3 October 2010). 
 
Lloyd, Robert. "Rebuilding the Liberian State." Current History May (2006): 229 - 233. 
 
Lyons, Terrence. "Liberia's Path from Anarchy to Elections." Current History May (1998): 
229-233. 
 
Malone, David. "Introduction." In The UN Security Council: From the Cold War to the 21st 
Century, edited by David Malone, 1-15. Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2004. 
 
Marten, James, ed. Children and War. New York: New York University Press, 2002. 
 
Mats Berdal, and David M. Malone, eds. Greed and Grievance Boulder Lynne Rienner, 2000. 
 
Mazurana, Dyan, Susan McKay, Khristopher Carlson, and Janel Kasper. "Girls in Fighting 
Forces and Groups: Their Recruitment, Participation, Demobilisation, and 
Reintegration." Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology 8, no. 2 (2002): 97-123. 
 
McCallin, Margaret. The Prevention of under-Age Military Recruitment: A Review of Local and 
Community Based Concerns and Initiatives. London: International Save the Children 
Alliance, 2001. 
 
   
  
- 269 - 
 
McIntyre, Angela. "Rights, Root Causes and Recruitment: The Youth Factor in Africa's 
Armed Conflicts." African Security Review 12, no. 2 (2003). 
 
Mcintyre, Angela and Thokozan Thusi. "Children and Youth in Sierra Leone's 
Peacebuilding Process." African Security Review 12, no. 2 (2003). 
 
Meek, Sarah, and Mark Malan. Identifying Lesson from DDR Experiences in Africa. Pretoria: 
Institute for Security Studies, October 2004. 
 
Mgbeoji, Ikechi. Collective Insecurity: The Liberian Crisis, Unilateralism, and Global Order 
Vancover: UBC Press, 2003. 
 
Millard, Ananda. "Children in Armed Conflicts: Transcending Legal Responses." Security 
Dialogue 32, no. 2 (2001): 187-200. 
 
Moran, Mary H, and M Anne Pitcher. "The 'Basket Case' and the 'Poster Child': Explaining 
the End of Civil Conflicts in Liberia and Mozambique " Third World Quarterly 25, 
no. 3 (2004): 501-519. 
 
National Transitional Government of Liberia. Liberia Needs Assessment Sector Report on 
Demobilisation, Disarmament, Rehabilitation and Reintegration Monrovia: National 
Transitional Government of Liberia, 21 January 2004. 
 
NCDDRR. "DDRR Consolidated Report Phase 1, 2, & 3." Monrovia: NCDDRR, 16 
January 2005. 
 
Nichols, Ryan. "Disarming Liberia: Progress and Pitfalls." In Armed and Aimless: Armed 
Groups, Guns, and Human Security in the ECOWAS Region, edited by Nicolas Florquin 
and Eric G. Berman, 108-141. Geneva: Small Arms Survey, 2005. 
 
Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Peacebuilding- a Development Perspective. Oslo: 
Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, August 2004. 
 
O'Neill, William. "Liberia: An Avoidable Tragedy." Current History May (1993): 213-217. 
 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. Peacebuilding Overview. OECD, 
2005. 
 
________. OECD Development Assistance Committee Handbook on Security System Reform. Paris: 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2007. 
 
Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD). The Development 
Assistance Committee Guidelines- Helping Prevent Violent Conflict Paris: OECD, 2001. 
 
Organisation of African Unity. "African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child." 
OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/24.9/49. Addis Ababa: Organisation of African Unity, 
1990. 
 
Outram, Quentin. "'It's Terminal Either Way': An Analysis of Armed Conflict in Liberia, 
1989-1996." Review of African Economy, no. 73 (1997): 355-371. 
 
   
  
- 270 - 
 
Paes, Wolf-Christian. "The Challenges of Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration 
in Liberia." International Peacekeeping 12, no. 2 (2005). 
 
Paris, Roland. At War's End: Building Peace after Civil Conflict Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2004. 
 
Paul Collier, V.L. Elliot, Havard Hegre, Anke Hoeffler, Marta Reynal-Querol, and Nicholas 
Sambanis. Breaking the Conflict Trap Washington DC: The World Bank, 2003. 
 
Peters, Krijin. Re-Examining Voluntarism Monograph No. 100. Pretoria: Institute for 
Security Studies, 2004. 
 
Peters, Lilian. War Is No Child's Play: Child Soldiers from Battlefield to Playground. Geneva: 
Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), July 2005. 
 
Pham, John-Peter. Liberia: Portrait of a Failed State New York: Reed Press 2004. 
 
Prendergast, John, and Emily Plumb. "Building Local Capacity: From Implementation to 
Peacebuilding." In Ending Civil Wars: The Implementation of Peace Agreements, edited by 
Stephen John Stedman, Donald Rothchild and Elizabeth M. Cousens, 327-349. 
Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2002. 
 
Pugh, Michael The UN, Peace, and Force Cass Series on Peacekeeping London Frank Cass, 
1997. 
 
________, ed. Regeneration of War-Torn Societies New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000. 
 
Reno, W. "Anti-Corruption Efforts in Liberia: Are They Aimed at the Right Targets?" 
International Peacekeeping 15, no. 3 (2008): 387-404. 
 
Reno, William. "Reinvention of an African Patrimonial State: Charles Taylor's Liberia " 
Third World Quarterly 16, no. 1 (1995): 109-120. 
 
________. "The Business of War in Liberia." Current History  (1996): 211-215. 
 
________. Humanitarian Emergencies and Warlord Economies in Liberia and Sierra Leone. 
Helsinki: United Nations University & World Institute for Development 
Economics Research 1997. 
 
________. "The Organisation of Warlord Politics in Liberia." In Warlord Politics and African 
States, edited by William Reno, 79-111. Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1999. 
 
Richards, Paul. "Rebellion in Liberia and Sierra Leone." In Conflict in Africa, edited by 
Oliver Furley, 134-170. London: Tauris Academic Studies, 1995. 
 
________. Fighting for the Rain Forest War, Youth & Resources in Sierra Leone Oxford: 
James Currey, 1996. 
 
Save the Children. Children's Rights: Reality or Rhetoric The Crc: The First 10 Years London: 
Save the Children Fund, 1999. 
 
   
  
- 271 - 
 
________. Child Soldiers: Care & Protection of Children in Emergencies A Field Guide London: 
Save the Children Fund, 2001. 
 
Sawyer, Amos. The Emergence of Autocracy in Liberia : Tragedy and Challenge San Francisco ICS 
Press, 1992. 
 
________. Beyond Plunder Towards Democratic Governance in Liberia Boulder: Lynne 
Rienner, 2005. 
 
________. Social Capital, Survival Strategies, and Their Potential for Post-Conflict Governance in 
Liberia. United Nations University, 2005. 
 
Schwarz, Rolf. "Post-Conflict Peacebuilding: The Challenges of Security, Welfare and 
Representation." Security Dialogue 36, no. 4 (2005): 429-46. 
 
Seraydarian, Souren. "Letter to UNICEF Liberia Representative Angela Kearney." 
Monrovia: UNMIL, 2 April 2004. 
 
Sesay, Amadu. "Historical Background to the Liberian Crisis." In The Liberian Crisis and 
ECOMOG: A Bold Attempt at Regional Peacekeeping, edited by M. A. Vogt. Lagos: 
Gabumo Publishing Co., 1992. 
 
Singer, P.W. Children at War New York: Pantheon Books, 2005. 
 
Stohl, Rachel. "Under the Gun: Children and Small Arms." African Security Review 11, no. 3 
(2002). 
 
The Graduate Institute of International Studies. Small Arms Survey 2005 : Weapons at War 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005. 
 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Liberia, "Truth and Reconciliation Commission: 
Consolidated Final Report", Republic of Liberia https://www.trcofliberia.org/ (30 
July 2010). 
 
Tschirgi, Necla. Peacebuilding as the Link between Security and Development: Is the Window of 
Opportunity Closing? New York: International Peace Academy, December 2003. 
 
Twum-Danso, Afua. Africa's Young Soldiers: The Co-Option of Childhood Monograph 82. 
Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2003. 
 
Ukeje, Charles. "State Disintegration and Civil War in Liberia." In Civil War, Child Soldiers 
and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding in West Africa, edited by Amadu Sesay, 85-112. Ibadan, 
Nigeria: College Press & Publishers, 2003. 
 
Ullman, Richard. "Redefining Security." International Security 8, no. 1 (Summer, 1983): 129-
153. 
 
UNICEF. "Annual Report: Child Protection and Participation (2004-2009) ". Monrovia. 
 
________, "Children Affected by Armed Conflict" 
www.UNICEF.org/progressforchildren/2007n6/index_41851.htm (05 Jan 2008). 
 
   
  
- 272 - 
 
________. "Demobilisation and Reintegration Project Document." 
 
________. "Draft Communiqué on Concerns About the Liberian Disarmament, 
Demobilisation, Rehabilitation and Reintegration Programme." 
 
________, "Fact Sheet: Child Soldiers" 
http://www.unicef.org/emerg/files/childsoldiers.pdf (accessed 19 October 2010). 
 
________. "Reintegration Options for CAFF." Monrovia, Liberia. 
 
________. "A Table Showing the Unit Cost of Training a Demobilised Child in Skills 
Training." Monrovia: UNICEF. 
 
________. "UNICEF Support to Reintegration of Children Associated with Fighting 
Forces in Liberia: Summary Coverage." Monrovia: UNICEF. 
 
________. "News Note: Japan Provides $6.78 Million to Liberia's Children." Monrovia, 1 
March 2006. 
 
________. "Guidelines and Protocols for Interim Care Centres in Liberia." Monrovia, 
Liberia, 3 December 2003. 
 
________. The DD Wrap up Session: Meeting Notes. Monrovia, Liberia, 8 December 2004. 
 
________. "TSA Payment for Children: Discussion Paper." Monrovia: UNICEF, 16 
February 2004. 
 
________. "Press Release: Reintegrating Children Associated with Fighting Forces in 
Liberia A "Success"." Monrovia, 26 August 2004. 
 
________. State of the World's Children 1996 New York: Oxford University Press, 1996. 
 
________. "Cape Town Principles and Best Practices." Cape Town, South Africa, 1997. 
 
________. "Operational Guidelines for Assisting Children Associated with Fighting Forces 
in the DDRR Programme." Liberia: UNICEF, 2003. 
 
________, "Former Child Soldiers Being Re-Recruited in Liberia" 
http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/liberia_25857.html (27 July 2007). 
 
________. "Press Release: Reintegrating Children Associated with Fighting Forces in 
Liberia A "Success"." Monrovia, August 2004. 
 
________. "Progress for Children- a World Fit for Children Statistical Review." Number 6. 
New York, December 2007. 
 
________. Code of Conduct for Staff of Child Protection Agencies. Monrovia: UNICEF, July 2004. 
 
United Nations, "Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for 
Children and Armed Conflict" 
http://www.un.org/children/conflict/english/securitycouncilwg.html (14 
February 2010). 
   
  
- 273 - 
 
 
________. "Resolution 1497." S/Res/1497 (2003). New York: United Nations, 1 August 
2003. 
 
________. "Protection of Children Affected by Armed Conflict." A/54/430. New York: 
United Nations, 1 October 1999. 
 
________. "Report of the Secretary-General on Disarmament, Demobilisation and 
Reintegration." A/60/705. New York, 2 March 2006. 
 
________. "Performance Report on the Budget of the United Nations Mission in Liberia 
for Period from 1 July 2007 to 30 June 2008." A/63/588. New York: United 
Nations, 4 December 2008. 
 
________. "Resolution 1478." S/Res/1478 (2003). New York United Nations: United 
Nations, 6 May 2003. 
 
________. "Resolution 1343." S/Res/1343 (2001). New York, 7 March 2001. 
 
________. "Nineteenth Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations 
Mission in Liberia." S/2009/411, 10 August 2009. 
 
________. "Resolution 1314 ", S/RES/1314. New York: United Nations, 11 August 2000. 
 
________. "Twenty-First Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations 
Mission in Liberia." S/2010/429, 11 August 2010. 
 
________. "The Role of UN Peacekeeping in Disarmament, Demobilisation and 
Reintegration ", S/2000/101. New York: United Nations, 11 February 2000. 
 
________. "Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council on Liberia." 
S/2003/875. New York: United Nations, 11 September 2003. 
 
________. "Statement by the President of the Security Council." S/PRST/2008/6. New 
York: United Nations, 12 February 2008. 
 
________. "Protection of Children Affected by Armed Conflict ", A/53/482. New York: 
United Nations, 12 October 1998. 
 
________. "First Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission 
in Liberia." S/2003/1175, 15 December 2003. 
 
________. "Resolution 1509 (2003)." S/Res/1509 (2003), 15 September 2003. 
 
________. "Statement by the President of the Security Council." S/PRST/2010/10. New 
York: United Nations, 16 June 2010. 
 
________. "Fifth Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission 
in Liberia." S/2004/972, 17 December 2004. 
 
   
  
- 274 - 
 
________. "Performance Report on the Budget of the United Nations Mission in Liberia 
for Period from 1 July 2006 to 30 June 2007." A/62/648. New York: United 
Nations, 17 January 2008. 
 
________. "Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court." A/CONF.183/9, 17 July 
1998. 
 
________. "Statement by the President of the Security Council." S/PRST/2008/28. New 
York: United Nations, 17 July 2008. 
 
________. "Sixth Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission 
in Liberia." S/2005/177, 17 March 2005. 
 
________. "Budget for the United Nations Mission in Liberia for Period from 1 July 2006 
to 30 June 2007." A/60/653. New York: United Nations, 19 January 2006. 
 
________. "Resolution 788." S/Res/788. New York: United Nations, 19 November 1992. 
 
________. "Budget for the United Nations Mission in Liberia for the Period from 1 July 
2005 to 30 June 2006." A/59/630. New York: United Nations, 20 December 2004. 
 
________. "Resolution 1645 (2005)." S/RES/1645. New York: United Nations, 20 
December 2005. 
 
________. "Statement by the President of the Security Council." S/PRST/2001/5. New 
York: United Nations, 20 February 2001. 
 
________. "Convention on the Rights of the Child ", GA 44/25. New York: United 
Nations, 20 November 1989. 
 
________. "Resolution 1379 (2001) ", S/RES/1379. New York: United Nations, 20 
November 2001. 
 
________. "Resolution 1539 (2004)." S/Res/1539 (2004). New York, 22 April 2004. 
 
________. "Resolution 1521 (2003)." S/Res/1521 (2003), 22 December 2003. 
 
________. "Second Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations 
Mission in Liberia." S/2004/229, 22 March 2004. 
 
________. "United Nations Security Council Report of the Panel of Experts Concerning 
Liberia Sanctions ", S/2003/498. New York: United Nations, 23 April 2003. 
 
________. "Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Children: Impact of Armed 
Conflict on Children ", A/51/306. New York: United Nations, 26 August 1996. 
 
________. "Performance Report on the Budget of the United Nations Mission in Liberia 
for Period from 1 July 2005 to 30 June 2006." A/61/715. New York: United 
Nations, 26 January 2007. 
 
________. "Resolution 1612." S/Res/1612 (2005). New York, 26 July 2005. 
 
   
  
- 275 - 
 
________. "Statement by the President of the Security Council." S/PRST/2006/48. New 
York: United Nations, 28 November 2006. 
 
________. "Statement by the President of the Security Council." S/PRST/2009/9. New 
York: United Nations, 29 April 2009. 
 
________. "Resolution 1261 (1999)." SC Resolution S/RES/1261. New York: United 
Nations, 30 August 1999. 
 
________. "Resolution 1460." S/Res/1460 (2003). New York, 30 January 2003. 
 
________. "Note by the President of the Security Council: Broadening Security ", 
S/23500. New York: United Nations, 31 January 1992. 
 
________. "Optional Protocols to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the 
Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict and on the Sale of Children, Child 
Prostitution and Child Pornography." A/Res/54/263. New York: United Nations, 
2000. 
 
________. "Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations." A/55/305, 
S/2000/809, August 2000. 
 
________. "Integrated Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Standards." New 
York: United Nations, December 2006. 
 
United Nations, and World Bank. Liberia: Joint Needs Assessment Sector Working Paper - 
Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (Draft). Monrovia: United Nations & 
World Bank, February 2004. 
 
United Nations Development Programme. "Reintegration Briefs: No 3 Reintegration 
Strategies - an Overview of the Implications of Non-Targeted Assistance for 
Demobilised Ex-Combatants." Monrovia: UNDP, 1 March 2005. 
 
________. "Status of Reintegration Activities for Ex-Combatants." In Briefing Note No9. 
Monrovia: UNDP, 8 June 2007. 
 
________. "Reintegration Briefs: No 2 Formal Education Support." Monrovia: UNDP, 25 
February 2005. 
 
________. "Reintegration Briefs: Justification for Providing Reintegration Subsistence 
Allowance for Ex-Combatants." Monrovia: UNDP, 26 January 2005. 
 
________. "Liberia Disarmament, Demobilisation, Reintegration and Rehabilitation 
Programme Trust Fund Activity Report: Volume I." Monrovia: UNDP, 2004. 
 
________. "Strategic and Operational Framework of Reintegration Support for Ex-
Combatants." Monrovia: UNDP, 2004. 
 
________. "Liberia Disarmament, Demobilisation, Reintegration and Rehabilitation 
Programme Trust Fund Activity Report: Volume III ". Monrovia: UNDP, 2005. 
 
   
  
- 276 - 
 
________. "Securing Development: UNDP's Support for Addressing Small Arms Issues." 
New York: UNDP, 2005. 
 
________. "Reintegration Assistance to Liberia DDRR Programme Residual Caseload." 
Monrovia: UNDP, April 2009. 
 
________. "Liberia Disarmament, Demobilisation, Reintegration and Rehabilitation 
Programme Trust Fund Activity Report: Volume II ". Monrovia: UNDP, March 
2005. 
 
________. "Bringing RR to the People." Monrovia: UNDP, November 2005. 
 
United Nations Peacekeeping Best Practices Unit. "Lessons Learned Study on the Start-up 
Phase of the United Nations Mission in Liberia." New York: United Nations, April 
2004. 
 
United Nations Security Council. "Resolution 1882." S/Res1882. New York: United 
Nations, 4 August 2009. 
 
UNMIL,  http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/unmil/index.html (15 November 
2005). 
 
USAID. The Liberia Community Infrastructure Programme (LCIP). 10 September 2008. 
 
Utas, Mats. "Sweet Battlefields: Youth and the Liberian Civil War." PhD, Uppsala 
University, 2003. 
 
Verhey, Beth. Child Soldiers: Preventing, Demobilizing and Reintegrating. World Bank, 2001. 
 
Watchlist on Children and Armed Conflict. Nothing Left to Lose: The Legacy of Armed Conflict 
and Liberia's Children. June 2004. 
 
Wessells, Michael. "Children, Armed Conflict, and Peace." Journal of Peace Research 35, no. 5 
(1998): 635-646. 
 
________. Child Soldiers- from Violence to Protection Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard 
University Press, 2006. 
 
Wessells, Mike. "Child Soldier." The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists  (1997). 
 
Wikipedia, "Small Arms and Light Weapons" http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SALW 
(Accessed on 04 Jan 2008). 
 
Wille, Christina. "Children Associated with Fighting Forces and Small Arms in the Mano 
River Union." In Armed and Aimless: Armed Groups, Guns, and Human Security in the 
ECOWAS Region, edited by Nicolas Florquin and Eric G. Berman, 181-218. 
Geneva: Small Arms Survey, 2005. 
 
Wippman, David. "Enforcing the Peace: ECOWAS and the Liberian Civil War." In 
Enforcing Restraint- Collective Intervention in Internal Conflicts, edited by Lori Fisler 
Damrosch, 156-203. New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1993. 
 
   
  
- 277 - 
 
World Bank, "Open Data" http://data.worldbank.org/ (22 December 2010). 
 
 
 
